What the COIN Manual Says About Religion

We've been looking at how the U.S. government engages with religion for a while now (see the report Mixed Blessings for the result of the first 18 months of study). PCR's Hamid Arsalan took a look at what mention the Army's counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24) makes of religion. It's often treated as one component of a broader identity, as well as a recruitment tool. More excerpts after the jump, but you can check out the full manual here (beware - 13+MB download). 1-17. Before World War I, insurgencies were mostly conservative; insurgents were usually concerned with defending hearth, home, monarchies, and traditional religion. Governments were seldom able to completely defeat these insurgencies; violence would recur when conditions favored a rebellion. For example, the history of the British Isles includes many recurring insurgencies by subjugated peoples based on ethnic identities. Another example of a conservative insurgency is the early 19th century Spanish uprising against Napoleon that sapped French strength and contributed significantly to Napoleon’s defeat. Identity-Focused 1-38. The identity-focused approach mobilizes support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. Some movements may be based on an appeal to a religious identity, either separately from or as part of other identities. This approach is common among contemporary insurgencies and is sometimes combined with the military-focused approach. The insurgent organization may not have the dual military/political hierarchy evident in a protracted popular war approach. Rather, communities often join the insurgent movement as a whole, bringing with them their existing social/military hierarchy. Additionally, insurgent leaders often try to mobilize the leadership of other clans and tribes to increase the movement’s strength. Ideology and Narrative 1-75. Ideas are a motivating factor in insurgent activities. Insurgencies can gather recruits and amass popular support through ideological appeal (including religious or other cultural identifiers). Promising potential recruits often include individuals receptive to the message that the West is dominating their region through puppet governments and local surrogates. The insurgent group channels anti-Western anger and provides members with identity, purpose, and community, in addition to physical, economic, and psychological security. The movement’s ideology explains its followers’ difficulties and provides a means to remedy those ills. The most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional concerns of the populace. Examples of these concerns include religiously based objectives, a desire for justice, ethnic aspirations, and a goal of liberation from foreign occupation. Ideology provides a prism, including a vocabulary and analytical categories, through which followers perceive their situation. 1-76. The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in story form. Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions. Insurgent organizations like Al Qaeda use narratives very effectively in developing legitimating ideologies. In the Al Qaeda narrative, for example, Osama bin Laden depicts himself as a man purified in the mountains of Afghanistan who is gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. In the collective imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, they are agents of Islamic history who will reverse the decline of the umma [Muslim community] and bring about its inevitable triumph over Western imperialism. For them, Islam can be renewed both politically and theologically only through jihad [holy war] as they define it. 1-77. Though most insurgencies have been limited to nation-states, there have been numerous transnational insurgencies. Likewise, external powers have tried to tap into or create general upheaval by coordinating national insurgencies to give them a transnational character. Al Qaeda’s ongoing activities also attempt to leverage religious identity to create and support a transnational array of insurgencies. Operational-level commanders address elements of the transnational movement within their joint operations areas. Other government agencies and higher level officials deal with the national-strategic response to such threats. 1-78. As noted earlier, insurgent groups often employ religious concepts to portray their movement favorably and mobilize followers in pursuit of their political goals. For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army frequently used Roman Catholic iconography in its publications and proclamations, although many of its members were not devout Catholics. In other cases, a religious ideology may be the source of an insurgent group’s political goals. This is the case in Al Qaeda’s apparent quest to “reestablish the Caliphate.” For many Moslems, the Caliphate produces a positive image of the golden age of Islamic civilization. This image mobilizes support for Al Qaeda among some of the most traditional Muslims while concealing the details of the movement’s goal. In fact, Al Qaeda’s leaders envision the “restored Caliphate” as a totalitarian state similar to the pre-2002 Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 1-79. Religious extremist insurgents, like many secular radicals and some Marxists, frequently hold an all-encompassing worldview; they are ideologically rigid and uncompromising, seeking to control their members’ private thought, expression, and behavior. Seeking power and believing themselves to be ideologically pure, violent religious extremists often brand those they consider insufficiently orthodox as enemies. For example, extreme, violent groups like Al Qaeda routinely attack Islamic sects that profess beliefs inconsistent with their religious dogma. Belief in an extremist ideology fortifies the will of believers. It confirms the idea, common among hard-core transnational terrorists, that using unlimited means is appropriate to achieve their often unlimited goals. Some ideologies, such as the one underlying the culture of martyrdom, maintain that using such means will be rewarded. 1-80. Cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency. American ideas of what is “normal” or “rational” are not universal. To the contrary, members of other societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior, level of religious devotion, and norms concerning gender. Thus, what may appear abnormal or strange to an external observer may appear as self-evidently normal to a group member. For this reason, counterinsurgents—especially commanders, planners, and small-unit leaders—should strive to avoid imposing their ideals of normalcy on a foreign cultural problem. 1-81. Many religious extremists believe that the conversion, subjugation, or destruction of their ideological opponents is inevitable. Violent extremists and terrorists are often willing to use whatever means necessary, even violence against their own followers, to meet their political goals. Nevertheless, they often pursue their ends in highly pragmatic ways based on realistic assumptions. Not all Islamic insurgents or terrorists are fighting for a global revolution. Some are pursing regional goals, such as a establishing a Sunni Arab-dominated Iraq or replacing Israel with an Arab Palestinian state. And militant groups with nationalist as well as religious agendas seek cease fires and participate in elections when such actions support their interests. 1-82. In that light, commanders must consider the presence of religious extremism in the insurgents’ ideology when evaluating possible friendly and enemy courses of action. Enemy courses of action that may appear immoral or irrational to Westerners may be acceptable to extremists. Moreover, violent extremists resist changing their worldview; for them, coexistence or compromise is often unacceptable, especially when the movement is purist (like Al Qaeda), in an early stage, or small. However, some extremists are willing to overlook their worldview to achieve short-term goals. Terrorist groups, regardless of their ideology, have cooperated with seemingly incompatible groups. For example, the Palestinian group Black September used German terrorists to perform reconnaissance of the Olympic Village before its 1972 attack on Israeli athletes. Currently, the Taliban is engaged in the drug trade in South Asia. Al Qaeda cooperates with a variety of diverse groups to improve its global access as well. 1-83. The rigid worldview of such extremist groups means that friendly actions intended to create good will among the populace are unlikely to affect them. Similarly, if a group’s ideology is so strong that it dominates all other issues, dialog and negotiation will probably prove unproductive. The challenge for counterinsurgents in such cases is to identify the various insurgent groups and determine their motivations. Commanders can then determine the best course of action for each group. This includes identifying the groups with goals flexible enough to allow productive negotiations and determining how to eliminate the extremists without alienating the populace. Religious extremist insurgents, like many secular radicals and some Marxists, frequently hold an all-encompassing worldview; they are ideologically rigid and uncompromising, seeking to control their members’ private thought, expression, and behavior. Seeking power and believing themselves to be ideologically pure, violent religious extremists often brand those they consider insufficiently orthodox as enemies. For example, extreme, violent groups like Al Qaeda routinely attack Islamic sects that profess beliefs inconsistent with their religious dogma. Belief in an extremist ideology fortifies the will of believers. It confirms the idea, common among hard-core transnational terrorists, that using unlimited means is appropriate to achieve their often unlimited goals. Some ideologies, such as the one underlying the culture of martyrdom, maintain that using such means will be rewarded. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support 1-128. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially when an insurgency is based in religious or ideological extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge. Religion, Race, and Ethnicity Overlay B-21. Religion, race, and ethnicity issues often contribute to conflicts. Religious, race, and ethnicity overlays depict the current ethnic and religious make-up of an AO. These overlays can also display any specific religious-, racial-, or ethnicity-specific areas and any zones of separation agreed upon by peace accords. These three overlays may be separate or combined.