

# The Future of U.S.-Angola Relations

A conference sponsored by the  
Center for Strategic and International Studies  
and the U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce

**Cochairs**

J. Stephen Morrison and  
Paul Hare

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# The Future of U.S.-Angola Relations

## The Conference

On June 12, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce (USACC) cohosted a conference on U.S.-Angola relations, which aimed, early in the Bush administration, to raise the profile of U.S. foreign policy stakes in Angola, advance U.S.-Angola exchange on the evolving bilateral relationship, and update debate on the critical issues and choices that the Bush administration faces in the near to medium term. Co-chaired by CSIS Africa Program director Stephen Morrison and USACC executive director Paul Hare, the conference brought together more than 80 participants, comprising senior officials from the U.S. and Angolan governments, congressional staff, corporate representatives, the United Nations, nongovernmental groups (human rights, democracy, relief, and development), policymakers from the Clinton administration and other former senior diplomats, and academic experts. John Hamre, president of CSIS, and Rodney Goodwin, senior vice president of Equator Bank and chair of the U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce, opened the conference. Victor Tanner, CSIS senior associate, served as conference rapporteur. Participant remarks were not for attribution.

The conference was funded by BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron, C/R International, and Texaco.

## Introduction

The United States and Angola have a long history of intermittent and episodic engagement dating back to the administration of President Gerald Ford, but the relationship in general has lacked depth, maturity, and mutual understanding. U.S. knowledge of Angolan policies and political dynamics is in general superficial and too often limited to experts within the oil industry or academia.

And yet, Angola is important to the United States for a number of reasons:

- The United States derives a significant share of its imported energy from Angola, and in future years this portion will increase dramatically. This has serious implications for U.S. national energy security policy, for U.S. direct

investment, and for U.S. domestic employment. It means that U.S. stakes in a stable, well-functioning, and predictable environment in Angola will rise steadily.

- Angola is in the midst of attempting major internal economic reform: if it succeeds and moves forward, it will open the way for new forms of economic development and open the way for a deepening of the bilateral relationship.
- Angola's continued internal war has high human costs, blocks progress on many other critical areas, including coping with HIV/AIDS, and contributes to instability within the region. Elections are in the future. There are new forms of dialogue internally, increasingly involving church and other independent voices.
- Angola plays a key role in the resolution of the crisis in neighboring Congo.

This is a propitious time to reexamine the nature of the U.S.-Angola relationship. The conference takes place against the backdrop of Secretary of State Powell's visit to Africa with the new administration in Washington showing early and high-level interest in Africa. Dynamics within Angola and in the Great Lakes region also give reason for optimism. Now, growing economic engagement between the United States and Angola must be married with a deepening of democratic structures and an opening of political space, both for the well-being of Angolans and for long-term health of the bilateral relationship.

With 4 percent of U.S. imported oil coming from Angola, the United States has important interests in Angola and will benefit from a strengthening of bilateral ties, particularly commercial and investment links. But these ties cannot flourish until Angola's conflict is resolved, and lasting resolution can come only through the construction of an open, pluralistic democracy.

## **Prospects for Resolution of Angola's Internal War**

Angola's internal war has been brutal and prolonged. With 3.8 million internally displaced persons and 400,000 refugees, it has been a major source of social and economic disruption. After the collapse of the Lusaka protocol in 1998, there was a radical disengagement by the international community and considerable skepticism about prospects for peace. The last three years have witnessed significant changes in Angola, with respect to both the internal and the external players, and while the humanitarian situation remains terrible, new hope is emerging that the conflict can be dampened. It is unlikely that this will happen through conventional diplomacy—direct negotiations, peacekeeping, and third-party observer and mediation efforts. The collapse of Lusaka was a break point and a dramatic failure of conventional diplomacy. The question remains: where do we go now?

In 1998 UNITA had rearmed, benefiting from \$3.7 billion in off-the-record diamond sales according to some estimates and successful manipulation of a number of other regional actors, a situation reminiscent of 1992. Both UNITA

and the Angolan government were resentful of the West and distrustful of the UN and the “troika” of donor nations. There was considerable regional uncertainty as well, with Laurent Kabila stumbling in Kinshasa; Rwanda and Uganda allegedly establishing shadowy linkages with UNITA; and Zambia, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo actively engaged in trafficking with UNITA. At the same time, South Africa made its offer of mediation and was rebuffed by the Angolan government. In addition, there were serious economic strains: in 1998, oil prices stood at \$12–13 per barrel and were threatening to drop even further.

The situation today is much different. The international approach has shifted away from peacekeeping and instead seeks to marginalize and stigmatize UNITA through a raft of UN Security Council sanctions and staunch the networks and flows that keep it engaged in war. The harsh denunciation of UNITA by the Security Council’s investigative panel, headed by Canadian ambassador to the UN Robert Fowler, was a case in point. UNITA cannot travel; Jonas Savimbi and other leaders still in the bush are getting old; and UNITA’s strategy is increasingly centered on terror and tactics born of weakness and desperation. The diamond industry is in the midst of a major restructuring, and while it has not closed all opportunities for UNITA, it has curtailed them considerably. A heavy Angolan diplomatic investment in the Congo, Namibia, and Zambia has borne fruit, and as a result, UNITA finds its conventional military capabilities much reduced. Finally, oil prices have risen to \$25–\$30 per barrel, financially boosting the Angolan government. As the internal military threat has diminished, there has been a loosening of political dialogue internally, a relaxation of media controls, and signs by the government—evidenced by the commissioning of the World Bank/IMF oil diagnostic—that it may focus efforts increasingly on accountability and transparency. These moves signal a psychological shift and make it possible to begin thinking seriously about reconciliation and ending the war, although this process will almost certainly not entail a sudden or dramatic turnaround and is highly uncertain.

What are the options? Internal actors are the predominant drivers, and the greatest responsibility will fall to the government of Angola. A first option might be that the international community returns to the Lusaka protocol as a venue for renewed talks. While Lusaka might continue to provide a framework, some observers suggest it will be more useful as a benchmark. The Angolan government, for its part, has indicated that it is open to resuming implementation of Lusaka if Savimbi will unconditionally and unequivocally renounce violence. But the government has made clear that it does not see the Lusaka protocol as open to renegotiation. According to the Angolan government, both Bicesse and Lusaka failed because of Savimbi’s intransigence. The government made concessions few other governments would have made, and yet it remains willing to go back to the Lusaka protocol. And the government believes that the Inter-Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA), which leads an active coalition of Angolan civic organizations, is coming round to the position that the Lusaka protocol is the necessary platform for peace. The only way forward, according to this view, is to pressure Savimbi: the Angolan government will pressure him militarily; the UN with sanctions; and the Bush administration with support for sanctions.

A second option will be for the government of Angola to take unilateral reformist actions, including elections, increasing social services, initiating anti-corruption measures, extension of administrative control, outreach to UNITA parliamentarians, greater tolerance of media, and outreach to churches and other civil society groups.

A final option, which is possible but not probable, is that external actors like South Africa will get involved to negotiate a transition to a post-Savimbi UNITA. Angola's relationship with South Africa is complex—there is an enduring gap between the two and a continued danger of misunderstandings. This benefits Savimbi and spills into U.S.–South Africa relations: the South African government, for example, regularly accuses the United States of indulging Angola because of oil. The Angolan government's official position is that Angola–South African relations are very good, and the two governments are aligned on the fact that Savimbi is a war criminal and the Lusaka protocol offers the best way forward. Yet in the international arena, according to an Angolan official, South Africa waffles on Lusaka and Savimbi, behavior which puzzles and irks the Angolan government. But Angola has improved its relations with Zambia and regional actors and could do the same with South Africa if it makes a concerted effort. The United States could play a supportive role in this regard.

## **Angola's Evolving Regional Security Interests**

### ***Changing situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo***

Six months ago prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were grim. Today there is reason for cautious optimism and new opportunities for the United States and Angola to work toward common goals of fostering peace, regional stability, and eventually, democratic development in DRC. While Laurent Kabila succeeded in frustrating virtually every interested party, his son Joseph has proven to be quietly effective at dampening the conflict. He has reached out to some of the combatants (e.g., Uganda), and he is travelling domestically and has visited many foreign capitals. His accession to power has given new life to former Botswana president Masire's negotiating mission. He has managed to distance himself from his father's cabinet, having had the wisdom first to listen to his protectors and then the self-confidence to fire them, and his new cabinet includes several respected technocrats. Joseph Kabila has no popular base; yet, despite his "foreign-ness," he seems to have a real sense of national identity, like so many Congolese. Most importantly, fighting seems to be decreasing. But the security vacuum caused by the incompetence of the Congolese armed forces and the associated security fears of Congo's eastern neighbors remain the main obstacle to a full withdrawal of foreign forces.

The situation concerning the ex-FAR–Interahamwe forces (respectively, former Rwandan armed forces and an extremist Hutu militia group largely responsible for Rwanda's 1994 genocide) is uncertain: the Rwandan government alleges DRC government support for the rebels, while the DRC government argues that any support that is getting through is primarily food and other things,

but that weapons are being blocked. Recent attacks on the Congo-Rwanda border can therefore be interpreted either as the result of an emboldened ex-FAR, or as the move of groups that are growing desperate for want of support.

### ***Angola's regional interests***

The key to understanding Angolan foreign policy is the existence of its 35-year internal war. Without threats from UNITA, and to a lesser degree FLEC (a Cabindan separatist group), said one participant, Angola's regional foreign policy would more likely be noninterventionist, perhaps even nonchalant. According to the Angolan government, Angola's approach to the DRC conflict rests on principles that are enshrined in Angolan constitutional law and which undergird both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN: sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia are invited forces inside the DRC; Rwanda and Uganda are not.

In the past few years Angola has projected itself beyond its borders three times, each time decisively and to considerable effect. In 1996–1997, Angolan support enabled Laurent Kabila's march and that of his erstwhile allies, Rwanda and Uganda, on Kinshasa, with tacit U.S. support. In late 1997, Angola intervened against President Lissouba in Congo-Brazzaville, which the United States sharply opposed. And in 1998, Angola moved to defend Laurent Kabila, and the United States did not officially take a position on this action but was widely perceived as more sympathetic to the Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed insurgents who nearly toppled Kinshasa. As these three excursions make clear, Angola has the means to act and the will do so with or without U.S. consent.

In May 2001, Angolan president Dos Santos' advice to Joseph Kabila was to open the political system, cooperate with the inter-Congolese dialogue, and establish accepted rules for a national transition. Kabila has subsequently grasped four fundamental realities, three of them encouraged by the Angolan government. First, UN deployment will help protect the Congolese government and prevent the loss of additional territory and should therefore be encouraged. Second, the DRC, even with its allies, does not have the capability to expel Rwanda and Uganda through military force alone and hence cannot insist upon their full, prior withdrawal as a precondition to support of a UN deployment and onset of the internal dialogue. Third, a popular incumbent who opens the Congolese political process can (and likely will) "win" the inter-Congolese dialogue and emerge as a legitimized DRC leader. And finally, the DRC government's relation to the former Rwandan forces responsible for the 1994 genocide (ex-FAR) and others, such as the Burundi *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (FDD) and *Forces Nationales pour la Libération* (FNL), is as much a liability as an asset and becomes increasingly a liability as Kinshasa seeks the moral high ground. On this latter point, Angola's perspective is ambiguous: the Angolan government has traditionally favored Burundi president Buyoya and has reportedly been pressuring Kinshasa to convince the FDD and FNL to participate in the Burundi peace process in Arusha.

### ***U.S.-Angola relations and the DRC***

A genuine opportunity to dampen the war and promote peace now exists in the DRC, and the United States should view Angola as a strategic partner in seizing this opportunity. There are important points of convergence in U.S. and Angolan interests in the Great Lakes region. Both countries want oil supplies in the Gulf of Cabinda protected from conflict and disruption; both want to see UNITA barred from using DRC territory as a launch-point for violent attacks; both want to see a stable and self-sustaining DRC, particularly with regards to security; and both want to see an end to cross-border movements of refugees and armed groups. The United States has long sought a common interest with the Rwandan and Angolan governments, but this has most often failed as both Kigali and Luanda accuse Washington of favoring the other.

Rwanda and Angola need to find a way to move beyond their longstanding mistrust of one another. The joint political and military commission established under the Lusaka accord is one way; high-level regional negotiations are another. If the United States can establish its role as an honest broker in the Great Lakes, it may well be able to push Angola and Rwanda to recognize and act upon their common interests in DRC—that is, to preclude insurgent groups from using DRC territory to threaten their respective states. From the U.S. perspective, there is a need to bring Angola into a sustainable regional security arrangement and change the fact that Angola and its military are seen as a threat.

Coordination with the French will almost certainly increase the likelihood of success. And there is an increasing convergence of U.S.-French interests in their shared desire to see a withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, the disarmament of rebel groups, and progress on the inter-Congolese dialogue.

### **U.S. Energy Policy and Angola**

In a luncheon address, the U.S. under secretary of state for economic, business, and agricultural affairs, Alan Larson, placed Angola in the context of the recently released report of the Bush administration's National Energy Policy Development Group.

U.S. energy policy is predicated on conservation, increasing production, and enhancing infrastructure. The NEPD report noted that concentration of world oil production in any one region of the world is a potential contributor to market instability, benefiting neither oil producers nor consumers. Encouraging diversity of world oil production is therefore an important component of U.S. policy.

West Africa is expected to be one of the fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the U.S. market. African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulfur, suitable for stringent refined product requirements, which ensures it a growing market share at refining centers on the East Coast of the United States. West and Central Africa, at 900,000 barrels per day exported to the United States, account for 10 percent of U.S. imports. Angola's growing offshore oil industry, with participation by U.S. and international oil firms, is also a major source of growth.

In 2000, Angola exported 300,000 barrels of oil per day to the United States, out of a total daily production of 750,000 barrels, and is thought to have the potential to double its exports over the next 10 years. And yet despite these production advances, Angola remains at the lowest end of the spectrum of human and development indicators (per capita income, health, education). The country faces three transitions: from war to peace, from an authoritarian to a pluralistic society, and from a planned economy to a free market. It is gratifying to see our oil companies so active in Angola, but the United States wants to see forward movement on budgetary transparency, decreased military spending, and sustained progress in curbing corruption. An important recommendation of the NEPD report is to support more transparent, accountable, and responsible use of oil resources in African producer countries to enhance the stability and security of trade and investment environments.

According to one Angolan participant, the Angolan government is willing to move forward against corruption—with a tribunal of accounts, curbs on government spending, enhanced transparency of oil transactions—but persistent war with UNITA constrains these efforts. The Angolan government seeks to encourage nonconventional and more flexible approaches to economic reform that are not tied to overly rigid formulas. It is not looking only for more money; it is looking for ways of becoming a full partner with the United States, even given Angola's difficult conditions.

For its part, the United States is open to new forms of cooperation, but budgetary transparency and measures to improve the lives of average Angolans will be prerequisites for a fuller partnership.

One participant commented that while the NEPD report called for greater accountability in the countries where U.S. companies have invested, there is little additional U.S. foreign assistance to strengthen regulatory mechanisms and provide technical expertise. The Bush administration, in its view, does not regard public sector resources as the *sine qua non* of reform. It looks instead to the private sector for major innovations and inputs in this regard.

## **Oil, Economic Reform, and Democratic Governance**

### ***Oil***

Angola's recent offshore oil discoveries account for 60 percent of the 12 billion barrels in new deep-water reserves discovered in West Africa in recent years. Angola's current output is 750,000 barrels per day. Oil company capital expenditures will peak at \$4.1 billion in 2004, and annual income from tax revenues to the Angolan government will peak at \$1.5 billion in 2007 (assuming an oil price of \$18 per barrel). Tax and profit revenues will peak at \$2 billion per year in 2007. But because the costs of working in Angola are so high (e.g., poor infrastructure, project delays, and the amount of revenue allocated to the government), the Congo Basin reserves are less profitable to the oil companies than reserves in the Gulf of Mexico. The government of Angola must proceed carefully so as not to make the cost of exploiting its oil prohibitive.

### ***The Angolan economy: progress and difficulties***

An Angolan government official outlined how, beginning in 1999, the government initiated a medium-term economic recovery program, which rested on a liberalized exchange rate, an interbank monetary and foreign exchange market, civil service reform, and the dismantling of subsidies and price controls. And the Angolan government is also making new commitments: UK Crown Agents has been contracted to revamp Angolan customs, and the government has commissioned a study of Central Bank figures and reporting, with a particular emphasis on the oil sector. The government is currently planning the privatization of state assets (public banks, power company) and has set up a fund for social-economic development. Social spending accounts for 40 percent of the budget and military spending for only 15 percent. Yet there are still problems: inflation is running at 200 percent (against the 75-percent planning target), and budgetary spending is up, mostly because of military expenditures necessary to defend against resurgent UNITA attacks.

When the IMF comes to Luanda to review the staff-monitored program in July, it will become clear that some of the goals will not be met. So far, the Angolan currency has held because of ample international reserves and anti-inflationary measures. The Angolan government wants international support, including debt relief and greater understanding on the part of the Bretton Woods institutions and the United States of Angola's political and security challenges. The agreement with the IMF was predicated on improved security, but in the Angolan government's view, the reality is different. Angola has tremendous potential—grounded in a strong resource base, ethnic homogeneity, and a vibrant civil society—but needs investment and international support.

### **The Future of U.S.-Angola Relations**

Critical questions that dominated debate five years ago in Angola persist today: war and peace; what role external actors and the UN should play; next steps by Savimbi and UNITA; the deleterious yet potentially constructive impact of oil and the role of U.S. companies in advancing developmental opportunities; and the immense, unending suffering of the Angolan people.

What does Angola want from the U.S.-Angola relationship? The first months of the Bush administration have raised high expectations in Angola, and Secretary Powell's visit to the continent was very well received. The Angolan government wants to work with the United States to address the internal security threat and asks that the administration give no support to UNITA. The government wants also to increase oil production and to see more U.S. investments in infrastructure (ports, airports, and the Benguela railway, for example) and other economic sectors (energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, banking). The government would like to work more closely with the World Bank and the IMF to help foster development and eliminate poverty and would like U.S. support in that regard. Foremost, the government wants peace.

What does the United States want from the U.S.-Angola relationship? U.S. policy goals are fairly clear. The administration would like to see a deepening and broadening of the relationship and sees increased commercial ties as critical in this regard. These ties cannot grow unless there is peace, and the administration wants to see an opening of political space, because this can contribute to the resolution of the conflict. The administration wants to help civil society and particularly to reach out to religious leaders who have to date played such an important role. (It is important to note, said one participant, that many people seeking an alternative to the Angolan government and UNITA tout civil society. But civil society in Angola is both very differentiated and very complex, and not always “civil.” For instance, there have on occasion been ugly calls for greater authenticity, as occurred in Côte d’Ivoire.) The United States applauds Angola’s Peace and Reconciliation Fund and will work with the UN and the other troika countries to help bring peace.

There have been a number of mutually missed opportunities in the history of U.S.-Angola relations. Had Washington recognized the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regime in the 1970s, the present situation would be very different. U.S. interests in democracy and development have remained consistent over time. But the United States’ earlier assessment that Savimbi was the best chance for democracy in Angola proved to be mistaken. Today, the United States engages with the government of Angola as the sovereign body responsible for democratization. But future U.S. policy will be shaped by results, not ideology.

The diplomatic attention paid to Angola, said one participant, is not commensurate with Angola’s importance. While there are three commercial attachés in Nepal, there is only one in Luanda. The trailer park/embassy accommodations are an embarrassment and signal official disinterest. After Angola’s intervention in Brazzaville, the United States halted valuable military-to-military programs. All this makes no sense for a country that produces the same share of U.S. imported oil as Kuwait did at the start of the Gulf War.

The United States may not have a major role in Angola’s peace process, but that is not to say it cannot make valuable contributions to peace. Among these, intelligence, verification, tracking of UNITA, enforcing implementation of sanctions would be invaluable.

From the U.S. perspective, the stability of Angola’s government, the wealth of its oil, the power of its military, and its broader role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region are all critically important. To further the U.S.-Angola relationship, the next steps for the Angolan government will be to open political space even further and to win the hearts and minds of the Angolan people through peaceful means. The United States, said one administration official, wants partners, not problems.

# Agenda

<b>Venue:</b>	CSIS, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C.
<b>Timing:</b>	Tuesday, June 12, 8:15 am–4:45 pm
8:15 a.m.–8:45 a.m.	Registration/Coffee
8:45 a.m.–9:00 a.m.	Introduction/Welcoming Remarks John Hamre, president of CSIS, and Rodney Goodwin, chairman of the U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce
9:00 a.m.–10:15 a.m.	<b>Panel 1: Prospects for Ending Angola’s Internal War</b> <b>Moderator:</b> Ambassador Paul Hare, executive director, U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce <b>Speakers:</b> João Lourenço, secretary general, MPLA; Walter Kansteiner, assistant secretary of state for African affairs; J. Stephen Morrison, director, CSIS Africa Program
10:15 a.m.–10:30 a.m.	Break
10:30 a.m.–11:45 a.m.	<b>Panel 2: Angola’s Evolving Interests in the Congo (DRC)</b> <b>Moderator:</b> J. Stephen Morrison, director, CSIS Africa Program <b>Speakers:</b> Robert Houdek, national intelligence officer for Africa; Alex Laskaris, U.S. Mission to the UN; Joaquim B. Manguera, Angolan Mission to the UN
12:00 p.m.–1:30 p.m.	Luncheon <b>Speaker:</b> Alan Larson, under secretary of state for economic, business, and agricultural affairs
1:45 p.m.–3:00 p.m.	<b>Panel 3: Oil, Economic Reform, and Democratic Governance</b> <b>Moderator:</b> Gayle Smith, former NSC senior director for Africa <b>Speakers:</b> Auginaldo Jaime, governor of the Central Bank of Angola; Pedro de Morais, consultant to the Angolan Ministry of Finance; Michael Rogers, Petroleum Finance Company
3:00 p.m.–3:15 p.m.	Break

3:15 p.m.–4:30 p.m.

**Panel 4: Future of U.S.-Angola Relations**

**Moderator:** Ambassador Don Steinberg, deputy director for policy planning, Department of State

**Speakers:** Ambassador Josefina Pitra Diakite, Embassy of the Republic of Angola; Charles Snyder, deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs; Gerald Bender, University of Southern California

4:30 p.m.–4:45 p.m.

Wrap-up

Ambassador Paul Hare and J. Stephen Morrison

# Participants

John Acree  
*International Resources Group, Ltd.*

Joyce Akhahenda  
*Africare*

Jim Andrews  
*Halliburton*

Mary Angelini  
*International Republican Institute*

Sika Awoonor  
*Goodworks International*

James Babbitt  
*Office of the U.S. Vice President*

Lorenzo Bellamy  
*The Bellamy Law Firm, P.C.*

Gerald Bender  
*University of Southern California*

John Bernsten  
*U.S. Department of State*

Joe Bryant  
*BP*

Jim Burkhard  
*Cambridge Energy Research Associates*

Vicki Butler  
*C/R International*

Ruth Campbell  
*ACDI/VOCA*

Anthony Carroll  
*Manchester Trade, Ltd.*

Guy Caruso  
*CSIS*

Hank Cohen  
*Cohen & Woods International*

Nicolas Cook  
*Congressional Research Service*

Jennifer Cooke  
*CSIS*

Luis Costa  
*VOA*

Edmund De Jarnette

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*Consultant to the Angolan Ministry  
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*CSIS*

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Janet Fleischman  
*Human Rights Watch*

John Flynn  
*Chevron/British Angola Forum*

Heather Flynn  
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*PACT*

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Richard Herold  
*BP*

Robert Houdek  
*National Intelligence Council*

John Hunt  
*Citizens Resources, L.L.C.*

Gail Ifshin  
*Discovery Channel GEF*

William Irwin  
*Chevron*

Nancy Izzo Jackson  
*C/R International*

Lorie Jackson  
*ExxonMobil*

Aguinaldo Jaime  
*Central Bank of Angola*

Evaristo José  
*Embassy of Angola*

Larry Julihn  
*Samuels International*

Walter Kansteiner  
*U.S. Department of State*

John Kelly  
*ExxonMobil*

Susan Keogh  
*U.S. Department of State*

Sunni Khalid  
*Africa Journal*

Len Kusnitz  
*U.S. Department of State*

Alan Larson  
*U.S. Department of State*

Alex Laskaris  
*U.S. Mission to the United Nations*

Jonathan Lifa  
*Chevron*

Mary Locke  
*Fund for Peace*

Natasha Logan  
*The Bellamy Law Firm, P.C.*

João Lourenco  
*Government of Angola*

Terrence Lyons  
*George Mason University*

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*Angolan Mission to the UN*

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Shawn McCormick  
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Michael Miller  
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Ralph Moss  
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Filippo Nardin  
*Citizens Energy*

Johanna Nesseth  
*CSIS*

Zuwa Omoregie  
*Chevron*

Teresa O'Shannassy  
*British-Angola Forum*

Fernando Paiva  
*Chevron*

Tafadzwa Pasipanodya  
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*Embassy of Angola*

John Prendergast  
*International Crisis Group*

Michael Rogers  
*Petroleum Finance Company*

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