

## **“Europe Stalled: A Crisis, What Crisis?”**

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Following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda in late May and early June 2005, politicians and pundits alike were quick to proclaim that the EU and the entire process of European integration were in crisis. The nature of the supposed crisis ranged from “existential,” to “political,” to “profound;” it was a crisis of “confidence” and of “identity” that called into question the future of the EU.<sup>1</sup> Two weeks after the referenda, when national leaders failed to reach agreement on a new EU budget at their summit in Brussels, Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s prime minister and president-in-office of the European Council, went so far as to claim that the EU was not just in crisis, but “in deep crisis.”<sup>2</sup> How serious was the situation?

The fate of the Constitutional Treaty was undoubtedly uncertain. Just as Danish voters’ rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 and Irish voters’ rejection of the Nice Treaty in June 2001 had jeopardized both initiatives, the outcome of the French and Dutch referenda imperiled implementation of the Constitutional Treaty. Whereas the Danish and Irish governments had been able to overcome the embarrassment (as they saw it) of the negative results by assuaging national sensitivities and holding second referenda, the outcome of the French and Dutch referenda was too consequential and the nature of the Constitutional Treaty too different to justify a similar approach. Seizing the opportunity to avoid a potentially polarizing domestic referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, the British government quickly suggested that the entire ratification process be put in abeyance. The other member states concurred. Instead of wrapping up EU-wide ratification by November 2006, as originally planned, national leaders agreed at their summit in June 2005 to consign the Constitutional Treaty to a potentially limitless “period of reflection.”<sup>3</sup>

The summit was one of the most disputatious in the history of the EU not because of the Constitutional Treaty but because of the breakdown of the budget negotiations. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, already at loggerheads over Iraq and other touchy issues, personified the two opposing camps in the budget debate. Juncker took the unusual step for a Council president of openly criticizing Blair first at the post-summit press conference and then, several days later, in an address to European Parliament, a body overwhelmingly unsympathetic toward the British Prime Minister. Yet Juncker’s aggressive chairmanship of the summit itself had done little to bring the two sides together, even had a breakthrough been possible. Nor did the collapse of the budget negotiations represent a crisis, let alone a deep crisis, for the EU. There was time enough to conclude and ratify a budget agreement before the end of the current financial perspective in December 2006. Contrary to prevailing expectations, Blair, then in the Council presidency, secured a budget agreement in December 2005, thanks largely to concessions on his own part and to the constructive contribution of Angela Merkel, Germany’s new chancellor.

Even with a new budget in the bag, is the EU in crisis because the Constitutional Treaty will not be implemented on schedule, if at all? Regardless of the ratification drama, the EU operated throughout 2005 according to the provisions of the existing treaties. It is important to bear in mind that, even if ratified in all member states, the

This paper was prepared for the first meeting of the CSIS Task Force on *The Future of the EU and its Relations with the United States*, held February 27-28, 2006.

Constitutional Treaty would not have come into effect until November 2006, at the earliest. The existing treaties include the much-maligned Nice Treaty of 2000, which only came into effect in February 2003. According to many of those who claimed that the EU was in crisis following the French and Dutch referenda, the Nice Treaty was inadequate (at best) or unworkable (at worst) for the enlarged EU. Yet national leaders were well aware when they concluded the Nice Treaty in December 2000 that the EU would soon enlarge to at least twenty-five members. Indeed, the Nice Treaty's institutional provisions envision an EU of twenty-seven member states—today's twenty five plus Bulgaria and Romania. Of course the Nice Treaty is far from ideal, but it is also far from impracticable. To the extent that the EU was handicapped operationally in 2005 and might remain so for the foreseeable future, the main cause was not built-in institutional sclerosis but political posturing on the part of national governments.

Beyond operational considerations, talk of an EU crisis seemed equally far-fetched in 2005. It is difficult to agree with John Palmer, a veteran Brussels insider, that rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France provoked “the most serious crisis [that] the EU—and the wider process of European integration—has faced for many years.”<sup>4</sup> Undoubtedly the EU and the process of European integration were (and still are) in the doldrums. Yet the French and Dutch referenda results were a symptom, not a cause, of the malaise. The underlying problem is growing public dissatisfaction with the EU or, more accurately, growing public misunderstanding of what the EU is and what it does, a misunderstanding compounded by national governments that are apt to exonerate themselves and blame the Commission, the Court of Justice, and “Brussels” generally for everything from the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact to tough competition policy rules, regardless of the reasons for those measures.

### **The Mythology of Crises in EU History**

**T**he history of the EU is not widely known or appreciated.<sup>5</sup> Conventional wisdom has it that European integration triumphed in the face of severe setbacks and crises; indeed, that crises provided the political catalysts necessary to impel greater European unity. The European Coal and Steel Community certainly emerged in response to a crisis, although one that is rarely cited and generally misconstrued by storytellers of European integration. The crisis was not post-war Europe's parlous economic plight, but the new Federal Republic of Germany's incipient economic miracle, which terrified France and threatened to derail that country's plan for economic modernization (the Monnet Plan). Under enormous American diplomatic pressure to abandon its punitive policy toward Germany and devise a strategy that would reconcile Germany's resurgence with its own economic and security needs, France came up with the novel proposal for a supranational coal and steel community. To be precise, Jean Monnet, author of the prevailing Monnet Plan and America's favorite interlocutor in France, came up with the plan, which bore the name of Foreign Minister Robert Schuman.<sup>6</sup>

This version of the initial crisis in the history of European integration is usually buried under clichés about Franco-German reconciliation and bromides about the EU's visionary founding fathers. By contrast, the crisis that garners most attention in the conventional history of European integration—the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954—was not really a crisis for the nascent European project. As usually

told, the idea of the EDC emerged from Monnet's febrile brain in response to renewed American pressure, this time for France to acquiesce in German rearmament. Just as he has earlier hatched the Schuman Plan, this time Monnet hatched the Pleven Plan for a supranational defense community (René Pleven was Prime Minister of France at the time). The six members of the Coal and Steel Community eventually signed a treaty to establish the Defense Community, which the French National Assembly refused to ratify in August 1954. The National Assembly's action (or inaction) provoked not only a ratification crisis but also the most serious political crisis in the then short history of European integration—or so the story goes.

In fact, the failure of the EDC *averted* a crisis for the European Community. It dissociated the European project from German rearmament and allowed it to refocus on first principles: economic integration. Implementation of the EDC would arguably have triggered a real political crisis in France as the Communists and Gaullists, strange allies in opposition to the Pleven Plan, would likely have gone on the offensive (literally) against the EDC and, by implication, against the ECSC. Although many advocates of deeper integration rue the failure of the EDC as a great opportunity lost, they should be grateful that German rearmament was shunted off to NATO via the intergovernmental Western European Union.<sup>7</sup>

According to the conventional narrative, it was in response to the EDC crisis that visionary Europeans, personified this time by Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, convened the historic Messina conference in June 1955 and reinvigorated European integration. The truth, once again, is more mundane. Earlier in the decade, the Dutch had come up with a proposal (the Beyen Plan) for a common market among the six members of the Coal and Steel Community, but open to other countries as well. Monnet, who had resigned as president of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, largely because he was bored in Luxembourg (seat of the High Authority) and wanted to get back into the political fray, proposed instead a European Atomic Energy Community. European Community foreign ministers met in Messina to discuss both proposals. The fallout from the EDC was certainly in their minds, but so was a growing awareness of the likely advantage of regional trade liberalization on national economic growth. It was the economic logic of trade liberalization rather than the political repercussions of the EDC debacle that drove the next stage of European integration, culminating in the Rome Treaty of March 1957, which established the European Economic Community.<sup>8</sup> The European Atomic Energy Community, Monnet's brainchild, came into being at the same time, but never amounted to much.

### **What would an EU crisis look like?**

**H**as the EC/EU ever been in crisis? How would we know what a crisis looked like, regardless of what it was called? One approach would be to look at crises in the member states and see if what happened there has ever happened or could ever happen at the EU level. Once again, the problem lies in deciding what constitutes a crisis. Opposition politicians sometimes claim that a crisis exists in order to weaken the government and try to take power themselves. That said, there have been undisputed examples of national crises since the founding of the European Community (many crises predating the European Community involved the outbreak of war, a condition fortunately

absent among EC/EU member states).

Two national crises since the signing of the Rome Treaty are particularly conspicuous, both of them in France. The first was the Algerian crisis of 1958 that caused the collapse of the Fourth French Republic and brought Charles de Gaulle to power. That was a constitutional crisis of the highest order. It also threatened to derail the nascent European Community, which could not have functioned with a chronically weak France. By saving France in 1958, de Gaulle saved the European Community as well. The second crisis took place exactly ten years later, on the streets of Paris and in the corridors of the French government. Had the Communists not been so slow to respond, the student and workers protests of 1968 could well have toppled not only the government but also the regime in France. In the event, both survived.<sup>9</sup>

Crises in member states, especially in large member states, indirectly threaten the stability of the EU. Nevertheless the EU has not experienced any direct crises such as those in France in 1958 or 1968, and arguably never will. There have been numerous demonstrations, some of them violent, against particular EU policies (farmers have been complaining about the CAP since the early 1960s), but never any efforts to overthrow the EU directly by force. Perhaps the immaturity of the EU as a political system is borne out by the fact that military coups or popular uprisings aimed specifically against it are simply unimaginable. Given the nature of the EU system, anti-EU action, which is indeed imaginable, would be directed primarily at national governments.

Nevertheless the EC/EU has endured a crisis—the so-called Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966. It says a lot about the EU that the only constitutional crisis in its history bears such a soporific title. The crisis was nonetheless real. By withdrawing French representation from the Council and its sub-committees, de Gaulle brought legislative decision-making to a standstill. De Gaulle did not want to destroy the EC; he merely wanted to thwart the introduction of qualified majority voting in a variety of policy areas. He succeeded in doing so (the Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966, which resolved the crisis, conceded that qualified majority voting would not be used against the wishes of a member state).<sup>10</sup> The outcome of the crisis weakened the EC considerably, until qualified majority voting became prevalent in the late 1980s, thanks mainly to the Single European Act of 1987. There have been many instances of brinkmanship since the Empty Chair Crisis, but not of a member state overtly rejecting the EU decision-making system (British Prime Minister John Major threatened a mini-boycott of the Council in the mid-1990s but nothing much came of it).

### **From Permissive Consensus to Pervasive Estrangement**

**T**he EU today is vastly different in membership, institutional arrangement, and policy remit from the EC of the mid-1960s. Since the single market program of the late 1980s, the EU has intruded much more than its predecessor into the everyday lives of Europeans. As a result, the old permissive consensus is long gone, although support for the idea of European integration remains strong in most member states.

The democratic deficit, identified by EC leaders in the mid-1980s as a potential political problem, can never be fully remedied. The Constitutional Treaty went farther than previous rounds of treaty reform, beginning with the Single European Act, toward making the EU more accountable and responsive to European citizens. Nevertheless,

implementation of the Constitutional Treaty would not have assuaged the concerns of many Europeans or completely closed the gap between them and the European level of governance. By its nature, the existence and increasing importance of European governance bothers many people, who at least are familiar, if not content, with national and sub-national governing systems. That may explain in part why Europeans, despite having long had the opportunity to vote directly for members of the European Parliament, have turned out in lower numbers in each successive round of direct elections.

The legitimacy of the EU depends on policy output as well as institutional architecture. Too often, the EU is judged by the (un)popularity, not the efficacy, of its policies. For all its blemishes, the single market is a success. Nevertheless it is a work in progress, requiring the vigorous application of competition policy and occasional legislative changes, which are not always appreciated by European voters. The Lisbon strategy seeks to increase European productivity, employment, and competitiveness, but is controlled by skittish national governments which, especially in the case of France and Germany, are afraid of taking tough decisions that could aggravate their electorates. The Commission, the embodiment of alien European governance, is a convenient whipping boy for national governments, the European Parliament, and citizens alike.

Fear of globalization, with its connotations of industrial restructuring, job losses, and inferior social services, compounds the EU's problems. The European Economic Community originated in the late 1950s in response to post-war globalization, although the word was not used at the time. The customs union and common commercial policy gave the original six member states a means of accelerating intra-European trade, promoting regional growth, and increasing their leverage in international negotiations held under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), at a time of rapid economic and technological change in the Western World. The consolidation of the EC in the 1960s took place during the golden age of full employment and generous welfare provision. The next phase of the EC's construction—the single market program of the late 1980s—was a response to the economic setbacks of the previous fifteen years and the competitive challenges posed by the United States, Japan, and the Asian tigers. Despite the altered economic circumstances, Europeans enthusiastically embraced the single market program as an opportunity to boost growth and employment and strengthen Europe's position in the Uruguay Round of the GATT.

The single market program was the historical high point of popular and political support for European integration. Economic and Monetary Union, the next big project, lacked the persuasive rationale of market integration, imposed unpopular national budgetary constraints during the preparatory stages in the 1990s and, according to local lore and legend, brought price rises with the introduction of the euro. At the same time, efforts during successive rounds of treaty reform to give the EU a political character and identity commensurate with its economic weight failed to generate public support. In addition, the prospect of seemingly endless enlargement toward the east and south-east of Europe, a geographical entity that defies precise definition, fills EU citizens with dismay or dread. Concerns about transnational security threats, ranging from terrorism to organized crime, have not strengthened public support for the EU, which nonetheless provides a potentially useful framework for attempting to tackle these issues. National governments, themselves reeling from public cynicism about political processes and widespread disillusionment with the political establishment, have not been willing to

invest in European integration or make a compelling case for the EU.

The origin, drafting, and conclusion of the Constitutional Treaty bear out these points. National leaders decided in December 2001 to launch a Convention on treaty reform because of the presumed inadequacy of the institutional provisions of the Nice Treaty—a treaty that they were then promoting as essential for enlargement. By including national parliamentarians and Euro-parliamentarians in the Convention on the Future of Europe, which met throughout 2002 and early 2003, national leaders opened up the arcane process of treaty reform but were unable to generate much public interest in the Convention’s work. Moreover, national governments reserved for themselves the right to resolve the most contentious institutional issues in the obligatory intergovernmental conference of 2003-2004 that followed the work of the Convention. The acrimonious conduct of the intergovernmental conference, while understandable in view of the high political stakes, reflected poorly on the process of EU constitution building.

An omnibus document such as the Constitutional Treaty, enshrining over fifty years of intergovernmental bargains on the institutional architecture and policy scope of the EU, and including a bulky Charter of Fundamental Rights, was bound to be unwieldy, like the process of European integration itself. The treaty was difficult to explain in easily digestible sound bites and was glibly denounced by populist Euroskeptics. As exhaustive analyses of the French and Dutch referenda results have shown, the “no” vote triumphed for a wide variety of reasons, few of which pertained directly to the treaty itself.<sup>11</sup> Rather, the treaty became a lightning rod for anti-government sentiment and extensive concerns about economic insecurity and loss of national identity.

Under the circumstances, the demise of the Constitutional Treaty—even though it has been ratified by a majority of the EU’s member states, but in only one of them by means of a referendum—is hardly a surprise, let alone a cause of crisis. The referenda results in France and the Netherlands did not set off an economic shock, monetary collapse, or political upheaval. Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and EU Foreign Minister designate, was one of the few politicians *not* to claim that a crisis was at hand. Cynics might say that his steadfastness was intended to reassure restive non-member states, few of which in any case thought that the situation was cataclysmic for the EU. More likely, Solana’s reassurance reflected a level-headed appraisal of the state of the EU in the aftermath of the French and Dutch votes. EU foreign, security, and defense policy have continued largely as before, just as other policy areas have been generally unaffected by the fate of the Constitutional Treaty. Further enlargement is often cited as being endangered because of the referenda results, although the accession negotiations with Turkey formally began on schedule, four months *after* the French and Danish votes, and negotiations began with Croatia at the same time. Turkey’s prospects of eventually joining the EU may be highly dubious, but that was the case well *before* the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty.

### **Making Do With Today’s EU**

Addressing the European Parliament a week after the fractious June 2005 summit, Juncker claimed that the failure of the budget negotiations revealed a clash between two visions of the EU: one “relies solely on the virtues of the market, which is incapable of producing solidarity;” the other “relies wholly on more extensive political integration.”

Juncker espoused the former, what he called “political union,” and implied that Blair espoused the latter, what he called “a free trade zone.”<sup>12</sup> Blair was quick to correct that caricature when he addressed the European Parliament the following day. Rejecting the idea of a struggle “between those who want to retreat to a common market and those who believe in Europe as a political project,” Blair envisioned an EU “of solidarity between nations and people, not just a common market in which we trade but a common political space” that nevertheless delivered higher productivity, growth, and employment.<sup>13</sup>

Nobody would deny the EU’s political persona, difficult though that is to define. While emphasizing the EU’s unique constitutional character, however, Juncker tends to disregard the extent of Europeans’ lack of interest in grandiose political structures and preoccupation with everyday socio-economic problems. Stripped of its political superstructure, the EU is a collection of separate national economies that coordinate closely with each other, share a single market and, in the case of twelve member states, have a common monetary policy. Economic performance varies markedly among member states, in the euro zone and throughout the EU as a whole, for a variety of reasons, many of which reflect national preferences and inhibitions. As long as national governments retain a high degree of control over their countries’ economic and fiscal policies and shape those policies differently, there are obvious limits to realizing the EU’s potential. Blair’s prescription for EU-wide economic improvement makes sense intellectually, but clashes with the realities of political life in many member states, notably France, Germany, and Italy, the EU’s economic laggards.

Regardless of the Constitutional Treaty debacle, the EU today is more constrained than at any time in its history, except perhaps from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. The Commission is less prominent than in the earlier, heroic phases of European integration (constructing the Community in the 1960s and implementing the single market in the late 1980s). Its primary responsibility now is to uphold Community law, execute Community policies, and generate ideas and proposals for improving the EU’s collective wellbeing. The European Parliament, politically and institutionally assertive, seems blissfully unaware of the extent of popular disaffection with the EU (the handful of Euroskeptics in the Parliament are an obvious exception). The Court of Justice, which, paradoxically, seems more attuned politically than the EP, is on the defensive, not wanting to offend member-state sensitivities with its jurisprudence.

National governments form the core of the EU system, making up the Council of Ministers and the European Council, the EU’s supreme decision-making forum. The sheer number of member states in the EU and the frequency and apparent randomness of national elections reduce the effectiveness of both bodies. The rotating presidency, much vilified in the Convention on the Future of Europe, hardly helps, but its drawbacks are often exaggerated. Fundamentally, however, it is the diverging preferences and priorities of national governments, which are increasingly unwilling to compromise, that hamper the ability of the Council of Ministers and the European Council to tackle issues within the EU’s purview.

The decisiveness of the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty was a clear signal to the EU’s political establishment that citizens care little about ambitious constitutional initiatives and want politicians at all levels of government to focus instead on pervasive worries about social welfare, employment, public health, the environment, immigration, organized crime, and terrorism. Improving the institutional

efficiency of the EU—one of the objectives of the Constitutional Treaty—would not make much difference without a resolve on the part of the member states, the Commission, and the European Parliament to realize the EU’s potential and try, at least, to deliver the goods.

There are a number of ways in which the EU could improve its institutional efficiency and policy delivery, and maybe even its public appeal, despite the generally inauspicious political climate, and without undertaking politically costly treaty reform. These include:

- *Fewer and better legislative proposals:* A mantra of the lackluster Santer Commission (1995-1999), the idea of reducing the number and improving the quality of legislative proposals is a mainstay (so far) of the Barroso Commission. Rather than legislating for the sake of doing so, the Commission increasingly justifies its proposals on the basis of subsidiarity and relevance. The Commission could improve the quality of its legislative proposals even more if it improved the nature of the pre-proposal consultative process. At present, non-business organizations are privileged interlocutors when the Commission drafts legislative proposals, whereas business organizations, despite being much better funded, are at a disadvantage. The consequence of such lopsidedness can be seen, for instance, in the initial proposal for a regulatory framework for the Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH), currently being decided on by the Council and the European Parliament.
- *More emphasis on research and development, strengthening the sciences, and improving the quality of third-level education:* The EU offers a framework for boosting spending on and increasing the effectiveness of trans-national research programs, as well as improving the quality of third-level education in the sciences and other areas through student and faculty exchanges. The EU does not need to launch ambitious new initiatives, but should concentrate instead on maximizing existing opportunities. For instance, former Commissioner Chris Patten, now Chancellor of the University of Oxford, has complained that the idea of establishing a European equivalent of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), one of the Commission’s pet projects, is unwise and could even be counterproductive.<sup>14</sup>
- *Devising an energy strategy:* With rising oil prices and Russia’s unpredictability as a supplier of natural gas from Russia, the EU badly needs a comprehensive energy strategy covering everything from new technologies to better power distribution and conservation. Tony Blair and Angela Merkel indicated their support for such a strategy following their bilateral talks in Berlin on February 17, 2006.<sup>15</sup>
- *Closer cooperation on internal security and foreign policy:* Eurobarometer and other public opinion polls consistently show that Europeans want more trans-national cooperation and integration in the areas of internal security (notably counter-terrorism and the fight against organized crime) and foreign policy (notably promoting international development and security, mediating in the Middle East, and dealing with China, Russia, and the United States). Member states are capable of enhancing their collective security and

leveraging their international representation through existing EU mechanisms, and also through less formal, more flexible arrangements (such as the EU3's dealings with Iran). By approaching these challenging and important policy areas in a pragmatic way, devoid (if possible) of visions of grandeur and resentment of the United States, the EU (loosely defined) has the scope to meet public demands for better results. A less defensive approach in the Doha Development Round, based on an honest appraisal of the egregiousness of the Common Agricultural Policy, would be a welcome signal by the EU of global responsibility and leadership, but runs counter to the domestic interests of some member states.

- *More transparency*: Transparency is a hallmark of good governance, yet the EU decision-making process is notoriously opaque. The Council and its various sub-committees, notably the Committee of Permanent Representatives, are the main offenders. The British presidency made a spirited attempt to open things up, in accordance with numerous pious declarations by other national governments and the Council itself over the years. Opening the Council's deliberations, especially when the Council acts in a legislative capacity, is no guarantee of genuine transparency, however. Council members and government officials would likely take their horse-trading to the corridors outside the meeting rooms or to that venerable Brussels institution, the liquid lunch. Nevertheless, more transparency, in principle if not always in practice, would signal national governments' appreciation of the need to adhere to well-established norms of democratic governance in their conduct of EU affairs.

Whatever the EU does, it is up to national governments, primarily, to take the initiative and, in the process, mobilize latent public support for European integration. Nevertheless the reinvigoration of European integration may have to await a better political climate and new political leaders. In the meantime, the EU is not in danger of collapsing or fading away. At worst, the EU will muddle through, as it has so often in the past. That may not be an elegant or uplifting scenario, but it accords with the political realities in Europe today.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> All quotations are from various EU media in the immediate aftermath of the referenda.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in *European Report*, 2972, June 22, 2005, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> "Déclaration des chefs d'état ou de gouvernement des États membres de l'Union Européenne sur la ratification du traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe," Conseil Européen des 16/17 juin, 2005, Brussels, le 18 juin 2005, SN 117/05. See also "Jean-Claude Juncker states that there will be a period for reflection and discussion but the process to ratify the Constitutional Treaty will continue with no renegotiation," Luxembourg Presidency, Press Release, June 17, 2005, available at <http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/communiqués/2005/06/16jclj-ratif/index.html>

<sup>4</sup> John Palmer, "A European Treaty Wounded: A European Union Disoriented," European Policy Center, Integrated Work Programmes, Political Europe, Commentary, p.

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1. Available at

<http://www.theepc.be/en/default.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&t=5&PG=TEWN/EN/detail&l=8&AI=491>

<sup>5</sup> See Desmond Dinan, "Historiography of the European Union," in Desmond Dinan (ed.), *Origins and Evolution of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> See Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951* (Stanford: University of California Press, 1984).

<sup>7</sup> See Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

<sup>8</sup> See Wendy Asbeek Brusse, *Tariffs, Trade and European Integration, 1947-1957: From Study Group to Common Market* (London: Macmillan, 1997).

<sup>9</sup> See Jean Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

<sup>10</sup> See N. Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the 1960s Crises: The Gaullist Challenge* (London: Routledge, 2006).

<sup>11</sup> See Paul Taggart, "The National Referenda on the Constitutional Treaty," in *The Journal of Common Market Studies*, Annual Report 2005-2006, Vol. 44, September 2006 (forthcoming).

<sup>12</sup> Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Council of the European Union, speech at the European Parliament on the outcome of the Luxembourg Presidency and the European Council of June 16-17, 2005, Brussels, June 22 2005, available at <http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/discours/2005/06/22jclj-pe/index.html>

<sup>13</sup> Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, June 23, 2005, available at <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7714.asp>

<sup>14</sup> See "Plan for EU technology body 'is wasteful'," *Financial Times*, February 16, 2006, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> See Tony Blair, Press Conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Berlin, February 17, 2006, available at <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page9082.asp>