

**CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
(CSIS)**

SMART POWER SERIES

**WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION:
JOHN HAMRE,
CSIS PRESIDENT AND CEO, CSIS**

**GUEST SPEAKER:
AMBASSADOR HENRY “HANK” CRUMPTON**

**MODERATOR:
CAROLA MCGIFFERT,
VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF,
CSIS**

MONDAY, JANUARY 14, 2008

*Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.*

JOHN HAMRE: Okay, ladies and gentlemen – ooh, this is working. Good morning, everybody. Welcome. We are delighted that you're here. My name is John Hamre. I'm the president here at CSIS. I have – I have the best job in the world because I get spend my day attending conferences like this, and it's just really, really great fun – wonderful opportunity.

We have with us today Ambassador Hank Crumpton. Anybody that knows Hank Crumpton would be surprised to hear the word “ambassador” put on the front of that. You know, I mean, this was – this was the guy who spent an awful lot of his career in anything but ambassadorial garb on circles and of course because ambassador when he was asked by Condi Rice to be the special coordinator for counterterrorism in the State Department. Hank before that of course had been with the agency – enormously successful career.

I have had the great privilege to work with Hank these last several years, and over the last several months, we have had a number of opportunities to talk about this issue we call smart power. Now, this was an effort we started here at CSIS to say that America needs to refurbish all of the tools in its arsenal to be an effective world leader. Now, a lot of people think that smart power is just a surrogate for soft power, you know, that – that is not the case. Smart power is integrating in the most effective way all of the tools in your arsenal, and especially integrating your inspirational tools and your tools of intimidation.

And I would argue that nobody has pioneered that more effectively than Hank Crumpton. You know, Hank was really the architect of the campaign that overthrew the Taliban, probably one of the most innovative strategies that we have ever had in this country, and I would argue is the quintessential demonstration of smart power, the quintessential demonstration of it. It used American power but judiciously and constructively, working with allies and friends that wanted to accomplish a shared goal. And it was a stunning demonstration of what can be done.

Now, in the last several months, I've had opportunities to talk with Hank on and off about what does America do in a larger sense as we try to refurbish our tools in state craft. He is probably experienced more than the rest of us in having a chance to look at this keep question. So, Hank, we're delighted that you're here. We're going to learn from you today. And I'm going to turn to Carola McGiffert who will be moderating our discussion. But we'll begin with you, Hank. Why don't you share thoughts with our group and we look forward to hearing you. Thank you. Thanks, everybody, for coming.

HENRY “HANK” CRUMPTON: Thank you, John, for the warm introduction. Is this mike working?

AUDIENCE: Yes.

MR. CRUMPTON: You can hear okay? Okay, good. It's always a delight to come to CSIS and to be with some of my colleagues and some of my friends. And I'd like to thank all of you for joining me – Judge Webster, in particular – honored that you would join us this morning.

We face I think an unprecedented time in our country. We look at the pace of globalization, we look at advances in technology and societies, not just here but around the world, and we're surrounded by change, change that I believe is driving us to make new decisions about everything, our economy, our social cultural structures, and also about conflict. I believe that the nature of conflict, the nature of war is accelerating at the same pace as globalization itself.

There is a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, I would even say fear. Look at some of the presidential candidates, some of the policymakers, some of the pronouncements they have made, some of the concern they have expressed, some of justified, some if perhaps magnified, exaggerated. Well, why is that? And why do we as a nation, as a society feel more anxious when in fact, if you look at some of the economic realities, we are better off than we have ever been, not just in those economic terms and standards of living, but in terms of the spread of democracy, liberal democracy.

We tend to focus on the media and the media's coverage of the violence and all of the negative and some horrible things that are happening every day around the world, but in the scope of human history, there are more democracies, liberal democracies, liberal democracies on this planet now than we have ever seen. In Africa, some argue that you might have as many as 20 democracies now, the varying degrees of democracy, but even 10 years ago, that was unheard of.

So I'm an optimist. I am very enthused about our future. I think that we'll be able to make some of these changes, but I'm also concerned that we don't realize what we face and we haven't made the changes we need to fast enough, certainly in the arena of war, of conflict, in the area of power. How do you understand power? How do you apply power? And where do you apply it?

And regarding our future, the future of war, I think there are many variables that play but I'd like to talk about three. Number one is the degree of asymmetry in warfare that we see today. It is unprecedented, where a handful of operatives or even an individual with certain technologies or a certain weapon can have enormous impact; they can bring extraordinary death and destruction to a degree that we have never seen before.

Now, there has always been assassination, terrorism, insurgencies, but we have never seen this degree of impact by so few. We think of suicide bombers. We think of, in the worse case, an individual operative with a radiological or nuclear weapon, or perhaps a tiny pathogen that has been genetically engineered and released into society

somewhere. And not only in lethal terms – think of propaganda, how one camera man can capture on horrible image in Iraq and upload it onto a website an al Qaeda can take advantage of this.

I refer to these actors as micro actors and their impact as macro; micro actors with macro impact. We have never seen this in the history of warfare, and this is just beginning; in fact, this trend is accelerating; it's changing the nature of war.

The second example of a second variable is the rise of non-state actors in conflict. When we think about the threat today, the enemy, well, number one on our list is al Qaeda, a non-state actor. But there are others. There is Hezbollah, there is Hamas; if you're in Sri Lanka, the LTTE; in Colombia, the FARC, and on and on. That list grows every year, by the way, if you look at the list of foreign terrorist organizations designated by the State Department.

Well, how do you understand their power and how do you engage them, these non-state actors that might not have aircraft carriers or artillery, yet they bring enormous power in terms of their technology? And it's not only the enemy forces that we have to think about in terms of their non-state characteristics; some of our best allies – you're going to swap out? This is not working. Okay. No, that is okay. You want to leave this one on? You're going to double up here? All right. I already forgot what I said, okay. (Laughter.) Okay, that is enough technical here now; we'll stop at that.

We're not only thinking about non-state actors in terms of enemies or potential enemies, but as allies. Some of our most important allies in the ongoing conflicts around the world are non-state actors: tribal leaders, leaders that have religious authority; educators, universities; associations; the media; multinational corporations. The list goes on and on and on. And you think, well, they are not a part of war; this is not a part of conflict as we understand it, and it's really not our role. We talked to some private-sector CEOs. It's dirty; it's uncertain; that is not their job.

But the problem is that the enemy doesn't think that way. If you're al Qaeda and you're thinking about the private sector, you see the private sector in many ways. You see them one as a source of your discontent. The private sector wants to advance liberal democracy, the rule of law, free markets. Well, that is challenging the notion of al Qaeda's view of the world. Al Qaeda and others, their affiliates, think that as global multinational network of free enterprise will bury them. And they right to be afraid because eventually I think that will be the case.

So they view the private sector, this non-state actor as a source of discontent. They view the private sector as a source of intelligence. They go to their websites. They send people out to case their sites. They try to recruit. And why is that? Because they also view the private sector as a target: 9/11. They view the private sector as a source of infrastructure and funds. These non-state actors, whether they want to or not, they are going to have a big role in the future of conflict.

So the degree of asymmetry, the goal of non-state actors, their rising importance, and the third big variable – it's a global battlefield. Tom Friedman in his book, "The World is Flat," talks about capital and labor, how they flow so quickly in this borderless flat world. The same thing applies in conflict. Now, we have had World War I, World War II. They had strategic consequences, but now, at an operational, even a tactical level, you see organizations, teams, plotting and planning on one side of the world, executing on the other in a matter of days, maybe hours, in cyberspace seconds. It is a global battlefield. It's exceedingly complex, and more complex when you think about these three variables, their emergence and convergence in this complex global environment.

So what are the consequences? Where does this impact a nation or as a community of nations? Well, number one, in the arena of intelligence. This evolution of war brings enormous challenges to us from an intelligence perspective. How do you find these micro actors, and how do you define them? Is this particular group, are they involved in terrorism or maybe just supporting acts of terrorism, providing material support. Or maybe they are just engaged in subversion. Or perhaps they are engaged in legitimate political discourse.

So along this spectrum, how do you define the enemy? And then once you do define them, once you find them, how do you keep track of them, these micro actors that are bouncing around with great speed, with great clandestine skill? Their tradecraft is getting better and better every day. They learn. Well, in this complex global battlefield, how do you discern them and then how do you find them? And this applies in the homeland also; it's part of the global battlefield – enormous challenge for us in the intelligence arena.

A second major challenge is once you define and engage these enemies, well, which tools of statecraft do we employ? We think of war, we think of the military. Are we structured now to engage this type of enemy in this type of global battlefield? Are we engaged diplomatically? Are we structured rather diplomatically to fight this kind of war?

The State Department, they are not built for an engagement with non-state actors; they are built for engagement with foreign ministries. The Pentagon is not built for engagement in deep, intricate counterinsurgencies, although General David Petraeus has done a wonderful job in Iraq – enormous respect for him. They are built to engage armies and air forces and navies.

What about economic power? We don't think about economic power much in this type of conflict. We did in World War II. Look how we harnessed this nation economically, to build all of those battleships. I haven't heard much of a discussion about this. Think of the economic power of Hamas. Compare that to the economic might of the G-7, the G-8. There is no comparison. Why haven't we harnessed this economic power to defeat them, working with our Palestinian allies who are striving for a Palestinian state and for some degree of liberal democracy in that part of the world?

The tools of state craft, military power, diplomatic power, economic power, covert action, that can only work if it reinforces and compliments a broader policy – what about law? The rule of law is so important, yet we are struggling to define the enemy. Is enemy a prisoner of war or a criminal, or something in between or some combination? And what do we do with them? We have Guantanamo. There is deep anxiety, understandably, because we have not yet grasped the type of conflict that we are in. And where are we in terms of our laws, not just here in the U.S. and the homeland, but in terms of international law, and how do we help, or how do we learn from our foreign partners and other country that has crafted laws that perhaps are more applicable in this type of war. We are just beginning to have this discussion.

So is intelligence a challenge in terms of instruments of state craft? And this is important. It's not only state craft, the nation state, but it's how does nation states, or how do nation states partner with non-state actors. How do we structure ourselves to better understand and engage those partners, those allies? And the intelligence piece, this is very important. We spend so much time thinking about the enemy, often we don't think about who our potential partners might be.

In Afghanistan, enormous amount of effort trying to understand Afghan society, Afghan tribal leadership and determine who would be our best partners in '01 and '02. Intelligence and policymakers need to drive this. Intelligence needs to be focused not just on the enemy but on this social, geopolitical, global battlefield, and how do we map that terrain and use that terrain in our favor when we do identify and engage enemy forces.

The role of intelligence, the intersection with state craft and the nation state's partners, especially the private sector, is going to grow monumentally. This is a huge change. Just a few years ago, after the Cold War, the peace dividend, there were some very smart, very serious people in this town and elsewhere talking about, well, do we need an intelligence service or a clandestine service? Now we are spending how many billions?

So it's about intelligence; it's about state craft; it's about the rule of law, but most importantly it's about us, us as a society. It's about the United States, our country and our leadership responsibility. What do we want to do as a nation? What example do we want to set? George Washington, remarkable intelligence officer and general, and leader, he understood this. The Hessians that he captured during the American Revolutionary War, 25 percent of them stayed here afterwards. They said, we have never had life so good as a prisoner; we'll stay right here, thank you. And they contributed enormously to the growth of our society, our country, these German mercenaries that came here to fight. George Washington understood that he was not only fighting war but he was setting an example for a nation.

We have to ask ourselves this, yet we are facing some enormous difficult decisions. The single operative with a nuclear weapon is coming into this country to

attack us and our families? Well, how do you deal with that and what are the consequences of their actions? I don't have any easy answers for this. I don't think anyone does, but we have to have more of a discussion, but we cannot have an informed discussion until you understand some of the variables that we face and look to the future of war and what this means.

And where we have had success, you've had good intelligence and you have been able to develop the kind of partnerships that I refer to, both state and non-state. It's a network interdependence that brings a deeper understanding and a more effective way of dealing with the threats that we face. With intelligence, with diplomacy, with military, with law enforcement – even broader, the rule of law or the private sector with NGOs. When you think of strategy, you have to think of all of these different players. And you also have to think – and this is really tough – you also have to think at a very local level.

Globalization we understand; we read about it all of the time – lots of great examples, but it's not only globalization; it's not only at a regional level, in Southeast Asia or Central Asia, or NATO – it's not only the national level, but importantly it's at a local level. Late Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil, he said all politics is local. Well, I promise you, all counterterrorism is local. In the future of war, it will increasingly be the case.

You can have great intelligence. You can marshal all of your instruments of state craft to apply the kind of power that you want, and you can do it perfectly in one valley; the next valley over it can be entirely different. You've got to understand the nuance and you have to have the flexibility to make those kinds of adjustments, and there are many, many examples of this because it's about people; it's not just about a threat or an al Qaeda affiliate; it's about the people and the impact in that village and in that valley, and what is most important to them.

And how we understand that and how we define our relationship with those people, well, that is going to help define who we are as a nation. How do we engage them? It means we're going to have to be much more precise, much more exact, much more nuanced, and most of all, we're going to have to listen to these partners and these potential allies. What are their interests? What are their preferences? What are their needs? And there is a whole lot you can do when that happens.

December 7th, 2001, in Afghanistan, the southern city of Kandahar fell. It was the last major city held by the Taliban. It was their stronghold; it was the heart of the Taliban. And by that date in early December, probably a quarter of al Qaeda leadership dead, the rest of them on the run, maybe 10,000 enemy have been killed, many more. Many more have been captured. Many, many more have laid down their weapons and have left. This was less than 90 days after 9/11.

How many Americans were on the ground December 7th, 2001? And bear in mind when you read today's newspapers or magazines and the reference to the American invasion of Afghanistan, how many Americans were on the ground? Four hundred and

ten: 110 CIA operatives and about 300 Special Forces guys. It was about listening and learning and building the alliances with the Afghan people.

And you ask an Afghan today, what about that American invasion in the fall of '01, they will go – well, no, it was our victory; it was our war. There were a handful of CIA guys and Special Forces guys helping us; we're very grateful. You provided us intelligence – terrific precise air support. A lot of logistics helped, and you were with us in the fight; we respect you for it. It was our victory; it was our victory also. We don't see it as an American invasion, yet we portray it as that. It's a pretty silly example of how we think of war, that we have to invade; we have to have some heavy footprint when in fact in the fall of '01 that was not the case.

I met with Ahmed Shah Massoud. He was the late leader of the northern alliance. He was assassinated just a couple of days before 9/11. Al Qaeda knew he was an important ally with the United States and they wanted to take him out of the picture. But this was a couple of years before that; I had a discussion with him. It was in the hinterlands of Central Asia – had a long talk about a variety of different things that we were working on together.

At the end of the conversation he asked me a question that I will never forget. He said, your country – I have great respect for the United States, but I wonder, your country – you care more about al Qaeda and bin Laden, or do you care more about the people of Afghanistan. That was a pretty good question. And I gave him the best answer I could, which was, well, I'm from the CIA and my mission is a singular focus, and you're talking to no one else in the U.S. government, so we care less about the people of Afghanistan.

And he smiled and nodded a very sad smile, but he knew the answer. He was going to determine if I had the gumption to tell him the truth. But he was also I think teaching me a lesson, that you got to do both; you've got to find the enemy; you have to engage; and you have to engage in some cases without mercy, without hesitation. But if you don't understand that environment and if you don't care about the people, the job is not finished. And when we think of conflict in the future, it's going to be exceedingly complex. It's going to require that hard power, that critical 10 percent. But all that does is buy us space and time for that 90 percent that has to come in, that whole array of instruments. But how do we think about it? How do we organize ourselves? How do we fund ourselves?

Remarkable, secretary of Defense – I have enormous respect for Secretary Gates. He comes out and says, I think we need to spend more on aid, more in the Department of State. That's our critical partner to this. And I would add, and how do you link that to private-sector investment? I have just covered a broad range of topics and I hope you find some of this of use. I would welcome any comments, any questions that you have. And I sit now and you want to moderate? That's great, thanks.

CAROLA MCGIFFERT: (Off mike) – in your last anecdote, you talked about the agency's singular focus in Afghanistan and, similarly, there is increased talk about

increasing special operations to go into Pakistan to look for Osama bin Laden and finish that. What are the challenges to this strategy, ramifications for Pakistani stability and regional stability? And do we know the people? Do we care about the people in the way that you were – way you were laying that out?

MR. CRUMPTON: This part of Pakistan, overlapping into Afghanistan along the border, poses enormous challenges, not only because of the extreme geography, but also, more importantly, because of some of the cultural, social barriers. I think our understanding is imperfect, but I think that we are able to learn if we approach it correctly. And if we think about those people along the border that have been terrorized by al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership, al Qaeda has gone in and killed more than 100 tribal leaders. I think the people there need our help and the help of the government of Pakistan.

But it's extra difficult because we have Pakistan as an ally, an important ally. And they've lost hundreds of troops in their fighting. We have to respect their sovereignty, on one hand. Yet, on the other, they are not exercising their sovereign responsibility within this tribal area. And as al Qaeda is able to expand the safe haven that enables them to plot and to plan and to train and to deploy operatives in this global battlefield, including into our homeland. So it poses a direct threat to us and the United States, we have a responsibility to protect our citizens. And the best way to do that, I think, is working with the Pakistanis at a local level and also being transparent with the Pakistani government. But at the same time, we cannot wait. We need to address this issue because it's getting worse, not better. And the consequences, I might add, of not addressing this issue now, when there's an attack in the homeland and we trace it back to the tribal areas of Pakistan, then what are we going to do? And I have concerns that we could over-respond. And we need to think about that also in our calculations and our discussions with our Pakistani friends.

MS. MCGIFFERT: We'll open up for questions. If you could – there are microphones that will come down. And if you could identify yourself and your institution, that would be great. I'll start right here with Arnell (ph).

Q: That was terrific. Many, many thanks, Hank. My question is obviously about Fattah (sp) and what we do about the tribal agencies. Musharraf made quite clear on Friday that we're not allowed in there. And if we do go in there, there will be some terrible consequences. So what would be your approach? What would you recommend as to what we should do specifically, step one, two, and three in the coming weeks?

MR. CRUMPTON: Step one is a greater understanding of that social geopolitical terrain, doing that in concert with our Pakistani friends both at a national level and also at a local level. And then, I think that we need to build alliances after we understand who are the best potential allies and with these alliances, go in and attack the Taliban leadership and al Qaeda that are there in these safe havens. And President Musharraf knows well the threat it poses. He's been the subject of repeated assassination attempts. The former minister of interior, Sherao, a very courageous man, he was just the subject

of an assassination attempt, lost some friends and relatives. He's from Peshawar. He knows that area.

So we have to be cognizant of their interests, but at the same time, we cannot wait much longer. In fact, I think we've waited too long in terms of our engagement in that area. And, again, I'm not talking about the invasion that many think about. It's really building those trusted networks at a tribal level inside those areas and getting to work.

MS. MCGIFFERT: I'm going to go in this front row here. Mr. Ullman (sp)?

Q: Thanks. I'm Harlan Ullman here at CSIS and, Hank, thanks very much for the talk. The question I really wanted to ask you, but I won't was, what was your reaction to the movie "Charlie Wilson's War." But what I wanted to focus on was really some more specific recommendations. We have a problem. We have a government here, as you well recognize, that is broken, broken. And the question really is: Who is in charge? Is it not a matter of authority, responsibility, and accountability? Take Afghanistan – emerging freedom was a brilliant campaign and operation. But since then, everything has gone down hill.

In Afghanistan, for example, who is in charge? Is it ISAF? Is it NATO? Is it CENTCOM, is it Special Forces Command? Is it Karzai? And it seems to me that the profound problem we face here, irrespective of how you define the threat and the dangers is a government that is still organized in stove pipes based on a Cold War mentality in which there is really nobody in charge south of the president. So could you share with us some of your ideas for how we really put somebody in charge in terms of assigning responsibility and authority to get things done, and also, along with that, accountability. Do you have some broad thoughts? I'm sure you do.

MR. CRUMPTON: Yes, I think we should have much more of a field bias. And if you look at all of the reform, all of the legislation since 9/11, it really has been about Washington, D.C. You have a national director of Intelligence, a new national counterterrorism center, Department of Homeland Security. It's all been about Washington and trying to address those issues when, in fact, if you think about this environment that I've described, if you think about this type of enemy and my emphasis on local conditions, well, you're going to have to have the authority in the field.

That's one reason General Petraeus I think is having so much success because he's understanding that and also working with Ambassador Crocker in Baghdad. What a great team! Now, you have the White House saying, okay, you guys take care of it, after a couple of horrible years. And you think, well, then, who overseas should do this? Well, there's only one person overseas who is the president's representative, who can bring all of these instruments to bear and that is the U.S. ambassador. He's not just an employee of the State Department. He is the president's personal representative. But do we think of ambassadors in that role? Do we select ambassadors to be the leaders in this smart-power application of force? Do we educate ambassadors that way?

There are some great ambassadors out there, both career and political appointees, who are natural leaders and who have learned and who are applying this. But institutionally we do not. And if it's not going to be the ambassador that's the U.S. president's representative, well, then, it needs to be someone else. And again, if we think about 10, 20 percent hard power in some areas and then, 80, 90 percent soft power, that's a gross oversimplification, well, then, who should lead in the field? And that's where you get accountability and you get authority. And when was the last time you ever heard of an ambassador getting fired because we didn't advance that mission?

We need to rethink our bureaucratic structure. We need to have much more of an emphasis on the field. And when you do that – I'll give you another example is if you look at Southeast Asia, you have a collection of outstanding ambassadors. I'm not sure how that happened, but they are really a great bunch of leaders. And they have formed a network. And when I was at the State Department, we encouraged this, working with Pacific Command and working with our Indonesian, Malaysian, Singapore partners and the Philippines also. You look at the progress in counterterrorism since the Bali bombings in Southeast Asia, it's extraordinary. They have done a terrific job. And you can argue, well, part of the reason is that Washington's neglect, the focus on Afghanistan, on Iraq. Well, let Southeast Asia, they'll take care of themselves. And they've done a great job. And I think that underscored my point.

MS. MCGIFFERT: I'm going to take two more quick questions over here then I'll move to the other side –

Q: I'm Rob Bilgul (ph) from India Global in Asia (ph) Today (?). It was a great overview and talk from – my question is that, after U.S. got freedom for the millions of Afghanis, now, they are in trouble because what they are complaining is that not only the Karzai government, but al Qaeda are back in there backyards from cross-border terrorism. U.S. has given billion of dollars to fight against al Qaeda and terrorism, so many press reports and also think tanks including former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, she said that Pakistan today has become the hub of terrorism and training.

My question is today, now, the president is in the Middle East, also talking tough against terrorism. What message do you think you have for the president, talking to those people, where the terrorism are coming from are supported by those? And why the Arabs and Muslims have not come out against terrorism like president and others are doing? So where do we go from here as far as Musharraf government is concerned?

MR. CRUMPTON: Well, I think I disagree with you to some extent. If you look at our successes, it's been rooted in our partnerships with our Muslim allies. And I think that's the future in terms of how we engage with al Qaeda and affiliates. And my remarks just didn't apply to al Qaeda, although that's our priority concern right now. It's any group of discontented individuals that seize terrorism as a tactic. So my comments were broader, not just focused on some of the problems that we see in the Middle East or in other Muslim states.

I think, in terms of what would I tell the president, well, I've told him and we've had some good discussions. And to the extent we understand what smart power is, to the extent we can reorganize ourselves and build these interdependent, trusted networks with state and non-state friends, I think, ultimately, that's the answer.

And on this topic, if I may, even our terminology, I think, is worrisome. We think about, well, we refer to it in our official statements with the U.S. government, refer to the jihadist threat. Why do we confer such a wonderful title on these murderers, these terrorists? These people are not holy warriors. The holy warriors are those American citizens, CIA staff officers that deploy with me and my teams in Afghanistan. They were fighting for the United States; they were fighting for their faith. Those are the holy warriors, not al Qaeda and those affiliates. We've allowed al Qaeda to define the lexicon of this conflict. I hope that answers your question.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Right here in the front.

Q: Hi, I'm Pam Hess with the Associated Press. I see two immediate pitfalls with a couple of your specific ideas. One, with field control, can get you into a situation like we had with Iran-Contra; we have people sort of calling their own shots. And the other part of sort of meeting the locals where they're at and giving them what they need, oftentimes antithetical to what people can swallow reading, you know, the morning breakfast, because, you know, some of these – the status of women is, you know, in grave – and Sharia law is not something that a lot of American can get behind. So if you can address sort of what the downsides are of those ideas that you have.

And then, just magic wand time, military, diplomatic, economic tradecraft, if you could wave your magic wand and pick one change or one program for each one of those, what would it be?

MR. CRUMPTON: Well, I think there's a gap in our understanding in terms of a bias to the field. Your leaders have got to have the responsibility of understanding the strategic intent of the commander in chief, the president of the United States. And decisions made in the field have got to support that strategic intent. And that, in term, is the longer-term consequences of decisions made, whether it's the empowerment of women or building the foundations for liberal, civic society.

But there's a natural and understandable dynamic tension depending on what your immediate mission is. If you are engaged in combat, you're not thinking about, you know, building a school that day, but you've got to engage allies with the understanding that, if things go well, well, that's where you want to be in the future. And I think that's one of the things that, in Afghanistan '01, '02, that we tried to think about. So it's not a bias to the field irregardless of what your strategy is that's coming from Washington, and not only in terms of the executive, but also the legislative and also the Supreme Court and their role looking at some of these very important legal issues.

It's about leadership, eventually. And your other question was in terms of if I could fix one thing, what would it be. Well, the most immediate concern, I think, would be how do we select and train and provide incentives to the president's representatives overseas, the ambassadors? And what are their roles and responsibilities? And, in concert with that, I think there's a huge role for Congress. If you look at the allocation of resources, so much of that is defined on what that particular congressman can achieve in his constituency, whether it's California or Colorado, and that's driving a lot of these major decisions. And that, in turn, is pushing us down what I think is a conventional way of thinking of conflict and resourcing conflict. So Congress has got a key role in this also. So I think those two things combined is what I would try to address immediately.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Way in the back and then I'm going to come back down this way. Right behind you, sorry.

Q: Thank you, Hank, insightful as always, good to see you. Two quick questions – one, do we have a need for redefining performance measures or metrics that can define success. To some extent, it's easy to define the hard measures of power. The soft measures and smart measures are much more difficult to – after all, policy without resources is rhetoric and we need to be able to put the funds behind these sorts of issues. And secondly, open yourself up a little bit with the lexicon issue. How about the term global war on terror itself? Has it had the unintended net effect of uniting our adversaries when I think we should be pursuing a strategy of disaggregation? Thoughts?

MR. CRUMPTON: Yeah, in terms of metrics, it varies enormously depending on where you are in the world. And so, I don't think there can be a set scorecard. There can be some macro issues that we look at in terms of long-term measurement. Look at health care and think of where Afghanistan is. It's still, you know, very, very primitive in terms of health care. We have so far to go in that particular area. But it's about education. It's about building liberal institutions because that's the foundation for democracy and for free enterprise. And so, if you looked at some type of formula where you could measure success, I would think about, well, liberal institutions, whether it's the media or universities or there's a dynamic educational program and a range of other issues to come, because that builds the type of society that is strong and flexible and that can deal with these types of new threats that we see.

Your second question regarding the name, the war on – the global war on terrorism. I don't like that name too much.

MS. MSGIFFERT: Tom Sanderson (ph), down here in front?

Q: Hi, Hank. Thanks a bunch. That was a great talk. How significant is the virtual world to terrorism in your mind as far as recruitment, radicalization, training, funding – there's a lot of talk about there being thousands of websites that are pro-al Qaeda, but how significant is it as a tool?

MR. CRUMPTON: I'm sorry, Tom. Which world?

Q: Virtual world.

MR. CRUMPTON: Oh, virtual world – enormously important and growing in importance. It's a classic example of the global battlefield that I referred to. And some very sophisticated communications, and beyond communications, you can think of cyberspace as a safe haven because it's not only a means of communicating between al Qaeda and affiliates and other groups that use terrorism as a tactic, but it's increasingly a source of – you noted recruitment – of fundraising, of plotting and planning, a source of subversion, and a lot of challenges in terms of law, some big challenges there. And some of these enemy forces are sophisticated; they understand this. They're taking advantage of not only U.S. law, but international law.

They've made some advancements in their technical tradecraft. And that diffusion of knowledge, of know how, is spreading pretty rapidly. So I see it as a major issue that we've got to face.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Right here, also in the front?

Q: Hi. Randy Michelson with Reuters – I'm wondering how you would apply the lessons of bin Laden's escape from Tora Bora to the situation in Pakistan now. And in whatever needs to be done there, do you think it can be done without U.S. forces? And then, secondly, you spoke of a sense of urgency for acting regarding Pakistan. But some of the solutions you discussed, the soft measures – building tribal alliances – don't seem to sound like something you can do quickly. Can you do that in a month or a few weeks?

MR. CRUMPTON: Well, if you look at Tora Bora and what are the lessons learned, it goes to my original point that you've got to understand local conditions and you've got to array the type of forces that are most appropriate for those conditions. And you also have to have a deeper appreciation for the strengths and weakness of our partners, in that case, both Afghan partners and Pakistani partners. And there are many other lessons I could talk about, but especially the need for great speed and flexibility and precision on the part of the U.S. military. I think that's important and I think that, since then, they've made enormous progress in that regard. It also goes to the point I made earlier about having a bias to the field and having a commander down range, whether it's intelligence, military, diplomacy, you name it, having them able to make decisions pretty quickly on the ground about what's needed.

And in terms of the strategy inside Pakistan, how would that evolve, it doesn't have to take as long as you referred to. You can do this in a matter of weeks, certainly months, I think. But it takes some risk and it takes a greater understanding of what those risks are. But what's most important is the long term. And if you look at what we have not done in Afghanistan to take care of that 80, 90 percent I talked about – and there was I think a question earlier about aid – Ashraf Ghani, the former minister of finance in Afghanistan, World Bank official. He estimates that for every dollar in aid spent maybe 10, 15 cents actually gets to the ground.

So we have to think about this because if you do have, or when you do have success in this part of Pakistan in a military sense, well, you have to be there the next day to reinforce that success, with the hospitals, with the infrastructure, with hope. In Afghanistan, in the fall of '01, the question that Afghan commanders asked me with the greatest concern, I think – and we talked about a lot of things. We had a lot of questions – how are you coming, when are you coming? But they also asked me, are you going to stay this time? And if you go into the tribal regions of Pakistan now and you talk to the tribal leaders, what can we in the United States offer them compared to the fear and intimidation that al Qaeda brings to them every day and every night?

You've got to address this issue and not just for the moment, not just for this year to stop those attacks that al Qaeda wants to execute here in our homeland and in Europe and elsewhere, but how do you secure those people for the long term to deny al Qaeda from reestablishing a safe haven? So when you think about your strategy inside Pakistan, it's not only about special forces, CIA going in. It has to be in concert immediately with, what are the benefits for the people of Pakistan? And to the extent possible, how do you align those interests with the nation of Pakistan?

Q: (Off mike.)

MR. CRUMPTON: I don't think so. I think that you'll have to have some U.S. forces, certainly involve the intelligence, air support – and there's already been some cooperative efforts on the ground so this is not unprecedented.

Q: I'm Chip House from the Alliance for Peace Building. And one of the things that we've been working on without much success – but we're getting there – is incorporating NGOs and cooperating with policymakers in the intel community, the DOD community, and so on. And there's a lot of resistance on our part. What I would like to ask you, Hank, is what you can do in any of your incarnations to reach out to us – not just us in the NGO world, but the corporate world – more effectively than you have?

MR. CRUMPTON: That's a great question. In fact, Dr. Hamre and I had a discussion with a good friend and executive with one of the Fortune 100 companies about that, struggling with how does the U.S. government better integrate its efforts from strategic planning to execution with, what I call, the private sector, which includes not just corporate America but NGOs, universities; and not just America, but really worldwide? And it's exceedingly broad and complex, but we clearly need to do more. I don't think that we're engaging nearly enough.

One is in terms of intelligence. You look at the increased complexity of these issues. There is no way a U.S. intelligence officer can understand that. They're going to be more and more dependent on sociologists and people that are involved in science research and others to help understand those threats in the world we face. And the same thing applies in terms of engagement. How do you apply those tools and how do you build those partnerships?

In short, I don't have a good answer for you. I'm struggling with that. But I know that the U.S. government needs to do much more in terms of building those types of networks. And often, I encounter private-sector executives who are eager to help. They want to contribute. But how do you have that intersection?

Now, there is one – there are several good examples – I'll give you one. This overseas private investment corporation, some of the work that they are doing, offering loan guarantees and trying to serve as a bridge between U.S. strategic interests – using economic power – with the private sector. There are a couple good examples there and I would love to see that expanded. But there's much more we could do, certainly in terms of healthcare and certainly in terms of education.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Back here and then Bill – two Bills right here.

Q: I'm James Eckert, currently unaffiliated. You've done an excellent job of characterizing the subtlety and the complexity of the current terrorist threat. But you've been addressing largely those threats that are clear and present dangers. Could you comment a little bit about how – what the role of intelligence and statecraft is or are with regard to identification and preclusion of this kind of threat arising in other areas?

MR. CRUMPTON: I think that one of the largest challenges when we look to the future is going to be the impact of technology on societies and the huge opportunity that will give us. But also, it will afford enemies and prospective enemies certain advantages. If you look at nanotechnology or you look at robotics, you look at biotechnology and where these are taking us – quantum computing – I don't know of any long-term comprehensive effort to try to understand these monumental forces and the impact on societies, the impact on conflict, and how do we get ready to anticipate that and deal with that? So that's a big concern.

And then, another piece – and again, it goes to my often-repeated emphasis for a field basis – is if we are not in the field, if we're not listening with intensity, with empathy, we're not going to be able to pick up on these future threats. Al Qaeda Afghanistan is an example – how many Americans prior to 9/11 cared about Afghanistan or knew there was even a potential issue there? Well, I fear there are other potential Afghanistans that are scattered around the world. But if we're not listening and learning and paying attention, we're going to miss those cues. And then, technology – that part's just going to make it more complex.

MS. MCGIFFERT: All right, Bill Taylor and Bill Breer down here in the front row. And if you'd maybe do you questions one after another and then Professor Crumpton can answer.

Q: Bill Taylor at CSIS. You touched on this in part. But you mentioned all counterterrorism is local. Therefore, funding, people, assets should be local. Or should it

be federal? How are we doing and what is the process for allocation of counterterrorism funding?

MR. CRUMPTON: Again, this is not – when I've talked about a local emphasis, it doesn't mean that you exclude or forget the national level. You have to do both. In terms of thinking of this global effort, you must think globally and then regionally. You can't talk about Afghanistan and not talk about Pakistan. If you look at Jamar Islamia in Southeast Asia, you've got to talk about Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. So there is an important regional emphasis here.

Moreover, if you look at the enemy's safe haven, they're often along border areas. These non-state terrorist groups, they understand the nation-state system and they understand how to take advantage of it. So global, regional, national – certainly, we're most comfortable there – but also local. And you have to do all four at the same time. You can't do one and exclude the other three, because that's the way these threats – that's how they run up and down.

Now, how do you integrate that? A major challenge, but it can be done. And here in our homeland, if you look at the need to educate and equip and to connect local law enforcement – and I know that Secretary Chertoff and Charlie Allen and others are working relentlessly to do this, but we have so far to go. And it also goes to our lack of understanding about intelligence in the homeland. And I think this, in part, addresses some of your question.

We tend to view intelligence here as some unrelenting, intrusive, Orwellian surveillance system. Well, in fact, the most effective intelligence is the beat cop that understands those 10 square blocks and has built a trusted network. And if something's wrong, the storekeeper is going to tell him. And from that, he can start working; but he has to understand what's happening in the FATA in Pakistan or in the Danal (ph) and right now, we are not educating those local law enforcement officers to understand that and we're not linking them up sufficiently into some of our national databases. So we've got to work through those four levels; not only in terms of intelligence, but in terms of well how do you marshal local civic society?

Now, some communities are doing a pretty good job on their own. I think New York City has done a very good job. You look at NYPD and how they're working with federal authorities in New York. There's a good team up there. And I think New York is a pretty good example.

Q: Hi, Bill Breer, formerly at CSIS. I guess I'm still the senior advisor. But there's one thing that hasn't been mentioned at all this morning. And that is the role of narcotics trade in Afghanistan. It seems to me that without dealing with this some way or the other, we're never going to be able to deal with financing the Taliban and financing al Qaeda as well.

MR. CRUMPTON: Another example of the non-state actors that I talked about, you see growing connectivity between terrorist group and non-political organized crime figures. The FARC is a great example in Colombia. And increasingly in Afghanistan, some estimates think that perhaps as much as a half of the economic growth in Afghanistan is attributed to narcotics, the trade of narcotics.

And it's a critical problem, because not only does that afford al Qaeda the Taliban resources, but it corrupts society. And the Taliban, they know this. This is part of their strategy, that if they can draw those farmers, or compel or intimidate those farmers to growing poppies, that takes them further and further away from the government in Kabul.

Well, Sun Tzu talked about you have to understand the enemy's strategy and attack his strategy, not just the enemy, to win wars. Well, we should be attacking that. And why don't we build roads and wells and subsidize local grain crops ten times that of the market price? It's a lot cheaper than putting another battalion downrange. But we're not thinking of conflict in those ways.

And it's a very important issue – again, economic power; how do we bring that to bear? And how do we afford those poor farmers in Helmand province the opportunity? How do we help that 18-year old in Gaza? What options does he have right now? The most important thing on the battlefield – and this is going beyond your quest – I'll carry on if you don't mind – the most important thing on the battlefield – and Thucydides taught us this in the Peloponnesian War – it is pride, prestige, and honor. That's not going to change. With all the complexities I talked about and how much the environment is changing, the tools of conflict are changing, and how we need to change, there are some fundamentals that we have to understand, some principles. And that is at the core of it.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Well, woman right here in red? We'll move across.

Q: Thanks. Barbara Grury-Miter (sp). Hank, AFRICOM would seem conceptually to be moving in the right direction, having more of an equal partnership between Defense and the State Department. I know you have some doubts about it. But are there some specific recommendations you would make to make that partnership more effective and closer aligned with the kind of concepts you're talking about?

MR. CRUMPTON: Oh, I have a special place in my heart for Africa. I lived there for 10 years in different countries. And I love the continent and the people and I think that there are some enormous opportunities while facing some unique challenges. I do question the emphasis on the military aspect. I don't necessarily disagree with having a separate command for Africa. I think that's probably a good thing, given the enormity of the continent, given the complexities. But we should not think of the U.S. policy toward Africa as AFRICOM. If our policy should be much more about the non-military instruments, well, then where is our emphasis there?

And I haven't studied this, and I can't give you an answer about what's the best alternative, other than to have the right kind of ambassadors that are selected and trained and given the incentives in these very important countries, and to think about economic power. And bearing in mind, what do those Africans want? What do they need? And not just their national leaders, but the people in some of these African countries. So that's, I think, an imperfect answer; but I hope it helps.

Q: But isn't that sort of like your RSI that you were providing – (inaudible) – bring together these different kinds of components?

MR. CRUMPTON: Yes, and Barbara's reference to RSI is the regional strategic initiative whereby at Department of State, we'd pull together ambassadors from regions and then brought in U.S. military special ops, USAID, OPIC, and others to have a conversation about these very things. And in fact, I know that initiative continues including in a couple palaces in Africa. And I think that's an important aspect of it. But really, just the first steps. How do you bring all these stakeholders together? And then the next step is well, how do you bring in non-state actors?

And that's got to be tied into intelligence collection. And that's hard right now, because intelligence is geared toward the enemy. Well, we also have to think in terms of allies, potential allies, and then how do you cobble together those types of networks? And who do you work with? That's in some ways an intelligence function. It does not have to be collected from a clandestine perspective; much of this is open source. And having Foreign Service Officers being enabled, empowered, and trained to go in and seek to understand what the partners might need. But that's just a piece of it.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Right here?

Q: Yeah, just – oh sorry – Hank, there's been a lot of talk about how al Qaeda is rebuilding in Pakistan and extending its global footprint around the world. But then, you also see other people that are saying that it has been hurt significantly, and that it's not rebuilding. I just wanted to get you thoughts on how the organization as a whole – what do you think that their abilities and capabilities are now – not just in Pakistan but around the world – and whether they're capable of launching a big mass-casualty conventional attack, and also with CBRN or WMD?

MR. CRUMPTON: I think al Qaeda, after taking some big hits immediately after 9/11, and they were under enormous pressure, really until the peace accord that the Pakistani government made with some of the tribal leaders in the tribal areas. And since then, al Qaeda has been able to expand; not only their geography, but also deep in their influence in some of these areas. And now, I refer to al Qaeda and the Taliban in the same breath, but in fact, there is a lot of tension within the ranks. This is not a nice bunch of people. And so, there is plenty of infighting and tension within al Qaeda.

But if you see any organization that has got expanded safe haven, that affords them enormous opportunities in terms of their recruiting and their training, the

indoctrination, their planning, their plotting, and their deployment of operatives around the world, given this battlefield, so I am very concerned about this. And yes, I think they still have the capability to launch large-scale conventional attacks in most parts of the world. And I would think that would include the United States. And clearly, that is still one of their strategic intents to attack us here in the homeland. And that's what's driving some of my earlier comments about what do we do and when do we do it?

MR. : (Inaudible, off mike.)

MR. CRUMPTON: Well, again, al Qaeda has repeatedly stated, and they have demonstrated their intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Bin Laden describes it as an obligation. And in Afghanistan, we were able to uncover some anthrax laboratories. We know that al Qaeda has sought to recruit scientists that can help them advance those programs. So yes, that is clearly their intent, and it's of concern.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Right here?

Q: Hi, Ann Scott-Tyson with the Washington Post. On the Pakistan border problem, that's festered for so many years. And many now see it as not just a counterterrorism problem, but a counterinsurgency. What has changed that makes you relatively optimistic about being able to address it so quickly? Are there elements of the Pakistan government that may be more open to cooperation? And who can carry out operations there? The Pakistan military has not performed well in the FATA. The tribal forces themselves are weak and subject to intimidation. Apparently, al Qaeda has married into some of the tribes and the dynamic is different there than say in a place like Anbar Province in Iraq where they've very much overplayed their hand.

MR. CRUMPTON: Well, let me clarify a point. I said it would take weeks or months to get rolling. I didn't say it was going to be resolved in weeks or months. It's going to take years and years like any counterinsurgency operation will. And counterinsurgency is the right way to think of it. And if you look at success in counterinsurgency, huge, huge part of that is non-military. And that's certainly going to be true in Pakistan.

Regarding who is best equipped to go into the tribal areas, it is going to require a mix. You have some of the local forces that have been recruited from that area, know the area well. The ministry of interior, they have got an important role to play, and the Pakistani military also. I think it's going to be a combination of forces to go into that area. But if I may underscore repeatedly, you have to do it with local alliances. If you roll in without an understanding of the local environment, without having local allies, it's going to be very hard.

And again, if you see what General Petraeus has been able to do in al Anbar Province, that's a very recent, very positive example. And once he was able to get rolling, it didn't take very long. And I think the Pakistani military and minister of interior might be able to learn from that. And we can help them.

Q: (Inaudible, off mike.)

MR. CRUMPTON: Right, the question was do I see a change in the government of Pakistan, their attitude? I have not talked with any senior Pakistani officials recently. But I think that the realities on the ground are dictating that Pakistan address this issue. And they have noted this. They are under threat. They understand it's about potentially the viability of their nation-state. And so, I think that as al Qaeda has expanded that the Pakistani government and the Pakistani people, they don't have much choice but to take this on and do it pretty quickly.

MS. MCGIFFERT: We have time for a few more questions. The gentleman here?

Q: Mauro Meswaron (ph) from Agence France Presse. Ambassador, you mentioned earlier about the situation in Southeast Asia where you believe that governments there seem to have brought the problem under control. How do you see, for example, the situation of Jamar Islamia? Do you think that they have been beaten, or is it the calm before the storm? If you remember, many of the leaders of the September 11 – mastermind of the September 11 attacks had some sanctuary in the region years before the attacks.

MR. CRUMPTON: Yes, I don't think I could describe that region as completely under control. And I can't say that Jamar Islamia is beaten. What I did say is there's been enormous progress made in that part of the world. But this is going to be an enduring effort that will take years and years. In some areas, I think those governments with international support are just beginning. If you look in terms of the educational systems, a lot more needs to be done in that regard. But at the same time, the degree of cooperation among those nation-states and the intelligence and law enforcement is exceptionally good.

And I might note that globally, despite a lot of the increased policy tensions or policy disagreements, at a professional level in terms of intelligence and law enforcement – not only within the U.S. government but with our partners around the world – the cooperation is extraordinary in the joint operations being launched. And that's a good-news story. It's unprecedented what U.S. services are doing with some of their foreign partners, and what some foreign partners are doing with each other. That's true in Southeast Asia; it's true in a lot of parts of the world. And I think that is one of the big reasons we have not seen an attack here in the U.S. yet, because of what these professionals are doing – in most cases, very quietly. And we need to acknowledge that success.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Steve Flanagan, in the back – the director of our international security program.

Q: Flanagan from CSIS. Ambassador Crumpton, I wanted to ask you, what are some of the key lessons you've learned in your experience in the ideological dimension of this struggle? We talked a little bit about Islamic websites earlier and other aspects of our efforts. Several years ago, there was a big push on enhancing our strategic communications. But I think gradually there seems to be more and more of a recognition that there is a question of how can we best strengthen the voices of those who are speaking out against the extremists in their own communities around the world, and can the United States and other members of the international community that support the kind of terrorism efforts and strengthen those voices without discrediting them?

MR. CRUMPTON: Yes, I think there are things that can be done and it needs to be tailored to those unique conditions in these particular areas. That's one of the problems I think we've had. We have a bias toward Washington, D.C. We're so Washington D.C.-centric. And you cannot package a message here and have that resonate in all these different localities. Now, the things that the U.S. stands for in terms of democracy and liberal institutions, freedom of speech, and all these wonderful things – I'm not talking about that. That, of course, is very important. But if you look at a particular issue – and it's not just about ideology; but it's ideology linked to some geopolitical realities on the ground there. And that's a key part that we have to fold into, our enablement of the people that want to speak out.

First and foremost, you have to provide them a degree of security. Many are fearful – many understandably so, because they're under an enormous pressure. They're intimidated. And working with locals, if we can provide them that room to speak out, well, that's one way to enable them. And then also, some of our technical assistance – it's less about telling them what to say, and letting them say things that might not exactly agree with our policies. But as long as they're speaking out against terrorism, well, then we need to help them do that.

So a local bias, providing them some of the room from a security perspective, enabling them with technology – bearing in mind, they're not going to repeat U.S. policy. This is not about advancing U.S. policy in that part of the world; it's about providing them freedom of speech. And there's a big distinction there.

MS. MCGIFFERT: I think we're coming to the end of our time. We were very fortunate. CSIS is very fortunate to have Ambassador Crumpton brief our Commission on Smart Power this past summer. And they were very taken with a number of things that he talked about and many of the themes that he brought up today. So I'll just end with a question. The point of the report, the target of the report is the next administration, regardless of who wins the election. And so if you were advising the next president, Democrat or Republican, on counterterrorism policies, what would your touchstones be, and what should we be looking for going forward?

MR. CRUMPTON: Rethink the government budget in terms of national security. And you have to do that in concert with Congress, of course. But that's got to be geared to what are our objectives overseas. And what do we want to achieve overseas? And

also, going back to my opening comments, how do we want to be perceived? And that goes to the questions of, well, what kind of society do we want to become? How do we want to evolve? What are the core values that we must hold onto in a very dynamic, rapidly changing environment? That's really the first question.

And then, you think about resources and structure. And again, the risk of repetition, how do we build these global interdependent alliances to understand the issues, to bring likeminded people together, to understand, and to defeat the kind of threats that we face. And bearing in mind that we have never lived in an era of such prosperity, we have never lived in a world where you have so many liberal institution moving the right way. And while I have expressed some deep concern about specific issues, the last thing we want to do is have a policy based in this sense of fear. I think it should be just the opposite. There are enormous opportunities ahead of us and we can make great advances, if we understand the complexities of conflict, and we understand the changes that are coming. And I would encourage our next president, whoever he or she might be, to keep that in mind.

MS. MCGIFFERT: Okay, thank you. Please join me in thanking Ambassador Crumpton.

(Applause.)

(END)