

NEW ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY  
How Election Results Will Affect Geopolitics, Global Perceptions

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**Mark Schoeff:** Thank you for joining us here at CSIS today and making your way through the rain which I understand is a real hassle because no one in Washington can drive in rain or snow. Those of us from the Midwest don't understand that.

I'm Mark Schoeff, the Director of --

**Voice:** And we clearly don't understand the Midwest.  
[Laughter].

**Mark Schoeff:** Right. The people who brought you the second Bush Administration are better drivers in inclement weather, trust me. As someone from a red state, a crimson red state, Indiana. We drive better.

Anyway, thank you all for joining us today at CSIS for this panel that will explore the foreign policy options and possible avenues that the second Bush Administration will take. I hope that each of you picked up a media advisory coming in. That gives you brief bios on each of the participants today. If you didn't get one we'll have more outside at the end of the event. So I will dispense with long introductions and I will just tell you that the panel consists of the following people starting at

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my far right. Jon Alterman, Director of our Middle East Program; Kurt Campbell, CSIS Senior Vice President and Director of our International Security Program; Bathsheba Crocker, Codirector of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project; Patrick Cronin, CSIS Senior Vice President and Director of Studies; Robin Niblett is next, CSIS Executive Vice President and Director of the Europe program; and right here to my immediate right, Teresita Schaffer, Director of the CSIS South Asia program. Each scholar will begin with a brief opening statement and we'll go in this order. Patrick, then Robin, Kurt, Tessie, Jon, and then Sheba.

Patrick, go ahead.

**Patrick Cronin:** Good morning, thank you very much for coming. We have a lot to say and really a short period of time to say it so let me just make three basic points here. As somebody who served in a senior position in the Bush Administration I may have a different perspective than some of my colleagues on this table.

I just returned from around the world. This was very much a global election. Everybody was watching it. American leadership is not at a high point, we all know that. And there's a huge opportunity and challenge facing President Bush now that he's been reelected. Whereas Kerry would have had a global honeymoon, Bush starts from essentially a hole internationally in terms of American prestige and influence.

The agenda is so complex, so big for foreign policy and security policy, unless we find a way to convert American power to influence and leadership the transaction costs will be so high that we're going to be further polarizing the world and America will not be meeting its basic national interests in perpetuating its foreign policy goals.

So the very first question is really one of leadership internationally and how President Bush reasserts international leadership. He's going to be doing it at a time when the budget is highly constrained with the deficits and difficulty with government spending. He's going to be doing it at a time when alliances, as Robin Niblett I'm sure will emphasize. The transatlantic relationship needs to be deeply strengthened and broadened. And the outreach to Congress is going to have to be much more effective than it was during the first term when the White House tended to give short shrift often to working very closely across the aisle.

So we're going to see in the next couple of months the appointments, and I understand Secretary Powell may be stepping down this hour, or today. We're going to have to find the way to broaden the Administration's outreach to incorporate not just

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other moderate Republicans but Democrats and international support if this agenda is to go forward.

A second big question that I would just put on the table here today is, the war on terrorism has been the all-consuming issue. I used to joke that we had locked up all of our foreign policy in the Iraq Box because it was just the overwhelming dominant issue. Clearly what we're trying to face now around the world is clearly so broad and multifaceted, we're going to have to develop strategy and a strategy that is very complex and multifaceted. When I think about counterterrorism strategy, do we have an effective one, where do we create that? The rebuilding of Iraq as Sheba Crocker will talk about is complex and could be all-consuming in and of itself. The Arab-Israeli problems as Arafat apparently has lapsed back into a coma, has got to be a central focus. Iran, as Jon Alterman will undoubtedly talk about and generally engaging the Islamic world.

All of those militate toward a strategy toward the greater Middle East as a locus of policy concern that no matter who was going to be President for the next four years, you cannot escape.

We're going to need a strategic approach as well as leadership on these issues. There's no easy answer or quick fix for these problems.

A third point is even while the greater Middle East is the locus of attention over the next four years on foreign security policy -- including energy policy I should add into that -- we live in this very small interconnected world, whether it's disease and global AIDS, the pandemic region, not just Africa but the follow-on countries as Tessie Schaffer may talk about in India, for instance, and elsewhere. But also conflict including in Africa spilling over into security issues. Dealing with Asian strategy in particular and a rising China, I'm sure Kurt will touch on this, is a long-term challenge for America and its allies.

Those are some of the issues I would just put on the table for starters, for warming up, and I'd like to listen to my colleagues before we go forward.

Robin?

**Robin Niblett:** Thanks, Patrick.

I'd like to say a few words on the transatlantic relationship, the relationship with Europe in general. The first thing I think that's worth saying is as I certainly see U.S. policy towards Europe, we're not really looking so much about the bilateral relationship between these two continents, necessarily the country and accessive countries, it's really the relationship between the United States and Europe and what they can do

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externally. That's going to be what really preoccupies this Administration as it goes forward over the next four years. It's the relationship looking out. What will the United States and Europe be able to do together and not be able to do together on the international stage?

Clearly I think Europeans were pretty shocked and certainly at a popular level and probably at a government level as well, the majority disappointed. Not just by the fact that President Bush won, but I think what is worrying for many European governments and countries is the style of the victory. The fact that it was won with the base and with a base driven partly by the moral dimension and also one that perhaps is resonated with opposition to the concept of the global test. Europe often sees itself as the teacher and master that hands out the scores and obviously keeps marking the current Bush Administration low on that.

So this victory just perpetuates this feeling in Europe of not understanding America and not really being confident, therefore, of knowing how to work with it as a partner. When the key priority needs to be over the next few years how we work as partners, looking externally as I said at the beginning, obviously we're starting with a handicap.

The second point I want to make quickly is that I think actually the Bush victory probably solidifies, perhaps, the domestic positions of some of those governments that the first Bush Administration had such a hard time working with. Clearly Gerhard Schröder, Jacques Chirac, maybe Zapatero in Spain, although he's having some problems perhaps adjusting to his position of power right now.

Having a government in Washington that they have at least somewhat of a conflictual relationship with gives them a context from which to operate domestically that is probably more certain and more confident-making than it might have been with a Kerry Administration. And conversely, I think Tony Blair in the UK continues obviously, therefore, to be saddled with a problematic relationship with the United States that perhaps constrains his room for maneuver as a partner.

That being said, therefore, there's little I think this Administration, the new Administration, will be able to ask of Europe immediately and in the near term. The potential for a more constructive transatlantic relationship will depend upon some preparation and some time. Again, from a European perspective that's probably helpful because most European governments would have been thrown into some very tough decisions very early if Senator Kerry had won.

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Just going through some specifics, obviously we're unlikely to see more European troops going into Iraq, and in fact as it was reported today both the Netherlands and Hungary have in fact now given dates for withdrawing their troops from Iraq in the spring of 2005 and some question has to be held probably over Polish troops and Italian troops -- it obviously depends a lot on the future of Italian politics and the Berlusconi government staying in power.

Perhaps just going down to one practical granular issue, there would be some potential and this Administration I'm sure will pursue it, to try and perhaps get some European troops into Iraq to protect the UN group that will come in to monitor the elections. So maybe there's some small room for maneuver but probably not at a more extensive sense.

One other just general comment on this in terms of how Europe might react. I don't think we can see a further widening of the transatlantic relationship because it's pretty wide, but we can possibly see a hardening of positions and that hardening is clearly something we have to look out for. Europe has a very very heavy internal domestic agenda with ratification of the constitutional treaty over the next year and a half to two years, so we may see Europe turn within itself a little bit, and again, that affects its ability to serve as an effective partner.

On the other hand let me just get slightly on, I don't know if it's a positive side but it's certainly an "on the other hand". I think both Europe, certainly the majority of European leaders recognize there are few international challenges that affect their near-term and even long-term security that they can resolve by themselves and that the bulk of those challenges are partly in the hands of the United States, and therefore any solution that they want is one they're going to have to undertake with the United States. I think from that point of view, certainly we heard prior to the election the U.S. Administration wanting to reach out to Europe more. Europe I think did not want to listen in the year leading up to the election. With the election now completed and the leader known, perhaps those openings might be able to be followed.

Let's not forget that the European governments and the European Commission and the European Council have put forward a view of the long-term security of Europe that doesn't match in many ways the main priorities of the Bush Administration. The danger of the nexus between terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction, the danger of failed states. Where the difference lies is in implementing what you do about those dangers and here clearly we are going to face some tough calls, I'll just list them quickly but we can come back to them Q&A on Afghanistan, Iran was mentioned already. I suspect many more European

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governments are more ambivalent about a nuclear Iran than perhaps is this U.S. Administration. The broader Middle East/North Africa. So long as the United States is in Iraq it's going to be tough for Europe to want to take a strong lead with America on that initiative.

Tony Blair has already put the Arab-Israeli conflict to the top of his list of issues that he wants to be able to work with the new Administration on. Again, that's something that perhaps is neither in America nor in the UK's hands. And we should not ignore China as a potential source of conflict over the coming year in terms of EU decisions to lift the arms embargo.

I think on the trade side I would foresee a more positive perhaps relationship I think going forward, and certainly working together on Airbus, and I think the FSC, the France Sales Corporation, might get resolved. We can do that on Q&A.

Let me conclude just quickly on the near term. We have an EU Summit taking place in December in Holland. Might that offer an opportunity for an invitation to President Bush very much as he was invited to the June Summit in Guertenberg, in Sweden. It may be too early, because I think the one lesson that was learned the first time around is preparation is needed for that type of exercise, rather than simply grandstanding. Otherwise we could end up with a negative point of view.

My final point would be that I think the UK joint presidency it will have over this coming year; the G8 presidency starting in January and then the EU presidency starting in June, at least gives an opportunity, an interlocutor for this Administration to work with on a more effective transatlantic relationship for the next four years.

**Kurt Campbell:** First of all, thank you all very much for coming. I think Robin and Patrick have given you a quite full agenda of potential issues in the global environment that will come cascading upon American foreign policy over the next couple of months and couple of years.

I'd like to start sort of at a broader level and make if I can first five points and begin with a quick personal study. I am a long-suffering Boston Red Sox fan. I'll take you back a week and a half, game two, walking along the sort of misty, freezing streets of Boston, the World Series. Weather that really baseball should not be played, and I was going to the game with my closest friend from childhood, an old Irish Catholic guy, a wonderful guy. We raised the question that dare not be asked which was, if you had a choice, you had to really do a selfish choice and you could only choose one -- the Red Sox winning the World Series or -- he's an old Democrat as well -- or John Kerry

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being elected President of the United States. I asked him the question. There was that momentary hush of silence, you've blasphemed and how dare you raise this question. He thought for a moment and he said actually, really, there is no choice whatsoever. I thought he would say of course you've got to think about the nation. Of course what he was thinking about was the Red Sox. He says, of course the Red Sox. The Red Sox winning is by far and away the most important. I talked to him yesterday and he said I'm not so sure now. [Laughter]. But here we are. This is the world that we're living in and we have to sort of decide about how to go forward.

I think the most interesting question is the one that Patrick raised which is what will be sort of the initial posture, and I use that term advisedly of this Administration, about how it wants to position itself both towards the allies in particular, and some of the people that we've interacted with very closely internationally, and the opposition at home. Will this be a President that will reach out, redefine the agenda, to use a phrase from the earlier Bush presidency -- a softer and gentler foreign policy? Or will you see a sort of damn the torpedoes, you are either with us, you're going to come to us on our agenda or not at all?

What everyone is searching for, both in terms of the hints of the rhetoric, of the initial statements, and the initial positions that will be filled and people that will be asked to leave are hints about what's likely to be the case. I've already heard several people pronounced very aggressively on both sides of this divide.

My own personal view, just quickly on this, is I think what is not well appreciated is this is a team that has an extraordinarily close relationship and I actually think a very well-honed world view that has been set in a very hard plaster as a consequence of September 11th and the events that have subsequently transpired. I think at a very deep psychological level the election is seen by them not just as conveying a mandate, a word that was used fairly effectively yesterday I think, but perhaps more importantly reinforcing a deeply psychological belief that we are right and we are on the right track, and that others are, correspondingly, wrong. I actually think that will be a consistent theme that we'll see. Perhaps not initially these first couple of days where there will be sort of language about bipartisanship and about reaching out. I think the reaching out will be very much along the lines of would you like to join with us on our agenda, which is a form of reaching out, but perhaps not exactly what the losers had in mind and others who have some anxieties.

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I can't tell you, like other people, how many calls I've gotten globally from people that are anxious, interested, worried, asking tons of questions about what's likely to be the case going forward. I agree very much with Patrick that this is an Administration that already has a track record, there are already some things buried in the backyard, so as a consequence I think what we're going to see is a period of real anxiety and uncertainty over the next several weeks as the initial hints of what lies in store will be sort of revealed as we go. But I personally believe that by and large the character of the presidency and this Administration has been set and that in many respects we're going to see more of the same.

The third issue that I'd like to just say is, the most pressing question that the Administration will have to deal with obviously is Iraq. What we've seen is, although this was a foreign policy campaign, what's fascinating is how little either candidate actually talked about specifics, about foreign policy specifics. And I would put at the top of that list Iraq. In which you have the President saying look, we're on the right course; and Senator Kerry saying we're going to reach out to our allies. Both really lacking the kinds of specifics that are sort of necessary that are going to have to be tackled immediately.

My own belief is that one of the things that we'll see very quietly beginning, probably today, is a serious rethink about what our options are ahead of us in Iraq. That will be the convening principle, that will be the convening issue in American foreign policy.

I've said before, I have a four year old daughter. I watch her play soccer. The coach tries to teach these kids to hold their position in the field when the ball is not in their quadrant, but what happens is all the kids just run to the ball. There's just this mass of kids standing around the ball. That's what Iraq is. Most of the focus, attention and money of our military, of our strategic leaders, is focused on Iraq and that will continue, and if anything -- and I'd like to underscore this -- intensify. Because the problems essentially have been stored up to get through the election and now Iraq is really going to be upon us. We're going to have to go to the Hill with a supplemental, a very large supplemental, probably on the order of \$80 billion. That will likely be signed quite easily by a very strongly endorsing House and Senate with rejuvenated majorities on the Republican side.

In addition, later this year, early next year, we're suddenly going to realize that the well that we've been going to for quite some time in terms of reserve forces that we're using in Iraq -- remember, 40 percent of the forces in Iraq primarily are from the Army and other forces' reserves. Those forces are

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diminishing substantially as larger and larger numbers of people are choosing not to re-up in the reserves if at all possible, and we're going to face some real shortages of personnel going forward. And materials. And then there's the question about the election in Iraq, whether the conditions will abide serious election. All of those things will be facing the President's senior advisors at a time where I think most of the countries that are with us if anything will seek to diminish their presence inside Iraq.

One of the most interesting things in terms of the out-polling were questions not just about morality, guns, and gays and gay marriage, but the questions about Iraq. One of the questions asked was who's policies did you have more faith in? What was interesting was what appears to be a sense that most Americans had much greater faith in the President about Iraq, very little knowledge about the plans but a great faith in his ability to get through Iraq. Where others who had looked at it had more confidence in Senator Kerry's sort of understanding of the problems in Iraq, but much greater belief and confidence in the President's ability, or at least his vision for Iraq.

So I think although Democrats tend to kind of pooh-pooh this concept of a kind of a faith-based policy, I think it's really important for us sort of in Washington to appreciate there really is a strong belief out in the heartland that the President can guide us through. It will be interesting to see how this faith, when it interacts with the realities on the ground how this plays out over the next several months.

That leads me to the next issue, what are the consequences politically? I'm almost done. What's interesting for Democrats, and I am a Democrat, is that it would be hard to underestimate the devastating nature of this loss. In terms of American foreign policy. In many respect it's hard to know what to think about. For Democrats, how to go forward. On so many levels this is repudiating, that it's hard to know what lessons to take.

I'm one that believes having a loyal opposition, having an ability to raise questions about the conduct of foreign policy is important institutionally. And I'm not sure how Democrats go forward. I think they will be in the midst of a very painful soul-searching experience in the wilderness over the next several months about what lessons to take from this and how to go forward.

My sense is that this sense of shock, surprise, and depression extends throughout Democratic ranks.

What's also interesting is that for many Republicans, I talked to one very prominent Republican yesterday, and he said

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well now the battle really begins. I didn't really understand what he was talking about, but his point was that because there is not an anointed successor, because Vice President Cheney one assumes will not run for President of the United States in 2008, there will be a major battle within the Republican party for the heart and soul of the Republican party, and many centrist, internationalist, sort of your father's Oldsmobile Republicans, are probably as anxious about some of the developments in this election as may Democrats are and they're already beginning to think about what's the kind of leadership in the Republican party they'd like to see come into focus in 2008 in terms of the next couple of years of campaigning.

The last thing I'll just leave you with is we've heard over the last several years a wonderful book by Sam Huntington that we all like to trash, "The Clash of Civilizations" in which the concept primarily was that either the United States would sort of struggle with a Confucian rise in Asia, or the prospects of a civilizational struggle between the United States in particular, or the West and Islam. I wonder, and I think that overstates it, but I do think the more people I've talked to and the more I experience, is that many allies, friends, and other countries that basically engage the United States are confused by these developments. I think that what will happen is a degree of alienation where many countries and the elite of many countries, particularly in Europe but also in the Middle East and elsewhere, will look to the United States and not completely understand the United States any longer. There could well be a cultural divide that will affect policymaking.

Now we're at the early stages of that. The President can do a lot to ameliorate that, but the real prospect of Europe going its own way at a fundamental level, of Asia being a little wary about a highly moral religious focus in American foreign policy, and the obvious tensions that we see between America and Islam, I think there's the real risk that those tensions can grow in the future, and at a strategic level that is what I see as the greatest risk to American foreign policy. Not specific crises in cross straits or North Korea or in Iraq, as worrisome as those might be. It is the larger strategic tensions between the United States and what really are our key allies and key regions of the world.

Thank you.

**Teresita Schaffer:** I'm going to talk primarily about policy towards South Asia which is what I follow here, but I think that what's gone before puts it in a very important context. I hold with those who believe there will be tremendous continuity from one Bush Administration to the next; that the people who ran this election and those who have worked in the Administration will see

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this is a vindication of everything they have done and will see no reason to change anything.

In reality if not in theory, in South Asia the dominant strand of foreign policy has been the war on terrorism and the consequent need for a strong relationship with Pakistan. The desire to build up a stronger relationship with India, something where this Administration, though it doesn't like to talk about it, in fact stands on the shoulders of its immediate predecessor, on the Clinton Administration, will remain important but is in policy terms I would say the junior partner.

The tight focus for which this Administration is famous is a great strength in terms of crisis. The inability to broaden the focus becomes a liability when you're trying to deal with a broader set of complications and the biggest challenge in South Asia, and I'm going to list six of them very briefly, is the fact that for this Administration the focus gets down to one issue that is, as Kurt said, Iraq. So everything else is part of the Administration's peripheral vision with the partial exception of a highly personalized concept of relations with Pakistan where Pakistan's and specifically President Musharraf's participation in anti-terrorism operations is what it's all about.

Now I have argued elsewhere and will continue to argue that this tight a focus on one person and one issue in a relationship where the United States has a heavy and very complicated agenda is likely to mean that we don't do terribly well on our anti-terrorism objective, let alone the others including ending the nuclear bazaar, trying to deal with some of Pakistan's internal problems, and possibly also the problem of the war risk between Pakistan and India, and I'm going to come to each of those as my three first challenges.

The first is Pakistan's internal problems. The United States is providing generous economic assistance and strongly supports the idea of rebuilding Pakistan's hollowed-out institutions which is the right objective. I don't think, however, that this Administration has so far conveyed to Pakistan that this is something that's really important to us and I don't see that as likely to change and I'm afraid the consequences may be ones that we regret.

A second challenge, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The AQ Kahn network, what has been referred to by some as the Nuclear WalMart, has been officially closed down. AQ Kahn is somewhere between freedom and house arrest -- this is all a little bit ambiguous. But the way the Administration made its decisions on how to deal with this situation in which Pakistan's premier nuclear scientist was making available the country's know-how to a broad range of about the worst customers one could

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imagine, leaves me with great concern that A, we are not getting and are not likely to get the full information from Pakistan on how this bazaar operated; and B, there's no particular reason why the Pakistanis should take the U.S. seriously in advance when it says heaven help you if it ever happens again.

So I think the danger that this kind of thing will continue at some low level and could bear seriously adverse consequences for U.S. security, will continue to be there and will be more difficult for the Administration to deal with as long as it believes that its primary focus, the Iraq war on terrorism, requires a relationship that more or less begins and ends with President Musharraf.

India-Pakistan relations at the moment are in relatively good shape. Unless things start moving an awful lot faster than they have in their peace dialogue, however, there is every reason to expect that this Administration will face another India-Pakistan crisis within the next year or two. They've handled past ones quite effectively. There is no particular reason to believe that the exact same formula that worked before will work again.

Because these emerge as crises, they play to the Administration's strength. It's able to deal with a crisis. What it is less able to deal with, and again I don't see this changing, is a strategic diplomatic effort to prevent the next crisis from coming up in the first place.

In principle this Administration could certainly deal with that and might even like to, but I think the overwhelming focus on Iraq means that effectively that's not going to be a possibility.

Three other challenges that I'd like to mention briefly. One is what I call the changing face of Asia, and I think it's important to remember that while the Administration has amazingly ambitious goals for reshaping the face of the Middle East, it does not appear to have set itself the same goal of reshaping the face of Asia. Neither I think has there been as much thought as I would have liked to see given to what overall Asian security looks like in an era when China is rising, Korea is undergoing dramatic and confusing change, Japan is barely emerging from a ten-year slump, Indonesia is in free fall. The next country west, the next big country west, India, is a country with which we've been trying to improve our relations. That has been a small priority but in this Administration the small priorities get relatively little attention. And you have all around India centers of serious instability which now include Nepal and Bangladesh which hadn't been in that category before.

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This is an area of great ferment. You have to consider both South Asia and East Asia as part of a common geographic area for security purposes, that's partly the result of globalization and partly the result of India's expanding economic power.

So I put this down as a challenge for the next Bush Administration for which there isn't an easy textbook answer, but which is going to demand, I would guess, more attention that it will get at least in the early days when Iraq is the only issue.

And my final challenge is resources. The \$80 billion supplemental may well go through. I would note that the budget figure that that \$80 billion filled in when the budget was submitted was zero. So you're dealing with an Administration whose strategy for getting money for really expensive things out of the Congress is to pretend they don't exist until you're right up with your nose pressed against the crisis. I don't know whether this will change. That would be some of the kind of outreach it would be nice to see, but with a group of people whose thinking patterns are hard-wired, I don't see that they have at this point a reason they would find compelling to change that.

But there's another side of resources. There are going to be very significant resources needed for development, for responses to worldwide threats that are not the war on terrorism, and the one that immediately comes to mind is HIV/AIDS, where this Administration put forward a creative and courageous initiative with a big number next to it -- the President's emergency program for AIDS relief. They say that it hasn't been underfunded so far. I'm somewhat skeptical. I've got to believe that that's going to become much more difficult to keep funding at a time when the needs are going to go up dramatically and go up in particular in some new countries, none of which have been named as focus countries -- India, China and Russia.

There are a lot of other resource needs that one could talk about, but this then folds you into the problem of budget deficits as far as the eye can see. These are not things that the U.S. has had an easy time spending money on at times when money was tight.

**Jon Alterman:** Good morning. I'm going to try to cover a lot in a little time. That means I'll be telegraphic but unfortunately not telepathic, so I'm just guessing what's going to happen in the Middle East.

I just want to start by reminding you of two quotations. One is the famous Winston Churchill quotation, "There's nothing so exhilarating as to be shot at without result." This Administration is feeling that they had a close election and they

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got by. The second quotation, the famous Washington quotation, "You have to dance with the one that brung you." Right? These guys got elected with a mandate to continue to do what they do.

When they look at the Middle East, the key argument that this Administration approaches the Middle East with is the problem requires transformation of the region. The persistence of anti-Americanism, the growth of anti-Americanism, the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict is not a consequence of what we do, it's their fault. The answer is, we have to help them change. We have to help them change the habits that led them into these behaviors.

The desire to promote political reform in the Middle East is going to remain a key central objective of U.S. policy and people will continue to look to the East European example as an inspiration. Remember, this was new Europe. Old Europe were the people who were opposing us. New Europe were the people who were supporting U.S. policy. The answer is to have that same sort of transformation in the Arab world as we had in Europe.

I think one of the interesting things, though, is if you look out at the Middle East, who's going to want to work with the U.S.? We're going to have a lot easier time I think than we've had with governments. It's my judgment that governments are going to accommodate themselves increasingly now that the Bush Administration is in for another four years. But on the public level people are going to be less willing to work with the Bush Administration. Yet the kinds of political transformations that we're hoping for aim to empower publics at the expense of governments. So we're going to have a very difficult time sequencing this and making sure that things move in the direction we're hoping for.

I think it's a huge question when we look forward to the next Administration in terms of personnel, whether the Department of Defense will continue to have a very strong voice in Middle East policy, and also whether the Administration will accommodate lots of different views on policy. I think one of the characteristics of this Administration has been relatively loose coordination at the National Security Council level and a lot of different voices and people competing in different parts of bureaucracy. Depending on who the National Security Advisor is, who the Secretary of Defense is, who the Secretary of State is, that may or may not change in the years forward.

Looking at the key issues in the Middle East, it seems to me that the Arab-Israeli issue is unlikely to draw high level involvement for the next couple of years, partly because of internal Palestinian politics, the struggle for the succession of Yasser Arafat which is almost certain to be occurring and which

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will take some time; and I think Israeli politics being gripped by managing Gaza withdrawal. Gaza withdrawal is something that two-thirds of the Israeli public supports, but not two-thirds of the governing coalition, and it's my guess that Ariel Sharon as he manages this and manages his own political career in Israel, that's going to be the thing that Israelis are driven by and I think the U.S. is really not going to seek to get involved until these processes play themselves out.

The key challenge is going to be, for the U.S. and for Israel, if you do have leadership succession in the Palestinian community, what can the U.S. do, what can Israel do to make sure or to try to promote the kinds of outcomes that the U.S. and Israel want to promote? We go into that I think with a very keen understanding that our ability to hurt this is much greater than our ability to help it. But still it's an opportunity and it's going to be a challenge and it's going to be a key challenge facing the Administration.

One challenge that's unavoidable is what to do with Iran. You've heard a little bit about it already.

I cannot imagine any circumstances under which the Iranian government would not prefer to have their moment of negotiation and ultimate conciliation with the U.S. until after they have nuclear weapons. I mean they just get a much better deal if they have nukes when they're making that deal. So it seems to me that they are going to make that deal.

The other part of our Iran policy, there had been a hope to support reformists except the reformist movement is dead in Iran. So this Administration I think is going to have to, because of the nuclear issue, is going to have to have an Iran policy.

Recall that one of the first issues on the agenda of this first Bush Administration was Iran policy review. They were unable to reach a decision. I don't think they're going to be unable to reach a decision this time around.

I'm going to leave Iraq to Sheba although I would point out that it seems to me we're at a turning point on the Iraq situation where Iraq is so tenuous and so threatening to all of Iraq's neighbors that instead of not wanting the U.S. to have a booming success in Iraq which is how they went into this, they also don't want the U.S. to completely fail. They're terrified of Iraq turning into Somalia. It will be a gaping hole, a real source of instability throughout the Middle East. I think we're going to see continued help for the near term and greater help from the countries around Iraq, try to at least get Iraq to some level of stability, certainly not what the Administration had

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hoped for early, but certainly keep it from tipping toward Somalia.

I think we're going to muddle through on Saudi Arabia. We're going to continue to put pressure on Syria. And there's going to be a search for success stories. This Administration did a little bit of that with Libya, giving up their weapons programs. Libya's a not very good success story for lots of reasons. I don't think it's going to be a very good success story. But my bet is you would see this Administration looking toward a place like Morocco, like Jordan, like one of the Gulf states to show what transformation can look like and to try to put out a carrot for what positive change would look like and ultimately to embody the Administration's hopes for the kind of political change in the region that can lead to a reduction of tensions over time.

Thank you.

**Bathsheba Crocker:** Thank you. I will try to keep this brief so we can hopefully have a little bit of time for Q&A, and I will just focus my points on Iraq.

The predictions even before the election of what the President might do if he were reelected seemed to span the extremes from there's a secret plan to start pulling out U.S. troops immediately to, they will take this as a mandate and do things like start to flatten Fallujah tomorrow.

The President has said only, as I think Kurt was describing, that we will stay the course and we intend to succeed in Iraq and we will stay there until we do and there haven't really been a lot of specifics put on what that might mean.

In most ways obviously the President's reelection on Tuesday didn't change the fundamental realities in Iraq and certainly didn't change what the U.S. policy should be. I think the question is whether this Administration will be willing to make the needed policy shifts to get us to that policy, and I think the worry is, for me anyway and perhaps for some of us up here on this panel, that the Administration hasn't until now shown a willingness to make the policy shifts that are needed.

In this sense the election may provide an opening in at least two ways. One is that the only difference the President's reelection may offer is that it does present an opportunity for the United States to send some fresh signals, both to the Iraqi people and to our allies and friends around the world and particularly to Iraq's neighbors as Jon was just describing, and to offer perhaps a clear sense of direction of where we're heading in Iraq

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A second point is now that we're out of campaigning mode I would think anyway that it is time to start owning up to the American people about what we really have on our hands in Iraq and to deal with some of the realities of the commitment needed from the U.S. side in terms of resources and troops if we really do intend to see this through, and also just what the realities on the ground are. Claiming success or progress in the absence of factual support for that claim is not really constructive either for the Iraqis or I would think for us.

We should make clear, and whether we will I think is the open question, that we support the following type of vision in Iraq and that we are very much in Iraq in a supportive mode. That our interest will align with the Iraqis' interests, and that we will support their economic recovery far more effectively than we have been doing thus far. That our troops are in Iraq because they are committed to achieving stability there and to wiping out the violence that we're seeing. That we have no intention, for example, of establishing permanent military bases in Iraq. We are committed to free and open elections and to supporting an Iraqi quest for a viable political process in their country, but that we do not intend to manipulate the Iraqi election in any way and that we will not question the results of that election. That we intend to listen to our friends and allies and to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people about their visions for Iraq and what they can most constructively do to assist in Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction. This obviously comes at a very difficult time as others have mentioned with the recent announcement of the pullout of Hungary, New Zealand, the Netherlands and questions remaining about some of the other coalition forces that are in Iraq, in addition to continuing announcements about NGOs pulling out.

The most immediate task obviously remains the security situation as it has been for the past 19 months and I don't think that's likely to change. The numbers and statistics coming out of Iraq are disheartening. We have to be willing to rethink our strategy and our tactics to best address the realities.

We also need to be willing to rethink our assistance package. We have not been at all successful up until now in actually getting money into the country and getting it in there in a way that really effectively starts to address some of the problems and the reconstruction challenges. This will be key to winning over the support of the Iraqi population.

I will just end with obviously the other immediate overarching ask is the elections that are scheduled for January and whether we will in fact be able to get there. Highly dependent on the security situation and also dependent on

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encouraging the Iraqis to really find a meaningful way to bring the Sunnis into the mainstream political fund so that they have a mechanism for expressing their interest other than violence and extremism, and so that we can actually have a viable political process and a viable set of elections in Iraq, and we haven't really shown ourselves willing to do that up until now either.

I think may just end on that point because I know we've run kind of late and hopefully have some time for questions.

**Mark Schoeff:** Before we move to questions just real quick, two housekeeping things. A reminder that biographical information on each speaker is contained in our media advisory. We have more media advisories out at the press sign-in for you to pick up when you leave. Also for reporters who are here, this contact sheet lists many of our CSIS analysts including all six at this table and their phone numbers. You can follow up with them if you have any questions.

I know some of you are in obstructed view seats. This became a bigger event than we were anticipating and we're not a platform here. But if you're a reporter looking to quote someone and you can hear the direction of a voice but not see a face, I'll remind you from the far right it's Jon Alterman, Kurt Campbell, Bathsheba Crocker, Patrick Cronin, Robin Niblett, and Teresita Schaffer.

We'll proceed with questions. Please identify yourself and your organization, and please wait for the roving mike to get to you.

**Jim Loeb:** Jim Loeb from the InterPress Service.

I wanted to ask Mr. Campbell if he would elaborate on his closing remarks about clash of civilizations, and particularly in light of the ability of MidWesterners to drive in rain and snow, and the divide that was alluded to in that way. And specifically with reference to the OpEd today that was published in the Times by Gary Wills as to whether in a sense we're turning our back on the enlightenment that unites the West.

**Kurt Campbell:** First of all I think much of the thesis that Sam Huntington has presented, at least as it has been caricatured, is wrong. In fact what we're facing in the Middle East is really a clash within civilizations and that's well understood, as opposed to a clash between civilizations.

However, his book posits the concept of a general agreement in beliefs, cultural norms, manner and means of governing styles between particularly the United States and Europe. And what I'm suggesting is that I think there is the prospect, what I find

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more and more in dialogues with European friends in particular, less so in Asia, but certainly in Europe is the sense that I think Europeans on some level really feel that they don't understand the United States any more, or at least that there are aspects of the United States that they find confusing and I would say probably underneath it a little alarming. And what I worry about is that I think it's possible that the election could reinforce beliefs in Europe that the United States is in fact a very different polity than the United States that was partnered with Europe throughout the Cold War.

One of the things that Americans find quite obvious is we feel very uncomfortable talking about the role of religion and politics, whether it be in the Middle East or in the United States, but no American can deny when you go abroad that one of the first things you hear is a belief from other friends abroad at how much they see what the United States does in religious terms. That's often quite a shock to Americans.

I think there is a worry of some distancing, and I think Robin was the one who suggested that it's possible that Europe might even further turn inward in terms of some of its internationalist strategies, and rather than this election being about a reknitting of alliances and old partnership, I think in fact it could mean a different outcome in which there is a higher degree of alienation between some of the key players in Europe and the United States.

**Steven Donahue:** This is for Patrick. I'm Steven Donahue from Kissinger McClarty Associates.

I don't believe we heard the word Latin America, Mexico, Cuba, the UN, trade mentioned. Can you just comment on whether those hold a candle or have any chance of being part of the foreign policy of the new Administration?

**Patrick Cronin:** Sure. Only space and time limited, as I'm sure, from having Peter DeShazo, our excellent new Program Director for the Americas, for instance or Steven Morrison for Africa, so these other regions also matter just as much and they're very important.

Economic growth, trade, aid, all are on the Bush agenda. They were on the agenda. They were overshadowed by Iraq. I think presumably in the next four years we have an opportunity to see those move ahead. The Doha negotiation, of course, brings trade and aid together in a very real way, as does the pursuit of free trade agreements as in CAFTA in Central America, for instance. A lot of challenges to face, but I think we heard from Robin Niblett correctly that one of the commonalities really across the Atlantic, one of the hopes is that there is progress

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on agricultural subsidies, for instance, which has been a big sticking point.

So I'm optimistic on the trade and aid moving ahead. The Administration's moving ahead, for instance, with the Millennium Challenge Corporation looking at [inaudible] countries in the Americas, five countries in Africa and others. And those have to move ahead just as the plan on dealing with HIV/AIDS, for instance, which is a big problem in Africa, but as Tessie Schaffer said also, many second-wave countries coming around the world.

So yes, there's plenty of scope and time for these other issues, but they still pale in comparison to the big problem that President Bush now must own up to as I think Sheba Crocker pointed out, which is we have to decide now how do you succeed with the Iraq that we have inherited and that we are in right now, not the one that we saw during the campaign or that we would like to believe should exist but the one that does exist. And then the larger panoply of issues that my colleagues have spelled out here today.

These are huge challenges. President Bush has been given a great opportunity in this vote. He was riding high after the American reaction to the invasion in Afghanistan and it sort of was downhill from there in many ways as he made difficult decisions. I think the defense of the Bush Administration's first term is that he focused on one big thing, protecting America and American interests in a post-9/11 world and he was sort of, as Tessie Schaffer said, fixated on that. Everything was seen through that.

He now has to sort of step back and realize how does he do this with a different team, which is a big challenge, especially if he loses really important people like Colin Powell. How does he put together that team again? He won't have the same team that Jim Mann wrote about on the Balkans. It's going to be a new team. How does he do that and walk and chew gum at the same time with this big agenda? It's very very difficult. He can't do it on his own. He's going to have to realize what are those continuity issues that appeal to his base that he wants to move out of, and there will be some of that continuity. But I believe there's an opportunity for change just as Reagan changed in his second term, because the challenges also demand it in this era even more than they did in the 1980s, for instance, and because also Bush should hopefully be thinking about his legacy as President of the United States, not the leader of the Republican party but as the leader of the sole super power, how is he going to influence people, not simply try to force them to follow?

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**Ken Simpson:** Ken Simpson from the Chicago Tribune. This question is for Jonathan.

This President on the international front very much depends on personal relationships. Is there anyone in the Palestinian community with Yasser Arafat now being gone who provides an opportunity that you see for a personal relationship with this President that could be a catalyst to actually getting something started there sooner rather than later?

**Jon Alterman:** I do think there are people who could strike a relationship with the President. I also think striking that relationship too soon could doom one's chances to lead the Palestinian community. The Palestinians are going to feel remarkably weakened and under siege as a consequence of Arafat leaving the scene, and there's going to be a determination that the time of ultimate weakness, the time of maximum weakness is not the time to make concessions. That's the time to be strong, to endure. Yasser Arafat's great legacy is not that Oslo mad Palestinians' lives better, it made it worse. It's not that the PA was a thumping success. It was disorganized, ineffective, inefficient, corrupt. Arafat's great legacy is he didn't give up. He had steadfastness, [Samuden Arabic], and it seems to me that it's going to be very hard for anybody to inherit the mantle of leadership of the Palestinian community in the near term without showing exactly that steadfastness and it will only be after the dust settles and people feel more secure that a more unified Palestinian community will feel strong enough to begin to explore. I think until that happens they're going to feel weak, they're going to feel divided, and they're going to be very very skittish about doing anything with anybody, let alone striking up a strong relationship with the President of the United States.

**Chris Baltimore:** Chris Baltimore with Reuters News Agency. I wanted to ask about oil. We've all talked about the extent to which the Administration has single-mindedly focused on Iraq and just a question of how that focus will play out in oil policy in the Middle East and elsewhere.

**Jon Alterman:** I don't think we have an oil policy. Oil is an element of our policy towards lots of places. Certainly Libya opening up is of great interest to a number of people. Libya seems to have the most forward-leaning government in terms of actually making an oil deal because people have been banging their heads against the wall trying to get deals with Saudis, Iranians, and it's very unclear what's happening in Iraq.

There's certainly I think a longer term desire to make all those things better, but I don't think any immediate opportunities for making them a lot better, and it seems to me

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that energy policy is something that's going to have to be managed for some time.

The other thing is that there are two consequences of very high oil prices. One is that it becomes economical to exploit oil in a lot of places or otherwise it's not economical. The second is you have a huge windfall for a lot of governments who we consider either troublesome or have troubles which in many ways they may be deferring solving because they don't have to because they have the oil windfall.

So it seems to me that where we're going is probably toward managing a muddy, difficult situation with no clear solution in sight, and probably a number of both immediate and longer-term detrimental effects to a whole range of relationships we have in the Middle East.

**Bathsheba Crocker:** I might just add from the Iraqi perspective in particular, not so much from the point of view of U.S. energy policy but more from the point of view of what position we should take with respect to Iraq and its oil, which is something that we have not again handled as well as we should have up until now to the extent that, for example, the CPA spent about \$20 billion of Iraq's money with very little if any transparency which is not leaving behind a particularly good legacy and I think another potential opening that we have now is trying to figure out what position we will take with the new Iraqi government with respect to Iraq's oil and sort of encouraging transparency and handling of that oil, taking a hands-off position from the perspective of the U.S. and sort of just reasserting or affirming for the first time that we will again play a supporting role here as well and play with the Iraqis and the international community in trying to figure out how the Iraqi government should handle its own oil, its oil revenues, somehow distributing those revenues to the Iraqi people and giving the Iraqi people a stake in their own oil and to a large extent just encouraging transparency and the handling of that. Because I think again, a legacy that we have is that our intentions in Iraq are very much still open to question because of what people think our interests in Iraq's oil are.

**Teresita Schaffer:** The other aspect of the oil issue that no one's talking about is the likelihood that a whole raft of developing countries will find themselves in serious financial difficulty because of high oil prices, the oil importers.

**George Hishmy:** George Hishmy, I'm from Gulf News and Data [inaudible].

I haven't heard -- I came in late, I'm sorry if I missed it. I haven't heard any discussion about the State Department, the

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role it will have in the second Administration. Will it continue to play second fiddle to the Defense Department, especially on the Middle East? Do you expect this Administration the second term will appoint a special envoy to handle the Middle East question as previously?

**Patrick Cronin: ??** Jon may want to add something on this particular issue since he worked in the State Department on the Middle East policy, but let me just at a higher level say that I think the President's facing a question of his team so it's hard to predict any one department, cabinet-level position until you figure out how that team fits together. [Inaudible] talked about Condoleezza Rice or Ambassador Danforth, for instance, moving to the State Department as a possible successor to Powell. I think each one would bring different strengths. I think there's a third possibility of somebody you didn't expect to move in as Secretary of State. And it depends on that person very much in terms of the role that they will play.

Secretary Powell had a predisposition against special envoys. It may be that the successor doesn't have that predisposition against it and they wouldn't mind separating the two positions so it's still possible that the President would create that in my mind.

The key question on Secretary Powell's influence or lack of influence over the last for years has been that he was often triangulated. The Vice President's office and the Secretary of Defense's office forged often a coalition on policy issues that overrode even Secretary Powell's tremendous influence and prestige and I think that's why we have to look at the team to see what is the impact of the State Department over the next four years.

**Jon Alterman: ??** Can I just say one other point about that? I think you can use a lot of words to describe the foreign policy group around the President in the first term. I would really not use the word team, though, because that actually sort of connotes the idea of working together. I think the most interesting feature of the last four years is the disharmony, the raging debates that in many respects were ferocious, almost unprecedented between various factions within the Administration, in which various issues would be fought to a standstill, almost like in your mind some sort of trench warfare during World War I.

The interesting question will be whether that quality will be replicated in a second term or will there be a desire to have a greater degree of collegiality.

My own personal sense is that it's much more likely to be a high degree of in-fighting for the specific reason that the most

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dominant influence clearly in foreign and security policy is going to be the Vice President, but for obvious reasons I think it's difficult to staff everyone at the highest level with people that have the exact same world view as the Vice President. I think that in fact would suggest not only a continuation of the Bush foreign policy of the last four years but an intensification of that if it's possible.

**??:** George, there are two reasons why I'd be especially surprised to see a new Middle East envoy in the near term in this Administration. First is the legacy of special envoys to the Middle East. First we had Tony Zinni who spent a lot of time there, couldn't really get anything done, and then turned out to be critical of the President on other issues. That didn't leave a very good taste in anybody's mouth. Then this John Wolf experience where he went over and made no headway and then stepped down sort of quietly. So I don't think they hold a lot of promise out for having a special envoy.

The second issue is I think this Administration's contention, the problem isn't that we don't have the right negotiating framework. The problem is that the Palestinian side continues to seek to use violence against innocents as a way to improve its negotiating position. That is unacceptable. And as long as that's the case, we'll wait. It's better to wait for the right deal than to make a bad one. I don't think this Administration, especially with a Palestinian leadership in turmoil and Israeli internal politics increasingly tumultuous, I don't think this Administration is going to see this as the time to put its stamp on Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

**Kevin Wong:** Kevin Wong from Techro.

I have a brief question for Mr. Campbell. Do you expect any U.S. policy change toward China in the Bush second term?

**Kurt Campbell:** Very interesting question. I actually think it's likely that the United States will become more involved with cross strait dynamics and I believe there will be a very clear message emanating from Washington to both sides to be very very careful in the period ahead. I think that's likely to be a stronger message than the message we've heard in the past. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of the United States actually stepping in to play a role to facilitate. Not to mediate, but to facilitate a reestablishment of dialogue between China and Taiwan.

**Justine Barskivic:** My name is Justine Barskivic from [inaudible] of Kyrgystan.

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This is a question to Ms. Sheba Crocker in particular. There is talks about deBa'athification in Iraq but at the same time Prime Minister Allawi is declaring quite openly and clearly about bringing back former Ba'athists to politics. How far do you think that should go and what should be U.S. position on that? At the same time, how does it relate to bringing Sunnis to power and giving them the right balance place in the current politics in Iraq? And again, what should be the U.S. position on that? Thank you.

**Bathsheba Crocker:** I think the two parts of your question are actually very interrelated. I think clearly there is going to be a certain high level of the former Ba'athists and certainly those who continue to fight against us, that it would be unwise to bring back into the government. But I think the problem, there were many problems with the way the deBa'athification policy was carried out from the beginning, and the problem now is figuring out how to sort of walk back from that. There are certainly tens of thousands of people who never should have been dismissed from their jobs and should be brought back in as civil servants and teachers and the like. But I think you have to go somewhat higher than that also. And that you cannot rule out the possibility of bringing some of these people back in, either at senior levels of government or in the security forces, and it has to be sort of part and parcel of an overall policy to try and bring the Sunnis back in to the mainstream political fold which will have to happen on many levels, both at a senior level and also at a much more basic level just in terms of making sure the people have livelihoods and feel like they have economic opportunity which I think is something that has also been missing.

**Dilbar Dishu:** My name is Dilbar Dishu, Al Jazeera TV.

I'd like to ask about the expected changes if any vis-à-vis Syria and also what's going to be the situation with asking for reform in the Middle East and relationships with countries like Egypt and [inaudible].

**??:** It seems to me that the Administration has Syria just where it wants it which is Syria feels threatened. Syria is trying to figure out how to get the U.S. attention, how not to get hit; and I think the Administration will be inclined to leave Syria just where it is. To not be very responsive, to see how much they can get out of the Syrians without giving very much in return. And I don't think the Syrians have very many good options. I expect the Syrians to continue to try to be more conciliatory rather than confrontational with the U.S. in the foreseeable future.

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This problem of reform in Egypt I think is a special problem for the United States because the U.S.-Egyptian relationship is so complicated in so many ways, and I think many people in the Egyptian government have come to the conclusion that if they give the U.S. what it wants on the Arab-Israeli conflict then all the other problems will go away.

There is certainly a view of some in the government and some I expect to continue in the government that Egypt's a growing problem and unless there's real dramatic political change in Egypt that's going to harm U.S. interests in the long term.

My guess is that this tension will persist within the government, with some people who say we really need fundamental change in Egypt and some people saying look, this is what we need from the Egyptians this week and we'll put off fundamental change until next week or next year. And you'll have this tension.

One of the things that I did note, though, I was looking at the BBC web site and they had a somewhat long article about the campaign for reform, I think it's called, that has a number of non-governmental organizations and others coming together in Egypt which has not encountered confrontation from the government, that [hes el rud] has begun as another voice, and my guess is that politics in Egypt are going to incrementally open up and the U.S. government is going to take that as a sign of success, but it's hard to really change the fundamentals of that relationship unless you change it fundamentally and I'm not sure either the U.S. side of the Egyptian side really wants to open that can of worms right now.

**Maria Vash:** I am Maria Vash from the Hungarian Embassy. I have a question concerning transatlantic relations.

I would like to pick up two thoughts which were expressed in the panel. One is that there is a whole range of external issues where Europe and the United States really need to work together, and the other was that we can expect further alienation of the United States and European countries.

So how do you see from a practical point of view the approach of the second Bush Administration towards working with Europe? What steps do you think the Administration will make to restrengthen cooperation? And a related question is how do you think the Administration will approach NATO policy and cooperation with European allies within NATO? Thank you.

**Robin Niblett:** That's a big question to throw to the end. I think there are, as we said earlier, such a huge range of topics that the United States and Europe are already working on. As we have the continuity of Administration the one thing we can

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at least say, as I said earlier, is that in many cases at an official level the teams are already in place, the dialogue's already under way. So certainly on the question of Iran, for example, [inaudible] already taking place; the United States to a certain extent has given France, Germany and the UK the opportunity to take the lead, and unfortunately I think as Jon Alterman mentioned earlier on, the likelihood of a successful outcome in the near term without going to the next stage but as you're looking at sanctions in the UN is hard to foresee.

Arab-Israeli conflict, Tony Blair said this is the most important problem on our agenda going forward. Again, how you move forward from rhetoric to action I'm not entirely clear at this stage because again, I think as Jon said, the matter is neither in Europe's hands nor in the United States' hands so it's going to be very difficult for them to take a step right now to move that process forward.

My concern slightly is that I think Europe may try to put, this gets back to what Kurt and Jon said, each side has a different set of priorities right now. The priority for the United States has to be to make Iraq succeed. There are some tactical steps where Europeans can be more helpful but they'll be outweighed potentially by a waning of support at the same time. So Iraq really presents, as I said, the central focus of the United States.

Europe, Tony Blair, going to the G8 presidency is saying that global warming is the top issue, and assistance for Africa. There are two different worlds, in essence, in terms of priorities taking place right now.

So the early steps will be, I would imagine, consultation at an official level, NSC level, not perhaps, certain levels of the State Department. This is not going to be a space where in the next month I imagine we'll see a large initiative, a statement that has specifics contained within it on the transatlantic relationship.

On NATO very quickly, I think this Administration has been reasonably positive about NATO throughout its term. It's put real weight behind the idea of the NATO Response Force. Again, some of the action really depends upon European countries spending the kind of money they need to spend to be able contribute effectively to such a force.

I imagine that now that the election is out of the way we could potentially see some deeper cooperation between those in Europe who are capable of providing European forces and the U.S. allies and not within NATO but to try to find some type of better

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integration between Europe's evolving defense capabilities and NATO as an institution.

**Juri Pakel: ??** My name is Juri Pakel [inaudible].

If you could elaborate on [inaudible] Russia and possible [inaudible] the Bush [inaudible].

**Robin Niblett:** The dominance of maintaining a good relationship with Russia around the issue of the war on terror clearly has put what I think Condoleezza Rice originally had as one of her three or four key states for great power relationships back in 2000 onto the back burner. So what was going to be a relationship I had imagined like China on the front burner of the Bush Administration originally back in 2000 and that slipped back onto the back burner after September 11th, clearly will require some reexamination going forward as we come into this new Administration.

The concern of a proliferation of Russia's huge nuclear weapons of mass destruction stocks is something that perhaps maybe not within the White House but certainly down at different levels in particular departments is a huge source of concern. The fate of Georgia and the kind of potential interventions that are taking place around some of the [near broad], how the Ukraine election plays out. If Ukraine goes a particular direction towards Yanukovich, whether there would be a reassertion perhaps of some influence on that [near broad] through Belarus and Moldova. These are all, I would imagine, at a geostrategic level sources of concern for a new Administration. However, I would be of the view that they are not going to be again central, to use Tessie's example of first order and second order. I would see those as potentially being second order.

I think this is ironically and perhaps disappointingly a space where again Europe should potentially be playing a more active role, either coordinating its position with the United States or actually actively playing a more active role itself, but yet once again I think here in Europe European countries are being divided and ruled somewhat by their relationships with Russia. In particular, requirements for energy imports. Therefore there is a concern I think right now and perhaps neither side has decided, the U.S. or Europe, do we let Putin go? Is ultimately the stability he's pursuing a precursor to reform in the long term? And let's not rock that boat. Or is this really a turn for the worse?

At the moment because focus is so much in other areas there's not a tight handle being put on this relationship. My concern would be that it will get to the worse and then it will be too late to do something about it.

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**Mark Schoeff:** We'll wrap up with that answer. Thank you all for coming out today.

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