

**CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**CHINA'S EXPANDING ROLE IN AFRICA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

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MR. MORRISON: Hi. Good afternoon. Welcome to CSIS, and thank you all for joining us here today. I'm Steve Morrison, director of the Africa program, and was fortunate in being able to work with Bates Gill and many of our delegates, many of whom are here today, in this mission that we took to Beijing and Shanghai, end of November, early December.

And we're really here to talk about the outcome of that mission and the findings and recommendations that are contained in the report that we've released today. We're also very eager to sort of put the -- put that particular report in the broader context and to explore sort of where the thinking is today on both -- at the official level -- both among American and the Chinese policymakers.

And for that reason, we've reached out to the administration and to the Chinese embassy here and we've been very fortunate in that Jim Swan, the deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs at Department of State has agreed to come and open this event up with some remarks around how the department is looking and thinking on these issues today.

Jim is familiar to many of you who work Africa issues. He's been dedicated to Africa matters since the early '90s in his career as a foreign service -- Senior Foreign Service officer. Prior -- he joined as principal -- as deputy assistant secretary at the end of last year. Prior to that, he headed up the Africa office in the Intelligence and Research Bureau at State. Prior to that, he was deputy chief of mission in Kinshasa, in Congo, and also in Brazzaville in the Republic of Congo. There. He has a great reputation here as a very careful, methodical thinker on a broad range of issues. His portfolio today covers Central and West Africa; covers regional security issues, all of which tie in very closely to this.

So Jim, I'd like to offer you the chance to come and kick this off, and thank you so much for being with us today.

MR. SWAN: Thank you very much, Steve.

I'm pleased to have the opportunity to make brief opening remarks before we get to today's main event, which is discussing the CSIS report that you have before you today. I'd also particularly like to acknowledge the participation in today's event of a representative from the Chinese embassy here in Washington. And I think we all welcome the opportunity for an open discussion of the many issues related to China in Africa, so I think it's useful that we have Chinese representation today as well.

As many of you in this room know, the topic of China in Africa has become very fashionable. There have been many, many conferences and articles and discussion for --

with respect to this topic. But I think even in this crowded field, CSIS has raised the bar and deserves special credit for having sent a very distinguished delegation to China for a on-the-ground look at what the Chinese are thinking with respect to their involvement in Africa.

I should mention that not wanting to be left out, the State Department organized its own China in Africa conference in early December, and we were fortunate to also receive a briefing from some members of the CSIS team who had just returned from China.

But attention devoted to China's role in Africa is not just a current academic or policy fad. It obviously reflects the many indicators that we see of growing Chinese engagement in Africa: that more than 30 percent of China's oil imports are from Africa; China is the largest consumer of copper, which obviously leads it to have a great interest in a number of countries in southern Africa. Overall, Chinese trade with Africa is reported to have quadrupled since 2002, although from a rather low base. And we have other indicators of significant Chinese involvement these days, including in peacekeeping operations, where there are more than 1,300 Chinese peacekeepers currently deployed on the continent. And of course, China continues to take a very active role on the Security Council, which deals frequently with African issues.

But I think beyond these broader indicators of Chinese involvement, what has attracted a tremendous amount of attention are certain specific events that are seen to highlight Chinese interest in Africa. Perhaps the most prominent example was the forum on China-Africa cooperation last November, in which 33 heads of state and five other African leaders came to -- went to Beijing for meetings with the Chinese. Frankly, 43 heads of state -- that's more African heads of state than typically turn up for an African Union summit. It's a very impressive demonstration of both China's interest in Africa and Africa's interest in China. And I think it's quite appropriate that the FOCAC meeting is featured on the cover of the CSIS report. (Laughs.)

Another clear indicator of Chinese interest is that President Hu is in Africa this week for an extended trip -- his third trip to the continent in as many years. This has obviously attracted a great deal of attention, and the Sudan portion of that visit has perhaps been a focus of particular interest because it does bring into relief some of the challenges that the United States faces as we try to engage with China on countries in Africa whose human rights and democracy records are not what we'd like to see.

Overall in recent years we've seen signs of an increase -- an increased Chinese outreach to Africa. We think this is based on some core interests of China, although I'll look forward to hearing from the Chinese speaker on this. These include access to resources, access to markets for Chinese goods, and obviously efforts to develop support in Africa for Chinese diplomatic initiatives, whether it's confronting or attempting to change the few countries that still recognize Taiwan or perhaps more broadly seeking to mobilize support from the 48 countries in sub-Saharan African for Chinese initiatives in the United Nations or in other multi-national fora.

But frankly, these are genuine interests. I think that's a message here. China has real interests in Africa. It is consequently going to be engaged in Africa. We don't see this as a zero-sum game. For us the important thing from our perspective is to encourage China to become involved in Africa in a way that supports and reinforces international norms.

I think also that while today's discussion is focused on Africa, we need to see China's role in a broader international context. The study itself notes China's quest to build a strategic partnership with Africa fits squarely within Beijing's global foreign policy strategy and its vision of the evolving international system. And in that system, China has reemerged in recent decades as a major player, economically, diplomatically, militarily, and in other spheres. This followed a long era sometimes called the hundred years of humiliation in which the Chinese saw their country as exploited and weakened by foreign powers.

Previously somewhat isolated, the government of China is clearly now more engaged in international organizations and other international fora. We think they see these as a power multiplier, particularly their involvement in the U.N. Security Council.

With that brief allusion to some of the history, I think it's important that we keep in mind that China takes often a much longer perspective in a range of policy areas, including foreign policy. That means that in dealing with the Chinese, we have to be prepared to be very patient. This is a government and a society prepared to sow the seeds in international policy that may take many years to blossom. I think we need to keep that in mind as we engage China on Africa and other issues.

Now with respect specifically to the U.S. approach to China in Africa and elsewhere, former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick offered the framework for our engagement in what he called a strategic dialogue with China. And essentially the purpose of that dialogue from our perspective is to encourage China to serve as a responsible stakeholder in Africa and elsewhere, acting in ways that help bolster the international system, promote peace and prosperity, and also ensuring that China demonstrates behavior commensurate with its status as a global power.

I think there are a number of areas where we think that there could be a collaboration with China in Africa -- some of these are mentioned in the report -- but -- areas such as seeking complementarity in some of our aid programs, continuing support for peacekeeping operations in critical areas, and perhaps looking for other opportunities for cooperation in the health sector, where both the United States and China have played leading roles in Africa. But frankly deepening our cooperation in these areas is going to require extended consultations, and our view is that in many cases the Chinese have in fact been quite reluctant to coordinate their assistance programs and to collaborate with other major donors in trying to arrange for a cohesive approach in various countries in Africa. But there are certainly -- again, I think we see that there are many areas where cooperation could evolve.

But there are also areas clearly where our approaches differ greatly, especially with respect to democracy and governance issues, human rights issues, transparency issues, and in these areas, too, we need to be prepared for a sustained dialogue with the Chinese, since they clearly are viewing their foreign policy objectives over a much longer time horizon.

Under the rubric of Deputy Secretary Zoellick's strategic dialogue, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazier went to Beijing in November 2005 for meetings with senior Chinese officials focused on Africa policy. We consult frequently with the Chinese on African issues in the U.N. Security Council and through other high-level visitors to China dealing with our global interests with the Chinese.

Just last month, as I'm sure many of you know, President Bush's special envoy for Sudan, Andrew Natsios, also traveled to Beijing with the specific focus on U.S. policy toward Sudan and Darfur and efforts to persuade the Chinese to play a constructive role in terms of the international community's commitment to responding to the situation in Darfur. In January also the State Department's director for policy planning held meetings with his Chinese counterpart to review a range of issues, including many that are germane to Africa, such as seeking to improve coordination of our approaches on development assistance and related donor issues. And obviously these specific examples of consultation and coordination with the Chinese are in addition to our regular frequent contacts with the Chinese through our embassies in Africa and of course through our mission in Beijing.

But to summarize briefly, our overarching goal remains to see China become a responsible stakeholder in the global system as befits its growing role in the international community. And in many ways we see China's involvement in Africa as a test case of its willingness to work toward the broader interests of the international system.

So finally let me thank once again CSIS for the opportunity to make opening remarks today. I look forward to participating in this discussion. And I'd like to commend the authors for the report. It illuminates China's role in Africa; it offers many thought-provoking proposals for ways that we might look to deepen our consultation and collaboration with the Chinese, and we look forward to reviewing it.

Thanks so much. (Applause.)

MR. GILL: Thank you very much, Jim, for taking the time out this afternoon to join us. And we do look forward to the conversation with you as we move to the discussion period.

Let me join with my colleague Steve Morrison in welcoming all of you here. I'm Bates Gill and hold the Freeman Chair in China Studies here at CSIS. And it was my very fortunate honor to join with Steve in putting together this delegation and the subsequent report. We've been very, very fortunate to be able to work with a number of

excellent colleagues. I would start with Ambassador Ma Zhengang, who is the head of the Center for International -- the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing, who served as our host for that portion of our trip -- was very engaged, he and his staff, and we greatly appreciate the hospitality and substantive input he has shared with us, and we look forward to welcoming Ambassador Ma and the delegation of Chinese specialists who will return, we hope, to Washington to continue this discussion later in 2007.

We've also received excellent support from the Chinese embassy here, including Ambassador Zhou; the D.C. administrator, Zheng Zeguang; and of course most importantly and certainly not least, Sun Baohong, who we'll be hearing from in just a few minutes.

Let me also just take a moment if I may to acknowledge and thank the colleagues who joined us on this trip -- a quite exceptional group of people, most of them -- almost all of them not from CSIS, but persons with deep experience and expertise in African-related issues who I think represented in many respects the diverse array of interests which the United States has in its approach to Africa. And I think we were able to introduce to our Chinese colleagues the depths of experience and the range of interests which Americans have in engaging in Africa. We're very fortunate that three of our delegation members are here with us today. I just want to mention them to you. We're -- and we hope as part of the discussion to bring their points to the fore as well -- beginning with Dr. Pearl Robinson, a professor at Tufts University and currently president of the African Studies Association; Akwe Amosu, who is senior policy analyst with the Open Society Institute here in Washington, D.C.; and Mark Bellamy, who is senior vice president of the National Defense University and our former ambassador in Tanzania.

MR. BELLAMY: Kenya.

MR. GILL: Kenya, sorry. My mistake -- in Kenya. Thank you.

Anyway, we look forward to having them involved as well.

So we're very fortunate. We thank them all, and a special vote of thanks as well to my colleague in the Freeman Chair, Chin-hao Huang, who is a research assistant with us and was absolutely instrumental in ensuring the success of both the visit and the subsequent report.

I won't dwell a lot on the key aspects of the report. You have that with you. I just want to draw out what I think were some of the important and more interesting takeaways that we had from our time in China as well as a part of our ongoing research activities and trying to examine China's expanding role in Africa. We note in the report sort of six drivers or motivators which we think help under-gird and sustain this more expansive approach by China. Jim has mentioned one of them, namely how well it fits in, it seems, to China's broad global approach to foreign policy and its vision about the evolving international system. And I'm sure we'll hear from Ms. Sun as well how the historical linkages still resonate for China as well as for their African counterparts that date back

many, many decades and even, if you look at some of the press reporting, even centuries of the China-Africa relationship -- that this provides a foundation upon which China thinks that it can build.

We were interested particularly from what we heard in China about how in their view, Africa is now on the verge of a kind of developmental takeoff. That differed I think somewhat from some of the opinions on the American side -- or at least maybe the Americans were more willing and forthcoming to acknowledge the many challenges in front of that kind of vision. But nevertheless, I think it's interesting to note, and it underscores China's interest to be a part of this developmental takeoff from the very beginning.

And one other point just from the -- these six sort of drivers that we think are important to note, and that is that it's our view, we think, that China continues to look through the lens of state-centric or state-to-state relations in its dealings with Africa. This is going to present some interesting challenges we think going forward, particularly considering the diversity of African nations as well as maybe most importantly the emerging and increasingly dynamic vocal and influential civil society sector in Africa today.

That leads me then to talk about some of the core challenges. I think too often we see reporting about China's engagement in Africa that comes across in ways that cast it in both assertive and maybe even censorious-type terms. I think it's also important for us to recognize that China faces a lot of challenges, just as the rest of the world does, in trying to productively expand its engagement in Africa in ways that benefit both China's national interests and those of its African counterparts.

We note, for example, the importance of continuing obstacles tied to language -- China of course -- China is not -- Chinese is not widely spoken in Africa -- but culture, religion, and even racial bias. We note that Africa -- China's system for engaging with Africa does not seem well-tuned to interpret very well what we might call the "African street" -- that is to say, how to reach beyond the state-to-state sets of relationships and engage with this increasingly influential nongovernmental sector in Africa.

We note, too, that the difference between principle and practice on the issue of noninterference in the internal affairs of states. We all recognize this is a well-honed and oft-repeated principle on the part of the Chinese government, not to interfere in the internal affairs of states. But we also know that in practice, China can be flexible on this question and has indeed very many times "interfered" -- quote, unquote -- in the internal affairs of other states, as Chinese interests warranted. And I think we will see this tension between principle and practice increasingly coming to the fore in China's dealings in Africa -- and indeed we already have. And we can talk about that a little bit more in our discussion period.

Complexity -- the engagement with Africa is increasingly becoming complex for China. It's involving an increasing number of bureaucratic actors within the Chinese

government system, as well as nongovernmental actors -- primarily the quasi-private or quasi-state sector of business which are increasingly engaged in China, but also an expanding Chinese Diaspora also active in Africa. Is it possible, we ask, for the Chinese system as it's currently structured to do as well as it might like to coordinate both internally this complex bundle of quite ambitious policy initiatives on the one hand, and also assure that reputational risks, if you will, posed by activities of Chinese companies and Chinese private citizens to assure that they do not rebound in negative ways against China's broad foreign policy interests?

Another point we raise, as Jim has mentioned, is the increasing pressure that I think China can expect to do a better job of harmonizing its donor activities in Africa with those of other major bilateral and multilateral donors. And finally, as we've seen so clearly this week, and as I think it's reflected in the turnout here today, Beijing can expect pressures to mount to better manage its relations with its most important bilateral partner, the United States, vis-a-vis Africa.

So these are big, big challenges, and I know very well that some very smart people in Beijing are trying to think through how they can deal with these challenges and importantly think through how, as part of that process, they can work with the United States. These developments indeed carry significant implications for the United States and our interests in Africa and around the world. And to discuss those points, then, I'd like to next turn the floor over then to my colleague, Steve Morrison.

Thanks very much. (Applause.)

MR. MORRISON: Thank you.

One of our premises of this entire effort has been that we need to approach this subject with a certain level of humility as to what we do not know and an awareness of just how fluid and fast-moving the picture is, and also that we oftentimes are not very sensitive at understanding our own blinders or our own tendencies towards hypocrisy or inconsistencies in our approaches. And if we do that, it's possible to have a civil dialogue around these issues.

We make the case that the U.S. and China have both been in a period of pretty dramatic expansion of engagement in national interests in Africa, but those processes of expansion have been undertaken with little apparent reference to the other. And we're maybe reaching a point where the possibility of costly clashes is beginning to become more apparent, and it becomes more strategically important for both to acknowledge the value of dealing with both the points of strong convergence and dealing with the points of tension in the relationship.

The clash points that we identified are the pretty obvious ones: the lack of donor harmonization; the lack of harmonization specifically around debt -- debt forgiveness, debt accumulation. This is a very serious issue, and this is one that does put us diametrically moving in opposite directions, but is one for which there are fixes. Energy

security is an issue that I believe will be fully upon us soon enough, as competition continues to intensify.

Sudan is oftentimes cited, along with Zimbabwe, as the really tough rogue states that, in the case of Sudan, the specter of war crimes, genocide, stalled efforts at getting the Security Council to move forward effectively in support of the AUU and hybrid force and to get a negotiated settlement. This is an area where today or in yesterday's papers we see that there's the possibility that the U.S. may be moving towards secondary sanctions as an instrument of greater -- bringing greater coercive pressures, particularly in commercial bank transactions, if there continues to be no progress on Khartoum's side. This will create an additional level of friction and tension, and we need to anticipate that. And it comes after a period, I would argue, in which the U.S. and China have collaborated in productive ways on Sudan. Andrew Natsios as the envoy has taken this issue up and deserves to be lauded for that. The Chinese permanent representative to the U.N. in New York has taken this issue up and pushed forward and should be applauded for that. There was a shift of position by the Chinese at the end of last year that contributed directly to the progress we have seen in terms of getting Bashir's at least official commitment on the three-phase expansion of the U.N. operations. Much, much more needs to be done, obviously, and we have not yet crossed a path where we can say that Khartoum is fully cooperating. But certainly we've seen some significant changes in the U.S.-Chinese cooperation, and we should be preserving and building on those.

We make the case that there are opportunities for strategic cooperation that should be undertaken in the first instance through multilateral channels. That's going to be the most comfortable zone. But there are opportunities for bilateral cooperation as well. At the end of this, we begin to identify what we think some of these multilateral options would look like, and they're the obvious: debt sustainability; security, particularly counterterrorism; peacekeeping capacity and conflict resolution in some of the key states in the horn and elsewhere in Africa.

Moving more assiduously forward, in the G-8 this year is a very promising year under the German leadership in terms of putting the emphasis on Africa, poverty alleviation and capacity building -- EITI, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative -- terribly important in those energy-rich countries which are undergoing massive expansion and ingesting an avalanche of cash in their oil earnings.

On the bilateral side, there's clearly been parallel expansion of interests by the U.S. and China in health and education. Much more can be done there. On the business side, we try to draw attention to the need to really begin to build trade and export capacity in key countries and partnerships, and begin to address the question of business practices.

And a last but very important sector that I think there's a lot of unrealized opportunity is in that of civil society. There is a period -- a precedent of very strong Africa-China-U.S. academic interlinkages that is still very much in the memory of American, Chinese, and African scholars as something that was enormously important to all of them as a piece of their lives. And that can be resurrected and made a success, I

think, with relatively modest resources and effort. And we were fortunate to have Pearl with us to carry that dialogue forward.

The nongovernmental sector in Africa is a rich, terribly influential sector across many different spheres. There are strong networks of NGOs in the human rights, on health, on legal reform, on education, that tie together with networks outside of Africa. There's plenty to be gained, I believe, by linking them together -- not just with North American and European networks of NGOs, but with the Chinese counterparts, who do exist.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

MR. GILL: If I may, its just a moment and my pleasure to introduced then Ms. Sun Baohong, who is counselor and senior specialist on security affairs, but increasingly drawing from her rich experience as a diplomat serving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as -- in part as a staff member of the Chinese embassy in Pretoria, South Africa, in the late 1990s, and also as deputy director and then director of the Office of Southern African Affairs at the ministry in Beijing. Again, we can't thank her enough for how supportive and engaged she's been with us in all of this work, and we very much look forward to her remarks.

Thank you.

MS. BAOHONG: Thank you. Good afternoon. It is a great pleasure and honor for me to be here with you. I have not expected such a grand turnout, which makes me a little nervous. And what makes me more nervous is that I saw many familiar faces.

I appreciate your interest in China-African relations. Actually, since I came here 17 months ago I have found out there has been a sharp increase of interest in China-African relations, and I really want you to answer me this question: Why? Well, I think this is a logical development of the truth that more and more people are viewing China from different perspectives nowadays -- not only China in Asia, but China in Africa, in Latin America, in Central Asia. And also that is also a large -- (inaudible) -- of more and more people in this country, in this world, pay attention to the stability and the development of Africa. I think that is a very promising sign for Africa.

And today my presentation will be very, very brief. And I think you are very interested in China-African relations. So I'll provide three perspectives when you study China-African relations.

The first perspective is that when you look at China-African relations you should view its relations from a historical perspective. You know, China and Africa enjoy a long tradition of friendship. We began to know each other and began the indirect trade I think around 1,000 B.C. But I do not have enough time to cover this period. (Laughter.) And in modern and contemporary history, China and Africa shared very similar

experiences -- we're both enslaved to the plunder of colonialism. So that is the solid foundation for the political relations between China and Africa.

And the second perspective is that when you look at the China-Africa cooperation, you should view that cooperation from an all-around perspective. There has been a lot of reports I think -- a big number of reports on China-African cooperation in the energy field. That is true. But I can give you some fact figures.

In the year 2005, China imported from Africa crude oil that is 38 million tons. And it's a quite big number, but it only accounted for 10 percent of the total Africa oil export; and compared with the figure of U.S.A., it only accounted for one-third of United States' import of oil from Africa.

And also we should look at other aspects of China-African cooperation in trade. We have provided zero-tariff -- zero-interest tariff treatment to many African countries. And in the development field we have engaged in many infrastructure projects. And in the aid aspect we have engaged in over 900 projects, and in peacekeeping forces. And as Mr. Swan said just now, we have sent 1,300 peacekeepers to Africa. And also we have provided 18,000 scholarships to African students. And nowadays, because of our new announcement at the Beijing summit, our government will provide 4,000 scholarships each year to African countries.

When it comes to the health sector, we have sent 16,000 medical members to Africa. We have built 30 hospitals in Africa.

So my understanding is that when you view China-Africa cooperation you should see it in an all-around way.

And the third perspective is that when you look at China's policy toward Africa, you should view it from a consistency perspective. To strengthen solidarity and the cooperation with African countries has always been an integral part of China's foreign policy of peace and independence. And we have promoted the idea of sincerity, of long-term friendship of mutual respect, mutual assistance, mutual help. And in the 1980s, when China just opened to the outside world, we had mapped out our economic strategy governing our economic cooperation with Africa. And the main four points still apply today.

The first point is that equality and mutual benefit. The second is put more emphasis on practical results. Third is to seek diversified forms of cooperation. Fourth is to seek common development. And you can see in the 1980s what we practiced those days are now different from what we practice nowadays.

In this regard I really recommend the CSIS's report. I think Steve and Bates and other members of the delegation have done a fairly good work in promoting understanding and in strengthening cooperation and in pushing for more dialogue in this respective. In this respect, in my perspective, and it's my personal view this is one of the

most, I think, most profound and most objective report ever generated by the think tanks here on China-African relations.

And the Chinese embassy and I myself -- we will continue to support the exchanges of different levels on China-African-American relations. Thanks a lot. (Applause.)

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. We're going to move towards inviting our audience members to offer question and comment. And please try to keep your question to one, and please try and confine yourself to one minute in your intervention. And we have folks with microphones who will go. So why don't we take -- why don't we do two or three questions. And we're going to invite our delegation members to be the first respondents, if that's okay. Would you like to start with a question first? Okay, Pearl Robinson.

Q: Pearl Robinson. I would like to thank the panel for what was informative for me, even having been involved in the process.

I have a question for James Swan and for Sun Baohong. Did either of you take issue with anything that was in the report?

MR. MORRISON: Can we hold on that for one moment and take two or three others, and we'll come right back. Thank you, Pearl.

Mark, would you like to offer question or comment? Okay, we'll hold. Others? There's one in the back, and one here and one here. We'll take those. Yes? Please identify yourself.

Q Yes, Richard Funni (ph) with Radio Free Asia. This is a question for Bates Gill. You mentioned there have been instances when China has acted contrary to its principles of nonintervention and noninterference, and I wonder whether you could elaborate on that.

MR. MORRISON: Okay, thank you.

Sir? Right here. Please identify yourself.

Q: Lieutenant Commander Darnell Edwards (sp), Naval fellow with defense analysis. A question just for Sun Baohong. You talked about a lot of the development projects that China is doing with African countries, and I wanted to know if they're using Africans to do those projects or are they bringing in Chinese nationals to do those projects.

MR. MORRISON: Okay, and we'll take one right here. Sir?

Q: Paolo von Schirach, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. On the issue of donor coordination, which was mentioned in reference obviously to Africa, and some of the problems that have emerged in terms of the contradictions that I think you -- I think you pointed it out -- what came in your discussions with the Chinese is there an opportunity to resolve this issue not just as an issue of donors, but also if we think about the equator principles, if we think about policies that Western multinationals seem to be sort of forced or willingly abiding by? What is the corresponding policy that the Chinese are willing to engage in? Is it coordinated? Is it not? Is it contradictory?

MR. MORRISON: Let's go back to Pearl's question, which was to both Jim and Sun about Jim, about what were the points where you might have diverged. Jim, do you want to?

MR. SWAN: I can't identify any individual point where I would say we saw this and thought this. It did not make sense. I think overall we felt the report reinforced a lot of the points that had been made in a number of other conferences and settings with respect to what's driving China's interest in Africa. But I think it usually elaborates on that in a number of areas, and that's been helpful in terms of explaining the motivations and explaining some of the constraints that I think we have not paid adequate attention to with respect to what may be limiting China's ability to deepen this engagement.

But I can't really cite a specific case where we said, "No, this is completely out of the question," and a misunderstanding from our perspective of what's happening.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. Sun, do you care to answer that one? And there's also a question from Darnell with respect to use of labor.

MS. BAOHONG: Okay. I think it's understandable that you cannot stay eye to eye on all the issues covered by the report, and even among the report's African and China relations in this town. They differ quite largely.

And my understanding is that if a report that grasps the realistic issues and grasps the mentoring of the situation then it can be called a good report. Right? And for those issues that you do not see eye to eye, you can put them under the framework of dialogue and the understanding will of course be enhanced during the dialogue.

And for the labor issue is that I think there are many types of cooperation. There will be cooperation that will employ Chinese workers. There will be projects that employ local workers. And for most of our projects, development projects, we use the BOT (ph) method to do that. And after it's transferred to the local community they will employ all the local employees, right?

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. There is a question -- hold on to Richard's question for a second. Paolo's question around donor coordination and also fitting this dialogue into what I took you were pointing us towards, sort of African institutions and initiatives. Akwe, would you mind? Can you take that? The whole question of what

was your sense of the opportunity or the lack of opportunity in that particular sphere for harmonizing donors and for moving it into more alignment with the AU-NEPAD statement of principles?

MS. : I think that the space that's available that perhaps hasn't been tapped adequately is -- do you need me to stand up?

MR. MORRISON: Yes, please.

MS. : Thank you. I think the space that might be available is one that relates to multilateral space in African politics, and I think particularly of the African Union and NEPAD. Some people probably know that the African Union late last year had a whole consultation looking at how Africa needed to relate to Brazil, to China, to India, and really tried to map out what was going wrong with these very bilateral negotiations between China and African countries, and wondering whether in the context of the multilateral discussions in Africa there was more room to harmonize principles. And I think China has been very clear that it would like to be engaging at a multilateral level. It feels that it would be actually easier -- recognizes the challenges of trying to negotiate with 49 countries at once; would like there to be some platform on which some kind of bulk agreements could be done. But at the same time I think those of us who are perhaps a little cynical about that would say it doesn't look as though that would always be in China's interests. So it remains to be tested the extent to which there is room there.

But I think from the U.S. point of view and from the Chinese point of view, finding common ground around the African Union and the principles of NEPAD is good for Africa. That I can be fairly sure of. The kind of skepticism on the Chinese side about making human rights such a major pillar of the kind of West perspective, you know, can really be dissipated. If you look at what the finding principles are of the African Union -- quite explicitly says that governance and human rights are important. From the Chinese point of view it's slightly bizarre to ignore that, if you're talking to the AU -- although perhaps it may not be mentioned if you're working bilaterally. So I would say there is space that has not yet been explored.

MR. MORRISON: Mark? Mark Bellamy?

MR. BELLAMY: I think this is a very important point about the differing approaches to development in Africa. And when you think about it, it might be one of the major more fundamental disconnects.

Certainly our approach is based on making a number of distinctions. We treat a Zimbabwe differently than a Botswana; Cote d'Ivoire differently than Ghana -- and as do the other members of what I guess used to be called the Washington Consensus. And there is a risk that a different Chinese approach could bring our different activities into conflict, could have us working at cross purposes. So we did discuss some of this. I don't know that we came to any conclusions, but I do think there was a realization that we need to find fora or opportunities where we can figure out how to at least -- if not get on

the same page, at least avoid conflicts and collisions. Maybe this is a G-8 discussion, maybe this is an OECD discussion. Maybe it's both. Maybe it's also a subject of bilateral discussions. But I think it's a very, very important issue.

MR. MORRISON: Just to add very briefly to that, I mean, there are plenty of signs out there of the friction around these issues, right? You had Wolfowitz's fairly harsh comments. You had a lot of discussion around these issues at Davos just 10 days back. You've -- this is -- during the U.S.-China economic dialogue at the end of last year this whole question around debt coordination was on the table. I'm not sure where it moved, but it's moved onto the table and onto the agenda. And the upcoming G-8 preparations are still at an early point. The papers that -- the Germans -- you know, the Germans hold the pen and the papers they've delivered have really focused much on this dimension, but they've made very clear that the senior level Chinese delegation will be very much integral to those deliberations. There's multiple opportunities to fit this and to push it forward. And there's a building tension around this whole issue, particularly around the debt accumulation piece.

Do you want to answer Richard's question?

MR. BELLAMY: Just very quickly. If you're really, really interested in this topic, I would refer you to the work of Allen Carlson and Taylor Fravel, who have done excellent work documenting an increasingly flexible approach by China in the face of this so-called principle of noninterference. But just to name just a couple of quick examples. Facilitating the restrictions on transactions coming to and from North Korea through the bank, the Banco Delta Asia, which let's not forget is based in China, in Macau, was certainly an interference in the internal affairs of the North Korean state. China's pressures upon Iran to come to the table and roll back its nuclear ambitions; maybe most importantly China's decision to stop selling civil nuclear technology to Iran at a time when Iran was not in any breach of any international obligation, but China took it upon itself to stop that cooperation because it saw in its interest to do so -- another interference.

And more timely, I think, I found very interesting the remarks coming out of Hu Jintao's visit in Sudan, in which of course he stated as principle number one for resolution of the Darfur crisis is noninterference in the internal affairs of that country; but then promptly two or three principles later said how imperative -- that was the word, "imperative" -- that the livelihood and lives of the people of Darfur be protected. Now, maybe that's no big deal for someone from our country to say, but that in my mind is as close as any Chinese leader has come to putting forward a Chinese view on the so-called responsibility to protect notion, which is gaining a lot of momentum in multilateral and international circles.

And there are reports, even citing senior Sudanese officials, that President Hu did deliver a message privately to the Sudanese president for the need to bring the Darfur rebels to the table and engage in a process and move ahead on the Annan vision for Darfur. So is it intervention in the sense we might undertake it? No, I guess it's not. But

it does I think demonstrate a flexibility and an interest on China's part to do some interfering in the internal affairs of states when they think it's in their interests to do so.

MR. MORRISON: David Goldwyn had a question, and there's another gentleman next to David. Take those two and then we'll come to you, sir.

Q: Thanks, Steve. I wonder if you could give us a flavor of the conversations you had, say, on a subject like Nigeria. Did China also see an interest in promoting security and stability in the region? Did they see a role for countries to play in influencing Nigeria's policy? Did you discuss whether they share the view that there's a connection between transparency and information and reducing conflict? Just to give a concrete sense of the two perspectives.

MR. MORRISON: Okay, thank you. Yes? Please identify yourself.

Q: Thank you. Philippe de Pontet from Eurasia Group. I had a question for Ms. Sun. How does the Chinese government perceive the new Africa Command recently endorsed by the Bush administration? And, along those lines, perhaps a question for Steve or Mr. Swan. Is it more likely to lead in the direction of the convergence you were talking about, or are there possible areas of friction or neither?

MR. MORRISON: You mean with respect to the command?

Q: Yeah.

MR. MORRISON: Okay. Right here. Sir?

Q: Thank you. (Inaudible) -- from China. My question goes to Mr. James Swan. To what extent does the U.S. concern over China-African relations is driven by kind of geopolitical considerations that the interactions between China and Africa will lead to a rising Chinese influence on that continent? And also maybe China will stand to some African countries as a more viable motor of development -- (inaudible)? So to what extent, you know, your concern goes beyond what you just mentioned, human rights, democracy, good governance, but relates to the tradition of geopolitical consideration?

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. Let's take a question back here, and then we'll come back to our speakers. Oh, I'm sorry, sir.

Q: (Off mike.) I guess really a comment, Steve, about the report, which I happily had a chance to read earlier. What concerns me is that it lacks a sense of urgency with respect to potential backlash that may be emerging. There's been a very considerable loss of jobs in two areas because of Chinese imports to the U.S. -- (inaudible) -- manufacturing goods in certain cases we believe because of dumping, in other cases because of rampant smuggling on an industrial scale, and it is alleged in many cases -- (off mike). This is not the only place in the world that this happens. I'm quite cynical

about these matters, but frankly the political backlash could be damaging not just to Chinese interests but to those of the many countries that are trying to help or be involved with them. I'm concerned that the report might have focused more about that. Thank you.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. If you could hold for one moment in the back. Oh, go ahead, go ahead.

Q: Okay, I'm Jill Shankleman from Media.

MR. MORRISON: Speak up, please.

Q: Jill Shankleman. Looking at your subhead, "Implications for the United States," I wondered if you came to any conclusions about the use of sanctions as a U.S. policy instrument.

MR. MORRISON: Against China?

Q: No, other countries. You mentioned Sudan, for example -- (off mike) -- U.S. sanctions -- even though when the -- (off mike)?

MR. MORRISON: Oh, I see what you're saying. I think that pretty much fell outside of what we were looking at, frankly.

On the question that John raised about the lack of urgency, there was some pretty blunt exchanges around the issues that you raised with respect to counterfeiting and dumping. And the reaction was moved on the Chinese side, and we had to varying points representatives of I think a total of eight to ten think tanks present and participating. And then we were engaging with other parties from universities and business interests. It moved from sort of an initial denial or defensiveness to much more of an acknowledgement of the gravity of this. And it also led into the whole question around reputational risk and the weak control that exists over an indigenized business class that falls outside -- to a significant degree outside of official control in their behavior. And yet there's a certain quite strong and understandable pressure for accountability and for how like you're going to deal with this. And I'm not sure that there is any quick answers to that. Mark, did you have any thoughts?

MR. BELLAMY: Well, I think that's right. It's probably important to remember, particularly from our discussions with the business community and with economic analysts and others in Shanghai, and understanding that while China has sent its industries and its entrepreneurs forward to do business in Africa, there is still a lot that is not under control on the part of the Chinese government -- still a lot of activity, including economic activity in Africa, that isn't something that can be reined in on command, and so representational risks, I think as you mentioned.

You know, in the final analysis it has to be African governments, African publics, African trade unions, African organizations themselves that are making the point about job loss or about counterfeit goods or about displaced industries and so forth. And that's if there's a sense of urgency, as you say, I think it needs to -- I would look for it to originate there.

MR. MORRISON: Akwe, did you want to comment on the question David posed around EITI and Nigeria?

MS. AMOSU: Sure. Actually what was striking to several of us in the delegation was -- I don't know if I would be wrong to put as strong as a reluctance, but an absence of enthusiasm about talking about Africa in detail and specific countries, getting sort of drilling down into experience on one front or another. There was lots of talk about the broad African reality, the numbers that spanned the engagement between China and Africa, but very little enthusiasm about getting down and dirty on what exactly was going on in the Nigerian Delta, for example.

So the answer to your question partly is we don't really know what the feeling was about the kind of local conditions in Nigeria. We had some kind of quite strong exchanges around who was to blame for situations, for example on the Delta one colleague on the Chinese side of the table said, "Well, if it hadn't been for the disaster that you oil companies" -- referring to my colleague from Chevron -- "had been in the area, we wouldn't be having this crisis." And I as a Nigerian then said, "Well, actually I think if the Nigerian government had done a better job of managing oil resources and investing in that area we might also be seeing a rather different reality." And so I think we had lots of exchanges, but very little in the way I can give you by way of conclusions.

I think, nonetheless, my own assessment of the whole conversation and the various points at which EITI was referred to -- but there is very much scope and space to discuss constructively with various parties in China and certain people in the industry the value of engaging with EITI quite concretely. I think there's a recognition that many of the governance issues and transparency issues in the oil sector that are impacting negatively on Western companies can impact on Chinese companies unless there's some kind of broader management context. And that's why I'm fairly convinced that this is a discussion that's going to go somewhere.

MR. MORRISON: Sun, would you like to comment on the African Command issue? And then there's some other issues you may want to pick up.

MS. BAOHONG: First I would like to come to the Chinese economic cooperation with Africa. I think at the moment China is very welcome in Africa. In all the African countries when our leaders meet with African leaders what they ask is more and more investment and they really regard China's development as an opportunity for Africa.

I recommend you to read President Hu's speech yesterday. He delivered a speech at the University of Pretoria Africa, and it's a speech oriented toward Africa. And he has mentioned in his speech that during our course of development we have met some new problems. In the economic cooperation with Africa we also encountered some new problems, but those problems can be solved through friendly negotiations and through our common development.

And the second issue is about how we engage African countries in the dialogue in the political affairs. In China we have stuck to the noninterference policy for a long time, and we respect Africa's effort in choosing their institutions and economic way through their own efforts. And we believe that they can find their way suitable to the national conditions. But we do wish to have dialogue with African countries on how to better govern – governments how to manage each individual political system and we want to borrow from each other, we want to learn from each other to see common development.

And another issue is about the African – (inaudible) – and we have taken note of that – the President Bush has announced the establishment of the African command. And in our view, it's America's affair and we do not have any comment on that. For us the development issue is the most important issue for Africa and China. We mainly help in, you know -- (inaudible) -- our resources and input in helping Africa to develop.

Thank you.

MR. MORRISON: You know, one of the puzzling aspects of the exchanges we had in Beijing was the apparent lack of the interest in the Africa command. I mean, it was an issue that was looming out there. It was one that was evolving and from our perspective, it was something quite significant. And yet, at different points when we would say, so let's talk about that, you know, there wasn't much appetite for that.

And it may have to do with the fact that it hadn't yet formerly been rolled out. It may have to do that people sort of stay in their lanes, and we didn't have the security people in the room with us. We didn't have the people that maybe that was their job to think about. I don't know. And Mark may have further insights into this.

MR. : (Off mike.)

MR. MORRISON: Maybe.

So anyway, your question, Philippe (sp) around convergence versus tension points, I think that all depends on how it is managed and whether there's a dialogue that begins early on. This is an innovative promising initiative. It will be controversial. It's one that's going to have to prove its value and merit over time. And it's one which there are going to be some, I think, choice opportunities – not the least of which is maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea where there's a very strong convergence of interest, but there's no dialogue up to now around this, and it's something where there's quite good potential.

Jim.

MR. SWAN: Well, just on Africa, briefly. Clearly, there's already a military-to-military engagement by the U.S. the Chinese in Africa. I mean, our intent in moving forward with AFRICOM is to try to rationalize our ability to engage in Africa from a situation in which three different combatant commanders had responsibility for different pieces of Africa. And this would have the effect of unifying that under a single combatant commander we think could, therefore, engage more effectively with his African partners.

This is still at the early stages, frankly, of being set up. I think they're looking toward October for a formal standing up of AFRICOM. So there will be plenty of opportunities between now and then to make sure that the details of this are raised and discussed more broadly. So there shouldn't be any surprises.

Thanks.

MR. MORRISON: Mark, did you have something – (off mike) – we'll do one more round of questions.

MR. BELLAMY: While I think it's correct to say there wasn't overwhelming interest in security issues or in discussion of U.S. security programs and relationships in Africa, two things I thought were noteworthy. One, our Chinese hosts stressed that they were well aware that the United States had a number of military relationships – longstanding military-to-military relationships in Africa. And they thought that was perfectly normal. China had no reason to object to these or to have an opinion on this one way or another. And secondly, our Chinese hosts were at pains to underline that they could not foresee any form of strategic competition between the United States and China in Africa.

We suggested a couple of things. One that Steve mentioned, that China take another look at this Gulf of Guinea Security Initiative, which has been launched by the African Center for Strategic Studies and the European Command as a way of bringing Gulf states together to look at how better to police and control these unpatrolled waters in the Gulf of Guinea as something the Chinese might be interested in. I don't think there was a lot of interest in that, but I think that's something we should continue to explore with them.

And I think we should probably also look at the Declaration of Principles and at the action plan that came out of the Beijing summit, where there are a couple of passing mentions to African security issues and where they might be. It's not clear whether China intends to do much beyond exercising its responsibilities as a Security Council member when it comes to dealing with African security issues, or whether there's scope in there for China to move beyond that and to become more active in facing what they describe themselves as nontraditional security challenges and as regional conflicts.

MR. MORRISON: Pearl, did you have some comments?

MS. ROBINSON: Yeah. Actually, I just wanted – I was thinking about this issue of urgency and how to explain that. The thing that I believe is really important – I went from the China trip to two weeks in Ghana on a corporate social responsibility study tour looking at the gold mining industry. Every single place we went to there was a road that was being built by the Chinese.

The Chinese are building a couple of hydroelectric dams and people are anticipating that their electricity problems will be alleviated by this. As we look at this year 2000, it's relatively recent that all of these things are happening. And so the question is, what do – how much is visible? What do people know about? Who is losing jobs? If they actually go out and have public demonstrations, how broadly are those demonstrations being covered in the local press of that particular country, and then how much coverage gets out into the rest of Africa, versus people actually seeing on the ground things that the Chinese are doing?

I suspect that what will happen is that there are two areas where sort of a sense of urgency that there's some real friction going on may come from. One is going to be in the relatively small numbers, percentage terms, of people who work in factories that they may lose their jobs, or people who are producing goods that get displaced, which may be a larger group. And the other is in the human rights area, which I think the African press and NGO communities are better organized to communicate on a broad basis.

But you really do have to – I mean, what I came away appreciating was how visible these new developments are on the ground, and the ways that they impact people's lives that's very different from the sorts of things the U.S. has been invested in – investing in. And I'll never forget sitting there across the table from the Chinese saying to us, "We have brought 200 million people out of poverty in the past few decades. We have a model of development that has worked to improve the quality of lives – lives of hundreds of millions of people – and we are offering this model to Africa."

Africa has been working for 40 years with this model of development that the West has offered and where are they? They're at the bottom of every socioeconomic indicator you can come up with. And so, you know, in essence, so we've got these two models working and what have you got to say?

I actually think – I came away believing that it's very important for the U.S. to have a long-term strategic approach to Africa that actually understands the importance of addressing quality of life issues for people in Africa in ways that visibly large numbers of people can see.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you.

Let's take a couple of quick questions. There's a gentleman right here, then David Shin (sp) and a woman over here – two women over here. Please identify yourself.

Q: Paul Starobin with the Atlantic Monthly and the National Journal.

Actually, to expand on that, I'd like to ask Ms. Sun to comment on what the report also describes as China having, it believes, a national narrative that has a powerful resonance in Africa. America has often thought that it has a powerful narrative. It is a country, several hundred years ago, founded on a kind of anti-colonial impulse. Do you think the Chinese narrative at this point is the more resonant and vital one in Africa? And I'd ask James Swan, in that vein, do you think the American narrative has gone somewhat stale because of our problems – America's problems in Iraq and perceptions in global attitudes – surveys that we are seen as something of a bully in international affairs?

MR. MORRISON: Thank you.

David Shin.

We'll do one more round and then we'll come back to our speakers.

Q: David Shin (sp), George Washington University.

MR. : I don't think that's on.

Q: Can you hear me now?

MR. : It's supposed to be on.

Q: David Shin (sp), George Washington University.

On the face of it, it would seem that one area for cooperation with China would in the area of international counterterrorism. The report does mention the possibility of collaborating on peacekeeping in Africa, on dealing with stability issues in Africa – the Gulf of Guinea, the Niger Delta area, but it really finesses the question of possible collaboration on international peacekeeping.

I'm wondering if this was done for a particular reason, and if so, why? And I would only add that on the basis of my own recent meetings in Beijing where I was raising the same issue, I do have a theory on it, but I'd rather hear yours.

Q: (Off mike.)

Q: My name is Kelly Spence (sp). I'm a graduate student at Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Kelly Spence (sp).

You mentioned, Bates Gill mentioned that China believes that Africa is on a developmental takeoff. I was just wondering if maybe Sun Baohong or any of you could elaborate on that.

Q: Yes. I'm Tom Reckford with the World Affairs Council.

No one has mentioned the interests of France. France has long had special interests in Africa – especially the francophone countries. It's not playing quite the role that it used to play, but it's still as jealous of its prerogatives in francophone countries. How does France feel about China's new role?

MR. MORRISON: Okay. (Off mike) – one last question.

Q: Thanks very much, Steve.

I think one of the most important observations, if we look at what is the implication of China's role in Africa for U.S. policy and interests was made by Pearl Robinson, because what the Chinese are doing on the continent is visible, and it does have an impact on the lives of ordinary people.

The U.S. thrust in previous years seems to be more process. People can't see process. We might appreciate the outcome, but you appreciate hospitals, you appreciate roads. So I think that one of the things that needs to be done is to look at what we're doing in terms of our own support for Africa – point one.

Point two – I think the Chinese can learn a great deal from Western failures. Take the example of the Niger Delta, where rightly or wrongly, Western oil companies are perceived as having degraded the welfare, the interests, the environment of the people indigenous to that area. China has an opportunity, because of your engagement and your need for your own energy security, to do a better job.

Thanks.

MR. MORRISON: Sun, would you like to lead off? There was a question from Paul with regard to the national narrative, and you may want to speak to some of the issues that were raised.

MS. BAOHONG: Well, let me put my remarks in this kind: there is Washington consensus and there is Beijing consensus, and which consensus will prevail, which consensus is bound to succeed?

I think – I just cited from a seminar the other day, I think it's a very well-known scholar who studies China in this country and he's Professor Harding. And in his perspective, he said neither, and I personally agreed to that. The reason is that first, at the

moment, China is a developing country and we do not have the capacity to help to input in Africa huge amounts of resources that beyond our capacity.

And the second is that that gentleman said this right – China can learn a great deal from the failure of the West, but we can also learn a great deal from the success of the West, because when I talked with people in this town – (inaudible) – engaged with Africa, I do think we have to learn a great deal – especially in Western countries, because I think there are many, many smart people. And there are many people who are with very selfish motivation to Africa. And they really want to help Africa to develop to realize their ability. And why they want to engage Africa in this way instead of that way? Will we engage in in-depth discussion like what I have with Steve?

I have a lot of point that when we said in Beijing we have never thought of before. So what I mean is that through consultation, through dialogue we can learn a lot from each other and we can complement our efforts in helping Africa. And today many people stress coordination. And I think that is the main theme, about coordination.

And also, I just want to pick up a bit about that discussion just now. I think the coordination also comes from this regarding – (inaudible) – better now why China should engage Africa in providing the assistance in our own way, in the way that is quite distinctive of Chinese style. I think that is because we think that development issue is the most pressing issue for Africa now. So we really want to do something that benefit ordinary people – to let them have some visible benefits, some immediate benefits. And maybe, from your point of view, you foresee something in the future or something more fundamental. That may not have come to our thoughts, but at the moment our thinking is this.

And we don't think that our criteria to Africa constitutes a main part of criterias in the national world. I don't think so. Actually, the foreign debt of Africa is 30 million U.S. dollars, and China each year just provide 3 million U.S. dollars foreign assistance to Africa. And most of them are grants and the low-interest loans which we will forgive during a period of time. So we don't think that we are the main creditor.

Still, we really try to help Africa in solving that problem. We forgive the debts, we cancel the debts after a period of time. And during our Beijing summit last year our president has announced that we will cancel other debts to Africa, maturity at the end of 2005. So it's almost gone.

Thank you.

MR. SWAN: I'd just like to address some of the questions that came up with respect to the development model, and the comments about the high visibility of a number of Chinese infrastructure and other projects that were raised by the speaker and also by Ambassador Giter (sp).

First, with respect to the high-visibility projects, of course at one time the Western countries did engage in exactly those sorts of activities – dam building, road building, large-scale bricks-and-mortar infrastructural activities. And I think that what – the conclusion after many of those proved to be less than wholly successful, in terms of raising countries out of their conditions, was that there needed to be a broader economic transformation in these countries that would reflect market forces shaping decisions, that would reflect greater transparency in terms of allocating resources, that would reflect the people of the country having more input in terms of deciding what the developmental priorities should be, rather through democratic elections or other means of contributing to those governing decisions.

So I agree that these high-visibility projects are highly sought by the Africans. And I think in many cases we may be confusing our terms a little bit when we say there's a great deal of attraction to a Chinese development model. And I think we might want to explore whether the attraction is the model or whether the attraction is the fairly specific and concrete benefits that are provided through assistance programs that are offered by the Chinese. I think there may be a distinction there that needs to be explored and teased out when we discuss the broader development model.

I also want to just leap in briefly on the issue of whether the U.S. or the Western model is stale. On that I think that we – I'm not sure which of the other panelists made the point about the need for some humility in the way we approach development in Africa. But I think we need to get away from this notion that it's the Chinese who are bringing a model, or it's the Americans who are bringing a model, or it's the IFIs who are bringing a model.

What I think we are seeing more and more in Africa is that African leaders themselves increasingly endorse the notions that good governance and transparency and respect for human rights and rule of law are core values that they themselves want to see promoted on the continent. We see this in the African Union, which has certainly adopted a number of positions in this regard that has taken it well beyond where the former OAU was. We see this with NEPAD, as some others have raised as well.

So I think as we look at the model, there is still considerable resonance in Africa for the kinds of interests in governance transparency, human rights that are being reported.

MR. MORRISON: I'll just add, you know, there was this recent worldwide very ambitious BBC opinion survey that came out two weeks ago. A multi-country – 26 countries, 26,000 people survey, something along those lines – and one of the striking findings was that while we've had catastrophic erosion of U.S. standing in the places you might anticipate – the Middle East, South Asia – the Africa opinion climate has remained pretty robust, pretty positive and pretty resistant to collapse under the pressure of some of the policies that have driven into low numbers in the Middle East and elsewhere.

As to how you account for that is another question. But the fact that there's been a tripling of U.S. foreign assistance, my guess is, has not gone unnoticed. And you put the question, as we did, to Alex Coutinho from TASO from Uganda as to, what's the opinion climate within Uganda where you're putting a couple \$100 million a year into life-sustaining therapies? The response was quite dramatic impact in those places that have gotten quite dramatic investments.

So Paul, your question around how the model is, I think, is quite variable. I think Africa is – you can begin to make an argument that Africa is an exception in some respects and that our narrative remains quite vital. But at the same time, that the Chinese narrative is innervating (?) and fascinating to a lot of people for good reason and compelling reason. And It's not – I don't see that as, you know, a zero-sum tradeoff. I think we've made dramatic investments that are paying off in holding the line against erosions that we've seen that are profound in other parts of the world.

On the France question – we didn't really go into that. I had occasion in March of last year to do consultations with the French in Paris on a number of issues, including China. The overwhelming impression there was that there were extremely seized with this issue and were examining it very carefully, but to what final conclusion I don't know. Perhaps others here know.

David's question around cooperation – I don't think we finessed or downplayed the significance of international peacekeeping as an area of potential collaboration. I think we state that fairly clearly. I think we state that in certain things like maritime security, Niger Delta, other areas, there's a strong case for cooperation.

The CT – the counterterrorism domain – we didn't really go into that much. And part of the problem with that was we didn't have – we ourselves weren't necessarily counterterrorism experts. I think Mark came about as close to that as we could claim and treated some of those issues in the paper that he drafted and then translated and presented beforehand. But we didn't have on the other side of the table folks who came equipped to really speak with authority on those matters and it just wasn't going to go very far.

Mark? Akwe, did you – Pearl? Do you want to add some closing thoughts?

MR. : I think I'll leave it at that – thanks.

MR. MORRISON: Sun, would you – do you have any closing thoughts?

On behalf of everyone here, I want to thank Jim and Sun for being with us, and I want to thank all of you for your patience and your participation. Thank you.

(Applause.)

(END)