

**CENTER FOR  
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

**DAVID ABSHIRE LECTURE SERIES –  
THE INIMITABLE ADM. ARLEIGH “31-KNOT” BURKE:  
LESSONS FOR LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY TODAY**

**WELCOME:  
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PRESIDENT AND CEO,  
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

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JOHN HAMRE: You know, people will frequently – my name is John Hamre, the president here at CSIS – (laughter) – and people frequently say, “Do you miss being at DOD?” And I say, “No, I don’t miss being at DOD” – (laughter) – except for one thing. I miss the ceremonies – because they are such a big part of reminding you what your life is about. And today is a chance for us to have a ceremony.

Now, it’s actually a bigger day, in many ways. Adm. Roughead was just this morning up at Fort Meade, where we commissioned the 10th Fleet – recommissioned the 10th Fleet. So this is a historic day in many dimensions. And we’re going to celebrate today the – a very great man, who was a part of the history of the Navy, made the Navy so great, and also – I hate to brag – but made CSIS great. And that was Arleigh Burke.

Now, this is the annual Abshire Lecture Series. David Abshire and Arleigh Burke cofounded CSIS and so – and David decided he would like to use this as an opportunity to talk about Arleigh Burke.

Now, before we get started, let me just – there are so many notable people here, I can’t do justice. But Jim Watkins, it’s great to have the CNO back. We’re delighted to have you here. Thank you for coming. And – yes – (applause) – and I know that – I haven’t seen him yet, but I know that Sean O’Keefe, who was secretary of the Navy, will be arriving. And Dino Aviles is here, someplace – where’s Dino? – who was the undersecretary. And we’re grateful to have Dino. Thank you for coming. We’re delighted to have you here.

And this is just entirely a selfish personal thing, but Allan Cameron, my friend Allan Cameron, built 17 of the Arleigh Burke destroyers, and he wanted to come for that event because it’s a big part of his life. And so I’m glad he can join all of us. So we’re going to have a wonderful afternoon.

David has asked – and I’m just so happy that this is the case – that Pam Scholl, a very dear friend, Pam Scholl, who was a – she came to CSIS many, many years ago – but it was a grade-school work-release program, so I want you to know that. (Laughter.) And she’s just going to give a little bit of a history of Arleigh Burke and the Abshire Series.

Pam, why don’t you come up and join me, please? (Applause.)

PAMELA SCHOLL: Thank you, and good afternoon, distinguished guests. It is a pleasure to be back at my old stomping ground. I began my career here as CS – CSIS. I’d like to give you a date, but you don’t need to do the math today.

David Abshire asked me to come here today from Chicago – and sorry about the cold weather – but he asked me to connect some of the pieces and briefly explain how Adm. Burke,

the Burke chair and Abshire lecture came to be. And when your first boss, mentor and dear friend asks, you do it, like the great adage: loyalty up, loyalty down.

In 1981, the Center for Strategic and International Studies began to raise its first endowment funds by creating endowed chairs. It was logical to raise an endowment in honor of the co-founder, one of our military's greatest naval commanders in the Pacific theater of World War II, and then President Eisenhower's chief of naval operations, Adm. Arleigh Burke.

In September 1983, we celebrated a beautiful evening honoring Adm. Burke and his lovely wife, Bobbie. I know many of you were there. Howard K. Smith, Navy Secretary John Lehman, Adm. Thomas Moore were among those who spoke about the admiral's heroic service.

Our team has spent countless hours at the Navy yard working with officers on a history and a film to pay tribute. This afternoon, we'll hear more about Adm. Burke's accomplishments, lessons we can learn about strategy and leadership.

The story doesn't end here. Many of us, under the tutelage of the brilliant Dr. Abshire, decided it was time to recognize his contributions to our country: a West Point grad, a Korean War veteran, assistant secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, and co-founder of CSIS, along with Adm. Burke and its leader for most of the 30 years until 1999, when Dr. John Hamre took the helm.

The CSIS board at that time – chairman was Anne Armstrong, another great patriot, first woman ambassador to the Court of St. James, and chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board helped us raise the funds for the Abshire lecture. And we did something unheard of and surprised Dave by announcing the creation of this lecture during one of the CSIS roundtable meetings.

The late beloved Ambassador Armstrong, Wayne and Lea Berman, Bill Taylor and many of you here today, along with other CSIS staff and friends, did this all behind Dave's back.

Not surprising long after, Sen. Sam Nunn – yes, Dave, his sideburns were quite long then – gave the inaugural lecture in March of '83. Since then, Manfred Wornier, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Lee Hamilton, the Duke of Westminster among those who have given this esteemed lecture.

Perhaps you, Adm. Mullen, can be persuaded to give a future one.

So with this background, I hope you have a better understanding of how these traditions began. Having left Washington to run our family foundation, I remain actively involved in two of Washington's greatest institutions: CSIS, led by the exceptionally talented, John Hamre, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, where I serve on the board of trustees.

There David continues to have an idea a minute. Sometimes at our board meetings, a trustee will say to Dave, now, Dave, don't you think we're doing a little too much? And I just smile to myself and chuckle inside. And I thank God that some things will never change.

We have so much to address in our world today. But we have some of the best and the brightest and CSIS and CSPC to do just that. Both organizations grasp the lessons of history, to deal with today's challenges, all the time moving forward with the fortitude and loyalty inspired by those who came before us.

There's no better an example of this spirit than having Dave share with us the lessons of Adm. Arleigh "31-Knot" Burke. (Applause.)

MR. HAMRE: Pam, thank you. And while I was supposed to at this stage introduce David Abshire, anything I might say would be a diminishment of what you just said. So let's ask David Abshire to join us at the stage.

Thank you. (Applause.)

DAVID ABSHIRE: Thanks, John.

First, I want to acknowledge the Army and Navy Club for lending us – I wish we owned it – this magnificent bust of Adm. Arleigh Burke. I think it's just tremendous.

You know, it's a deep honor for me to talk about someone with truly so many great qualities and try to figure him out. I dealt with Arleigh 10 years here, and it was never until I went back into this journey that I began to recognize his true greatness and the extraordinary personality, the near misses, the nine lives he had. It is simply extraordinary.

What made him a unique leader? What made him a successful dissenter? How did a Burke once placed under house arrest during the so-called Revolt of the Admirals and later stricken from the promotion list then get promoted to the highest position in the Navy and reappointed two times? How did Burke get away challenging President Truman on the entire strategy of the Korean War? How did Burke get away with telling President Eisenhower that he should scrap – not scrap the draft? What made this personality tick? Why was he not called out, sent back to his father's farm in Colorado, then promoted over 92 senior officers to become the chief of Naval Operations? Figure it out. I've tried to.

The Arleigh story is as much – more than about dissent, survival, promotion. His story provides lessons – lessons about leadership, about strategy, about tactics, innovative research that are as important to us today as they were in Burke's time.

Now Burke shared a name with the so-called father of conservatism, the famous British parliamentarian Edmund Burke. That Burke supported the American Revolution and abhorred the French one. Indeed Arleigh shared more than a name. Both Burkes abhorred fixed mind-sets and ideology.

Both knew the importance of human factors in leadership and in governance. Above all, our 20th century Burke embodied the 18th century's Burke's concern about a grounded, realistic outlook that still recognized the need to adapt to changing circumstance.

Now in preparing this lecture, I've been ably assisted by Alex Dougal (sp) – Where's Alex? – and his graduate work on the Pacific war under the famed military historian/professor Russell Weigley.

While there are many books about Burke, I also enormously benefitted by my friend Professor Potter's remarkable – he was at the Naval Academy for so many years – biography. Potter drew his own analysis of Burke from many interviews where Burke himself allies himself to Potter. Most men of action don't have that capacity. It sort of conflicts with decision-making. He possessed both.

And of course my dear friend Evan Thomas, and his magnificent writings, beginning with John Paul Jones and the "Wise Men" and now about the Pacific, is an inspiration. And we're so glad you chair the meeting.

Our story will open with a slugfest between the United States and the Japanese navies over Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. We find ourselves in the Southwest Pacific in 1942 through 1944. In many of these battles, the Japanese gave as good as they got. The new tactics had to be developed to defeat the powerful Japanese navy. Commander Arleigh Burke suddenly came to national fame during his service of battles with his destroyer squadron. Named them the Little Beavers. He loved the Little Beavers. He always loved the sailors that served under him. That's why the lone star sailor down on Pennsylvania Avenue symbolizes that love that he had for sailors.

Now, Burke was an aggressive combat leader. His standing orders were to attack on enemy contact without orders from the taskforce commander. In the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay and Cape St. George, he emulated among all people Scipio Africanus' strategy to defeat Hannibal in the Second Punic War.

Here's how he described it himself. The plan was based on hitting the enemy with one sudden surprise after another. This was accomplished by putting two destroyer divisions in parallel columns. One division would slip in close under the cover of darkness, launch torpedoes, and duck back. When the torpedoes hit, the enemy started shooting to the retiring first division; the second half of the team would suddenly open up from another direction. When the rattled enemy turned around – the new unexpected attack, the first division would slam back into it. That produced a startling victory.

Following the battles around the Solomon Island (sic), the Japanese no longer – no longer held the initiative – the U.S. Navy, therefore, free to launch an island-hopping campaign through the Central Pacific that led to the heart of the Japanese Empire.

In preparation for this offensive, Adm. Ernest King had determined that all surface fleet commanders needed to have aviators of – chiefs of staff, or vice versa. This order helped to

diffuse the growing rift between the surface and naval aviators, the command structure, and also resulted in Adm. Burke being sent as chief of staff to the prestigious Mark Mitscher, a pioneer in naval aviation.

Initially, Burke refused. "I will not go. I will stay with the Little Beavers," he stubbornly said. Well, they told him to get his – (inaudible) – up there. (Laughter.) He did not want to leave.

Mitscher reciprocated; he didn't want Burke. In their first disagreeable meeting, Mitscher said sarcastically, "Welcome aboard! Take a shower, and get some sleep! Then come back up here, after you sleep it off." Infuriated, Burke finally went back down, got clean clothes, came back up: "Reporting for duty, sir!" "Well, you're on the job." They growled at each other.

That's the way it was for two weeks. Then it began to break, in this relationship of great affection when Mitscher was finally approaching his death. But the two were different, as you will see.

By June 1944, the United States invaded the Mariana Islands. These islands were critical to Japanese strategy, because from there American B-29 bombers could begin and sustain a bombing campaign against Japan itself. Thus the Japanese navy threw everything into destroying the U.S. invasion fleet in the famous battle of the Philippine Sea.

Even though the U.S. scored a victory, shooting down over 300, 300 escaped. It had – it had been badly hurt by one aggressive carrier airstrike. At the one time when it was within range, the fleet was not sunk. Japanese planes in the so-called turkey-shoot – Burke was far from satisfied. The bulk of the Japanese escaped, Burke believed, because the overall commander, Adm. Spruance, wasn't aggressive enough in pursuing the Japanese fleet. Spruance had opted to play it safe, to protect the invasion fleet.

One of Burke's tasks was to write an after-action report for the battle. Burke's draft was blunt, criticizing Adm. Spruance. Mitscher asked that Burke tone it down before sending it to Adm. Nimitz. "Don't you think you should go back and rewrite those last two pages, Arleigh?" he suggested.

"No, sir," Burke replied, "but I will." (Laughter.)

However, he knew that Mitscher loved to sleep, and went up and snoozed away, and didn't read his reports. So Burke concluded, "The enemy has escaped. He was badly hurt," but one aggressive – "by one aggressive airstrike. At one time, when he was within range, the fleet was not sunk when it could have been."

The Pacific war story now moves to the largest naval battle ever in naval history, which is so brilliantly described by Evan Thomas in his "Sea of Thunder." I wish I could write that way. (Laughter.) But where he gets into the minds of the opposing commands with this

enormous research that he did, Mr. Ambassador, some in Japan and some here – I don't know how he does all this, and does what he does at Newsweek. He's a genius.

By October 1944, the United States prepared to strike at Leyte Island. The strike would fulfill Gen. MacArthur's promise to return to the Philippines. Again, the U.S. fleet was tasked with ensuring the success of this invasion.

Once again, the Japanese threw everything they had at the Americans. The Japanese divided their fleet into three task forces. One was composed of what remained of the Japanese once-vaunted aircraft carriers. As the Japanese no longer had enough trained pilots to compete with the Americans, this decoy fleet would try to lure the powerful U.S. fast-attack carrier fleet away from Leyte. This ploy, this stratagem, would allow the two remaining Japanese surface task forces to attack the lightly-defended invasion fleet around Leyte. It was a brilliant strategy.

Again, Burke and Mitscher disagreed with their vaunted fleet commander, Bill Halsey. You know, Halsey and MacArthur were alike, both brilliant, and both got so tied up with their ego that they could make terrible mistakes. That never happened to Burke.

By now, Halsey was a folk hero in all of the papers. Like MacArthur, nobody dared challenge him. Burke and Mitscher thought Halsey would make a serious blunder if he left unprotected the invasion fleet anchored off Leyte, in order to chase what turned out to be a Japanese decoy fleet.

Burke argued that Halsey had a chance to defeat the Japanese decoy fleet and still turn south in time to deal with the Japanese second task force, Adm. Kurita's fleet at Leyte, if he played it smart. He didn't.

The third smaller Japanese fleet already had been destroyed south of Leyte. Halsey neglected the tactical importance of the Japanese carrier force and focused on the northern Japanese fleet as the biggest threat. He was suckered.

Burke begged Mitscher to relay these doubts to Halsey. But Mitscher grumped, I think you're right, Arleigh, but I don't know you're right. I don't think we ought to bother Halsey. He's busy enough. He's got a lot of things on his mind.

Burke was despondent. During the night, a report reached the U.S. fleet that the Japanese center force was heading for Leyte – center taskforce was heading for Leyte Gulf through the unprotected straits vacated by Halsey. A brilliant move was taking place.

Again Burke went to Mitscher to force the issue, by contacting Halsey personally to change course. Mitscher said to Burke, does Adm. Halsey have that report, Arleigh? Burke replied, yes, sir. Then if he wants my advice, he'll ask for it, Mitscher replied as he went back to sleep.

Burke didn't sleep. Stymied by his latest attempt to get Mitscher to challenge Halsey, Burke played one last card. Technically Mitscher still had the operational control of the tactical formations of the fleet. And he was asleep and he turned it over to Burke.

So Burke on his own orders increased the speed of the fleet. He hoped to engage the Japanese in night battle and then sail back south in plenty of time to deal with Korea. But Halsey slowed his fleet.

The next day, while Halsey's ship took care of the Japanese decoy fleet, Adm. Kurita's powerful Japanese surface fleet was causing havoc around Leyte. Finally Halsey realized that he had been lured north by the decoy fleet – Burke had been right – but then was too far away from the Battle of Leyte to influence the rest of the battle.

Luckily, the tenacious but almost suicidal defense of the invasion fleet escort carriers forced Kurita to withdraw before he could attack the transports. Saved the invasion. Burke felt that Halsey made a critical error and that the U.S. had averted disaster only because of the miraculous defense of the outnumbered escort carriers and destroyers.

If Halsey or Mitscher had listened to Burke, what if they had? They would have had the opportunity to completely annihilate the Japanese fleet and bring the war to conclusion earlier. This is one of the many “might have beens” of Burke.

After Leyte, Burke and Mitscher continued to work together in subsequent battles around Iwo Jima and through the kamikaze onslaughts against Okinawa. They were together with great affection until the end of the war, however different they were, because Burke could work with people different than him.

Our story now takes us – now that we got through that, I need a sip of Coca-Cola to get me through the next scene. (Laughter.) (Pause.)

Our story now takes us to the period immediately after the war. In 1949, Captain Burke – by the way, when he was about to be promoted to rear Admiral, he protested that, at the end of the war. He said, you know, I won't be able to keep it and it's just not good. He had this habit of fighting promotions. That's a strange – I never had that when I was in the military. (Laughter.) I wanted to get them.

Captain Burke was made head of the Organizational Research and Policy Division, OP-23. There, Burke developed the first long-range Navy plan or vision since Alfred Thayer Mahan. This led him to become involved in what became known as the Revolt of the Admirals – and there he got into trouble.

As you recall, during this time of bitter competition – we did not invite any Air Force generals to this meeting – (laughter) – bitter competition between the different branches of the armed services regarding which service would take primary role in national defense. The so-called revolt was a controversy over the powers of the secretary of defense.

Many senior officers were unhappy with the new austerity measures of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. We were in a great period of disarmament. They publicly attacked the new service unification under the Department of Defense – sound familiar? There was also an attack on reliance on air atomic power as the country's first line of defense, dwarfing the other two services.

As head of OP-23, Burke was tasked with coordinating the Navy's effort to defend its role in the national defense, and thus challenged the Air Force nuclear strategy. He was no shrinking violet. Burke boldly testified before Congress against the plan. It was dramatized and played up in the press, and then characterized as anti-unification and anti-the secretary of Defense.

In retaliation, an incensed Secretary Louis Johnson and Navy Secretary Francis Matthews removed Burke from promotion to rear admiral. This was it for Arleigh Burke. His career was over. He and petite Bobbie got out the old Plymouth, and figured out where they would go next, and were packing up. The victor of Solomon Islands was packed out.

Meanwhile, back at the White House, a Captain Dennison, later an Admiral, handed Harry Truman the list of promotions to rear admiral. And God bless him, he spoke up and saved Adm. Burke.

He said, sir, there's one missing. I think an injustice has been done. Truman said, what's that? He says, it's Captain Burke, Arleigh Burke. Truman said, didn't I meet him down there in Norfolk? (Inaudible.) Yes, sir, that's the one. Oh, I – he's good. Yes, sir. Well, we'll just write his name back in on the promotion list.

Oh, the secretary of Defense, the secretary of the Navy – they were shocked. Rear Adm. Arleigh Burke was saved for this country.

Now, the irony in the Revolt of the Admirals however, in this remarkable career with so many turnabouts, that they did feel they had to give him a place to sort of cool down. And a noncontroversial position would be Defense Research and Development Board.

Ironically this position was another step in opening a new vista to Adm. Burke and introducing him and enthraling him with technological and strategic solutions to naval and defense issues, through creative breakthroughs, thinking smarter, not richer.

We need that today. The seeds were sown in this training for Burke's monumental Polaris breakthrough.

We now move back to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. And the drama doesn't stop. Burke served as deputy chief of staff to commander of Naval Forces Far East and then as commander of Cruiser Division Five.

After MacArthur's truly brilliant Inchon operation – which Burke applauded, which pushed the North Korean armies running back to the north – Burke flatly disagreed with

MacArthur's strategy to pursue the North Koreans to the Yalu River, ignoring reports of Chinese intervention.

And as was his custom, he spoke up and challenged. Burke argued that MacArthur should establish this line between Wonsan and Pyongyang, and from that line the U.S. Army could continue to mop up North Korean armies and, if the Chinese did intervene, be in an ideal position to deal with it, but avoid provoking. Burke knew when to be aggressive and when to be careful.

MacArthur rebuffed the idea. He knew best. Burke didn't.

If Burke's advice had been followed, the Chinese would not have intervened; the Wonsan-Pyongyang line today would be the border between North and South Korea; and two-thirds of Korea would be free.

Another Burke what-if:

In 1951, to Burke's surprise, he was made a member of the United Nations Truce Delegation. The purpose was to negotiate with the communists for military armistice in Korea. As those tedious negotiations proceeded, Burke became angered and frustrated by the fact that the American soldiers continued to die while we wrangled over a few hills – later I had to go fight for those hills – and people died, and we weren't accomplishing anything, and he felt that the strategy was unsatisfactory.

He learned a lot about the communists in those negotiations, particularly if he had to take a rest stop in the next room, come back, and they'd taken a new position, had new – on the line and had negotiating position.

But something else happened during this period – very remarkable, Mr. Ambassador. Arleigh Burke lived in Japan. He came to love the Japanese. That Japanese that came in and put flowers in his room. And when he left every night, he thanked the management, and they said, she's done this on her own.

He got to know your admirals, and he became a powerful influence on the development of the early Japanese Maritime Defense (sic) Force. And when we set up CSIS, and when I came from the State Department and he was leaving, he said, you know, "I've attended these conferences in Japan" – this was in 1970 – "You've got to open major efforts with Japan." And it's for that reason we got together and these major congressional exchanges later got to know Dr. Toyota, who gave us the Japan chair here, then Dr. Inamori, who's endowed the Abshire leadership academy here, and a real tie of this center with your great country.

After six months, Burke returned to the United States and became director of – let me say, I wear my decoration from your emperor – really I think it came because of what CSIS has done for Japan today in your honor.

After six months, Burke returned to the United States and became director of Strategic Plans Division. Now, after assuming this position, he boldly asked to see the president. You know, he's a rear admiral. (Laughter.) That didn't mean a damn to him. (Chuckles.)

Well, all right. They granted him 15 minutes. It went on two hours. Burke forcefully laid out his observations about the communists and why this war, the whole strategy was wrong. And later, you know, Eisenhower moved to what Burke wanted. But he was banging his hands on the table on this president who'd saved him. (Chuckles.) I mean, it – just an amazing personality. Truman listened.

With his record of dissent, Burke figured they had him tagged. He was shocked when President Dwight Eisenhower announced that he was going to be chief of Naval Operations in 1955. He objected. (Laughter.) This was not a good idea at all. There were 92 active flag duty officers senior to him. It was going to cause bad feelings and make his job impossible.

Furthermore, he had a – did they think he was a patsy? He had a bad habit of speaking his mind, didn't they know that? He was not going to change.

Objections overruled; Burke became CNO on August 17, 1955. (Laughs.) My gosh, Jim Watkins, how did he do it? (Laughter.)

MR. : The hard way. (Laughter.)

MR. ABSHIRE: (Laughs.) The hard way.

With the added press attention, and with his war exploits written up again, you know, on the Time – many times, Time Magazine cover, Burke more than ever was a true national celebrity and hero.

As the 15th CNO, Burke immediately set about to inculcate individual initiative and responsibility throughout ranks. Take the initiative! Think anew! Act anew! Come up with new ideas!

Burke often said he could not command anything in Washington. He could only influence. He could only inspire. He could only set an example, and offer strong vision for national strategy and for the future of sea power, as Adm. Mahan once had at the Naval War College.

Shortly after becoming CNO, Burke was at it again with the president – the very president that had done this for him. This time, it was over the issue of eliminating the peacetime draft. Burke believed that such a move would hinder U.S. ability to fulfill its defense obligations at that time, especially those of the Navy.

He disagreed with the secretary of the Navy on this, he disagreed with the secretary of Defense on this, and then he demanded to see the president. We're back at it once again. In

those days it was the privilege of the CNO. That's one of the reasons they were slow on this unification, Mike. (Chuckles.)

And in front of President Eisenhower were the secretaries of Navy and Defense sitting there, angry. Burke goes on and on laying out the reasons for his position, and Ike is getting redder and redder in the face. And finally, after some time, Ike slams his fist on the table and he says: We're going to keep the draft. Meeting over. Burke, you stay back.

Burke had won, but he got a balling out. He says, don't you ever create a situation where with your two superiors, in front of them, I overall them and disgrace them. Never again, Burke.

"Yes, sir." The draft remained.

Well, Burke figured he'd won that, but he figured he was through with Ike. And he began to get these invitations. Just, you know, come over to the White House for a drink. Come over and let's have another little discussion.

They developed this fast friendship. Ike was dying at Gettysburg when Burke was here at the center. One of the last people he sent for to talk to.

Now, we mentioned earlier how Burke treasured the value of science, the cutting edge, the narrow edge in victory, like we know at Wake, that comes from those breakthroughs which are so key. And his greatest achievement as chief of Naval Operations was the development of the Polaris. Burke felt that such a nuclear-armed Polaris missile, designed to be fired from submarines, would give the U.S. strategic flexibility in the Cold War. Burke contrasted this flexibility with that of the Air Force dependence on bombers operating from fixed positions.

Furthermore, he argued that intercontinental missiles and development were dependent upon fixed launching strikes. He pointed out that the Polaris missile submarines could move anywhere around the globe with agility and from not just one designated position. The Polaris maneuverability could also replace – this really burned up the Air Force – those vulnerable Air Force bombers, based on fixed launching sites at substantially lower cost to the nation.

Needless to say, Burke's alternate strategy, sometimes called finite deterrence, control retaliation, certainly greater agility, was a devastatingly direct attack on the Air Force bomber and massive, indiscriminate missile doctrine. Now, this is one fight Burke didn't win, just as he did on the Polaris, but not on the larger strategy. This is just as he'd not won the argument on the alternate Wan San Pyongan Lan (ph) in Korea.

The Soviets constantly began to match the buildup of ICMs, increasing numbers of strategic bombers, and once escalation superiority was lost, we matched assured destruction, which could have lead, I learned at NATO when we played these games every year, to a terrible miscalculation where we were using nuclear strikes for political signaling, not thinking they might do a nuclear strike on Boston as a political signal.

Henry Kissinger challenged that at a conference we ran in CSIS in the Palais D'Egmont in 1979. Fred Ikle challenged it as undersecretary of defense. Ronald Reagan, Jim Watkins – Adm. Watkins was in the room when Ronald Reagan moved toward seeking a strategic defense initiative as a flaking maneuver, as a way out.

Burke had something going for him in adding an agility, which we lost in the strategy of Mahan. By the end of the second term as CNO, Burke stated it was obviously time for him to retire. Ike would have none of it. It was his third term, however, and Burke – his deepest disappointment with himself and his own leadership, he opened up to me here at CSIS, was the failure of the Bay of Pigs.

He felt he had let himself down. He felt he had not performed the way he had performed previously. He went over this privately with me again and again. He would never write it up because he said he didn't want to hurt anybody now that it was over. He served as acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs during this period. He would be invited into these meetings, allowed to take no notes, and there would be incremental changes made and no capability to analyze whether this was a workable operation or not.

Burke regrets that he did not go to President Kennedy and blow the whistle: This is not going to work with all of these compromises. When he did speak up, it was during that famous night in the Oval Office when the Bay of Pigs operation fell apart.

He told President Kennedy that he had a destroyer off the coast of Cuba ready to fire, to which Kennedy replied, Burke, we don't want to get involved, to which Burke responded, "Hell, Mr. President, we are involved!" Well, anyway, he was not allowed to fire and he never wanted to talk about it after that except privately.

The revered Adm. Burke finally retired in August, 1961. In his biography of Burke, Professor Potter describes in 1962 how I first attempted to persuade Arleigh to join me in founding a strategic group as a part of Georgetown University.

I told Burke it might be called the Center for Strategic Studies, and later we added "International." I received my doctorate in history from Georgetown, got the blessing of Father Edward Bunn, who thought I was a Catholic although I was Episcopalian. (Laughter.)

I came to know – I could cross myself fairly well. (Laughter.) I came to know Adm. Burke when my stepfather, Adm. George W. Anderson, who had replaced Burke as his CNO – Burke turned me down the first two times. That didn't bother me. I had the experience of dating a Navy junior who loved those white middys and not those West Pointers with gray-gold buttons.

She was a Navy many times over. Her own father, Rear Adm. Sample, was lost at the end of the Pacific war. She had four members of her family in naval – and John Warner knows all this – in naval aviation. So my wife turned me down the first two times. I got her on the third time. (Laughter.) I figured I would get Burke on the third time, and Potter says, "Abshire hooked Burke on the third go-round."

I hooked Burke on the focus, on the need to foster a coherent national strategy, a challenge we face today. Previously I had worked as a staff director on Capitol Hill. I explained to Burke my frustration with the committee compartmentalization there. I knew the admiral's frustration with compartmentalization in the executive branch. We both agreed that such mutual compartmentalization at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue was the enemy of strategic coherence, the enemy of the best use of our resources.

Burke said, when I finally hooked him, if we can tackle that issue in this new center, it will be truly strategic; count me in. My working arrangement with Burke was this: We'd meet at 8:00 sharp every morning. He had a notebook, schoolboy, with all of his boards. He was on four important corporate boards and his Boy Scouts that he was leading. He gave me his view in other organizations what worked and what didn't work to carry over to ours.

I gave him a rundown on (center of ?) research scholars program fundraising. He'd stay out unless he thought it was off course. Our first meeting he said to me – something that's very telling about him. I warrant you will like this story because you knew Adm. Burke.

He said, Dave, you call me Arleigh but I want everybody else to call me Mr. Burke. I said, Admiral, nobody is going to call you Mr. Burke; why do you want to be called Mr. Burke? (Laughter.) And he said, well, I'll tell you. There are a lot of big shots getting out of government, or else they think they're big shots getting out of government. They think the world is going to come to them. That's wrong. They've got to remake themselves and I've got to remake myself and I'm Mr. Burke. He was Mr. Burke to nobody, but that told you something about his personality.

Our first conference in the Hall of Nations at Georgetown had his imprint. The Council on Foreign Relations – I meant to bring that great big book of a thousand pages, a lap-buster they called it, but it was a strategic awakening. The title of the conference, "National Security: Political, Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead." Burke said, you've got to look 10 years ahead. Nobody is doing that. We've got to have that in our strategy.

And I think Adm. Mullen would agree, when we (locked into ?) now we've made progress with three departments in Quadrennial Reviews. They're looking four years ahead, and each one is compartmentalized.

Furthermore, Burke insisted, in this conference, that we bring together national security and national economics. Sound familiar? Burke quoted Eisenhower, who often said that those dealing with the daily near-term operational requirements could not look over and across the strategic horizon.

The 30-odd scholars at the conference included some well-known older names like Herman Kahn with his escalation business, Edward Teller, and younger thinkers like Henry Kissinger, Jim Schlesinger, Otto Eckstein, Thomas Schelling and Murray Weidenbaum.

Burke insisted that we pull together the points of differences, define the issues. He said, so often the problem is people jump to the problem and they're not looking at the issues from all angles, and that's what it is to be truly strategic.

Later I worked with Arleigh Burke on the Walter Edge lectures at Princeton. Here he wrote about and spoke about the difference between power and force. He said that so many presidents, generals, admirals, ambassadors don't understand. He said that if you have mobilizing, perfect power, as Sun Tzu talked about, the perfect battle, you didn't have to fight; you gained the will in your direction without it through power, not with force – force always being the potential.

CSIS grew throughout the 1960s as the Vietnam conflict grew. Incrementally we committed half a million men with body counts, incrementalism, light at the end of the tunnel. Burke was beside himself with this strategy, and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow came over, and we had the young president here, and he said, victory is just over the horizon. We're about to break through in the take-off period. That was two weeks before Tet.

We had an after-action on Tet that was a very – a three-star general back from Vietnam that came to that, and he assured Adm. Burke that we'd actually won in South Vietnam because the Vietcong infrastructure had been destroyed. And Burke said, Gen. Giap is not aimed at South Vietnam; he's aimed at the Battle of Washington, and he's won if the president has decided not to run again, the commander in chief. Burke knew that maxim of Napoleon that, "the moral is to the physical as three is to one." The psychological, the human factors Napoleon thought were three times more important than his armies.

I was pulled in to be assistant secretary of state for congressional relations in 1970. He didn't like that. He gave me an ultimatum two years to get back. In the ultimatum he wrote, he says, "I'm retiring in another year. We've got to make things really interesting again." That word "interesting" is the key to Burke's personality.

Whenever he disagreed with his superiors or his presidents, his arguments were interesting and captured his opponent into what he was saying. He attracted them to what he was saying. He made them think anew. This became his unusual quality of persuasion, which ultimately became a key to great leadership. Burke was a magnet.

Arleigh A. Burke's funeral took place in a packed Annapolis chapel on a very chilly day in 1996. He nearly lived to 95. Prior to his death I would visit him for a decade or more at his retirement home. He lost his chronology, never his wit. As we sat in that packed chapel – you several would have been there – there was one place on the aisle next to the national security advisor. Well, I don't think that would be Bill Clinton, President Clinton, because when CSIS was founded and we got into the Vietnam War there were people at Georgetown – and he was a student and I don't know that he marched, but marching against – ROTC marching against – (inaudible) – CSIS, even though we'd moved downtown.

At that time, the president of the United States comes down the aisle, gets up to deliver the eulogy. He was right, magnificently, with Adm. Burke – John, you were there – with Adm.

Burke fighting (us out ?) of Solomon Islands, right along with him. What a great tribute from the commander in chief.

Our story ends here, except that he's the godfather of this institution that John Hamre now so splendidly leads. Arleigh would be so proud of John. CSIS, our counselor here, one of them, said when we honored Zbig on his 80<sup>th</sup> birthday, CSIS was the first institution in Washington that sought to be truly strategic. Why not? Arleigh Burke was truly strategic.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

MR. HAMRE: I would ask our – I'll just say our panel – it just doesn't seem right to call this distinguished group a panel. You know, I mean, every one of them is such a singular leader in America and we're so proud to have them here.

You all got copies of their resumes, so I'm not going to go through introducing anybody by personal background because I think that would be a diminishment again of this afternoon. But let me just take the opportunity to say a sincere thanks – please, everybody sit down – a sincere thank you to Adm. Mullen, to Adm. Roughead, to Adm. Rondeau, and of course to the secretary of the Navy, John Warner, a counselor here at CSIS, for being here.

Evan Thomas is a fabulous author and has captured the spirit of these times in probably the most gripping of ways. We've asked him to take the lead. Evan, can I turn it over you?

EVAN THOMAS: You bet.

MR. HAMRE: Thanks.

MR. THOMAS: David's wonderful speech begs the question, shouts the question of when do leaders, particularly military leaders in a civilian-controlled system, disagree, dissent, challenge higher authority? I want to ask that of each of the group, but first let me start with you, Adm. Mullen. Could Arleigh Burke survive today? (Laughter.)

ADM. MICHAEL MULLEN: I guess, in the way David captures him so well, I would say he'd have figured out a way to do it – (laughter) – given those that he routinely challenged and the description, I think, of the word "interesting" and how he would draw individuals in, even as they got mad and even at that level, and clearly want to hear from them again. So I suspect he could and that he would have figured out a way to adjust to the circumstances that exist today, and very much so.

MR. THOMAS: But can you address the larger question of when – particularly a military officer in a civilian-controlled system – when and how and under what circumstances – what are the rules of the road on challenging higher authority and dissenting?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, actually, I think – not unlike what Adm. Burke did in the sense that in discussions that would be routine with your boss, your civilian boss, and then those that you could, when you disagree and feel strongly about it, even as we can now, right up to the

president – and it's not just me, even though I have, routinely, more access to the president than the other chiefs, but certainly they have the option.

And it's done privately and it's done in a way that – I think in a timely fashion, if you will, and that you have a president – you know, the other examples I think that are there tied to what David's talking about is you had senior individuals who wanted to listen. Presidents, senior officers, even if it maddened them, they were also willing to listen, and I think that's important for anybody in any senior position in the military and civilian that you want to listen, and having that opportunity, give that advice, and then, as was the case in a couple of examples, he didn't win them all, and I'm sure that he marched off and did whatever the senior civilian leadership said, and that's what we do now.

And so that, both opportunity, certainly I have it. I had it with President Bush, I have it with President Obama, and I think it's a very important part of our system, the opportunity to do that, and then when the president makes the decision, we're off.

MR. THOMAS: Adm. Roughead, let me just pick up with the last first. What's the line when you don't go any farther? How do you know when you're supposed to salute and keep going? What's that moment? (Laughter.)

ADM. GARY ROUGHEAD: I really think that, as you have thought the problem through, as you have tried, as David mentioned about Arleigh Burke, have made the arguments interesting, that you have explored those areas and have had a thorough vetting of your position, and in the society and in the system in which we work, when the civilian authority makes a decision, that's it.

I think you can't go in superficially. You have to have thought the problem through yourself, but when the decision is made, that's it. If at some point it is contrary to your sense of honor or your ethics, then at that time you have other options.

MR. THOMAS: At one point, at least one point, Adm. Burke basically went over the heads of others in the military to make a point to civilian authority. Eisenhower took him aside and said, don't do that again, but is that – can you imagine a circumstance in which you're a senior military officer, military officers more senior to you have basically gone along with the president, and you say, well, no? Under what circumstances might you do that? You talk about honor and ethics, but can you be a little bit more specific about a moment in which you think your senior military officers have just got it wrong or aren't challenging?

ADM. ROUGHEAD: Not to dodge. I mean, I think it has to be driven by the circumstances that you are in, the issue that you're dealing with, and the receptivity of your arguments as you put them forth, and then you as an individual have to make that decision. And I do not believe that anything fits a mold because of the many facets of every issue and the complex nature of what we're dealing with.

MR. THOMAS: Let me ask you just one more question along this line. What do you tell your subordinates about this? Do you discuss this together when you're with senior

admirals and talk about the limits of dissent? Are these conversations that happen at the highest level, and what do you say to them?

ADM. ROUGHEAD: I think that it's very, very clear that the expectations of civilian control of the military is unquestioned. I think everyone that is subordinate to me understands the strength of my convictions in that regard. I do believe it is important as a senior that you foster the opportunities for your subordinates to feel comfortable and free in having the open discussions, as opposed to having been held in check and then trying to release everything at the final moment.

And I think that in the ability to have that organization comfortable coming forward, that there is an expectation that opinions can be offered, positions can be taken, and I think that that is for the best of the institution.

MR. THOMAS: Adm. Rondeau, you are actually a teacher – Adm. Rondeau is the president of the National Defense University. What do you teach about this whole obligation or duty or limitation on speaking truth to power, so to speak?

VICE ADM. ANN RONDEAU: Let's bring Burke as our example to the answer to the question. Burke was absolutely able to constantly reframe the problem, or reframe his mind around a new problem. And so the notion of strategic reframing is an intellectual predisposition that either you have or that you learn.

And so, what we do at NDU or what any of the defense education entities seek to do is to reframe out from where we have been to something more that we should be thinking about. And so, what Burke was able to do and what we seek to do in the spirit of Burke is constantly seek to reframe mindsets and mindfulness about the issues that are in front of us.

What Burke was able to do was be comfortable thinking eight to 10, 20 years out. We seek to do that as well. But it's about setting a mindset and a mindfulness about what you are in and the environment that we are in.

If I might say, though, in echoing also the chairman and the CNO, Eisenhower was a leader who also knew what he had, and so the respecting of the mind of the leaders who are subordinate to you is also part of this. So Burke was allowed to be Burke. And one of the key things that we seek to teach is to be respectful of the intellect of those who are junior to you because they may indeed have an insight or a reframing that you do not have.

And so, every good leader would seek that, but we seek to reframe and to teach the ability to be comfortable in a different environment.

MR. THOMAS: Senator you've been watching this balance for a long time. Talk to us a little bit, as you've watched over the years, whether you think the modern military has the balance right on its willingness to challenge civilian authority, or to challenge, even within the military, their own superiors. What is your sense of how to balance this –

JOHN WARNER: Well, let's tick back 41 years when I was privileged to be in the Pentagon in the Navy Secretariat. Melvin Laird was secretary and David Packard deputy secretary. And we used to get in the rooms with the chiefs and Larry would always start, all right, let's take off the stars and bars and let's just have at it and listen to one another; I want to know your opinion. That's the same way I was privileged to – and I say with a deep sense of humility to be secretary of the Navy – I always asked everybody for their view.

But maybe – I would like to return to your first question to the chief and partially answered over here. But first to you, David Abshire – well done. As we say in the Navy, 'atta boy. (Laughter.) But, you know, as long as I've known you, you've made one mistake in life: Rather than West Point, you should have gone to Annapolis. (Laughter.)

I want to go back these many years. I had gone to the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet in the Mediterranean, and I'd met Burke. Burke had a protocol. He would – when you joined the Navy Secretariat, there would come a time he'd send a little note – now is the time I would like to meet you – and you would go over and see him in his home and his lovely wife, and that's where I first got to know him.

But where I knew him was the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet, so I did a little research. My aid at that time, a wonderful man, was Tom Hayward. He later became chief of naval operations, but this one incident might have cost him that. I found that the ship that Burke had in his squadron was still a part of our active fleet, so I went aboard her. We had a little breeches (ph) boy that transferred me from a cruiser over to the ship.

And, as a custom, I always went down to the engine room as a part of any visit aboard an operating ship. And I was just with the senior chief down there. There was an old chief petty officer boiler man down there operating that steam plant. I said, do you think you could drive this thing at 41 – I mean, 31 knots like Burke? He looked at me, he looked at the other chief, and he said, you betcha; you know what. And I said, crank it up. (Laughter.) And he looked at me and he said, I usually take my orders from the captain, but you're the secretary? Civilian authority controls. (Laughter.) This is a true story.

And for those of us who have been aboard ship, there is an exhilaration of when that steam plant throws full thrust to the cruise and that rotating power train – the ship trembles. So I thought I'd better get back up to the bridge because there's going to be a little consternation. (Laughter.)

So I got up to the bridge, and I'd had this program that I knew where Burke was, and I called him from the bridge, and the captain of the ship is there and Hayward (sp) is standing there. I got him on the phone thinking he would be just exhilarated to know that his ship – I said, Admiral, she's right at 31 knots right now. And, ladies and gentlemen, I cannot tell you the response, but it was a verbal keelhauling. (Laughter.) I mean, he dressed me down. I turned to the captain and said, the admiral said, bring her back. (Laughter.)

And in later years we met and had a wonderful relationship. I'm deeply humbled to join this distinguished panel and all with us today – truly someone who's idolized to this day by anyone who's fortunate enough to wear the Navy uniform.

MR. THOMAS: Adm. Mullen, let me ask you a history question: When you talk to your colleagues about these difficult issues about dealing with civilian authority and how far you can go, do you talk about history? Do you talk about Adm. Burke? Do you talk about how it was done in past wars? Are you informed by history?

ADM. MULLEN: I think I'm informed by history, probably for me more recently than those times. When I actually was, much to my surprise, selected to be the CNO, I did some research then on Adm. Burke and I was actually stunned that in just that period of time – his time as CNO, which I recall was six years, longest-serving – and what he was able to accomplish. And it was one of those things – I looked at that and I was wondering how I was going to even come close to matching up to anything like that, to be able to accomplish so much in that period of time. And I use that – I use it from that standpoint.

From the civilian control piece, I guess I'm much more driven and informed by current times, and by current times I'd say the last 20 years or so. And, you know, my goal as a leader is to be strictly apolitical, strictly neutral. And, in fact, the State of the Union earlier this week, I've had, you know, many comments since that about, you know, the chiefs – when we stand up, when we don't stand up – in the aftermath of the president's speech.

But the goal there, really, literally, is to certainly respond in a way that is supportive of those national security and military issues, but other than that stay completely neutral in that. And so, amongst my colleagues, and actually with my juniors, I do talk a lot about the need to stay – be completely apolitical.

And where that is different from Burke's time, I think, is in the situation where there is this seeking of news, the vast exposure to media. Certainly the media, you know, is always looking for the kinds of differentials to, in many cases, sharpen issues.

But where I think it has gotten out of bounds is, quite frankly, when we take the uniform off. And there is tension between those who have worn the uniform their whole life and then they take it off and there's tension between free speech, which is nothing that I certainly would ever take on, but I think in ways it can be very difficult to understand. Certainly I frame a lot of this from the – in terms of the farmer in Peoria, who is really talking on the news cycle, or who's writing, because, generally speaking, they're still called admiral or general, on the one hand.

And the other hand, that we're training, in that regard, many of our young officers in particular, but not exclusively, that it's okay to speak up and it's okay to disagree publicly and constantly. And I worry a great deal about that in terms of the apolitical position that the military is in.

And so – and, actually, one of the things I’ve asked Adm. Rondeau to do is address this issue, actually in all the war colleges, to our young ones because I think we do need to make sure we have it right, and –

MR. THOMAS: Because you’re both encouraging them to speak up at the same time, saying, watch it.

ADM. MULLEN: But they have to do it correctly, and they really – the treasure here is the apolitical military, and it is, in my view, what we have to, I think, ensure we guard and retain at all costs in this democracy. And it goes back to who we are, who we work for, very clear civilian control. And when – as I think Adm. Roughead said, you know, when we disagree and it gets to a point of ethics or morals, or when we actually are working for somebody and they don’t have confidence in us, then our only choice isn’t to speak up; it quite frankly is to move on.

MR. THOMAS: Let me ask you more specifically – and you’ve been asked about this before, but the most recent example of this, when it got into the news, was Gen. McChrystal’s statement.

ADM. MULLEN: Sure.

MR. THOMAS: How do you think he handled that?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I don’t want to – (laughter). How do you think he handled it? (Laughter.)

MR. THOMAS: Actually, pretty well.

ADM. MULLEN: Yeah. It was, you know, a very difficult position obviously very early in his tour in what was certainly if not then but rapidly becoming the most visible four-star position in the United States military. And it was one that was made much more challenging because it was public. And, actually, one of the things – and this is part of us growing as an institution, growing as an individual – and Gen. McChrystal and I talked a long time about moving into the four-star realm. It’s different. And then he was going to do it on the world stage, and that’s a real challenge.

So you know, all in all I thought he did handle it well. It was a very – it made the challenge of the review that much more difficult, and certainly I would have preferred to not do it as publicly as we did, and we all learned a lot in that regard, and certainly I would hope that, you know, in further strategic reviews we can avoid that particular model. (Laughter.)

MR. THOMAS: Well, said.

Admiral, let me ask you a question about the Navy in particular. By tradition, the captain of a ship has tremendous authority; in the old days complete authority because there was no communication. But even today, where you can talk to – there is a tradition of a captain

of a ship having all this authority, and yet, when he gets on land he's got to learn how to – he's not admiral – like Nelson putting his spyglass up and saying, I really cannot see the signal.

How do you balance this tradition of authority and command authority on a ship with deference to civilian authority? What do you tell you captains?

ADM. ROUGHHEAD: Well, as you pointed out, one of my favorite Burke quotes, and I identify with it a great deal, is – you do have the autonomy on a ship, and as he pointed out, “Going to sea used to be fun and then they gave us radios.” (Laughter.) And I think that even translates up in our current connectivity that we enjoy.

But I think for me – and one of the great things about our Navy and something that I place tremendous value upon with all who serve and wear this uniform – and Burke articulated this himself, in that the Navy is a culture of command; it is not a culture of staff. And that simple concept makes us who we are. The willingness to step forward when something needs to be done, the willingness to accept accountability, which is oftentimes judged to be a bit extreme in the Navy, but that is what our culture is.

And I find that that culture of command translates ashore as well because it is about the willingness to take on the hard things, the willingness to lead, and, most importantly, when things are good or bad, you accept the accountability. And so, I do not see a distinction. I see it as this great strength of this service, and I am extraordinarily proud of the men and women who live that culture.

MR. THOMAS: Senator let me go back and ask you this question again because you're in a position of having been in the service for a long time, from the wonderful perspective where you're dealing with the military. Do you think that there is any evolution here, for better or for worse, on military willingness to stand up to civilian authority, either good or bad in that direction? Or is it a fairly even progression?

MR. WARNER: I've found that particularly the individuals in the military that get the flag rank in the Navy or the general rank in the Army, they know at that time to accept a special responsibility and be very candid. Throughout my career in 30 years in the Senate I had, of course on the Armed Services Committee, regular contact with the senior officers. And I always had a policy very often to leave the aids in the anteroom and just sit with that officer but none of my own staff and just exchange views. I found it very productive, and I'm sure I've had it with you, and I've had it with you in my office on that basis.

By the way, I remember when you came up to CNO, I asked you, when I was Navy secretary, did we ever meet? You rather defiantly said no. (Laughter.) And you said – you added this – you said, I was a lieutenant JG, I was on the gun line – this was during the Vietnam War. You said, I did everything I could never to get to you. I never wanted to go there. But what goes around comes around. (Laughter.) You own it now.

But, Evan, I've got to tell you, the American citizen should be grateful for young men and women who all volunteer now and come up into these ranks and work their way up and

give their lives and their career, together with their families. And when they get there, it's always been my experience, whether it's been in the Senate or the five years I was in the Navy Secretariat, they shot straight with you.

MR. THOMAS: Adm. Rondeau, let me ask you really the same question. Do you see any evolution here of the military getting more or less willing to stand up to or to challenge – again, for better or worse – civilian authority? Is there any trend?

VICE ADM. RONDEAU: I think that the question is framed interestingly because it is at the edge. I think that young people or older people – I think that what determines the leader who can do this responsibly is the one who is intellectually curious and the one who is able to ask questions of him or herself and of the environment.

So this is not at some edge of the first act. You go about your professional life and you ask questions, you try to understand, you try to analyze, and at some point you come to an aggregation point where you would say, this does not make sense, or this is a better way. And you come to that in an analytical, mature, professional manner. Then, by that time, you also have understood where you are on point.

Then you go through the chain and you bring it up to your leadership. And usually the leaders are going to let you air that because you've thought it through and you've done a very good job at that.

So our job is when – we're educators – is to try to help the individual officer or sailor or airman, soldier, Marine to get there so that they can come to an analytical understanding of what's going on. Once you do that, your boss, your leader is going to be grateful, and for the most part they're going to let you – they will help you carry the right argument. They may even help you to shape it better so that it will be successfully argued.

So in my mind this is not about the edge point of when you must take on somebody at some point of adversary. It's about being compelling and good and competent and coherent so that everybody else is then compelled. This was Burke's gift, and this was the gift of good leaders is to be able to do that and know where you are intellectually.

So the intellectual curiosity of a young person today is to understand. Their access to information is without precedence. Our job as leaders is to help them get there so that they feel as though they're being heard, so that we are listening. This is about a conversation and not just about being at the edge of being the adversary. If that is happening, and it happens every day, then you have a really healthy military and a healthy environment.

MR. WARNER: Could I add a point?

MR. THOMAS: You bet.

MR. WARNER: These fine officers are managers, but bottom line, they're all commanders. And foremost in their minds at all times is the fact that they're responsible for

the life and the limb of those in the ranks. Their decisions put them in harm's way. Their decisions direct them to perform those duties. Now, that's a special burden that none of us in private life or politics or business or whatever – we don't have that on our conscience. That's why I always feel they give it their best.

MR. THOMAS: Amen to that.

Let's take a question from the audience. David, do we have time for a couple of questions from the audience?

MR. ABSHIRE: (Off mike.)

MR. THOMAS: All right, let's take a – anybody want to ask a question? There are mikes there. Just stand up to it. Now's the time. Yes, ma'am.

Q: I have a question for Adm. Roughead. This experience in Haiti with the military going in and offering relief, have there been any lessons that we've learned from it for the future on how we might be able to get about that faster?

ADM. ROUGHEAD: I think there are. As you may recall, there have been a couple of responses similar to this – the tsunami of 2004 in the Pacific, the earthquake in Pakistan – and so we're always looking at how we can do this better. And at the end of the experience in Haiti, whenever that may be, we will have learned much from how we respond, how we stage the types of skills and equipment that we may need.

And I think that's one of the great things about not just humanitarian relief or anything else, that the military has a wonderful culture of learning from our past and from our mistakes, and we are willing to expose things that perhaps weren't done as well as we would have liked and analyzing why that happened and how we can be better. We are constantly renewing and reexamining ourselves.

Q: Any thoughts so far as to what you might change?

ADM. ROUGHEAD: I think that the – one of the things that has been very important to me and what we've been working on for several years post-tsunami is the continued integration of non-governmental organizations and our military forces and other agencies. We have come a long way. I think that we have to continue to work on that because when you pitch into one of these, relief operations of this magnitude, it is not one entity that will pull the whole thing off; it's the integration of that.

Dick Solomon here, we've been working very closely with his organization, and I think there are going to be a lot of opportunities there to continue to develop those types of relationships and protocols that allow us to come together more quickly.

Q: Okay, thank you.

ADM. MULLEN: Let me –

MR. THOMAS: Yes, Admiral?

ADM. MULLEN: Can I just comment? I have been both intimately involved, and I think the response has been remarkable, given, one, the suddenness of it; two, the scope of it, and the ability for us to both muster resources and get them there in the mass that is required as opposed to the individual piece.

And I did – I thought some of the most remarkable stories were some of the rescue units – I mean, there was a rescue unit from China which got there 33 hours out of Beijing; the Israeli hospital that got there. And all of those are really an important part of this, but – and we had units. You know, our Coast Guard was magnificent, literally, right after the earthquake.

However, it has taken much more than that to get some structure in place to be able to handle the scope and the volume of the tragedy. And it really has come, in many ways, as a result of our assistance in Indonesia and Pakistan, even Katrina here where you couldn't get there fast enough, even – you never can in these, and yet –

And I'll just use an example of the Comfort, which got there in record time. You can't beam a thousand-foot ship in, you know, with all its people. You'd like to be able to that, but still, based on previous experience, Comfort got there in record time and look what she's doing now, and that's just one example of getting the other forces on the ground.

So we clearly will learn, and we're much better than we were, but from my perspective, the response has been magnificent, from NGO's, USAID, from our government, and from many other countries as well, in addition to the men and women in the military.

MR. THOMAS: Sir?

Q: Hi, I'm Al Pessin from Voice of America. I have a question for Adm. Mullen on this theme of leadership and what you consider as you chart a course in a complex situation towards a destination that's been determined by the commander in chief – what sort of factors you have to consider. And I'll give you two to talk about.

One is don't ask, don't tell, and the other is relations with China because the Taiwan arms sale just announced the last couple of hours. So how do you try to balance, you know, this commitment to Taiwan and the decisions made, but the imperative of remaining engaged with China? But now that I've talked about China, don't forget about the first point that I made. (Laughter.)

ADM. MULLEN: I actually will be happy to answer the second question and I'll answer the first question Tuesday at the hearing. (Laughter.)

Q: Fair enough, fair enough.

ADM. MULLEN: The issue, from a leadership perspective, with China I think is one that I and others have responsibility, from a military-to-military perspective, and opportunities, as has been the case with many, many countries. I actually find it a little bit ironic that we're talking about Adm. Burke, who put the Polaris program in place.

And I literally, last week, was in Moscow in negotiations with my counterpart with respect to the START follow-on treaty, which has an awful lot to do with the vision that he had, even though he didn't win all of that, which affects the decisions that we make and how long they last. Sometimes we think of them in the short term.

So I actually try to think about how I handle myself and approach this from the long-term perspective. After you're here in Washington a while, at least there is an opportunity to look out more than just tomorrow, and what does it mean?

And the reason I bring that up in China, and particularly on the mil-to-mil, because my thoughts are very much not anywhere – not even close to just the senior leadership perspective because I really want our younger officers to meet each other, because that's the future, that's going to be the relationship, that's what we lost more than anything else in Pakistan when we sanctioned them for 12 years is those mid-grade officers who are now generals that don't know anything about the United States.

And so, I always have that in mind, even in the discussion earlier in terms of both accountability and being apolitical. Half of my mind goes to our young ones so that in the long run that change can be made, and I feel that way with China. And I'll save Tuesday's answers for Tuesday on don't ask, don't tell. I certainly recognize the question and I understand that this issue is moving very rapidly.

Q: Thank you.

MR. THOMAS: David?

MR. ABSHIRE: I'd like to make a comment and then I think maybe John should wrap us up.

MR. THOMAS: You bet.

MR. ABSHIRE: The hour has come – a marvelous session here.

You know, I think what so overarches the civilian military – and Burke understood this – is the power of ideas, and I'm going to take two examples – one, John, with my naval hat for not going to Annapolis, because I served on the board of the Naval War College, and then my Army hat, with the long visit I had privately with David Petraeus last week.

But, you know, here are two cases of a whole change of strategic tactical doctrine, one by the pen-and-ink (ph) sailor that BUPERS constantly tried to sink as he – he went to history;

Petraeus went to the lessons of Iraq. Both learned; both got their acolytes. So David Petraeus described this, how they got the buy-in, the puzzle they put together.

Out at Leavenworth – I remember I one time mentioned at the White House that Petraeus was at Leavenworth and they ought to bring him back. They said, in the penitentiary? (Laughter.) I said, no, he's at Gen. Staff School out there. I won't say who said that in the White House. It was the last administration. (Laughter.)

But the – that Mahan got his acolytes; T.R. Roosevelt, who then became assistant secretary, but before that he was going up to the Naval War College. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, John Hay (ph), became Secretary of State – Elliot Rue (ph). And when they came then to Washington there was a whole strategic vision in the move into the Pacific, and the only reason, the only thing we had prepared in World War I with the Navy to support the Army over there was due to this one guy and his thought process and the acolytes.

Petraeus did the same. And, you know, they changed a mindset in the way you fight in asymmetrical war. And I told him, you know, this is very similar – very different than – and then when you get into this, it blurs civilian military. People are moving forward on ideas and doctrine.

And of course the other thing that I've already said – I said this in my last book – this civilian – George Marshall, great secretary of state as well as defense, and our national security advisor – this mix is good, this military experience mixed with civilian – the State Department learned to appreciate that. We need engineers, former four-stars and USAID today, and so forth.

But I think this has been a wonderful session and, really, we're indebted to all of you. John, I think we'd better wrap it up, but I really thank you all for being with us and echoing the one and only Adm. Arleigh Burke. Thank you very much.

MR. HAMRE: Thank you very much. (Applause.)

(END)