Washington Post Op-Ed: 5 Myths About Abolition

In Sunday’s Washington Post, Barry Blechman and Alex Bollfrass from the Stimson Center wrote an op-ed examining what they call the “five myths about getting rid of the bomb.” The pair attempts to debunk five of the most common objections raised when discussing the viability of nuclear disarmament: that elimination is impossible because countries could cheat, that nuclear weapons are a guarantee of security, that as long as there is nuclear energy, there will be nuclear weapons, that in a world without nuclear weapons, a single cheater could rule, and that nuclear weapons are the only way to become a global power.   While a 1500 word editorial is certainly not going to settle the various arguments Blechman and Bollfrass nevertheless do a commendable job illustrating the complexity of the issues and viability of nuclear disarmament. What’s more, the two point out the need for disarmament discussions to take place rationally without unrealistic fear mongering.

 

Blechman and Bollfrass’ first point concerns whether states can be aware of other states’ secret nuclear programs. The two claim that

 

 

While the intelligence community has certainly been surprised by other countries’ clandestine programs, they are correct in asserting that observation of the entire nuclear cycle from uranium mining through weapons testing makes it impossible for countries to completely hide their activities. What’s more, the two point out that technological developments and international efforts are only making it easier to detect cheaters. That being said, the two don’t examine how countries can ascertain whether a country’s intensions are peaceful or not (the current difficulty in understanding Iran’s nuclear program comes to mind), or how the international community would respond to a country whose nuclear intentions were not peaceful. That’s not to say that such a determination is impossible; The Additional Protocols, for example, would certainly strengthen the international community’s ability to detect cheaters, but the resistance to those measures would certainly be a hurdle the world would need to overcome.

 

Second, Blechman and Bollfrass take issue with the idea that nuclear weapons are a guarantee of security. They argue

 

 

Drawing on the Yom Kippur War and the defeats of the nuclear-armed United States and Soviet Union in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively, the pair point out that nuclear weapons have only limited value in warfare. What’s more, they point to Ward Wilson’s 2007 article that challenged the foundation of the nuclear security argument – that the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced Japan to surrender.  

 

Here, Blechman and Bollfrass are right to point out the limits of nuclear weapons (especially in the type of conflicts the United States finds itself involved in now), but they ignore some of the cases where nuclear weapons played an important role in a state’s security concerns (the contemporary case of North Korea, for example), and they also avoid discussions of where nuclear weapons have may have had a role in preventing conflict from breaking out. That’s not to say that Blechman and Bollfrass are entirely wrong, but rather to point out that all states must accept that nuclear weapons have limited value for their security for nuclear weapons themselves to lose importance (when states somehow reach the point where they decide that the costs of nuclear weapons are greater than any realized benefits).

 

Third, Blechman and Bollfrass question whether the proliferation of nuclear energy will necessary allow weapons proliferation. The two acknowledge that while

 

 

The authors are correct in asserting that controlling the fuel would severely inhibit countries’ abilities to divert civilian nuclear programs for military purposes, but the added caveat “provided individual states stop producing their own reactor fuels” is quite a large one. Not only is that right enshrined in the NPT, but many states, especially those most at risk for cheating, are loathe to give it up. That’s not to say that such multinational fuel banks are a pipe dream, but only to emphasize that gaining international support for such banks would be difficult.

 

Fourth, the authors take on the claim that in a world without nuclear weapons, a cheater with just a few bombs could dominate. Here, the authors do a good job debunking this unrealistic bogeyman. They rightly point out that not only would a small arsenal be ineffective, but also that

 

 

Furthermore, Blechman and Bollfrass note that the threat today comes primarily from terrorists armed with nuclear weapons, who in turn cannot be deterred with nuclear weapons. As such, they point out that

 

 

Finally, the two attempt to debunk the idea that nuclear weapons are inherently related to a country’s status as a global power. They contrast the case of nuclear-armed North Korea, unable to feed its own populace to the cases of the unarmed Germany, the economic engine of Europe or the rising, yet unarmed, powers of Brazil and South Africa. They add that China and India are emerging on the world stage not because of their respective nuclear arsenals (which remain small), but because of their

 

 

Now nuclear weapons could play some role in a country’s status as a great power, but the root argument that there are many more elements to national power and prestige than nuclear weapons makes sense. In addition, the idea of nuclear weapons as an element of great power status could instead be representative of a country’s security concerns. A great power is one that is assured of its security, through some combination of its own strength and security guarantees. Thus a country’s quest for nuclear weapons in pursuit of national greatness would actually be a country’s attempt to guarantee its own security. Such an understanding does not discount the possibility of nuclear abolition, but rather suggests that the international community must find a way to assure state security if they are to remove one of the drivers of nuclear proliferation. 

 

While it is certainly possible to take issue with some of Blechman and Bollfrass’ points, their underlying argument is sound. The role of nuclear weapons is diminishing, yet the risks remain astronomically high. While it would take huge changes in international politics and strategic thinking for a world without nuclear weapons to become reality, the risks of nuclear weapons make steps in that direction more important than ever.  Having a rational argument about the costs and benefits, rather than warning of a rogue and now invincible nuclear bogeyman who secretly developed his arsenal from his civilian program is a step in the right direction.