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**NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:  
A VIEW FROM THE HILL**

Thank you, Michele, for that generous introduction; the Armed Services Committee benefited greatly from your recent testimony on military strategy. I want to thank Dr. Hamre as well for the invitation to speak here today; I am sorry he is not able to be with us.

**History Repeating Itself**

In 1923, then-Major George C. Marshall was asked to give a speech on national defense. He briefly recounted the history of the Army's end-strength since the Revolutionary War and noted a consistent pattern. After every conflict, the United States immediately and significantly decreased the size of the Army, only to have to increase it dramatically the next time a conflict broke out. U.S. leaders continued to act as if the absence of an immediate threat justified a dramatic decrease in the size of U.S. forces and the defense budget. "The astonishing fact," Marshall said "is that we continue to follow a regular cycle in the doing and undoing of measures for the National Defense."

Nearly eighty years later, in the aftermath of the Cold War, we find ourselves caught in the same pattern. Our active duty military has shrunk from 2.1 million people in fiscal year 1989 to 1.4 million for the coming fiscal year, a decline of 34 percent. Some in the administration argue that this decline is reasonable-and that further force cuts are justified-because we do not face a single global peer competitor. But neither did the United States in 1923. Yet less than twenty years later, it found itself at the center of a massive global conflict. This pattern must stop.

**Why A View From the Hill?**

Why am I, as a member of Congress, thinking about questions of national military strategy? My first answer goes back to that 1923 Marshall speech. The Congress and the administration must bring stability to the size of our force and the resources that support it, both in the current budget and in the outyears. Stability ensures the United States can counter any threat to its interests, can fulfill its responsibility as the world's lone superpower, and can live up to the trust all those who serve in the military should have in their government.

Second, the Constitution charges the Congress "to raise and support Armies, . . .to provide and maintain a Navy, [and] to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces." This is a sacred duty that transcends merely authorizing and appropriating annual funds for the Defense Department and the military services. It requires thoughtful consideration of where our nation is heading and what the proper role and size of the military are in the current world.

Third, I have had the great fortune of serving on the Armed Services Committee for over two decades. In that time, I have participated in scores and scores of briefings and hearings and have conferred widely with active duty and retired military officers, defense experts, military historians, and, most importantly, our troops. Through their wisdom and generosity, I have learned quite a bit and have come to some opinions about what our military should be doing for our country.

### **The U.S. Role in Today's World**

It is an old speechwriting ploy to say that the United States stands at a unique moment in its history. But in this case, it happens to be true. There is no single overwhelming threat to the United States and its interests. There is no political or economic ideology to rival our democracy and capitalism. The United States is the world's leading military and economic power. It has brought not only economic progress but democracy and stability to many parts the world. On balance, the United States has provided great benefits to the world through its leadership.

We should feel a great sense of accomplishment at that. And many people in this room helped achieve it. But this elevated position creates responsibilities. The United States must continue to lead—we must consciously stoke the fire of our leadership to serve as a beacon for those friends and allies who would follow us. We must work with them as partners, without arrogance, recognizing that together we can make the world a better, safer place.

Leading in the 21st century means leading globally. The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly critical to our future security. Because of its population, growing economic strength, advancing military capabilities, and potential for conflict, this region will demand significant attention. Yet our leadership cannot focus on this region at the expense of others where U.S. interests remain strong, particularly Europe and the Persian Gulf.

In addition to requiring global leadership, our world position makes us a tempting target for those who would attack us. We may face direct challenges—attacks on our homeland, our citizens and soldiers overseas, and our military and commercial information systems. We may face indirect challenges as well—as those who resent our leadership seek to increase the costs of our global position and seek to block access to the ports and battlefields of the future. We may face challenges to our allies and friends—in conventional and unconventional forms—that affect our own national interests. And we continue to face challenges associated with being a global leader, as others ask us to contribute troops to help keep the peace and stem violence.

Given the breadth of these challenges, our national military strategy continues to matter and the size and strength of our military matter as well. A good force structure with the wrong strategy is useless. So is a good strategy with the wrong forces.

### **Getting the Strategy Right**

Getting the strategy right requires asking what the military must be able to do. In basic terms, we ask the military to prevent attacks on U.S. interests and to respond if prevention fails. Let us look at each in turn.

I use prevention to mean two broad categories of activities that together protect U.S. interests, maintain U.S. world leadership, and minimize the likelihood that the military will have to fight.

### **Protecting the U.S. Homeland**

The first preventive element of our military strategy is the protection of the U.S. homeland as it is our most fundamental national interest. We know of a number of states and non-state actors that may seek to counter U.S. conventional strength through attacks that may involve weapons of mass destruction.

To counter these threats, the United States needs a comprehensive homeland security strategy and I have called for this in legislation. To be sure, a limited missile defense system is part of such an effort. But the obsession with national missile defense by some as a "Maginot line in the sky" has become theological. A missile defense system should be treated as a weapons system like any other and it should be only one part of the U.S. approach to protecting its citizens.

Homeland security must include continued support for nonproliferation programs, including cooperative threat reduction programs with states of the former Soviet Union. It must include greater resources for intelligence and coordinated response mechanisms among a range of government agencies. Comprehensive homeland security, not merely the one element represented by missile defense, should be the focus of our efforts.

Beyond physical attacks, the United States is now vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated information warfare capabilities targeted at our military communications or at domestic critical infrastructure. The diffusion of technology allows many states and non-state actors to target the United States directly through cyberspace at a fraction of the cost of confronting us with conventional forces. Our own information operations wargames, like 1997's Eligible Receiver, showed that even a small group of attackers could break into the power grids of major American cities and disrupt military command and control systems. In such a scenario, our very technological superiority becomes a weakness with potentially devastating consequences both for infrastructure and for the lives of our citizens and troops.

In considering how to deal with information warfare, the United States must build robust offensive and defensive capabilities. We must ensure that the information and communications that enable combat operations is secure. To do this, the Defense Department should focus on integrating information operations into broader operational planning and on updating information operations doctrine.

### **Actively Shaping the Global Environment**

The second preventive element of our strategy is shaping the global environment through active U.S. military engagement. The absence of this requirement in current administration rhetoric deeply troubles me. To speak of the importance of engagement is not simply a liberal effort to make the world a better place. It is one of the best means of maintaining alliance relationships, deterring adversaries, encouraging civilian control of foreign militaries, and gathering vital intelligence throughout the world. If we want to decrease the number of contingencies to which the United States is asked to send troops, we must aggressively pursue engagement as a means of preventing such conflicts before they happen.

This vital engagement function takes two forms. First, it requires presence—both through permanent basing and temporary deployments and port calls. The changing global landscape may require basing in new locations. We should consider the use of an Indonesian island, greater presence in Guam, small deployments throughout Southeast Asia and the shifting of more European forces to the southeast of that continent. We also must be creative in how we use bases—adopting more of a lily pad approach to basing would allow us to move forces without overly stressing local communities. Frogs don't live on lily pads but they use them when needed to get where they want to go.

Beyond presence, engagement must involve continued military-to-military exchanges and international military education. This is our best means of affecting the senior leadership of other countries and of building expertise in their cultures and doctrines. These relationships should be the LAST thing we cut in times when we are trying to send a political message. Cutting contacts discourages the positive changes we are seeking to affect in many countries.

In the end, our ability to shape the global environment to the benefit of our national security depends on a multi-faceted approach, the lynchpin of which is continued engagement and collaboration with other countries.

### **Response: Warfighting and Deterrence**

If our strategy takes these preventive actions-for the homeland and through global presence-it must then focus on required military capabilities if prevention fails. Without a credible, overwhelming warfighting capability, the United States cannot deter would-be aggressors and cannot maintain global leadership.

There is no simple, elegant proposition for the warfighting element of the strategy to replace the two major theater war construct, but let me offer a notional "1-2-3" approach. One-We must be able to fight and win decisively at low risk a major regional conflict. Two-We must be able to conduct serious military actions in at least two other regions simultaneously to deter those who would take advantage of our distraction in a major conflict. Three-At the same time, we must be able to undertake at least three small-scale contingencies throughout the world. Our recent history has shown that this level of demand is simply a reality. Therefore, we should plan for it and accept it as the price of global leadership.

I have agonized over the risk of abandoning our two major theater war force-sizing approach. While I know we do not currently have the troops to support it, I still believe we must determine our strategy first and only then determine the size of our force.

Our vital interests are spread throughout Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia, and therefore we must maintain the ability to undertake significant military action in any combination of these three regions. Many states continue to plow resources into conventional and particularly anti-access capabilities. While it is true that Iraq's capabilities have been eroded by sanctions and North Korea's by economic stagnation, both nations maintain significant conventional strength. The Taiwan Straits remains a potential flashpoint. The U.S. military has not given sufficient consideration to how the United States might have to respond if a large-scale conflict broke out between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. These are the presently foreseeable regions in which a major regional conflict seems most likely to occur.

I agree with Secretary Rumsfeld that the likelihood of any two of these major conflicts happening independently at a given moment is remote. Yet the United States must continue to have a multi-theater capability and retain enough deterrent capability to discourage an attack of opportunity when we are engaged in a major theater war. For these reasons, I believe any move to a one-MTW capability must be accompanied by the ability to undertake significant military actions in two other places as well. These would not be "holding" actions but a credible capability to deter adventurism and to protect critical interests in those regions.

### **Respond to Small-Scale Contingencies**

In the third element of the "1-2-3" approach to countering conventional threats to U.S. national interests, the United States will continue to take part in small-scale contingency missions in areas of lesser concern. At any given moment, there may be more or less than 3 such contingencies. The evidence of the last 10 years shows such a tempo is likely, particularly if you consider the continued deployments in the Balkans and to maintain the no-fly zones in Iraq. Military planning should, therefore, be able to contend with at least that number.

Many voices have called for scaling our commitments back and limiting the duration of U.S. involvements. We in the Congress will continue to ask tough questions about how we get

involved and how to complete the mission, but being involved is the price of global leadership. We must acknowledge this fact and plan our forces accordingly.

### **Size and Structure of U.S. Forces**

When taken together, these strategic elements are similar to those put forward by Secretary Rumsfeld. With the most notable exception of his down-playing of engagement activities, I believe he has gotten much of the strategy right.

He has also rightly put attention on the need to transform a percentage of our forces and to invest in certain critical capabilities. The United States must be able to protect space-based communications and other systems. It must search for increasingly effective intelligence capabilities. It must procure sophisticated, stand-off capabilities to ensure we can deliver firepower when confronted with anti-access strategies. Finally, the Department must further joint warfighting through approaches like standing joint task forces. The Secretary has articulated these requirements effectively.

What he gets wrong, however, is his approach to the troops. Technology is critical, but in many cases, it cannot substitute for boots on the ground. Cutting forces directly would be dead wrong. The alternative approach of forcing each of the services to make their own cuts is even worse. This approach would force each service to make cuts in a vacuum and would abrogate America's responsibility to match force structure to the strategy it prescribes.

The strategy I have articulated here requires significant forces-in some cases more than we have today.

### **Army**

The United States requires more Army forces to fight a major theater war, to deter a second such conflict, to undertake peacekeeping operations, and to take part in engagement operations. If you consider that we used the equivalent of 10 ground force divisions in the Gulf war, it is hard to see how we could fight one major conventional war while taking on any other missions with our current force. This and the reality of high current OPTEMPO rates argue for additional forces.

At a minimum, we must secure an increase in the size of the active-duty Army by 20,000 soldiers to an end-strength of 500,000, while maintaining 10 active-duty divisions. Just last month, both Secretary White and General Shinseki testified before our committee that the Army could use 520,000 to meet the requirements of today's missions. 500,000 is the minimum force size needed to implement this strategy.

In addition, we should support Army transformation efforts. The Army has given careful thought to how it must meet future challenges; these efforts deserve administration and Congressional support.

### **Navy**

My strategy will continue to put great demands on the Navy for presence, ensuring access to conflict areas, and providing firepower to those fighting on the ground. In this service, a greater number of ships, along with a modest increase in end-strength, is desperately needed.

The Navy currently has approximately 315 ships. Over time, given our current replacement shipbuilding rate, that figure would drop to 230. Such a decline is appalling for a global naval power with global requirements. The scope of our commitments argues for a 400-ship Navy and

this should be our goal. At a minimum, however, we should build toward the Navy's articulated requirement of 360 ships. We must also devote resources to developing innovative ships capable of operating in the littoral-such as a Cebrowski-class of "streetfighters"-as a complement to our fleet of capital ships. Such new platforms may well have great warfighting value, provide presence on the cheap, and serve as a counter-force to others' anti-access capabilities.

### **Air Force**

The Air Force is currently well-sized for the present strategy and will continue to play a vital role across the spectrum of conflict. The Aerospace Expeditionary Force concept is essential for allowing the Air Force to deal effectively with the tempo of current operations.

While the Air Force doesn't require greater force structure, it will need additional capabilities. The Air Force will need to recapitalize its aging fleet. In addition, the distances involved in a strategy more oriented toward Asia must involve greater airlift and more long-range capabilities, like the B-2.

### **Marine Corps**

Finally, the Marine Corps is well-suited to both contingency operations and major theater war in the 21st century. In addition, they are developing urban warfare capabilities, highly relevant to future conflicts. While Marine force structure is appropriate to their missions, they require a modest increase in end-strength to allow fuller manning of existing units and a relief to some OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO demands. We must ensure that the Marine Corps continues to be able to provide the swift, forward action required by future challenges.

### **Getting the Balance Right in a Budget-Constrained Environment**

Taken together, these changes result in a larger force. The administration is right to say that we currently have a mismatch between strategy and force structure, but the answer is not to explain away the requirements of our global role. The answer is to size a force appropriate to the roles we must play.

Some might argue that we can accomplish these missions with fewer forces if we accept larger risks. This is a fool's economy. We must give the services the tools they need to fight and win decisively within low to moderate levels of risk. We must also lower risks to readiness by ensuring adequate forces for rotations. Mitigating these risks by modestly increasing the size of the force is the best way to provide the stability in U.S. forces that then-Major Marshall sought in 1923, so that we are prepared to meet any challenge that confronts us.

Budgetary concerns alone should not determine our national military strategy. However, we must acknowledge the difficulty of both modernizing our forces and ensuring they have the capabilities needed to fight on any 21st century battlefield, without cutting force structure, will be significant. Alleviating those pressures will require effort on both sides. We in Congress must keep national strategy in mind when allocating defense resources. President Bush recently expressed his hope that "Congress' priority is a strong national defense." I can tell you that for many of us, Democrat and Republican, this is the case.

But for its part, the administration must make the priority of national defense as or more important than a tax cut. The military truly requires and deserves a greater budgetary top-line and a larger percentage of discretionary spending. The department must follow-through on the management reforms that Secretary Rumsfeld and the service secretaries have rightly highlighted to achieve cost savings.

At the end of the day, my approach is nothing more than Harry Truman common sense. Implementing effective strategy requires inspired leadership by the President and Secretary of Defense-I say again, inspired leadership. I hope the current administration will provide it. Conversations about strategy tend to stay within policy elites. But at its most fundamental level, the impact of the strategy we make is felt by every member of the service. They must have confidence that their leaders will consistently fund defense at levels that allow them to do their jobs proudly and effectively. If we fail to do that, we undermine not only our strategy but all those Americans we should inspire to serve.

Thank you.