jwarden's blog

by John Warden and He Yun

John Warden [JWarden@csis.org] is a research assistant and program coordinator for the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at CSIS. He Yun [claudiabeijing@gmail.com] is a research fellow at Tsinghua University’s arms control program and a Ph.D. candidate in international security.

(This article first appeared as PacNet #50, published by Pacific Forum CSIS)

John Warden

Missile defense has become an area of controversy in the US-China relationship. The US government sees an enduring role for a range of relatively limited missile intercept capabilities, designed to protect the US homeland, deployed forces, as well as allies and partners by: 1) dissuading other countries from acquiring and deploying ballistic missiles by reducing their perceived value; 2) deterring the use of ballistic missiles by introducing the possibility of operational failure; and 3) defeating a missile attack. China, by contrast, questions US motives in developing such a system and is particularly concerned with the potential evolution of the technology.

By John K. Warden

Just achieving agreement on a Final Document at the 2010 NPT Review Conference was considered a remarkable success after the disastrous failure in 2005. However, the real challenge will be following through on the lofty commitments—moving from words to concrete results. Over the last two years, there has been rejuvenated interest in nuclear issues, driven prominently by President Obama’s Prague speech and commitment to pursue a world without nuclear weapons as well as the negotiation and eventual ratification of New START. Going forward, it may be difficult to sustain this momentum and continue to make meaningful progress on nuclear nonproliferation. Success will require like-minded states to focus their energies on realistic next steps.

PONI Debates the Issues Live Debate
College National Champions Edition

Thursday, June 10^th, 5:30 PM - 7:30 PM
CSIS B1 Conference Center
1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC, 20006

Resolved: that the United States should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Michigan State University vs. Emory University

Featuring comments from:

Dr. William Bookless
Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Dr. John Harvey
Principal Deputy to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

Dr. Alexander T.J. Lennon
Editor-in-Chief, The Washington Quarterly

To RSVP, contact Chris Jones at cjones@csis.org or (202)-775-3234

FISSILE MATERIAL
Head of Atomic Agency Asserts Right to Scrutinize Iran
NYT by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger

Too Much Mr. Nice Guy
NYT by R. Jame Woolsey

Obama Plans Revival of Russian Nuclear Deal
NYT by Peter Baker

Solving Tokyo's Nuclear Conundrum
WSJ by George Perkovich

By John K. Warden

At PONI’s 7th Live Debate, Ivan Oelrich, Vice President for Strategic Security Programs at the Federation of American Scientists; Clark Murdock, PONI Director and Senior Advisor at CSIS; and Doug Feith, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, expressed their opinions on 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  While it was designed as a more traditional panel, the discussion turned into one of the more lively debates of the series.

By John K. Warden

Speaking at the NDUF-NDIA Seminar Series, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona) discussed the NPR and New START, outlining what it would take to get him to support the treaty.

On more than one occasion, Kyl said the NPR was not as bad as it could have been.  As he put it, in most areas, the NPR changes terminology, but maintains old doctrine and force structure.  The NPR supports:  a sizable deterred based on a nuclear triad; maintaining weapons on alert; continuing nuclear sharing with NATO allies; modernization of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure; and increases in missile defenses and conventional global strike.

In other areas, Kyl was critical.  He described the revised negative security assurance as “bad news,” arguing that it “muddled the waters,” making deterrence of biological attacks more difficult. 

However, he was more concerned with the NPR’s limitations on nuclear modernization, which he described as “alarming.”  According to Kyl, the NPR does not make an adequate commitment to life extension for the W-78.  He further argued that the formulation in the NPR that requires Presidential approval and Congressional authorization for replacement could “chill the labs,” preventing them from pursing the best possible options.

On New START, Kyl’s bottom line was that he is “not yet convinced that ratifying the treaty is in the best interest of the United States.” 

By John K. Warden

This morning, Ambassador Linton Brooks, former director of the NNSA and negotiator of START I, gave a talk on "Nuclear Deterrence Perspectives" as part of the NDUF-NDIA Seminar Series.  Here are some key takeaways:

On New START --

• Those evaluating the New START should not use Cold War standards.  During the Cold War, the United States did not trust the Soviet Union, was in the middle of an arms race, and though that the likelihood of nuclear use was high.  The United States hoped to use arms control to get Russia to restructure its forces to enhance strategic stability.  The current treaty, recognizing past failure, does not try to alter Russia's force structure, but instead aims to decrease suspicion, increase predictability through transparency, and improve political relations.  It also, unlike past arms control treaties, hopes to show the world that the United States is committed to the legal constraints of the NPT and the President's vision of a world without nuclear weapons.
• Comparing the number of "warheads" allowed by arms control treaties is a mistake.  All of the treaties, including New START, the Moscow Treaty, and START I, use different standards to determine what "warheads" count toward treaty limits.
• The verification part of the treaty is unique.  In past arms control treaties, a limit was decided upon, then both sides determined what verification measures would be needed.  In this treaty, access to unencrypted telemetry has nothing to do with verification; instead, telemetry exchanges serve as a transparency mechanism, which is a positive development.
• While the administration is correct that the treaty has no limits on current or planned missile defense programs, it does include a limit on missile defense.  The treaty forbids using converted ICBM silos or SLBM tubes for missile defense capabilities (grandfathering in current U.S. deployments).  Brooks noted that these deployments are not currently planned and are not a good idea.  Arming subs with missile defense would force them to be in a fixed location, close to the surface, making them less survivable and therefore, a less effective deterrent.  Deploying missile defenses in ICBM silos would be similarly impractical because using the assets could threaten Americans ("there's a reason the United States has never test launched an ICBM from a silo"). 

By John K. Warden

In conjunction with the release of its report, “Nuclear Security and Nuclear Counterterrorism: Streamlining and Updating the Legal Framework,” the Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) hosted a panel discussion about the upcoming international summit on nuclear security.

The panel featured short presentations by Igor Khripunov, CITS Interim Director, Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Ken Luongo, President of the Partnership for Global Security, Mary Beth Nikitin, Senior Researcher at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and Sharon Squassoni, Senior Fellow and Director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at CSIS.

Luongo began, providing details on the summit’s agenda.  The summit will span three days.  The main meeting of forty-four heads of state on April 13th will be sandwiched between a non-governmental summit on the 12th and a nuclear industry summit on the 14th, both of which should have a lot of international participation.

FISSILE MATERIAL
US cautious on removing nuclear arms from Europe
AP by Robert Burns

Debate Grows on Nuclear Containment of Iran
NYT by David E. Sanger

Pakistani scientist Khan describes Iranian efforts to buy nuclear bombs
WP by R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick

Miliband says Security Council on same page on Iran
AFP by Susan Stumme

FISSILE MATERIAL
Facing the nuclear terrorism threat
The Hill by Alexandra Toma and Kenneth Luongo

Gates: Gulf allies understand Iran sanctions next
AP by Anne Gearan

Mideast feels 'tricked' by nuclear arms treaty: diplomat
AFP

NATO Commander Supports Partnering With Russia on Missile Shield
GSN