Will START get to the finish line?

Of all the items on the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policy agenda, negotiating and ratifying a new START is the top priority.  START was also the topic of a panel discussion last week, hosted by the U.S. Institute for Peace.  Panelists included Ambassador Linton Brooks, Joe Cirincione, and Tom Scheber.  The discussion focused on both the details of START negotiations and the role that a new START plays in the administration’s disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.

It’s not surprising that a new START is the administration’s number one priority.  First, the current START expires on December 5th.  Without a new agreement, Russia will be able add warheads to its strategic launchers.  Furthermore, according to a report last week, the administration wants an agreement completed before Obama accepts his Nobel Peace Price on December 10th.

More importantly, completing a new START is seen as an important part of the administration’s disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.  According to Cirincione, the administration sees START as an important catalyst for the rest of its disarmament agenda.  Negotiated cuts in the U.S. and Russia arsenals could generate momentum for further reductions in the role of nuclear weapons (including ratification of the CTBT) before the May 2010 NPT Review Conference.

So the important question is:  Will the administration get its wish?  Really, it’s a two part question.  First, will the U.S. and Russia be able to complete negotiations promptly so an agreement can be signed?

According to the latest press reports, there has been serious progress in negotiations thus far, and further talks will continue next week.  Ambassador Brooks, the chief negotiator of the original START, described four main questions that must be resolved in negotiations:  1) What the number of warheads means and how we count it? 2) What launchers count? 3) Will there be limitations on strategic defenses? 4) What will be the specific verification measures?  Kingston Reif identified a lot of the same obstacles to an agreement.

While recognizing the divergent viewpoints of the U.S. and Russia on each of these issues, Brooks remained optimistic that the negotiators could find compromises.  For example, one of the main disagreements is whether or not U.S. nuclear missiles that have been converted to conventional roles will be limited under the START agreement.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has made it clear that Russia wants these limits in the new treaty.  Brooks suggested that this disagreement might be resolved with two separate limits, one for real strategic weapons, and one for former strategic weapons.

According to a recent statement by Lavrov negotiating verification details (which Brooks described as the most difficult part of the original START negotiations) will be much easier this time around.  After all, part of the reason both sides want to renegotiate START, instead of extending the original treaty, is to simplify verification rules.

Despite a number of differences, the negotiations should conclude relatively quickly (though Brooks admits not necessarily by December).  For this agreement, the details don’t matter as much.  Both the U.S. and Russia appear to see the treaty as an important symbolic commitment to disarmament.  Therefore, they will likely find ways to compromise and punt the more difficult discussions to the treaty after next.

The more difficult question is:  after an agreement is signed, will the U.S. Senate agree to ratification?

On this question, Brooks was again optimistic.  He reasoned that the final agreement would likely include modest cuts that wouldn’t bother Republicans.  Cirincione was less optimistic.  He worried that Senate Republican would oppose the treaty for partisan purposes either to:  gain political points, try and delay or block the CTBT, deny Obama a strategic benefit, or maximize the bribe for new nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

It's possible that both are right.  In order to secure ratification, the administration will have to demonstrate that START will not harm U.S. nuclear deterrence.  While the administration seems committed to avoiding "modernization" or "new capabilities," it seems ready to support funding to maintain an "effective" arsenal.  At yesterday's nuclear labs conference, some people liked the term "deterrence management" as a label for the commitments the administration should make.  The difficult task will be convincing Senate Republicans that we have done enough to sustain our arsenal without alienating liberal Democrats and foreign governments that want the U.S. to move away from reliance on nuclear weapons.