chris jones's blog

REMINDER: PONI Debates the Issues Event Tonight

Jun 29, 2011

As a reminder, PONI will be hosting a live debate tonight between Ambassador Bob Joseph and Ambassador Steve Pifer on the future of bilateral arms control. The details for the event:

Date: Wednesday, June 29
Time: 6:00 - 8:00 pm
Location: CSIS (1800 K St. NW), B1 conference center

There are still a few remaning spots open for the debate. If you are interested in attending, please contact Chris Jones.

PONI Debates the Issues Announcement: Joseph/Pifer on Arms Control

Jun 10, 2011

PONI is pleased to announced the next event in the "PONI Debates the Issues" series. The debate will feature a discussion between Ambassador Robert Joseph, Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy, and Ambassador Steve Pifer, Director of the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings, on the desirability of another round of U.S.-Russian arms control. The details:

Date: Wednesday, June 29
Time: 6:00 - 8:00 pm
Location: CSIS (1800 K St. NW), B1 conference center

To RSVP for the event, please contact Chris Jones

Missile Defense and the "Russian Veto"

May 5, 2011

By Chris Jones

Frank Gaffney wrote last week that the Obama administration has an “ideologically driven hostility to the idea of protecting the American people and their allies from missile-delivered threats.” Or so he claims. This argument is pieced together by a number of misleading statements about the Obama administration’s actions on missile defense. In order of appearance:

1. In office, Mr. Obama has hewed to his anti-missilephobic line. Notably, he has slashed billions from the U.S. missile-defense program.

A little context is needed. In FY10, the MDA budget was reduced by $1.4 billion (not plural) . Since then, however, General O’Reillly explained in April 2011 testimony that the FY11 request was $324 million higher than FY10 and the FY12 request was $48 million higher than the FY11 request. All told, that puts the reduction at about a billion dollars annually, coming mostly from programs that Secretary Gates was pretty clear did not work like the ABL, KEI, and MKV. Upward trends in the missile defense budget requests for the past two fiscal years signal a pretty strong commitment to the missile defense even if the topline has been reduced during of the most fiscally strained environments our government has faced.

2. And he killed the NATO-agreed-upon plan for defending Europe and the United States

In the narrowest sense, the Obama administration did cancel the plan to put ground-based interceptors in Europe. They then replaced the previous plan with the new European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Thanks to a leak, the rollout wasn’t pretty but the new strategy has had pretty strong endorsement from many quarters on both sides of the Atlantic. That includes Congressional Republicans who noted in their 14 April letter to Obama, the primary source for Gaffney’s article, that

Russia continues to protest the planned deployment of U.S. missile defense in Europe especially phases 3 and 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach, which would defend the United States and NATO against an attack by ICBM’s.

In addition the the EPAA, the administration played an instrumental role in getting NATO to adopt missile defense as a core mission in the 2010 Strategic Concept. Given the divergence within the alliance on the utility of missile defense, especially when you factor in the sticker price, that is a very important accomplishment.

The Power of the People?

Mar 24, 2011

By Chris Jones

With the United States and South Korea preparing for the first high-level meeting of the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) next week in Hawaii, the Asan institute just released a survey that may draw some attention. According to the China Post,

A majority of South Koreans support the idea of developing nuclear weapons or redeploying U.S. atomic bombs to cope with the threat from North Korea, according to a survey published on Wednesday.
The survey, conducted by the private Asan Institute for Policy Studies, found that 68.6 percent said South Korea needs atomic bombs, while 28.9 percent replied negatively.
Some 67.3 percent supported the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea while 30.1 percent opposed it, the institute said in a telephone poll of 1,000 people.

While the survey identifies a pretty disproportionate view, which is essentially the reverse of public opinion in Europe about TNW’s deployed there, the news should not be seen as a bolt out of the blue. After all, South Korean public polling in October 2006, right after the North Korean test, also found “65 percent said South Korea should develop nuclear weapons to protect itself.” Nonetheless, it does provide another data point to suggest the re-emergence of the nuclear debate within South Korea. Robert Einhorn and Cheong Wa Dae have been clear re-introduction of TNW’s is not in the cards, which is probably the right call, but the EDPC certain has its work cut out for it. When the committee was formed, Jeffrey Lewis observed:

So, what can Washington talk about with Tokyo and Seoul, if not the operational use of nuclear weapons? Is it even possible to have a meaningful dialogue without nuclear sharing or some other operational entanglement? Without nitty-gritty questions, aren’t you just really having yet another seminar on nuclear deterrence? One answer, suggested by the National Institute for Defense Studies’s Michito Tsuruoka in a very interesting monograph for the German Marshall Fund (Why the NATO Nuclear Debate Is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa) is that conversations about missile defenses and conventional capabilities can provide a basis for real, detailed operational discussions that place nuclear capabilities in their proper context

The EDPC would be well served to discuss conventional weapons and missile defense, which can start to get into operational details, but the growing support, or at least debate, in South Korea about nuclear weapons, bolstered by Gary Samore’s recent “yes” comment, has to be a central agenda item for the EPDC. The US and ROK governments need to have a frank discussion about the best way for the United States to reassure its ally across the spectrum of threats, including nuclear. The EPDC provides a chance to ensure the countries have a clear understanding of the respective viewpoints on critical topics such as the benefits reintroduction of TNW's may or may not have. As progress continues to be made on these issues behind closed doors, the EPDC can also allow the governments to better craft their public messaging, which could in turn help allay public anxities.

The Future of Modernization Budgets

Mar 11, 2011

By Chris Jones

A few months ago, the Administration was loosening the purse strings in an (ultimately futile) effort to secure Senator Kyl’s vote for the New START Treaty. Since the ratification of the New START Treaty, however, nuclear issues have taken a backseat in Washington as the 112th Congress continues what “is not a workable situation,” according to DEPSEC Lynn, by funding the government in a series of two-week extensions. For nuclear analysts, a looming question is what will happen to the administration’s promises on nuclear funding. Earlier in March, GSN picked up an article from the always strong John Fleck that argued:

Recently defeated budget bills suggest fiscal 2011 funding for the maintenance of U.S. nuclear weapons will ultimately fall below levels sought by the Obama administration, the Albuquerque Journal reported on Thursday (see GSN, March 3).
President Obama requested $7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's weapons stockpile activities in the current budget cycle, which ends on September 30. Congress has yet to approve a final budget for the current fiscal year and the federal government is operating under a continuing funding resolution set to expire next Friday.
The fiscal 2011 spending budget passed by the House of Representatives would provide $6.7 billion for nuclear stockpile work. Though the amount is less than what Obama sought, it would provide a 7 percent increase over fiscal 2010 funding levels. A separate Senate budget proposal would have allotted $6.8 billion to NNSA weapons programs.
Though neither the Democrat-sponsored Senate plan nor the Republican-backed House proposal acquired enough votes for passage in the Senate on Wednesday, the fiscal 2011 stockpile funding levels offered by both bills suggest the ultimate amount would fall between $6.7 and $6.8 billion, Friends Committee on National Legislation lobbyist David Culp said.
"The Senate cut less, but certainly followed suit," Union of Concerned Scientists stockpile policy analyst Nickolas Roth said.
The debate over stockpile funding in the current budget cycle indicates fiscal 2012 funding negotiations could be similarly contentious, Culp added.

While these reductions are not THAT large (roughly 3% using the Senate CR number) should the FY 11 budget actually pass, there are major concerns that this is only a preview of bigger reductions to come. Senator Graham explained in February:

It was not immediately known whether the Senate would put money back in for NNSA nuclear nonproliferation operations and stockpile sustainment activities. U.S. nuclear weapons funding is likely to remain in danger, said speakers at a nuclear conference including Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Representative Michael Turner (R-Ohio) and Leland Cogliani, a GOP staffer for the Senate Appropriations Energy and Water Subcommittee.
However, a "national game plan" has been developed to safeguard the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said.
"We have it on paper, but I don't believe the average member of Congress has any idea what I'm talking about," Graham said, stressing the need to modernize the nation's nuclear-weapon assets. The senator also called for broader focus on lawmakers, their offices and others to preserve nuclear weapons funding

He made a similar argument in the context of the funds (or potential lack thereof) for the Air Force to study a future ICBM:

Sen. Lindsey Graham said Thursday that he views a Defense Department misstep in omitting fiscal 2012 funds for a future-ICBM study as a harbinger of the Obama administration's "gradual retreat" from nuclear modernization commitments made last fall.
"It is a sign of things to come," said the South Carolina Republican, speaking at a Washington-area conference on nuclear deterrence. "It is a program that was thought to be valuable ticket-pricewise; it's not that expensive. But it is what I fear the most: a gradual retreat, beginning on the margins, that goes to the heart of the matter."

In response to Graham, a senior administration official quoted in the article said the White House remains "committed to modernizing the stockpile," While the White House does seem willing to continue to put its money where its mouth is, it remains to be seen if the Hill will maintain the fragile bipartisan consensus on nuclear modernization funding. The Congressional deficit hawks on the right, including many of the new members, and leftist Democrats who are not convinced on the merits of modernization, particularly given that New START is now ratified, could easily form an alliance that would not be kind to nuclear funding. Senator Kyl and other national security Republicans would cry foul, even though they didn't vote for New START, and say the Administration was crossing their fingers the entire time even though the blame lies on Congressional shoulders, both Democrat and Republican. This could have deleterious implications for the Administration’s nuclear agenda moving forward. As the administration prepares to tee up issues like the CTBT, significant horse-trading will almost certainly have to be part of the strategy to get the 16ish votes they need. Congressional unwillingness to come through on nuclear budget requests could easily be a reason, or an excuse, for Senator Kyl and the opposition to say they don't trust Democratic deals because things will just “go for a while and peter out” (his language from the New START debate). The nuclear complex, meanwhile, would be right back to the unenviable situation of the past decade.

In Defense of Small Reactors: A Response

Feb 23, 2011

By Micah J. Loudermilk

Last week, this forum posted a thoughtful commentary on National Defense University’s recent publication examining the possibility that the Department of Defense could embrace small nuclear reactor technology at its domestic military installations. In the blog, Terrence Smith lays out his main objections to the NDU article by honing in on the hurdles and potential pitfalls – challenges freely admitted by the authors – that would accompany a move by DOD to integrate small reactors into its operations. The concerns Smith raises are real and the report presents them in detail. Smith, however, opts for a cost-benefit analysis of the topic that largely ignores the benefit side, which, along with several misunderstandings about the larger argument, must be addressed.

At several points, Smith suggests that Andres and Breetz push for DOD adoption of small reactors “for the purpose of controlling a competitive technological edge” while failing to examine “the wisdom behind DOD’s interest.” While the article does argue that pursuing the technology will help to preserve the United States’ edge in nuclear technology, it is made immediately clear in the opening paragraph that:

DOD’s attention to small reactors stems mainly from two critical vulnerabilities it has identified in its infrastructure and operations: the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid, and the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations.

A bit of clarification is needed here as Smith misinterprets this, evidenced in his statement that:

…driving around nuclear reactors and material (particularly through areas that have “a fragile civilian electrical grid”) hardly seems like the idea of the century to me.

The central argument made by Andres and Breetz is that the military should look to small reactors as an energy source for domestic military installations – the U.S. is the country with the fragile grid. The claims about placing reactors in forward operating locations is a separate argument – and one discussed by the authors only due to its potential to save lives.

On both fronts (domestic and foreign), this is really a conversation about base vulnerabilities and energy security – all other considerations are secondary in nature. On the domestic side we know that the U.S. electrical grid is fragile (see 2003 Northeast blackout), that U.S. installations are almost entirely dependent on this grid, and that critical military mission capabilities are lodged at these bases. All of this adds up to a significant strategic risk for the U.S. – and one that was recognized by the Defense Science Board when it recommended “islanding” domestic military assets from the grid.

While the notion that this can be done entirely through increased efficiency and renewable technologies is pleasant, it is a pipe dream on par with expecting the rest of the United States to be powered solely by renewable energy. Small reactors on domestic military installations would provide a clean and assured supply of energy to bases – insulating them from electrical grid outages resulting from natural disasters, malfunction of outdated infrastructure, or attack by a foreign nation or group.

On the foreign side, where the bulk of Smith’s criticism is based, the authors are far more cautious – admitting each of the risks that are pointed out, especially that of contingency plans in the event that the reactors fall into enemy hands. However, at its core, the military aims to use the best available technologies in order to enable its warfighters to successfully execute their missions. This includes, but is not limited to, the best intelligence/surveillance equipment, weapons systems, operational vehicles, and yes, energy sources. Any and all equipment and technology brought into the field carries some risk of loss or capture, though that does not deter its use.

Ultimately, calculations must be made on the basis of costs versus benefits. The potential cost in this case is the risk that a small reactor could fall into enemy hands. What is the likelihood of this though? When was the last time that a U.S. forward base was overrun and captured by enemy combatants? How dangerous would it be for enemies to gain access to a small reactor? Furthermore, if the question is one of risk, most people would agree that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (weapons mind you, not reactors) is most likely significantly more vulnerable than U.S. bases. Finally, while the possibility of loss to the enemy is only distant and remote, the troops and drivers who die every month guarding fuel convoys are hard and ever-present reminders that the military depends completely on the consistent delivery of fuel supplies through hostile territory.

Smith’s final contention takes issue with the argument that DOD needs to operate as a “first mover” in the small reactor market – stating:

The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today.

Though this contention is arguably true from a weapons-related standpoint, Smith’s point does not make much sense when discussing nuclear energy. The pursuit of nuclear energy is not remotely equivalent to an arms race and it is simply not possible to draw comparisons between the two.

What we do know, however, is this: the domestic nuclear industry in the U.S. has stagnated and virtually died since the Three Mile Island incident over 30 years ago. Meanwhile, foreign nuclear energy companies are surging ahead and making rapid strides in the energy industry – moving forward with advanced nuclear reactors while new countries constantly enter the market. Like it or not, the nuclear renaissance is here – the world is pressing on and the U.S. simply is not on board.

More than that, DOD investment as a “first mover” in the small reactor market in fact directly supports the nonproliferation agenda. As an increasingly large number of countries seek civilian nuclear power, real discussions on proliferation begin to center not on weapons, but on the weapons risk arising from the pursuit of energy.

Historically, this potential problem has been largely mitigated by the influence exerted by the U.S. in the global nuclear energy market. The U.S. is influential largely because of its historic lead in nuclear energy technology. However, with the atrophy of domestic capabilities, U.S. share of the global nuclear trade has declined precipitously as aspiring states turn elsewhere to meet their needs. Other countries, such as China, that are making rapid advances in the field, do not share the U.S. commitment to reactor safety and nonproliferation objectives. Indeed, as can be seen, DOD’s efforts as a “first mover” in the arena are imperative, not simply from a military security standpoint, but also from a mindset of preserving the nonproliferation agenda.

At the end of the day, small nuclear reactors offer a host of potential benefits in both areas where Andres and Breetz consider their use. On the domestic military installation side, they offer the ability to island domestic bases from the fragile civilian grid, ensure the availability of the nation’s military assets in the event of a cyber attack or blackout, and preserve the country’s ailing domestic nuclear energy industry. On the foreign side, the use of small reactors in forward operating areas can reduce the use of liquid fuel to power base generators, lessening the need for constant convoys and ultimately saving lives in the field. Even when taking into consideration the potential hurdles to small reactor adoption on these fronts, the benefits are ultimately tangible and real enough to make serious discussion and pursuit worthwhile.

Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Wikimedia commons/Bryan Tong Minh

Missile Defense and Deterrence

Feb 18, 2011

By Chris Jones

Lisbeth Gronlund at the UCS “All Things Nuclear” blog had a piece this weekend about the relationship between missile defense and deterrence. The argument centers around a wikileaked cable (which is not directly quoted there and will not be here) discussing a conversation between Secretary Gates and French Minister of Defense Herve Morin. She argues:

Morin began by explaining how France sees missile defense, which he summed up by stating that it was wrong to believe that missile defense would provide additional security. He said he believes that the U.S. shift from a theater missile defense (designed to defend troops against a limited number of theater missiles) to a defense of Europe and its population will provide people with an unwarranted sense of security, since in the end offense is stronger than defense. Senior Ministry of Defense officials later disavowed Morin’s comments.
One might expect that Gates would argue that missile defense would offer a limited defense that was better than nothing. Apparently he did not even suggest this possibility. Instead, he responded to Morin’s points by stating that missile defense contributes to deterrence. In particular, he argued that missile defense would deter limited nuclear missile attacks by countries such as Iran that might acquire that capability in the future.
The first thing to note is that Gates’ focus on deterrence as a rationale for the U.S. defense system suggests that he agrees with Morin’s assessment that it would not provide a population defense.
Second, Gates’ argument is essentially that a potential attacker would not be deterred by the certainty of a devastating military response, but would nonetheless be deterred by the possibility that its missiles would be destroyed in flight. That makes no sense.
. . .
The question remains, does Secretary Gates really want to spend billions of dollars on a Potemkin defense to deter potential future missile states, or is he constrained by the political climate in Washington that requires all good Americans to support missile defense?

Neither of these implications should be drawn from what Secretary Gates said. The argument that missile defense contributes to deterrence does not mean that Gates agrees that missile defense doesn’t provide a population defense. That is part of why it contributes to deterrence. Missile defense is not for either (a) defense or (b) deterrence. It is both and there is a relationship between the two. Missile defense has to be perceived as credible, which opposing sides will be debating about for eternity, but Secretary Gates’ argument make quite a bit of sense. Gates has been a fan of missile defense “ever since President Reagan started the program back in 1983” and has come out many times in support of current missile defense capabilities. Yet, true to his style, he has also proven very pragmatic on the issue by cancelling some of the more troubled programs. The Administration rolled out the Phased Adaptive Approach in Fall 2009 precisely because, in the Secretary’s words, it “will enhance our ability to respond to the most immediate threats to the continent, as well as future threats.” That ability to respond to missile threats will never be perfect but it nonetheless contributes to deterrence by raising the chances in an adversary’s mind that their attack will not achieve the desired effect.

It seems the real issue here is the role of nuclear weapons. The French worry about missile defense being touted as a substitute for nuclear weapons, a view clearly espoused by the Germans. The U.S., meanwhile, enthusiastically backs both missile defense and NATO’s nuclear capability. With European defense budgets declining, it will be interesting to see NATO sorts this out over the next few years.

DoD FY12 Budget Event

Feb 15, 2011

By Chris Jones

Wondering what to make of the FY12 defense budget? CSIS experts David Berteau, Clark Murdock, and Maren Leed will give their take tomorrow. Taken from the event page (which has a link to register), here are the details:

Implications of the FY12 Defense Budget

Pending the release of the defense budget on February 14, CSIS will host a panel to discuss its implications. This session will be on the record.

Hosted by
David J. Berteau
Senior Adviser and Director, CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group

Maren Leed
Senior Fellow and Director, CSIS New Defense Approaches Project

Clark A. Murdock
Senior Adviser and Director, CSIS U.S. Defense and National Security Group

Wednesday, February 16, 2011
1:00p.m. to 2:30p.m.

B1 Conference Center
CSIS
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

The Trident Commission’s Mandate

Feb 9, 2011

By Chris Jones

The Guardian reported today that the UK has established an independent “Trident commission.” The opening paragraph explains:

The government's decision to go ahead with a new, but as yet undefined, nuclear missile system will be subjected to unprecedented independent scrutiny by a group of senior defence, diplomatic, scientific, and political figures. The new Trident commission will be headed by the former Labour defence secretary, Lord Browne, the former Conservative defence secretary, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, and the former Lib Dem defence spokesman, Sir Menzies Campbell. The government has decided to put off a decision on the shape and size of a new nuclear weapons system until 2015, as part of the coalition agreement, after the next general election is due.

The SDSR was pretty light on the specific of Trident modernization so some high-level thinking on how to shape and size the British deterrent could be a useful contribution. Yet the rest of the article, continuing immediately after the quoted paragraph, seems to suggest that the commission will be less interested in how to do Trident and more interested in whether to do Trident:

It also comes at a time more and more leading establishment figures, such as the former US secretary of state and national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, say they are becoming increasingly anxious about nuclear proliferation, sources involved in setting up the commission said.
Other members of the group include Lord Guthrie, the former chief of defence staff, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK ambassador at the UN at the time of the invasion of Iraq, and Professor Sir Martin Rees, former Astronomer Royal and President of the Royal Society. They were all described yesterday as having an "open mind" about whether Britain should continue to possess nuclear weapons, and if so, how they would be delivered.
"This is the first time in a very long time that we have had a wholesale review of nuclear weapons policy", Campbell said. He added: "It is high time it was subjected to rigorous analysis".
Lord Browne, defence secretary at the time the Labour decided to renew Trident in 2006, said that an independent review was crucial now in light of the government's insistence that the cost of a new nuclear weapons system must come out of the core defence budget. "No one has debated the impact of this on the rest of expenditure on defence", he told the Guardian. In the past, spending on the nuclear deterrent was in addition to that agreed for non-nuclear weapons. Browne attacked the government for not allowing nuclear weapons to be included in its recent strategic defence review.
Ian Kearns, research director of the British American Security Information Council (Basic) who proposed the new commission, said that it would be an "open-minded look at the issue from first principles … Should the UK be a nuclear power at all and if it should, is Trident the only or best way to go about it?"
He added: "What more can and should the government be doing to promote global nuclear disarmament in a world of growing proliferation risks?"
Kearns continued: "Given the government's decision to delay Trident renewal until after the next election, there is an important opportunity before the country for a fresh an in-depth debate. This commission will provide a focal point for that debate". [emphasis mine]

There are two problems with the characterization of the commission, if it is correct. First, it ignores the thinking that has gone into nuclear issues since the Kissinger op-ed was first written four years ago. The UK recently issued the first new defence strategy in over 12 years together with a National Security Strategy. Both documents, backed by a great deal of thinking, were quite clear that in the 21st century (1) WMD proliferation is a major concern, (2) “The Government will maintain a continuous submarine-based deterrent and begin the work of replacing its existing submarines.” (SDSR)

Second, and perhaps more worrisome, is that it could contribute to swinging the nuclear pendulum far enough to hamstring the government but not far enough to actualize the commission's goals. By populating the commission entirely of members who have an "open mind" about "whether Britain should continue to possess nuclear weapons," the group has seemingly established, at the outset, a predisposition against current Trident plans (and perhaps nuclear weapons writ large). Adding nuclear weapons to the core of the defence budget does pose additional challenges for the UK but it is not a given that this requires a wholesale rethinking of nuclear policy while the paint on the 2010 SDSR still dries.

Billed by former Lib Dem defence spokesman Sir Menzies Campbell as the "first time in a very long time that we have had a wholesale review of nuclear weapons policy," the commission might be cited as a reason to continue delaying Trident action. After all, some would say, we may not even need Trident. This line of thinking, however, continues to remain worrisome because it exacerbates the difficulty of modernizing Trident in a timely manner in the likely event that the UK government continues to embrace an independent nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.

Did the U.S. sell out the UK in New START Negotiations?

Feb 7, 2011

By Chris Jones

The Telegraph leaked a rather curious claim Friday night: the Americans bargained away British nuclear secrets in the New START negotiations. The article argues:

Information about every Trident missile the US supplies to Britain will be given to Russia as part of an arms control deal signed by President Barack Obama next week.
Defence analysts claim the agreement risks undermining Britain’s policy of refusing to confirm the exact size of its nuclear arsenal.
The fact that the Americans used British nuclear secrets as a bargaining chip also sheds new light on the so-called “special relationship”, which is shown often to be a one-sided affair by US diplomatic communications obtained by the WikiLeaks website.
. . .
A series of classified messages sent to Washington by US negotiators show how information on Britain’s nuclear capability was crucial to securing Russia’s support for the “New START” deal.
Although the treaty was not supposed to have any impact on Britain, the leaked cables show that Russia used the talks to demand more information about the UK’s Trident missiles, which are manufactured and maintained in the US.
Washington lobbied London in 2009 for permission to supply Moscow with detailed data about the performance of UK missiles. The UK refused, but the US agreed to hand over the serial numbers of Trident missiles it transfers to Britain.
Professor Malcolm Chalmers said: “This appears to be significant because while the UK has announced how many missiles it possesses, there has been no way for the Russians to verify this. Over time, the unique identifiers will provide them with another data point to gauge the size of the British arsenal.”
Duncan Lennox, editor of Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, said: “They want to find out whether Britain has more missiles than we say we have, and having the unique identifiers might help them.”
While the US and Russia have long permitted inspections of each other’s nuclear weapons, Britain has sought to maintain some secrecy to compensate for the relatively small size of its arsenal.
William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, last year disclosed that “up to 160” warheads are operational at any one time, but did not confirm the number of missiles.

The problem with this argument, however, is that transferring this information is hardly a new practice. In an e-mail exchange this weekend, a former senior White House/Pentagon official pointed out that this procedure has been in place since the original START Treaty. Jake Tapper at ABC News reported that the U.S. and UK governments both disputed the Telegraph report on precisely those grounds:

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley called the report "nonsense," saying the information sharing about U.S. transfers of nuclear weapons to the U.K. dates back to the original START treaty, an assertion backed up by the White House and British government officials.
The report, based on a Wikileaked cable from February 2010 during negotiations over the U.S.-Russian New START nuclear disarmament treaty, discussed an agreed statement on the transfer of Tridents II SLBMs to the United Kingdom.
The parties agreed that "in order to increase transparency in relation to the use of "Trident-II" SLBMs, transferred by the United States of America to equip the Navy of Great Britain, the United States of America shall provide notification to the Russian Federation about the time of such transfer, as well as the unique identifier and the location of each of the transferred missiles. The Parties agree that, upon conclusion of the life cycle of 'Trident-II' SLBMs transferred by the United States of America to equip the Navy of Great Britain, the United States of America will send notification to the Russian Federation about the time and method of elimination, as well as the unique identifier for each of the transferred missiles."
Crowley emailed ABC News that "Under the 1991 START Treaty, the U.S. agreed to notify Russia of specific nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom, such as the transfer of SLBM's to the U.K., or their maintenance or modernization. This is under an existing pattern of cooperation throughout that treaty and is expected to continue under New START. We simply carried forward and updated this notification procedure to the new treaty. There was no secret agreement and no compromise of the U.K.'s independent nuclear deterrent."
A knowledgeable source with the British government, speaking anonymously because his government has a policy of not commenting on Wikileaks, says his understanding of the policy conforms with that asserted by the State Department.

Needless to say, this myth has safely been busted.