Zeroitis and Assessing Interim Consequences

The CSBA’s relatively new report titled “US Nuclear Forces: Meeting the Challenge of a Proliferated World” argues that nuclear policy is focused too much on ideal solutions at the behest of ignoring tough questions in the “what happens if we don’t succeed” world. It says:

Given these formidable barriers, even those who continue to advocate for a nuclear free world might see the virtue in developing a “Plan B” policy should their ambitious objectives fail to materialize. Indeed, based on the analysis to this point, it appears likely the future we will inhabit will see a significantly more proliferated world than that which exists today. Prudent planning requires that this future — unpleasant to contemplate though it may be — and its implications for US nuclear forces be examined as well, rather than be shunted aside through willful ignorance on our part.

At its core, the argument certainly has some merit: we need to be thinking about the “what if” questions should we lose on issues like Iran and as a result see some nuclear dominoes fall, even if people disagree on the likelihood of that happening. The report recommendations were “modest” and discuss topics such as counterproliferation, assisting friendly nuclear armed states with safety, and consequence mitigation activities that many people could get on board with.

The logic behind the report’s focus on a Todd Collins strategy does tug at an interesting question: where on the long and winding road to zero should nuclear intellectual energy be focused? While the report is right to some degree to caution against

seeking refuge from this [more nuclear weapon states] possibility by making the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons the central theme of US nuclear policy and strategy is not practical

it can also be criticized for falling into the same trap of being too zerocentric. A quarter of the report is directly devoted to pointing out why a world without nuclear weapons may not be feasible of desirable with the pretty typical salvo of conditions that need to be met and "pave the way for WWIII" arguments but this begs the question: how relevant is that discussion? As Linton Brooks recently said in the Q&A session at a USIP event about START:

I am bothered by the amount of time and energy we’re expending on the merits of zero which, if we’re very fortunate, is several decades off and it’s sucking the all intellectual energy out of focusing on things we actually need to worry about in the next few years. That’s without regards to whether you think zero is a sham or the only reasonable goal.

Another parallel problem in the discussion of potentially misplaced intellectual energy is working through when many of the criticisms levied against the reduction of nuclear weapons would be likely to come to fruition. For example, the CSBA report argues that reductions “will so lower the threshold (and the cost) to nuclear great power status that it will actually spur some other nuclear powers to seek parity with the two Cold War nuclear superpowers” (in addition to other strategic requirements like deterrence and extended deterrence) to reach that conclusion likely to be cited in debates about “New START” and the treaty after next discussions that “1,500 warheads seems to be an absolute floor.” Assuming the “drastic reduction” to 1,000 used as a ballpark in the article (and probably about where the treaty after next aims), there is very little analysis done about why reductions in the ballpark would green light a sprint to parity from other nuclear powers. If the U.S. and Russia are hypothetically at 500 and the Chinese say 100 some of the sprint to parity concerns become much more acute but in the current ballpark being discussed there needs to be more done to explain why sprint to parity should be a large concern. This also happened last week when Mike Turner gave the keynote address at a Hudson Institute event last week. In laying out the case for a robust deterrent, there were arguments like reductions could force the U.S. to have to shift to a counter-value strategy out of necessity but this, along with some of the other consequences mentioned, seem like concerns that will be much more relevant further down the road to zero. The efforts to focus on what it is we can reasonably hope to achieve in the next few years and the importance of understanding as best we can when possible negative consequences to steps on the zero path are likely to occur are both valuable endeavors that need to be explored.