A view of the U.S. nuclear dilemma from abroad

Carl Ungerer published an piece in the Canberra Times discussing the inherent dilemma Obama faces between trying to resuscitate global arms control and nonproliferation while ensuring an effective deterrent.  Ungerer argues:

Obama is likely to move quickly on strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, implementing a global ban on the production on new nuclear materials, stopping the development of new nuclear weapons, seeking dramatic reductions in stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material, and making the US-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles a global agreement . . . In direct contrast to Obama's stated policy goals, Gates has argued for America to develop a new reliable replacement warhead and the possible return of nuclear weapons testing in order to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear deterrent.  In the absence of a program of force modernisation, Gates argues that the provision of extended nuclear deterrence to allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia can't be guaranteed.

Creatively maneuvering this dilemma will be a concern of primary importance for the administration's upcoming nuclear agenda, in particular the arms control side of the agenda.  If "modernization" (perhaps a problematic word) efforts are not pursued in a politically and diplomatically savvy manner, they could largely undercut leadership gains made elsewhere on the host of agreements Obama seeks to get through.  For example, in this article Ungerer explains Gates' agenda, "a return to nuclear weapons development and testing by the US" that would quickly cause Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to start testing again.  Precise legal and technical work needs to be done to effectively define what sort of "modernization" efforts, if any, the administration will pursue so that allies can be convinced they don't need their own weapons and the world can be convinced that "Mr. Multilateral" does care about arms control.