What Would Brazil Do?

Sitting in room with forty track 2-level officials from the U.S., UK and France debating how to develop a coherent and unified approach to next year's NPT Review Conference, one can’t help but think about how to deal with a certain country that’s near the center of it all: the one that is aspiring to regional leadership and global recognition as a major power; that is situated in a region where political stability is delicate and the ability of state governments to control matters within their territory is questionable; that has a longstanding rivalry with one of its neighbors; that has large amounts of natural resources, including oil, which it feels compelled to protect; that has a history of nuclear weapons pursuits spanning several decades; that has not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol; that asserts its need to develop enrichment capacity and expand nuclear power production to meet energy demands; and that has political leaders accustomed to equivocating on the limits of their country’s right to nuclear technology. The muse for such daydreams is, of course, Brazil.

The similarities between Brazil and Iran are fairly obvious, as are the many differences, and it has been recognized for quite some time that Brazil could play an important role in persuading Iran to keep its nuclear program peaceful; Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has stated that Brazil "could do more than other countries" in this effort. There’s no-doubt that Iran could use a friend given that it is in some seriously hot water with the recent controversy over the ‘too little, too late’ declaration of its enrichment facility at Qom. (Compliments to James Acton at Carnegie for his speedy work back in September to expose Iran’s ruse about being compliant and raise some serious questions about the purpose of the Qom facility). And thus far Brazil has played the part, with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva comming to his Ahmadinejad's defense in imploring the U.S. and Europeans to "stop punishing him."

Lula does have cordial relations – alarmingly cordial to some – with his Iranian counterpart, and it is on those grounds that Avigdor basis his argument that Brazil could be critical to convincing Ahmadinejad to be more cooperative with the IAEA and ultimately embrace a framework through which the peaceful intent of Iran’s nuclear program could be reliability verified. It is interesting, however, that the logic behind encouraging Brazil to be more active in resolving the nuclear issue with Iran seems to have a lot to do with Lula’s closeness to Ahmadinejad and little to do with the overall good example Brazil has set. It is true that it has not signed the Additional Protocol, and that it has vigorously asserted its right to develop an independent fuel cycle, and even has a vice president that brazenly floats the idea that Brazil should develop nuclear weapons; but it has nonetheless signed a Qadripartite Agreement that covers many Additional Protocol measures, has adopted a constitution that prohibits nuclear weapons and, of course, not taken any steps that would suggest that the vice president’s opinion is going to become state policy. For a large, rising power, these are things to be continually referenced and rewarded, even if only symbolically, by everyone actively engaged on the Iranian issue, in particular the diplomats heading to the Review Conference. The dividends would be easily achieved and could be significant.

The Olympic Committee has given Brazil a prestige injection by awarding it with the 2016 games, creating a seemingly opportune moment for those prepping for the 2010 RevCon to familiarize themselves with the ideas that animated the Olympic Committee’s decision, explicitly reaffirm their support of Brazil’s decision to forego nuclear weapons, and, to take it a step further, cite it as an example of how a country can rise to global prominence without nuclear weapons. The RevCon is definitely not be the place where the Iranian issue will be solved, but it may be a place to change the dynamics of the dispute and establish that the NPT regime and the non-nuclear norm that it embodies provides more than just a pretext for punishing the noncompliant.

Yes, a lot of this clearly smacks of “happy talk,” but the Western P3, the P5 and other nuclear “haves” would be remiss to ignore a unique opportunity to link the nonproliferation cause to the understanding that global order has changed (and continues to change) rather than stodgily repeating that global order has not changed enough to allow for the elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide. The former message of change speaks to the sensibilities of those we implore to forego nuclear weapons, while the latter message of relative stagnation, to say the least, does no favors to our efforts to instill a sense of urgency among those whose cooperation we need to prevent proliferation, contrasts sharply with obvious shifts along other metrics of power, and is simply not that convincing of an excuse for relegating disarmament to distant hypothetical. (After all, if nuclear deterrence is as important as we say it is and nuclear powers are so unconvinced that they would resist fighting each other without it, then countries who have foregone nuclear weapons could understandably question: (a) why this should be their problem in making the case against double standards; (b) why the logic that justifies those retaining nuclear arsenals does not apply to those without nukes as a reason to acquire them; and (c) how they can be convinced that ownership of nuclear weapons is not a necessary prerequisite for achieving great power status.) Hopping on the Brazil bandwagon can help the nuclear powers formulate more convincing answers to these questions and move beyond the rhetoric to more concrete issues that will make the global nonproliferation project more successful.

However, there’s no reason to presuppose that Brazil is ready or able to step into the role of a nonproliferation hero. Its awkward-but-close relationships with autocrats and “junior league” foreign policy demonstrate that it has a long way to go in its emergence as a global leader. But perfection shouldn’t be the precondition for recognition of status and Brazil isn't alone in its vulnerability to charges of cavorting with foreign governments of ill-repute. Furthermore, it would be entirely counterproductive to let the things that Brazil hasn’t gotten right become the excuse for not taking significant steps to recognize and reward the things that it has got right. Besides, practice makes perfect, so the question is whether will reward the good, punish the bad, or both. There is not much that we can do to change Brazil’s mind about whether or not it deserves a permanent seat at the Security Council – and maybe we shouldn’t. But we can surely reduce some of its incentives to pursue it immediately and at all costs by cozying-up to dictators in order to gain their vote, and there’s no good reason why Brazil, particularly President Lula, can’t become more of an asset for nonproliferation and less of an apologist for Iran.

Concretely, what does this mean in terms of changing Iran’s direction? Much of it will depend on what Brazil is prepared to do and therefore falls under the nauseating TBD category, but there are a few small but potentially meaningful things that the U.S. and others can do to help their cause on nonproliferation before, during and after the RevCon.

Publicly recognize, early and often, Brazil’s responsibility in its decision-making on nuclear weapons issues. If the U.S. can do India the honor, then surely it can do the same for a country that has walked the walk by taking the decision to not acquire nuclear weapons and signing the CTBT. This also helps insulate Brazil’s current nuclear policy from arguments that it should change in favor of nuclear weapons acquisition.

If protecting Brazil’s offshore oil wealth, as Vice President Alencar suggests, presents the security problem that nuclear weapons acquisition could supposedly solve, then work actively to create a security framework through which Brazil can rest assured that it needs no such capability.

Take up the call of the New Agenda Coalition, of which Brazil is a part, to pursue the establishment of a reporting framework and mechanism to account for all nuclear arsenals worldwide. China will almost surely resist, but predictability bodes well for long-term stability, and transparency serves that end.

Heed Lula’s exhortations to resist the temptation to make sanctions the solution to every problem with Iran and other nuclear weapons troublemakers. Demonstrating P5 solidarity on an issue is generally a good thing, but it is hard to establish that sanctions will produce the desired effect; they haven’t produced it so far. The Obama Administration was right to use the Qom revelation as a vehicle to get to talks, not to sanctions.

This is just a start, and there are undoubtedly lots of better, more specific ideas to be had. But these four things, at the very least, may better enable the nuclear powers – particularly the Western powers – to pre-empt criticisms that they are reinforcing double standards, provide compelling evidence that there is a nuclear weapons-free path to status as a recognized regional leader and global power, help keep Brazil on the right track, and push President Lula into a position where he will be compelled to indeed do more - much more than serve as an excuse maker for his friend's highly troublesome nuclear program.