

**PLANNING FOR PEACE IN SUDAN**

**To Guarantee the Peace:  
An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Sudan**

**Rick Barton  
Co-Director of the CSIS Post-Conflict  
Reconstruction Project**

**Stephen Morrison  
Director of the CSIS Africa Program**

**Bathsheba Crocker  
Co-Director of the Post-Conflict  
Reconstruction Project**

**Dina Esposito  
Consultant, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project**

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**Crocker:** Thank you all very much for coming. Maybe we'll just get started since we're a few minutes past 9:00 o'clock here. We want to apologize for those of you who didn't get our message last week about the cancellation because of the weather. I'm sorry for those of you who have had to show up two weeks in a row.

We have four of us up here today to talk to you briefly and then we will hopefully get into a good discussion.

On my right is Steve Morrison who is the Director of CSIS' Africa Program. On my left is Rick Barton with whom I Co-Direct the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project here at CSIS. At the end is Dina Esposito who has been a consultant with the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project for our Sudan work and was really instrumental in our getting the report done.

All of have in the not too distant past taken trips out to Sudan and the region, Steve more recently than we have. He was there in January. The three of us, along with one of our research assistants, were there in September, in Sudan, north and south, and in Kenya.

So Steve is going to provide sort of an overview and some context and brig us all more up to date on the peace process based on his discussions out in the region recently and

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discussions since he's been back. Then the three of us will turn to a discussion of post-conflict Sudan, teeing off of our report which I believe we have copies of available in the back and some of you may have had a chance to get through by now.

I should mention up front that the report was done for the Secretary of State's Africa Policy Advisory Panel, and a copy of it has been provided to the Secretary but all of the views expressed and the conclusions reached and recommendations given in the report are solely those of CSIS.

The report, although comprehensive, does not presume in any way to cover all of the reconstruction needs in Sudan which will be vast, or to go into sufficient detail necessarily about some of the things that will be needed to do in terms of implementing some of these recommendations. But instead what we aimed to do was to lay out what we view to be the real strategic priorities for the U.S. and for the other major players including the United Nations in terms of what we all should be thinking about to make peace in Sudan stick.

We know and have already started to hear since publishing the report about, and indeed before we published the report, about some of the difficulties of pushing some of these recommendations and perhaps particularly the question of the Chapter 7 recommendation for the United Nations in part because they run counter to some standard practices both here and with our friends and allies and up at the UN and to conventional wisdom.

We won't today go through the whole report. What we'll do is briefly lay out what we view to be some of the more significant challenges and then hopefully we can get into a dialogue with all of you about some of the likely sticking points that we'll see in trying to push some of these recommendations [...Blank Spot...] dialogue on Sudan and on the post-peace period in Sudan and to widen the debate. That's again why we put in some of these more challenging recommendations although we know that the response we'll get back will often be well gee, a Chapter 7 would be really nice but it's going to be Chapter 6.

As part of that effort we have already begun a huge outreach campaign and that's in part why we're doing this meeting here today and we hope that you will in turn circulate the report widely to all of your contacts. We have also thus far circulated the report to over 500 people in the U.S. and internationally including hundreds of people in Sudan itself.

We have started a series of briefings. We have met with

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USAID so far and we intend to also meet with the State Department and the NSC and the Congress and have a series of meetings up at the United Nations. We've also briefed the Norwegian government which helped in part to fund our study.

I think I'll turn it to Rick now who is going to address the security piece of our report. Sorry. I'll start with Steve. Bring us up to date.

**Morrison:** I'll be very brief. I think many of you in the room are quite aware of the status of the talks. Let me first say a word about the genesis of this report which I think is a terrific report. Dina, Sheba and Rick invested a massive amount of personal energy and creativity in putting this together and benefitted from the input of military fellows and from lots of outside help at the UN and within Sudan itself, and also benefitted from the direct support that the Norwegian government provided in addition to the Africa Policy Advisory Panel which was commissioned by Congressman Wolfe. Secretary Powell agreed to undertake that panel. Walter Kansteiner was the Chairman of that panel and we are the Executive Secretariat. This is one component of a series of reports that have gone to the Secretary and kindly the Secretary has agreed to allow us after January 20th to circulate the report publicly. That brings us to where we are here today.

We'll get into a detailed discussion from the presenters on the security options in the Chapter 7. I think they're right on mark on that score. I think it's going to be very important to continue to remind people what's at stake here and be cognizant of how difficult the environments for this discussion.

If you just look at Africa itself, we're at a point of considerable expansion of UN peacekeeping in Africa. You've got the proposal on the table of the Security Council to convert the operations in Ivory Coast to a 6200 person blue helmet operation. You have a similar proposal to convert the African operation in Burundi into a peacekeeping. You have a 15,000 person blue helmeted force that's not yet fully staffed up. It's I think at about nine. The Sierra Leone operation which is at about 11 is scaling down at a far slower pace than anticipated. The Ethiopian 4200 blue helmets in Ethiopia are stuck in the recalcitrance of Addis Ababa. So we've got a lot of blue helmets on the continent.

It's remarkable when you look at the numbers and compare them against the slump, the sort of '94 to '99 slump in UN peacekeeping in which peacekeeping in Africa almost ceased, today you have this proliferation of large, sizeable, in many cases long-term operations and if we get to a peace accord this year

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the question is going to be front and center how much will, how much resources, what type of mandate, and that decision is going to be decisive. It's going to be determinative of the future and we'll hear more as to why that is. I think that's one very very important reason why we need to get this issue and this debate out front and center now rather than, while there is time.

The talks resume I believe it's on the 17th. As all press accounts have repeated, [Abier] and the power [inaudible] pieces are remaining. I think it's fair to say that the mood of optimism after the early January wealth-sharing agreement, the sense of euphoria and the sense of momentum, that a deal would be closed rather rapidly, is in fact, has shifted. Now there's a certain amount of caution and pessimism around this. There's also an awareness that after the Abier, after resolution of Abier and the power-sharing issues that there will be a need for a negotiated ceasefire, final ceasefire arrangements. Then you would enter into the six month pre-interim phase.

What we're seeing today is a sharp, obviously as we head towards the end state we're seeing a very sharp uptick of violence in the west. These are not unrelated, but the actual connection remains very murky. How the crisis in Darfur is affecting calculations of the two parties at the table in [Nivasha] remains a bit mysterious although it's, I believe, completely false to say that these are two separate realms of calculation and action. But we're in a fairly speculative realm.

In the history of peace accords and reaching final closure on negotiations, it's very very common that you have a sharp uptick of violence in the last phase. What's unusual about Sudan is the violence is taking place in another realm. It's not between the two parties. The ceasefire between the two parties has held as you've seen this upsurge of violence and displacement in the west. And where it heads, where that war heads is uncertain. The government clearly has taken the decision, I would argue, that it is going to pull out the stops militarily in order to eradicate what they see as they threat. Will they be successful? We don't know. They have new materiel that they've brought into play. External access remains minimal. Overnight we had 100,000 refugees appear in Chad and an estimated near a million displaced internally. Those numbers are soft numbers and it could morph very rapidly into a very very sizeable number of folks crossing the border. There is going to be humanitarian access and the like.

What we observed when we were in Khartoum in January was a government that was at least outwardly expressing a lot of confidence in their ability to carry this forward, but I think

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beneath the surface unsettled. Unsettled by the nature of the threats that they faced in the west, and when they took an account of all the compromises that have been made in the talks up through the wealth-sharing in which Khartoum had given in, basically, at every turn and given in significantly at every turn and raised the political tensions around the settlement. The Abier piece represents a challenge to the government to give away something in its territory and a challenge to compromise in a way that would have great implications for armed opposition and unarmed opposition throughout the north. This fact is not lost on the [Espulan] negotiating team as they ponder what they want and how much time they're prepared to sort of string this out.

There seems to be a sense that this process will take at a minimum a couple of months. That it very much hinges on the security situation as it evolves in the north.

One of the dangers here is that the leverage of the outside players, and particularly Washington, could soften as we head deep into our electoral cycle and perhaps with continued distractions through Iraq or elsewhere.

The Administration has shown remarkable conviction and determination in moving this process forward and they deserve an enormous amount of praise and credit for what they've accomplished. This is the signature diplomatic achievement for this Administration in Africa. It's not complete yet. There's no other conflict in Africa which received this sustained high level attention and it would be a terrible shame if it didn't reach a successful conclusion.

This is a coerced agreement. This is one that's going to require sustained heavy external pressure from Washington and elsewhere and hopefully there will not be slippage in this.

I think the unsettled psychology in Khartoum, on the SPLM side I would say it was euphoria. It was certainly giddiness around what they had gotten out of the wealth-sharing and many other things. I think they were beginning to recognize that they had protected their options, they had erected defenses they thought protected their core interests and they were getting more than I think they had even though was likely to result out of these negotiations. In the discussion we can talk further about what the strategies may be of the two sides at this point diplomatically as they head into this process.

I think I'll just close there. Thank you.

**Barton:** Thank you.

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The framework that we use in our post-conflict reconstruction analysis here is essentially a four-pillar framework which starts with security and public safety. We feel that's the precondition for virtually everything else that follows.

The other three pillars are basically governance and participation, justice and reconciliation, and economic and social well-being. What I'd like to do is just walk through the first pillar, the security elements, and just give you a brief look at what's in the report.

The threats that we are considering in Sudan, the threats that worry us most in the post-peace period are essentially the immediate post-conflict vacuum which we think is natural and happens in almost every one of these cases. The transfer of power in certain communities. Rogue elements of both militaries which are not happy with the results. We spoke to some of those folks. The militias. The parties who have been left out of the talks. Hot spots around the country that just seem to be resurfacing. And neighborhood spillovers such as the large resistance. So there are plenty of threats that concern us and which we think require a more robust response than we think has been planned up to now by the people who are doing the international thinking and by the Sudanese who are reluctant about the violation of their sovereignty or by the negotiators who seem to be happy with the mix they have at this point.

So our response to that is essentially to say that we need to get ready now, that reversing trends is much much tougher than getting things started in the right direction. Accelerating the calendar for the post-peace preparation is a chronic need that has not been met in most of these cases and we have an opportunity here in Sudan because of the rather prolonged peace talk process.

The recommendations that we put forward are really pretty straightforward. You've already heard about the Chapter 7. The critical element of the Chapter 7 is that there be a quick reaction force that will have sufficient air support, primarily helicopter but also fixed wing support, so that it's capable of getting around the country and responding to any of these uprisings. We do not expect full-scale war to break out again but we think there will be pockets of problems and the quick reaction force with this mandate could be capable of containing those incidents so that they don't create huge people movements and some of the other common side effects that we have seen happen in Sudan before.

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We also believe there needs to be a strong emphasis on these joint integrated units. We'd like the JMC model that has been operating in Sudan up to now in terms of the monitoring, we want to see that extended, continued, expanded, but the joint integrated units we believe will need special attention to work. It's a very ambitious number that the agreement lays out. If the best soldiers find their way into those units, which is not necessarily the natural result, then there may be some significant Sudanese capacity to deal with some of the problems that arise in the coming years and might in fact lighten some of the international responsibility which we would like to see. But without special attention we don't have great confidence in that happening either.

Finally, we put a great deal of emphasis on the policing function because we think that that's going to be a huge vacuum. There are differences in the way the policing will be approached in the north and the south. Basically there isn't a particularly good national model right now and there will be a tremendous number of local issues that will need to be addressed by police rather than by any kind of international force, although we do advise that there's an international component and a training dimension to it.

Probably the three sticking points, the toughest elements that we are worried about in terms of this plan really unfolding as we think it should. First, the Security Council and the role of the United States in the Security Council. This is a high bar that we are setting up and there is no great enthusiasm at this moment for going quite this far, so one of the reasons we're pleased to see all of you today is we recognize that sort of the acceptance of this standard is probably one way that this, by a larger group of people, is one way this debate will focus on the right issue rather than sort of trying to finesse something we think cannot be finessed.

The second issue is where will the forces come from? We've had some encouraging opinions from the Nordic states, but again this is a huge challenge.

Finally, this notion of the Sudanese of their sovereignty and what they're going to allow in their country. If that is given too much respect then we don't think this is likely to happen either and we're really nervous about the success of the peace without this kind of a configuration.

I hope that gives you an introduction, and clearly we'll take up some of these issues in the discussion.

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**Crocker:** I'll move now to some of our other recommendations, not necessarily broken down along the five pillars of reconstruction as Rick laid them out although I do touch in part on the economic pillar.

Much of the report, as Rick was also highlighting, is premised on the idea that relying only on the parties to exercise good behavior will not in fact be a recipe for lasting peace in Sudan. And at the same time that the international community actually has a great deal of leverage to induce some good behavior from the parties, two in particular may be debt relief and sanctions lifting.

For the government the prize obviously is normalized relations on the international scene, perhaps particularly with the U.S. and also normalized treatment from the World Bank and the IMF, and again that relates in part to debt relief. And for the south, presumably it will be continued or increased international attentions in assistance.

We believe that what we'll need to see is a mixture of handcuffs or sticks such as things like conditioned aid and the possibility of further assistance cutoffs if either side slips, as well as carrots, and a good deal of international handling as Rick was describing. Part of that outside of the security posture will come in the form of robust diplomatic engagement which we believe must be sustained in the post-peace period.

As Steve was mentioning, we've seen an enormous amount of engagement by the United States but also by others. By the UK, by Norway, by Kenya and many others, the UN, in pushing the peace process itself. We think we're going to need to see this robust diplomatic engagement sustained in the post-peace period, perhaps by the creation of a standing international implementation body that could sort of build off of the troika model that we've seen so far and would include external powers and organizations and Sudanese players and be a sort of forum for addressing the likely problems that we're going to see, and sort of the likely slips in the implementation of the peace.

We'll also obviously need to see significant economic assistance but we're actually a bit worried that the promised peace dividend that's been talked about may not materialize, and we've heard some sort of discouraging things so far about the prospects for example of going for supplemental funding in the United States for Sudan. What's included thus far in the '04 budget would not sort of equal the peace dividend that we've promised the Sudanese, but yet I don't think we're likely to see

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a real push for supplemental funding, and I think we're also quite worried that all of the different donors have different pots of money and we're not necessarily coordinating as we should be on issues such as benchmarks which Dina will get into a little bit.

There's also the question of what posture for the U.S. and other donors diplomatically and on the development side, and we believe and have stressed in the report that it has to be robust both in Khartoum and in the south. We can't think of business as usual, either we or the Europeans, in terms of either what our diplomatic posture looks like, because we think we'll need to have significant pressures available on the ground in Sudan to deal with some of the problems, but also for the U.S. in the sense of our engagement being geared predominantly or only toward the south as it has been.

On the question of debt relief, we are all now seeing the relevance of this issue particularly in Iraq. Sudan also has a big debt burden. Not quite as large as Iraq, but for Sudan it is incredibly significant. It's estimated at about \$21 billion right now. According to World Bank standards they could probably carry around \$3 billion. We are arguing that creditors need to start discussing this issue now in terms of coming up with a reasonable overall number and also thinking about issues about rescheduling or restructuring this debt.

This is one sticking point that we think we're likely to see in our discussions so far. It suggests that we're sort of stuck in our standard practices here in the U.S.. For example, that sort of Treasury's involvement in this issue is being treated as a totally separate matter rather than being talked about along with the State Department and AID as sort of part of the reconstruction package for Sudan.

There is also the question of U.S. sanctions, which as you're probably all aware, are a very complicated web. They include sanctions related to Sudan being on the terrorism list, to the war, to human rights, to debt to the United States and to the military coup. We need some advance thinking about how and when those sanctions should be lifted.

This is obviously a significant carrot for the government, but it will also be key to another part of what we argue in the report which is the idea that the U.S. needs to start shifting away from our standard assistance outlook for Sudan. If we're serious about thinking about unity for the country we need to be able to provide assistance both to the National Unity government and perhaps to the joint integrated forces that Rick was talking

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about, as well as in the south.

I know one ongoing concern for both the Administration and for us and for many in this room I'm sure is the question of human rights. But even on the question of human rights there are ways to sort of deal with Sudan on the sanctions issue which would be treating Sudan more like we treat other countries who have human rights concerns, and not necessarily to maintain the sanctions that we currently have on Sudan that are related to human rights but are in fact much more extreme than those that we might need.

We are actually planning to do a paper on these sanctions which hopefully if you all sign up you'll be able to get. It will go up on our web site. It's become apparent to us that there are many people who would be interested in somebody trying to lay out what all of these sanctions are and the processes we'd have to go through to lift them which would be quite significant.

There is one question that we sort of deal with a bit later in the report which is the issue of transparency, particularly in the oil sector. But we believe that some of these questions like debt relief and economic assistance and sanctions lifting can all be tied to certain baselines such as requirements of transparency in the budgeting processes in both the north and the south and in the oil sector which would of course be significant.

I think Dina can sort of take off from there and address some of the further issues in the report.

**Esposito:** Sheba, you were so thorough. I'm not sure I have a lot to add.

I'm going to focus on the last two sections of the report which look at governance issues and leveraging reconstruction efforts in ways that bring diverse parts of the Sudanese people and the country together.

In those last two sections of the report we argue that the peace agreement offers an opportunity not just to end the north/south war but to address a series of issues of governance reform in both the north and the south. The parties through the [Metacos] Protocol and other elements of the agreement have committed themselves to a democratic system of governance that respect the human and political rights of all Sudanese people. Without the governance reform element in both the north and the south we argue that the prospects for sustainable peace in Sudan remain dim.

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We see violence in Darfur today but absent improved governance that addresses the political and economic marginalization of many Sudanese, the outbreak of violence in the east, south, the transition areas and even other parts of the north are equally probable.

If we take the parties at their word with regard to their embrace of democracy then the Unity government, as Sheba said, as well as the southern regional entity will need technical assistance, training, capacity building in the area of governance reform. Such assistance will also need to trickle down to the state and local levels. That is one reason why the question of addressing U.S. sanctions is a pressing one and why the report calls for moving away from the traditional southern focus of U.S. assistance in the post-peace period in order to look at the larger issues that are breeding conflict in diverse parts of the country.

To address governance issues in the north there will need to be an increase of aid personnel to seriously engage the Unity governments on issues of democratic reform as well as other pressing issues that will emerge from the peace agreement. Resources should flow to the Unity government if they make serious efforts of reform, and certainly the U.S. at this point would not be in a position to do that.

At the same time we do call for a set of serious, significant benchmarks by which to measure progress in the governance area and say clearly that aid should not flow in the absence of positive steps being taken. And as Sheba mentioned, we have some concerns for example that the EU has a \$500 million peace dividend. At this time we have not heard that there will be any benchmarks around the distribution of that money and we do mention in the report our concern that donors do need to come together and come to some common set of expectations around performance.

We also recommend stronger support for civil society of political parties to promote the new openings for democratic transition that are implicit in the agreement. If allowed to participate, these non-state actors can in their own way provide some measures of guarantees to keep the signators on track.

The report highlights the potential importance of a constitutional convention to counter the closed-door nature of the peace process [inaudible] dialogue around the nation's future so that a wider variety of people can participate, actors in civil society and other marginalized groups from the north and south. Such a convention could be used as a vehicle to help forge

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a consensus on Sudan's future in advance of the referendum.

A related but slightly different point in the report refers to leveraging reconstruction efforts to build bridges among the Sudanese people. There will not be enough to decide what sectors will be emphasized in the reconstruction phase but we need to take a closer look at how reconstruction is undertaken.

It was clear to us, for example, that donors recognized the urgency of infrastructure reconstruction, roads, waterways, telecommunications, electricity. What is far less clear is the interest of donors to encourage the use of these activities to open the country and to build bridges among regions and people which is a priority in [inaudible].

The south we frequently heard is seeking separate independent initiatives that will allow them to operate in complete isolation from the north and will assure their independence. We are suggesting a closer look at mutually beneficial projects that intentionally bring together diverse groups and regions of Sudan in order to build bridges and either reinforce prospects of unity or at a minimum forge linkages that could make northern and southern Sudan good neighbors.

I'll stop there.

**Crocker:** I think we'll just open it up at this point to your questions. I would ask that you identify yourself before asking any questions, and I'd also just remind everyone that there are signup sheets I think in the back and it would be great if you have a chance to sign up before leaving so we can keep you on our list and engaged with you on future Sudan work.

**Question:** Peter Yance, Refugees International.

Having not read the report, I confess -- not yet. [Laughter] I have a file that thick. Do you get into numbers with regards to what you think the peacekeeping mission needs to have both on the troop side and the civilian police side?

**Barton:** We do in some cases. I don't think we do across the board. But for example on the quick reaction force we do say around 600 is the number we think is appropriate.

What we started to do when we were out there as we met with various people is to look at the numbers that might required in different parts of the country. We knew that UN teams had come in before, some were coming in after us, so what we were trying to do was just advance the discussions so that there wouldn't be too

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much vagueness in terms of the design, and in particular looking at [inaudible] in the east and west as well as the north and south and making sure that Khartoum had attention in this regard because there's obviously a monitoring function that needs to take place there.

So there are some numbers in the report, but as Sheba said in the introduction, we didn't get into the full detailed implementation because this is really designed to give action strategy.

**Question:** [Amadu Shif], [inaudible]. I commend CSIS and the others of this [inaudible] for, which is the first of its kind in a long time, for a person like me who has been around here for some time, especially in the last decade. This is a [inaudible].

I am not only Sudanese who think so highly about the report [inaudible], [inaudible] Khartoum Daily [inaudible] last week and started serializing it in a very, in an excellent professional translation. I have some parts of it here, but it is, the rest is coming.

What's good about this [rylam] is now on the internet and is widely read by Sudanese in [inaudible], so I assure you that the report will be read and discussed a lot.

I hope that the two Sudanese parties, the [inaudible] and the national donor community as well as the UN officials will heed this call to transform efforts to peace and post-conflict reconstruction. However, I am very worried about the spoilers, I think you referred to them diplomatically as spoilers, especially the American pressure groups and their supporters in Congress. We worry a lot about those people.

My question is do you think that the Sudan Peace Act agreement which led in turn to the [inaudible], to [Mushafas] and [inaudible] will be revisited by Congress to become the Sudan Peace and Post-Conflict Reconstruction? Because I think although the Sudan Peace Act [inaudible] on both sides condemning it or accepting it, but it did a job in pushing for this. But I think it is outdated now. If we continue to apply to the Congress and others, continue to pressure for its application it might backfire.

So what do you think, what are the chances of the Congress and the pressure groups revisiting the Peace Act to transform it and develop it to include at least reconstruction and unit if possible? Thank you.

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**Morrison:** We don't know the answer to that question. I think the point you're making is absolutely central. The next reporting date on the Sudan Peace Act is April 21st. That will be an important moment. Congress is now getting more engaged on Sudan. I think the HRC Africa Subcommittee is planning a hearing the end of February, the 26th.

Many of the people that were central to the Sudan Peace Act in Congress and some of the activists will remain engaged into the post-conflict period. Although if you look at other conflicts where there's been an intense mobilization during wars of American interests the coalition that forms during the wars tends to change dramatically after the war. We certainly saw that in the Angola context. Those that were very engaged in support of [Savimbi] prior to the [Bessesa] Accord in '91, that coalition changed.

I think one of the key determining factors is going to be the position taken by the White House on all of this. It's the White House that will be called upon to lead in redefining what is at stake and redefining the need to move forward expeditiously and with balance and conviction. The White House has made certain fairly explicit and strong commitments on how they intend to move ahead and hopefully those will be fulfilled.

The removal of Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terror will be a terribly important moment, and the kinds of consultations that will have to happen with Congress to engineer the lift of the raft of sanctions that are in place today will be very important, and putting it into some new legislative context as you suggest will be very very helpful in updating this.

I think you should anticipate that there will be a lot of continued skepticism, deep skepticism about the capacity and the intentions of Khartoum. There will be [inaudible]. I don't think we should be surprised by that at all.

**Barton:** A quick additional point. Our hope is that this report will give people some rather tangible challenges that need to be addressed so that we can perhaps capture some of the energy from this unusual convergence of political players in this city who suddenly, or fairly recently, have developed an interest in Sunday. It's an unusual combination of political forces, but if we can get them thinking about some of the practical steps that need to be taken, which this report really would challenge anybody to successfully carry out, then we think we might be able to get some of the positive energy as opposed to the internal conflict which has marked the debate.

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**Esposito:** I would just mention that our report does mention the Sudan Peace Act and recommends a new version of that with an emphasis on things like debt, addressing debt issues, sanction issues, multiyear commitments around reconstruction funds. But I agree with Steve that the content -- I think there will be a revised version, but the content, whether that promotes opportunities for unity and linkages between the north and south continues its emphasis on the southern reconstruction. I think the verdict is out on that.

**Morrison:** One other thing. The allegations today of excessive high level violence being directed toward civilians in the west, if that persists that will be a part of this new debate because the human rights considerations are not confined to strictly what happens in the war in the south. So that, Darfur, the situation in the west or anywhere else where you have an upsurge of violence will figure in the broader debate. It's not going to be strictly confined to the way that the north relates to the south and will spill into the debate around how the U.S. posture should be revised.

One other thing I think is important to get out on the table is that if we get a successful peace and there's an enlargement of UN and World Bank engagement which is already beginning with these joint assessment missions that are about to begin, these eight different clustered assessment teams that are very ambitious, very rapid, 60-90 day timeline to complete their analyses of both north and south, a very comprehensive look. If we get a sudden enlargement of UN and World Bank engagement, and we get a UN peace operation operating out of north and south, and this is heralded as a major diplomatic achievement with U.S. imprimatur on it as well as the Europeans, you can pretty well expect that this is going to create a target for those who are interested in destabilizing U.S. or UN operations in Iraq or elsewhere. No one's really thought this through very carefully.

When I raised the issue with the UN folks in Khartoum it was very clear that there was a lot of anxiety around their vulnerabilities but nobody had really taken this factor into account. It's not one that's really been anticipated because the whole thinking around Sudan was not in that context of an ongoing war in Iraq in which you had a sizeable mobilization of an international sort trying to undermine UN operations and U.S. operations.

**Question:** Two questions. First, congratulations on a spectacular, thorough report. I hope it's heeded.

Do you all see the combination of the electoral calendar and

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the G7 summit, the USE summit, the incoming British presidency as forcing events to get things like donor coordination principles out? It seems like you have a window of opportunity which is fairly short too, while the Administration is focused and while there's a relatively small circle of diplomats who are interested in forging something on Sudan to push this. So I wonder if that has figured into your thinking.

The second question was whether you made recommendations on the U.S. bilateral diplomatic presence, both where it ought to be or how many places it ought to be and what size and composition it ought to be. That seems like a near term budget issue as well as a diplomacy issue.

**Crocker:** I think on your first question, others may have a different answer. I think you're right to point those out as sort of action forcing events. We didn't anticipate them in the writing of the report, but that doesn't mean that they aren't good things we should be focusing on as venues for raising some of these issues. We'll continue to try to do that. We're starting with the folks here at the State Department and in Treasury and elsewhere. We do also have hopefully some planned meetings at the World Bank and the IMF to start also discussing that issue.

On the second question, we don't get into numbers so much but we do get into the question of what the posture should look like. I mentioned that briefly. But we feel that our embassy in Khartoum and the Europeans' embassies in Khartoum need to be significantly enhanced, and that we also have to have a senior level AID person in Khartoum. But we say at the same time there needs to be some sort of presence in the south. What we mentioned was the idea of opening consular offices in the south at the same time that you beef up the mission in the north and we talk about raising our charge' to an ambassador which is I think something that's certainly on the table now as something that we'll do immediately after a peace agreement is signed.

So we recognize there will be some sensitivities in terms of where we will place people and perhaps particularly from the AID side there may be some sensitivities about where AID folks are going to go. There will be an initial question about even moving people into the south and out of Nairobi which we also think is something that will need to happen, but of course is somewhat security dependent in the short term.

**Esposito:** I think that covers it pretty well. I think AID told us they were thinking about again the orientation of the reconstruction effort would be in the south with a satellite office, if you will, in the north. That doesn't mean they won't

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expand the number of staff and the range of programs in the north which is what we are interested in and which they suggested would be possible with the understanding that sanctions will still restrain what it is, the types of programs they can actually implement.

I think our report emphasizes the fact that there are just going to be so many issues around reconstruction and the actual implementation of their [inaudible] that's going to require a very heavy engagement, continued engagement by both state and AID and we can't just declare victory with the agreement but actually need to increase the staff levels. The report recommends that these programs [inaudible] as robust as it is and that once people are shifted to the embassy that they can go back to sort of a more normal posture. We really can't just revert to a business as usual approach once the agreement is signed.

**Crocker:** That recommendation is also geared not only to us. We will be key, but also to the Europeans. When we were in Khartoum, everyone has an incredibly small mission in Khartoum right now so this recommendation is going to sort of apply across the board.

**Morrison:** The question you raised about the G7. The U.S. hosts the G7 this year in [inaudible], Georgia June 8th to 10th. The preparations are just beginning on this. The plan right now is not to bring to Georgia Africa leaders as has been the habit at [Katanaskcus and Evian]. It's going to be organized around three broad themes -- security, prosperity and freedom. It's going to have a very heavy focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. But the White House was pushing and pushing and pushing in January for a final framework agreement with a [inaudible] inducement to highlight that in the State of the Union address on January 20th and to have in the audience present as guests of the White House the senior representatives of the two sides.

I think if they had dramatic progress there's a very very strong likelihood that the G7 would become the occasion for trying to focus international efforts around consolidating the peace. I think that would make sense. I think it would be easily fitted within the themes they're proposing to cover and it would be sufficiently important to them. The G7 in June may turn out to be a very timely opportunity.

**Barton:** One quick thing on the assignment. I think we were all underwhelmed by the diplomatic presence in Khartoum and at the same time we were concerned by the huge division between what was going on out in Nairobi and what was going on inside the country. The report really just talks about a post-war mindset so

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that great resource centers, humanitarian operation centers that may be based outside of the country should become an element of the past, and that's going to have a huge impact on a number of you who are here. People have to really start thinking about operating from inside the country and the development of the infrastructure needs to go along with that.

As we all know in these wars the neighboring countries usually do quite well in terms of having to provide services and upgrade their infrastructure but that's left Sudan in a hole. There are opportunities in the south as well as in the rest of the country to really upgrade that and that's really going to take a new mindset.

**Question:** My name's Andy Watkins from [inaudible].

I worked in Sudan as a UN officer a long time ago and quickly learned the concepts of scale that many of us are used to don't apply. It's a very large place and it would be large if it were easily governable and has an order of magnitude greater [inaudible] not easily managed.

My question relates to my old agency, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its manifestly limited ability to do big things well and sometimes even to do small things pretty well. So I'm wondering how many roses in your basket of hope you would place on the UN's ability either in a heavy option or even in a light option property to secure some of the many working goals [inaudible], and in failing the UN robust mission of [inaudible], what is plan B?

**Morrison:** Plan B is to start off even worse than the stumbling model you describe, and then to come back to the Security Council several months later and have the mandate upgraded because peacekeepers are being held hostage or have been killed or some other disaster has occurred. That's Plan B. That one you can probably invest in that one and make more money than you would on the first one which is it's a tough job, it's a big place, it's not going to be easy, but we need to be able to be operational in probably five or six places. We're going to have to have real flexibility.

We were quite impressed, actually, by the JMC in particular and the way that they had achieved we thought operational effectiveness within six to nine months which isn't bad. But again, you don't want to waste the three months that we've got right now which in a way we're doing because nobody really wants to address, gosh, it's going to be tough to get the mandate we require and nobody's going to want to put their troops forward so

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why don't we delay longer so that the six to nine months happens after the peace has been signed and then we've got all the risks that we put into play.

The mediocrity of the United Nations effort really comes down to a great extent to the less than enthusiastic backing of key members of the Security Council and whether we're going to leverage what we have with the Sudanese, both parties right now. Everybody's so eager to get the peace agreement that they're not necessarily focusing on this element which is why we're making a living right now because we recognize that gosh, this is the toughest job and it's not getting the attention it requires.

**Question:** DPKO has in the last couple of years post-Brahimi report actually shown some progress and they've done some good operations. The Stimson Center is just releasing I think this week the Bill George and Tory Holt review of the Brahimi report and what's happened with it and they go into considerable detail. I think it's on their web site.

**Morrison:** Yeah. [Inaudible]. Stimson.org. [Laughter]

**Question:** I think we should give some credit where there has been progress. It had nothing to do with your departure. [Laughter]

The second thing is I think the critical element is getting a Nordic state lined up, or some Nordic wannabe state. That will begin to shift the balance.

There is enormous resistance in both Khartoum and within the SPLM to the notion of a robust Chapter 7 style operation and that's going to have to be overcome as well.

**Barton:** We think the job is doable because even though the geography is brutal, we don't expect there will be simultaneous challenges all over the country. Maybe we're being too optimistic in that assumption, but we're making the assumption that there will be sporadic or occasional outbreaks of problems and that if you have a capacity which is showcased and actually does react well initially, that that message tends to get around as well. That's something we've seen in a lot of post-conflict settings.

**Question:** [inaudible] eight to ten thousand just two days ago.

**Morrison:** Who?

**Barton:** Powell.

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**Morrison:** The peacekeepers? We've heard numbers like that.

**Crocker:** I think that's coming from the UN planning.

**Question:** Randy Martin from Mercy Corp. A great report, let me add to the accolades.

That said, it seems to -- whoops. [Laughter] It seems to underplay the importance of the oil industry and oil revenues in Sudan which I found a little bit striking. We're talking about an industry that's approaching \$1 billion a year. A lot of money anywhere, and particularly in Sudan a whole lot of money. Under conditions of war that all goes to the north. It's not just spent overseas on arms. That happens, but it's been spent quite, if you will, quite intelligently building their own arms industry and what not. So it's created enormous vested interest in the continuation of the war.

What happens to the oil industry in times of peace? What are the incentives for peace in oil revenues and industry? What changes if this whole thing falls apart and it goes back to war? Will the revenues be uninterrupted? Just talk a little bit about how oil revenues fit into this whole picture.

**Crocker:** To the extent we underplayed it, it's unfortunate, but we agree with you that it's an incredibly significant issue and we did try to tackle somewhat the question of what you need to do in terms of certain measures of transparency and accountability. Some of your questions are answered at least in part by what was decided on with the wealth-sharing information. But it will obviously be critical that there is oversight in both the north and the south as to what happens with the oil and any other revenues that are coming in. Neither side has at this point the capacity to deal. I mean the north arguably more so but it has obviously been dealing with them in a way that we wouldn't want to continue. The south is going to have almost no capacity to deal with the heavy influx of revenues both from the oil and also from the economic assistance flows that will be coming in.

So questions of technical assistance will be very important, but people need to also be thinking now about issues related to sort of what you do about transparency. It could be that Sudan becomes a sort of a model case for dealing with the question of publish what you pay which is something we would very much support. And in fact one thing that we're hoping to do is start a series of meetings with oil companies and other interested folks to sort of talk about what some options may be from the private side and how the private sector might handle some of its

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responsibilities. But this is just yet another area where you're going to need to see a significant amount of international hand-holding and oversight I think.

Part of what the international community might be able to do in terms of incentives is to, as we were talking about earlier, do things like tie debt relief and sanctions lifting and economic assistance to requirements of certain levels of transparency and accountability and budgeting processes and relate it to the oil sector. And in talking about legislation, if you think about a revamped Sudan Peace Act, that is one type of document that put some of that in place, at least from our end.

**Morrison:** If you go through the reports up to now and look at all the different commissions that are called for, it's a lot. And the details are not always very fine for some of these. The question of the capacity, in particular on the southern side, to staff these commissions adequately is a huge uncertainty.

The oil sector, they agreed on the wealth-sharing to honor existing contracts. It was a very pragmatic resolution. The 50/50 split was sort of a clean manner of dividing the wealth at very much the advantage of the south. There's huge uncertainty around the question of pipelines and future discovery and exploration that are going to be sorted out. How the SPLM is going to manage \$400 to \$500 million in cash is a big question. We've seen what happened to the Palestinian Authority post-Oslo when [inaudible] and that was an entity with vaster capacity in comparison with this.

It's a sector that is not easily divisible into northern and southern entities. It's one that requires by definition close integration and cooperation and management if they're going to carry forward in this way. It's one sector where the notion of having an autonomous south with all the walls of defense up and a nominal unity preserved is going to be very hard. You're not going to see that. We see a different set of political relationships forged around the [world] sector and it's going not be very interesting to watch.

**Crocker:** Part of an interesting issue around this will be the question of the potential pipeline from the south out through Kenya. That is obviously something that the SPLM has already expressed some interest in. It gets back to the points that Dina was raising about sort of how donors and in this instance the private sector begin thinking about infrastructure projects in the reconstruction phase. Part of this will be just an economic analysis, whether that makes any sense at all. But part of it will also have to take into consideration sort of what you want

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to be doing in terms of connecting the country versus connecting the south to its southern neighbors.

**Question:** Dan Griffin with Catholic Relief Services.

Could you say more about your third pillar? Can you say how you envision the justice and reconciliation moving forward? Who do you see facilitating that? Also did amnesty issues come up in your research or discussions?

**Crocker:** We don't, this is an issue, the justice side of it we did not get into so much save for the question of policing. And the idea that judicial, justice sector reform is going to have to be part of any sort of technical assistance and other economic assistance packages, particularly in the south. We met in Rumbeck with this wonderful judge on the SPLM side who told us there was something like 25 existing judges I think in all of southern Sudan. So this is going to be a difficult challenge.

On the reconciliation side, we did have some discussions with the new Sudan Council of Churches and with others we met with on the NGO side throughout the south in terms of sort of expanding the dialogues around peace and bringing into that questions of reconciliation.

We spoke last week with a group of folks at USIP and there were some questions raised about whether there might be opportunity for sort of inter-religious dialogues that might go some measure toward reconciliation which Dina can talk a little bit more about because we did actually talk to the new Sudan Council of Churches about that.

**Esposito:** It's going to be a very long process. I think we were looking for some way that we could point the international community in a clear direction just to begin to promote reconciliation. But we didn't find anything in place that really was a clear, go this way or look in this direction. The new Sudan Council of Churches, conversations that we had about perhaps broadening their sort of people to people peace processes beyond the south, to look at more reconciliation north/south. They're just not there psychologically. I mean they're very focused on getting the south in order. There was no one organization that seemed to be really ready to take, or that was well placed to begin that sort of dialogue. Although this notion of a national dialogue around peace and reconciliation is out there. What the vehicle for that is was much less clear to us during our meetings.

**Crocker:** I think on the question of amnesty, one of the

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interesting things we found in our discussions in this case again in the south, we raised the question of do you have a Truth in Reconciliation Commission or something like that for Sudan. And the folks we spoke to in the south all said you can't trust the leaders on either side, not the SPLM or the government, and so how you would have the two parties to the agreement coming up with some process by which you could form a Truth in Reconciliation Commission type of mechanism in Sudan is something they just sort of couldn't fathom. The perpetrators on both sides would be overseeing such a process. So again I think it just points out some of the difficulties in this area.

**Question:** Trish Bagin, Georgetown University.

I look forward to reading the report. [Laughter]

The last time I asked a question about hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons that might be going back somewhere I was told that it was an issue still coming up in the peace negotiations. So I'm asking again, because so many of the people who have been displaced have been displaced from very controversial and potentially quite conflicted areas and their return could provoke yet more conflict and more tension.

So the question is are there plans for integration of these people and plans to, and it really relates to the oil question, to the reconciliation question. Is there a special category or reintegration people who are coming back?

**Esposito:** We met with folks in UNHCR and also in [inaudible] issues, and you're not going to be happy with the answer I'm going to give you I don't think.

There's no language in the peace agreement and probably will not be any language in the peace agreement with regard to the right of refugee return or specific discussion about the rights of persons to move freely. General Sambawo who is the lead negotiator basically in conversations with the UNHCR let it be known that the two sides are dealing with critical issues of power and wealth sharing and they really couldn't get down to that level at this point.

UNHCR's hope is that it's really going to come down to having some general language about respect for international humanitarian law in the final agreement. Very general. I haven't seen that anywhere and I don't even know if that will make it in, and then it will go to the tripartite agreements on return, at least for refugees, in terms of getting the parties to sign on to some basic standards.

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The strategy for IDP assistance and refugee return is to really focus on community-based assistance for all persons. They're not going to try to single out IDPs for special treatment in returning areas. But the IDP coordinator that I met who I think is Khartoum based but travels quite a bit is deeply concerned about the security issue and basically sort of threw up his hands when asked about how in the absence of a serious peacekeeping operation or police support, it's going to be a very difficult situation. The notion that assistance is going to keep pace with returns is also one that's, I just don't think is likely. We can't provide basic assistance in southern Sudan with people who are there. The notion that somehow the assistance is going to be sufficient for returnees.

But the big question is how many people will move? I think we get wildly different interpretations on that.

**Morrison:** We spent about half a day out with IDPs outside of Khartoum and rather extensive communities that have grown up out there. I'm sure many of you have been there. And in our conversations with them we sort of asked them what are your plans, are you going back, are you going to stay here? A range of responses that didn't have much to do with sort of the statistical evidence that we had been provided before we got there. People don't really have much of an idea what's going on in the parts of the country where they came from.

The second complication is that the infrastructure is just so awful. There's virtually no way to travel around the country even if you get beyond the huge restrictions that the government has.

We made a point in the report of saying that we've got to get, in the post-peace process you've got to get to a system of movement within the country which is more open. Right now it's permit driven, it's highly controlled, and almost nobody's moving around let alone people who don't have any resources.

I think there's also a political calculation that's taking place with these populations. I think some of the politicians in the south see the people living in the north as being part of their future base, and the people in the north are saying, the politicians in the north, when do we get rid of these people because they're a potentially destabilizing force. So they're ready to be taken advantage of, but it's not clear whether it's going to be for their benefit.

Finally I'd say that we did see in the Nuba Mountain area

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when we were there, we did see quite a few people who had returned so the population had been growing in that area since they had come up with an agreement and had a monitoring, some sort of confidence building in terms of their own safety. And we saw a lot of people who talked to us about the joys and the freedom of movement. The markets were flourishing again and other things and we even saw that in Rumbeck as well, that things are happening as a result of there not being the way.

There are some positive indications but it's not a population that is at the top of those who are controlling the process right now. It's not in the forefront of their thinking I would say.

**Question:** [inaudible] Sudan. I have a question on the security situation in the [inaudible] areas.

Is there any thinking among the negotiators now or is there anything in your report on who is to have the responsibility of security for oil production itself and whether there shouldn't be an international [body]?

**Crocker:** It is one of the areas that we note, the oil area, some of the areas we know will be hot spot areas and already have been. As you know there's been quite of a lot of violence in some of them, in [Bentu] which is one of the places we went. We do suggest that one of the functions for the quick reaction force but also in thinking about where peacekeepers should be placed is thinking about the oil areas and the garrison towns in the south in particular.

It's going to be particularly problematic in some of the oil areas because of the question of the militias and the role that the militias are playing right now. And again this is something that I think in all of our conversations so far there's this sort of notion that the parties will deal with the militias somehow. It's totally unclear what it is that anyone is thinking the "deal with" means. If it means sort of taking them outside and shoot them or if there's some other concept for how to deal with the militias. But in our opinion thinking has not gone far enough yet, and it's certainly one of the things that the international peacekeepers are going to have to deal with.

**Question:** Victor Tanner. I was back in Sudan for a few weeks in December doing assessment for USAID's offices [inaudible]. And in talking to dozens of Sudanese at that point in December for two weeks what really struck me was that the peace process has sort of created a dynamic of its own. It seemed to be escaping both the government and to a certain extent the SPLA. So you had

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people talking, speaking openly in Khartoum and other places, but especially in Khartoum, about democracy, about legal reform, about rights, about justice in a way that would have been unthinkable a year ago, six months ago, even two months ago. The arrival of the SPLA delegation, high level delegation in Khartoum, the signing in Jeddah of the agreement between the DUP [inaudible] Taha which is seen as harbingers of change.

There are caveats to this. The newspapers remain closed. Darfur is a problem that you cannot underestimate, that that problem will be [inaudible] long, long problem. The idea that perhaps once a peace agreement is signed external pressure, particularly U.S. pressure will decrease.

But my question to you is did you get the sense as well of sort of an opening of a political space, of even an advocacy space within Sudanese society? That it opened up. Do you think it's sustainable? And do you think the U.S. in particular can do things to maintain that momentum [inaudible]?

**Morrison:** I think we believe it's essential. We definitely saw it but we worried that the people we were talking to and who were exhibiting these relatively new practices, put them in a category. If there's a category called spoilers this would be the category that might be called dear hearts. [Laughter] The people that you would like to do well but somehow end up being victimized very early in any kind of entrenchment process that tends to happen in these places. So we didn't think the critical masses there, we were worried about the political parties in particular in the north because they're somewhat antiquated in virtually every way. And yet the demographic of the country is obviously a young demographic. We didn't see who was capturing that energy as well. We didn't really have obviously a great chance to get into it, but you have to catch that youth market somewhere if you're going to succeed.

Those were concerns we had, but we believe there's great potential there. There's a huge pent-up demand. A lot of people are counting on this peace process to create the opening that will allow for real play.

Part of what we are really hoping, and I must say I'm thrilled to see that the paper's already been translated and is appearing in the market out there, is that our work, we thought our work could be used as an expander of the political space and we hoped that would happen because we believe that is necessary and it needs to be reinforced in virtually everything that's done.

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So big investment. I'm a huge fan of conditionality in this next phase and the money should really make sure that we get the kinds of behaviors. Right from the very beginning we heard this is a piece that's going to need to be guaranteed and there will need to be guarantors. Our very first meeting with 18 Sudanese here in Washington that was the attitude and we didn't have anything that dissuaded us from that in the three weeks we were there.

**Crocker:** I might just add a couple of things to that. We definitely sensed the same I think momentum taking off around the peace process that you did, although it was also our sense that although people are very aware that there is a peace process, as you know, people know very little to nothing about what is actually encompassed in that peace process. So mostly what you heard is people just expecting two things. One there are going to be American Marines on the ground post-peace, and two, there are going to be enormous amounts of money flowing in the country. Part of this will also just be an exercise in trying to manage some of the expectations.

But I think your question also gets back to some of what we talked about in terms of the need to start supporting things that will open up the peace process, for example civil society groups, human rights groups. We talked to maybe some of the same folks in the north in Khartoum that you did and it's our sense that we all need to be supporting those groups and those kinds of people post the peace.

It's also the reason that we raised this issue of the possibility of a constitutional convention which again is addressed only very vaguely in the peace process itself but could be a way that we really move beyond the closed nature of the peace process and start opening up the political space in Sudan after peace to include more participants.

**Esposito:** I think that was a key question, is it just lip service to the [inaudible] notion of [inaudible]? Or is it genuine? We're arguing that the assistance programs can in a sense be a wedge to push that door open a little bit more, but I still have a lot of serious questions about intent and whether or not there really will be additional space for these people to operate in. But we did see a nascent civil society that we thought should be supported.

**Morrison:** My guess would be, and maybe you could comment on this, my guess would be there's an enormous amount of hope, there's more space politically in the north than existed before, and there are great opportunities for U.S. engagement with any

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number of players there. And direct bilateral through OTI and others, but quite a bit of programming done through the National Endowment for [Democracy].

The government has sold the notion of peace to its public and it's consciously used this as a way of trying to shore up their facing legitimacy and give some notion that there's a future in which new things are going to happen.

The Darfur situation throws an enormous wrench in all of this and there's a streak of paranoia that runs through all of these calculations about how much the benefits, how will the benefits, how quickly will the benefits flow and how risky is this enterprise going to be, and will this regime survive or will it morph into something else. But can you tell us a bit about what you observed?

**Question:** What was stunning to me, having been to Sudan a number of times in the past [inaudible], was just the degree of openness. It's not a nascent civil society, it's the remnants of a once-flourishing civil society. But what I saw was, or got a taste of. I don't know if my assessment is accurate or not. Was a situation that may not have been yet spinning out of control for the government but sort of had that potential where students were sort of middle class types, people who have refrigerator stores, repair refrigerators; mechanics; were talking openly about using the momentum of the peace process to create a new Sudan. These were northerners talking about a new Sudan. Watching the SPLA go to Friendship Hall which has hosted so many of the Islamic meetings of this government in Khartoum over the years, and stand up and have northerners in the audience stand up and say yes, yes new Sudan, or up, up New Sudan, down, down old Sudan, was really quite stunning.

I think it goes beyond dear hearts, you know? It may be the opposite of spoilers. It may be people who offer an opportunity to push things and to push for real change that many people don't believe will come through the peace agreement per se. But my question was just, was that my wishful thinking, what I wanted to see, what I was hoping I would see? Or is this --

**Crocker:** We certainly had similar conversations with groups in the north -- at the universities, human rights groups, civil society groups, lawyers. And I think there is definitely that hope among them, and they also were expressing the idea to us that there would be some momentum that would take off after a peace agreement is signed that the government might not be able to keep the reigns on. But I think that it was not yet our feeling that that was in the process of spinning out of the

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government's control.

I think certainly the question of how much attention is paid to this National Unity government as opposed to U.S. attention, for example, focusing only on a southern regional entity I think will be a key part of that because as Dina was expressing earlier, we have to sort of hold the parties to what they have put in these pieces of paper and I think that's going to be a difficult challenge. I'm not sure that we yet are sanguine about the possibilities that the U.S. government at least is thinking as robustly as it might about what needs to be happening to reinforce some of those tendencies that are starting in the north.

**Morrison:** We want to believe what you are feeling and there were some encouraging other voices. There was a stronger divergence of opinions within official government meetings than we had expected. We thought that was encouraging even though some were populist and would be difficult.

Some of the people that were most open were editors of newspapers and we thought that was encouraging because they tended to have the ability to reach more people.

We heard on the campuses that if the elections were not rigged for the leadership of the student leadership that it would be overwhelmingly against the existing status quo.

**Question:** [inaudible]

**Morrison:** Yeah. My worry is always are we at the tipping point. That's the key issue.

**Esposito:** And how new is the new Sudan? You get a sense that if you really start to talk about what does new Sudan mean, it's a shifting of power to other elites or to other Khartoum [inaudible] centric approach. I'm not sure when you really look at that closely that there's a lot there.

**Crocker:** I think I see folks packing up so since it's 10:30 we may just stop there.

I encourage you to please get in touch with us on e-mail or phone if you have further comments or questions and hopefully we will continue to be in touch with you as this [goes forward].

(END)