Washington, London, and Kabul Disagree on Issue of Taliban Reconciliation

by Nida Jafrani

In March 2009, President Obama brought to the table the idea of negotiating with “moderate elements” of the Taliban, pointing to the successful example of Sunni militias fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq. More recently, reconciliation was a key issue at the January 28th London Conference, where donors and President Karzai presented differing views about engaging the Taliban. A consensus between Washington, London, and Kabul about the details of negotiations has yet to be reached.  

The contentious question of reconciliation has been a source of intense debate amongst experts and donors alike (see Katherine Hubbard’s post “Experts Discuss the Possibility of Reconciliation in Afghanistan”). While experts contend that money is a primary motivating factor for Taliban foot-soldiers, the upper echelons are ideologically motivated and opposed to foreign forces on their soil (for more, see Mehlaqa Samdani’s post “Rewarding Reintegration--Reaching out to the Taliban”).

At the London Conference, the U.S. position favored negotiation in the abstract: "The starting premise is you don't make peace with your friends. You have to be able to engage with your enemies," said U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

On March 3rd the Washington Post claimed that there is tension between Washington and London about the timing of reconciliation talks. The Obama administration wants to wait until it has the military upper hand while London’s Foreign Office is divided, with some supporting quicker engagement. There is also friction between Washington and President Karzai.  While Washington may be open to negotiations with foot-soldiers and some mid-level commanders, Karzai has been pushing for talks with all levels of leadership, including Mullah Omar. In a Fox News interview on March 3rd, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton speculated that President Karzai is stepping up negotiation efforts because “if he waited a year until it was March of next year, three, four months before the American troops began to draw back down, he would be in a much weakened bargain position.”

U.S. special representative Richard Holbrooke said on February 17 that the U.S. will not participate in talks unless the Taliban renounce al-Qaeda: “we are watching this. We are talking to people…The United States is not in direct contact with Taliban leadership. Why not? Because they aren't renouncing al Qaeda. We're not going to talk to people who are affiliated with al Qaeda."

The U.S. has denied a role in secret exploratory meetings with the Taliban leadership in Dubai and the Maldives (view this post about Saudi Arabia and Pakistan's role in the talks).

Along with the differing views about when and who to talk to, the logistics of reintegration are undetermined. Dawn News columnist Huma Yusuf notes the challenge of successfully reintegrating the commanders who are “eager for a negotiated end to the fighting:

“Until Karzai can promise security, talks could simply lead to more violence in the form of militant infighting. And if the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is required to help ensure security for reintegrated militants, the idea of talks may be stillborn since the Taliban have made it clear that their primary demand is the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan soil.”

While there has been some consensus to reconcile with foot-soldiers and low-level commanders, Washington, London, and Afghanistan have yet to agree on all aspects of negotiation conditions. Additionally, the logistics of providing security and alternative sources of income to would-be defectors is challenging given the presence of Taliban spies in the Afghan military and the troubled Afghan economy, among other factors.

  Flickr photo by isafmedia used under a Creative Commons license