What Does the Leaked Draft of the QDR Reveal About the NPR?

By John K. Warden

Although the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will not be officially released until Monday, February 1, Inside Defense got their hands on a leaked draft that’s dated 3 December 2009.  Like the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the QDR is a legislatively-mandated review carried out by the Department of Defense (DoD).  The QDR aims to indentify long-term threats and outline how the DoD will adjust forces to react.

While this is just a draft, its contents likely provide a pretty good idea of what will be in the QDR, and may also provide some useful hints about what will be in the NPR, now scheduled to be released in March.  Spencer Ackerman already noted that the draft includes an explicit referent to Obama’s yet to be released National Security Strategy.

While the document does not include an explicit reference to the contents of the NPR, it does establish the connection between the documents:

The QDR was conducted in tandem with a number of other reviews relating to U. S. national security ends, ways, and means. The Nuclear Policy Review, Space Policy Review, and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, all led by DoD, were conducted in parallel with the QDR. Each effort informed and was informed by the others as they went forward.

Nuclear policy is also discussed at various points in the document.  First, the draft identifies the potential spread of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist organization as a “key geopolitical trend”:

Of grave concern, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) undermines global security, further complicating efforts to sustain peace and prevent harmful arms races. Even as the United States and Russia make progress in reducing the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, states such as Iran and North Korea continue to pursue nuclear weapons programs.1 Moreover, Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks have a demonstrated interest with the employment of WMD, including chemical weapons and biological agents. Perhaps most serious, the instability or collapse of a WMD-armed state, leading to the potential for rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons, and technology, would quickly become a global crisis that could pose a direct physical threat to the United States.

It’s not surprising that nuclear terrorism and proliferation are a priority, and stopping nuclear terrorism will likely be a priority in the NPR.

Second, the draft highlights the importance of deterrence and identifies ways the United States is and should continue to strengthen deterrence:

The United States is postured to deter a wide range of attacks or coercion against the United States and its allies with capabilities across domains. Deterrence is predicated largely on land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in anti-access environments, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups. These forces are enhanced by emerging U.S. capabilities to deny adversary objectives through ballistic missile defense, early warning and intelligence collection, resilient infrastructure, including command and control systems, and global basing and posture. Until such time as the President's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities to respond will be maintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense, with a safe, reliable, and effective stockpile and forces sufficient to defend the United States, U.S. interests and forces abroad, and to continue to meet extended deterrence commitments to allies.
The United States is strengthening its approach to deterrence in multiple ways.
• The Department of Defense continues to improve its ability to attribute WMD, space and cyberspace attacks so that it can continue to hold aggressors responsible and deny them the obfuscation of new domains or the use of proxies.
• The United States will not and does not distinguish between those who employ weapons of mass destruction and those who may transfer those weapons or enabling materials for use. Any regime considering the transfer of such materials should have no doubt that it will be held responsible for the consequences.
• To reinforce U.S. commitments to extended deterrence, we will consult closely with allies and partners to build our capabilities to work together in the context of new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that take advantage of our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued commitment to extending our nuclear deterrent to allies.
• The United States has and continues to strengthen its resiliency: the ability to recover quickly from attacks in any domain and to fight through catastrophic events and effectively recover. The U.S. Government is also expanding its capabilities to assist allies in responding to such events.
• The United States will work with like-minded nations to foster regimes and norms regarding behavior in the global commons—especially space and cyberspace. These are shared resources in which an attack on one nation has consequences for all.

The draft reiterates Obama’s previous commitment that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain an effective deterrent and extended deterrent.  More specifically, it calls for the United States to maintain nuclear role in extended deterrence, while increasing close consultation with allies and utilizing missile defense.  These are likely to be themes in the NPR as well.

The bullet about transferring materials is interesting.  While making clear that the United States will respond to those who use WMDs and those who transfer WMDs, the bullet does not include retaliation against those that neglect their responsibilities in guarding nuclear or other materials.  If this exclusion is intentional, it could signal a reversal of the so-called “negligence doctrine” (for more on negligence see Marko Beljac or Philipp Bleek).

Third, the draft identifies the need to prepare for the possibility that a country such as North Korea acquires nuclear weapons by consulting with allies and enhancing capabilities to prevent these weapons from being used:

Because of their extreme lethality and long-term effects, nuclear weapons are a source of special concern, both for the United States and for its allies and partners in regions where adversary states possess or seek such weapons. If regional adversaries such as North Korea succeed in fielding even small arsenals of deliverable fission weapons, the security dynamics of key regions could be severely complicated. Even as we strive to prevent proliferation, we must take steps to hedge against its possibility. The United States, its allies, and its partners will undertake consultations on policies and postures that can credibly deter aggression under new circumstances. We will also enhance our capabilities for preventing the use of nuclear weapons and their delivery means, recognizing that a regime in the crucible of a crisis or conflict with a far more powerful opponent might feel driven to cross the nuclear threshold in an attempt to break the coalition arrayed against it or deter decisive military operations.

It would be encouraging if similar language is included in the NPR.  While the United States hopes to prevent countries like Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear arsenals, consulting allies to prepare them for the possibility is important.  If the United States can convince allies that it can still defend them in such a world, allies might not overreact.  Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats argue that this type of consultation is important for U.S. assurance of Israel:

With respect to Israel, U.S. statements and actions that strengthen Israel’s confidence in U.S. assurances…coping with a nuclear Iran, will make it less likely that Israel will feel compelled to preemptively attack Iran’s nuclear facilities or to make an overt declaration of its nuclear capability (which many believe could result in additional regional proliferation). Such statements should, however, not convey that the United States believes that a nuclear-armed Iran is either inevitable or acceptable.

Fourth, the draft might foreshadow a change in plans for conventional prompt global strike.  The draft includes a recommendation to invest in new conventional long-range strike capabilities including "conventional prompt global strike prototypes":

Expand future long-range strike capabilities. In order to increase the long-range striking power of future U.S. forces, the Navy is investigating options for expanding the cruise missile capacity of future Virginia-class attack submarines. It is also slated to conduct field experiments with prototype versions of a naval unmanned combat aerial system (N-UCAS) no later than FY 15. The N-UCAS offers the potential to greatly increase the range of strike aircraft operating from the Navy's carrier fleet. The Air Force is reviewing options for fielding a penetrating, persistent surveillance and strike aircraft as part of a comprehensive, phased plan to modernize the bomber force. The Navy and the Air Force are cooperatively assessing alternatives for a new joint stand-off attack cruise missile, as well as advanced electronic warfare systems. The Department also plans to experiment with conventional prompt global strike prototypes. Building upon insights developed during the QDR, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a follow-on study to determine what combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, will be best suited to supporting U.S. power projection operations over the next two to three decades. Findings from that study will inform decisions that shape the FY 2012-17defense program.

However, while the draft says the DoD will explore “conventional prompt global strike prototypes” it makes no reference to specific capabilities.  This signals a change in policy; the 2006 QDR called for conversion of Trident submarine-launch ballistic missiles for use in conventional prompt global strike:

To help shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, strengthen deterrence, and hedge against future strategic uncertainty, the Department will develop a wider range of conventional and non-kinetic deterrent options while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. It will convert a small number of Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles for use in conventional prompt global strike. The Department will also increase procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles to increase persistent surveillance, nearly doubling today’s capacity. It also will begin development of the next generation long-range strike systems, accelerating projected initial operational capability by almost two decades.

While the language in the draft by no means rules out Conventional Trident Modification, it’s not surprising that the DoD would shift away from that specific capability after Congress refused to fund the program.  It will be interesting to see if the final draft of the QDR and forthcoming NPR include more specific recommendations for prompt global strike.