



**FIELD REPORT ON
IRAQ'S POST CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION**

**Testimony before the
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
July 23, 2003**

A joint statement by

**John Hamre, Frederick Barton, and
Bathsheba Crocker, *CSIS*
Johanna Mendelson Forman, *United Nations Foundation*
and Robert Orr, *Council on Foreign Relations***

**CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 1800 K STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20006
TELEPHONE: (202) 887-0200 FACSIMILE: (202) 775-3199. WWW.CSIS.ORG**

**UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION, 1225 CONNECTICUT AVE, NW, SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, DC 20036
TELEPHONE: (202) 887-9040 FACSIMILE: (202) 887-9021 WWW.UNFOUNDATION.ORG**

**COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1779 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20036
TELEPHONE: (202) 518-3400 FACSIMILE: (202) 986-2984 WWW.CFR.ORG**

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, it is an honor to testify before you today on the subject of Iraq's post-conflict reconstruction. Together we recently visited Iraq and spent nearly two weeks in comprehensive interviews on the progress in post-conflict reconstruction. We went to Iraq at the invitation of the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Bremer.

We were invited to undertake this trip because of the extensive research we have completed over the past two years on the post-conflict reconstruction challenges that the world has faced during the past fifty years, and how the lessons from that analysis might be applied to the situation in Iraq. This work was undertaken by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the United States Army, with support provided by the United Nations Foundation, and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

Let me state that we were given complete cooperation and support by Administrator Bremer and his team in Baghdad. We have shared our findings with Administrator Bremer and with Secretary Rumsfeld. We have provided to the Committee a copy of our report and would ask that it be included in the formal record of these proceedings.

Mr. Chairman, we know that you, your colleagues, and staff have recently visited Iraq, and we know that our trip report has been reviewed. Therefore, permit me to summarize briefly a few key points so that we might quickly turn to your questions.

Despite the difficulties that we confront in Iraq at this time, we cannot fail in our mission to create a new government in Iraq, a government that represents the people of Iraq, embraces a constructive agenda of economic and social development and establishes a set of positive security policies and programs in the region. While we cannot fail in this task, success is far from certain. Indeed, the next 3-6 months are crucial.

There are seven points we would like to reinforce.

First, the security environment today is impeding all other aspects of the reconstruction of Iraq. There are insufficient security forces in Iraq. That does not necessarily mean that we need more troops in Iraq. It does mean, however, that we need to dramatically expand the role of indigenous Iraqi security forces and tailor U.S. and allied contributions to most effectively meet the composite security needs of the country.

Second, Iraqis need to take control of the future of their country. Administrator Bremer took the crucial first step by establishing the Iraqi Governing Council and local and provincial political councils throughout the country. It is essential that these councils succeed. We believe this requires a careful balance of mentoring and challenging the Governing Council to address increasingly complex issues, but at a pace where it can succeed.

Equally important, we need to start knitting together the growing governance institutions at the national, provincial, and local levels. Our military forces and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) officials have done an excellent job of creating the local political councils. It is now critical to link these councils to the Iraqi Governing Council, and to give the local and provincial councils the resources to meet needs that have been identified through local priority-setting processes.

Third, we must grow the economy. The crucial first step is to secure the countryside so that reliable electricity can be delivered to the cities and to the oil fields and refineries. Iraq has been blessed with excellent natural resources. We cannot ensure that those resources are fully applied to Iraq's reconstruction until we make it safe and are able to deliver reliable power.

This is not by itself enough, however. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq developed a deeply flawed, corruption-ridden economy that needs complete reform. This task cannot be met overnight. Indeed, we must proceed with structural reform carefully, since there is already excessive unemployment.

Fourth, the Coalition Provisional Authority needs to extend its representation into the country. Specifically, the CPA needs to establish offices in Iraq's 18 provinces, and to provide these provincial officers with adequate staffing and resources. Currently the CPA depends on military commanders in the field to undertake civil reconstruction efforts. These military commanders have done an excellent job, but they are at the edge of what they are trained to do as we start the most complex governance, economic, and social tasks.

Field CPA offices will serve to help link the local provincial governing structures with the Iraqi Governing Council, provide a much better ongoing assessment of conditions in the country, enhance operational speed and effectiveness, and allow maximum empowerment of Iraqis.

We also believe that these field offices represent an opportunity to broaden international participation in the civil reconstruction effort. These provincial CPA offices do not have to be — indeed should not be — exclusively staffed by American and British officials. This is an opportunity to widen the basis of international cooperation in the rebuilding of Iraq.

Fifth, our information campaign must be more aggressive. We have failed to communicate our vision for a new Iraq to the Iraqi people. We need an enhanced public outreach program, complete with radio, television, and print media, and Iraqi word of mouth. We should also explore unconventional communication channels such as the internet and school programs. This cannot be overstated. In a society where rumors dominate and trust has not existed, two-way communications need to be dynamic and ever-present.

Sixth, we have an international coalition that is helping us build a new Iraq, but we need to broaden that coalition even further. We need to find ways to invite other countries in to help with the rebuilding. The creation of the Iraqi Governing Council represents an important

opening in that regard.

Finally, Administrator Bremer and his team need greater flexibility and funding to deal with the daunting challenges they face. The CPA needs more money. There are several ways to fix this problem. We need to harvest what resources we can from the old “oil for food” program. We need to hold a successful donors conference in October. And—although this is not a popular thing to say in the face of record deficits—we are likely to need additional supplemental appropriations this fall or winter. Finally, we need to ensure that all potential revenue for the reconstruction is unencumbered, which will require addressing the question of Iraq’s outstanding debt and reparations, relieving funding from internal U.S. government constraints, and avoiding encumbering future oil revenues to generate immediate income.

The more we cheat the present, the longer the reconstruction stretches into the future. Saving now is a false economy.

There are many individuals who question whether or not we should have undertaken the war against Iraq. This is a perfectly legitimate line of inquiry, but it is not the situation we face. We did defeat an evil regime. We do have a responsibility to rebuild Iraq. We cannot fail in this task.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, we can go into each of these areas in extensive detail. We are pleased to answer your questions and to help the committee in any way as you participate in this national responsibility. Let me again state that for this mission, we cannot fail.