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JOHANNA MENDELSON FORMAN: Good afternoon. Welcome everybody to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And my name is Johanna Mendelson Forman. I'm a senior associate at the Center. And this is part of a series that we are pleased to bring you on smart power, based on a CSIS Commission on Smart Power. The report many of you have seen, but if you haven't, it's available on the CSIS website. And, of course, we are here today because this series and the smart power report talks about multilateralism and what it means. So it is especially an honor to have with us today the undersecretary general for peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno, who came down from New York especially to be with us this afternoon.

As we all know that in the wide grey area between war and peace, there is peacekeeping and that peacekeeping is a way to help countries that have been torn by conflict and are in search of a sustainable peace. And since the first U.N. mission 1948, UNSTO, which actually helped in the formation of the state of Israel, there have been 63 peacekeeping missions. Today, there are 17 missions around the world, of which 20 are peace operations. There are close to 100,000 military personnel, uniformed personnel. The cost of these operations in 2008 is close to \$7 billion. And one feature of the post-Cold War has been the exponential growth of peacekeeping around the world. And to compare, just to tell you the budget of peacekeeping in 1993 was \$3.6 billion; it's close, as I say, to \$8 billion today.

The CSIS Commission on Smart Power noted that peacekeeping was one of the four areas in which the United Nations could help promote the global good and thus have a multiplier effect on our own security. And, in fact, the U.N. peacekeeping deployments are the second largest security provider after the United States in the year 2008. But, of course, smart power also recognizes that the United States – recognizes the important contribution of the U.N. and its ability to reach out to conflict countries and to help stabilize failing states and to ensure our own security.

And in spite of this, the U.S. support for this vital function and our financial commitments often fall short. And that's the dilemma we face today and a dilemma which we hope that Undersecretary Guehenno is going to address in remarks that he has for us. After his remarks, we will take questions and unfortunately will have to terminate the session at 2:15 p.m.. Thank you.

JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO: Well, thank you very much. And I don't know if peacekeeping because it combines the hard power of troops and hopefully the soft power of the political process – that falls right in between what you call smart power. We try to be smart; we are not always smart, but at least the whole idea is certainly to orchestrate the use of military force with the resources of economic development and with the strategy of a political process. That's at the heart of modern peacekeeping.

You mentioned the figures, the enormous growth that we have witnessed in the last few years. I arrived at the time when the Bramey (sp) panel report had just been issued. And indeed

peacekeeping was then a fraction of what it is today. Why that? Possibly a growing awareness that if we do not attend to number of conflicts that undermine states, a vacuum can develop that is not only a humanitarian challenge that can become a strategic threat. And certainly what happened in Afghanistan at the time of the Taliban is an illustration of that. And so the greater commitment of the international community to peacekeeping in the last eight years shows that there is a greater recognition that they can be countries that nobody has heard of in Europe or in the United States, but that cannot be ignored for reasons of moral principles and for reasons of strategic interests.

And indeed when I look at where we are in a number of countries and where we were some years ago, I think that there has been real progress on a number of fronts. When you look at where most of West Africa was in 2000 and where it is now, it's much better. Sierra Leone had been destroyed by a vicious rebellion. Liberia had been destroyed by years of conflict. In those two places certainly looks better. In Cote d'Ivoire, after a very difficult moment is in the midst of a political process that hopefully will help turn the page of conflict.

When I look at the Great Lakes, I also see – although it's extremely fragile, I also see real progress. The Democratic Republic of the Congo a few years ago, you couldn't go from east to west, west to east. It was a divided country. Today, you can travel all around the country. At the same time, there's still a lot of violence in the Kivus. There are still very dangerous situations in a number of parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but certainly, after elections that everybody recognized as free and fair in one of the biggest countries of Africa – I mean, that's a sea change compared to what the Democratic Republic of the Congo was in 1999. And likewise, for Burundi, which all the fragility.

And I'd like to say that you can judge a peacekeeping success only 10, 15 years later. You can say now with confidence that Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, they were a real success. Ten years from now, we'll be able to judge with a measure of certainty where we have succeeded, where we haven't.

So there has been some success and there has been a rebirth of peacekeeping after a period where the conventional wisdom that U.N. peacekeeping was essentially over after the disasters of the '90s. After Yugoslavia, after Somalia, after Rwanda, the conventional wisdom was there would be regional organization possibly doing peacekeeping, but with the United Nations, it's over.

Why did it turn out to be different? Probably because of some comparative advantages that the United Nations has. The most obvious one is the issue of legitimacy. And I am not talking here as a kind of a stickler to international law; I'm talking here as an observer of conflicts. It's very difficult in any country to accept the presence of foreigners. Nobody wants foreigners to interfere with one's own affairs. Nobody is happy if there's a sense that any national agenda could interfere with the future of the country. The advantage that the United Nations has brought to a number of conflicts is that simple notion that the U.N. does not pursue a particular national agenda. That is immaterial, but that is essential to the acceptance of the influence that is at the heart of the peacekeeping political process.

The other two comparative advantages: it's the simple fact that we have access to a pool of resources that is the world, that is 192 countries, although we don't have a 192 troop countries because that would be hard to manage, actually. But we certainly have access to the broadest possible pool of countries when it comes to tapping military resources around the world. And there is a formula for burden sharing that also has its robustness and that helps.

So I could stop there and tell you that everything is fine and that now the world is – there are a few loose ends to be tied here or there, but it's all over, thank you. Unfortunately – (laughter) – I think this is a time to have quite serious concerns. I think that first we are now 10 years away from the tragedies of the '90s. We learned some painful lessons. Ten years is too short a time to forget them.

Some painful, but some basic lessons: if you deploy a peacekeeping operation, you need to have a peace to keep. Now, that may sound a little glib. And, of course, we deploy in places where there's not full peace to keep. When we deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there was far from a full peace to keep. Nevertheless, there was a critical mass of stakeholders who felt – who had signed a peace agreement and who were ready for a political process.

We eventually deployed a robust force, unfortunately not at the outset of the Congo mission, but we eventually deployed a robust force because we did not want the political process – the international community did not want the political process to be held hostage by a few spoilers. You can't allow a militia here or there to stop a process that the vast majority of the population, the vast majority also of those who hold guns would want to go forward. And so for that, you need a robust force.

But that is not saying that robust force is going to coerce into a process, people, movements, who are not ready for that process. So robust peacekeeping, yes, but robust peacekeeping on the basis of a solid political foundation. That's what we learned the hard way in Yugoslavia. If you throw peacekeepers in the middle of a war, you are courting real trouble.

And that's why we learned from those tragedies of the '90s, the importance of having clear, credible, and achievable mandates. You can fudge an issue in a resolution of the Security Council, where the resources of the six official languages of the U.N. are great. So in English, French, Chinese, Arabic, Spanish, you can be wonderful. But on the ground – and Russian – you can do a lot of clever things. But when it comes to the mission of the military force, when it comes to a political strategy on the ground, acting on the basis of a fudge doesn't work. It doesn't work for the military who want to know what their mission is. It doesn't work for a political strategy; if you don't know where you want to go, you will not go anywhere. And so this need for clarity is essential.

The third lesson I think we learned from the '90s is the importance of cohesive political support of the membership. And that's linked to the previous point, in a way, because there is a fudge when there is disagreement among the key stakeholders. You can have clarity if there is agreement. And what we see is that in a post conflict situation, if the parties to the conflict have a sense that different components of the international community are pulling in different directions. They will exploit it. They will use it. And so you're going to be at a very serious

disadvantage. And so the cohesiveness of the international community in its strategy for addressing a post conflict situation is essential, as is essential the consent and the cooperation of the key parties.

And in a way, I am saying in different ways always the same thing. That is, a peacekeeping operation, it is not to substitute for the absence of a political process. It is there to support the political process. And a political process is not something that can be coerced. A political process comes from the strategic choice made by the parties that it is in their best interest to have a third party, the United Nations, come to their help. Of course, they won't be agreed at all times on all things with the peacekeeping mission. And that's natural, because we will push and we need to push. But if they disagree at all times, or if they're reluctant at all times, we have a problem. And that's, I think, also a very important lesson.

And the last lesson – and in a way, I mention it last because it's the one most often mentioned and it's important, but in a way, because it's more visible, it's the material resources and capabilities to undertake the mandated task. Of course, if we are given a very ambitious mandate and we don't have the capabilities, we are in trouble. But I mention it last because the political context in which those resources are provided matters even more. Today, we have challenges on all those fronts.

I'll start with what I just mentioned, the material resources. The international community is stretched, not just the United Nations. I know the discussion in the United States on the challenges to the U.S. armed forces. We see the challenges in Europe. We see the challenges of the African Union. The gist of it is that peacekeeping is a labor-intensive activity. Yes, high-tech can help; drones can help, all sorts of things can help, but at the end of the day, you need to have a visible presence on the ground. You can't do peacekeeping with virtual presence. You have to have real persons patrolling in remote places. And so numbers do matter. And today when you look at the whole of peacekeeping, you see that basically those resources are not quite there.

And I've started with numbers, but the capacities are also missing. The whole international community, for instance, does not have the enablers it needs. It took a long time for NATO to find the helicopters it needed in Afghanistan. We haven't found the helicopters we need in Darfur. We are missing critical capabilities.

And the governance arrangements of the United Nations, I said our comparative advantage is the universal pool of resources. That is a strong advantage. A disadvantage we have is that the governance arrangement of the United Nations, in a way, creates a disconnect between those who decide, those who pay, those who take the risk. And that's a challenge that we face today at a high level of peacekeeping activity.

Let me be clear. Those who pay, they are essentially the United States, which pays 27 percent of the bill, there is the European Union member states, which pay roughly 40 percent of the bill, and there is Japan, which pays roughly 20 percent of the bill. Add all of that, you come to 87 percent of the bill for that group of countries. That's a lot. That means that the rest of the

world pays roughly 13 percent of the bill. So great concentration on the small number of countries for those who pay.

Those who provide the troops, they are largely South Asia and some African countries and some Latin Americans, essentially, in Haiti. There were almost no Europeans until the deployment of the reinforced UNIFIL in Lebanon. So there is a great concentration on a small number of countries. And so those who take the risk for more and more challenging mandates are not those necessarily who pay and they're not certainly those who take the decision. Those who take the decision, that's the Security Council and the overlap of the Security Council with those who pay is partial, with Japan and Germany not in the Council presently. And with those who take the risks, also very partial with South Asia essentially absent for the moment of the Security Council, certainly not permanent members. So that's a weakness at a time when the international community, when the United Nations, is asked to do so much.

By stressing those challenges of the governance arrangement in a way, I'm transitioning to what is, for me, one of the most – maybe the most critical challenge: the political challenge, the degree of support that peace operations need if they want to be successful. I said earlier that there's a tendency to focus on the material resources. The political fuel is as important, is actually even more important than the material resources. I mean, they're both essential.

But the challenge that we face today, as you noted, 20 missions, if we include the peace operations that are under the responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the peacekeeping in the traditional sense, 20 operations, 20 different conflicts. Is there enough political will to address today by a limited number of countries, those 15 countries which are sitting on the Security Council, especially, and the five permanent members among those 15? Is there the will to address those 20 political situations, those 20 political processes?

Maybe there would be the will, but there's not the time. (Chuckles.) Because it's not just peacekeeping. There is non-proliferation. There is the crisis in the Middle East. I mean, there are other issues which deserve certainly a lot of attention of the international community. And I'm not one who thinks that peacekeeping is the only issue on the agenda of international security.

Can the major powers focus on so many issues at once? I doubt it. I don't think it's happening today. I don't think it's feasible. And I think it's dangerous because again, we tend to focus on the hardware, so to speak, and ignore the software. The troops that we provide, the window of security that we open with the deployment of a peace operation, it helps control the downside of a situation. It doesn't really build the upside. The upside is the political engagement, is the development effort, is all that comes on top of the military deployment.

And so it's – if you limit the downside, but you don't exploit it to really build the upside, eventually you're not going to make the progress that you want to make. And that is what we are risking today. That is we are risking today because of what I would call a political overstretch. Because also, let's be frank, there is an international community today that is much less united in its strategic goals than it was at the end of the Cold War. There was a window that opened at the

end of the Cold War that we considered as a new era. Sometimes, I wonder whether it was just actually what I said, a window.

There has to be in the international community a common sense – sense of common purpose if one wants to achieve such ambitious goal as helping broken countries to rebuild themselves. Is that sense of common purpose present in all the missions where we are deployed? I don't think so. I'm concerned to see how issues like Kosovo, for instance today, are divisive for the international community, how the Security Council cannot come together on an issue like Kosovo. And I mention Kosovo because today is the most prominent among the issues which divide the Security Council. But I'm not sure that on other issues there is a deep unity, sense of common purpose, in the Security Council.

So that is a real challenge and a real threat to the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping. To address that challenge, we all agree that we need to work as partners, that we need to bring more actors to the peacekeeping table. And we have seen in recent years organizations like the African Union, like the European Union, like NATO, like the Organization of American States contribute to peacekeeping and get involved in peacekeeping. And that is welcome. I think it would be very foolish on the part of the United Nations to think that it has to claim any monopoly on peacekeeping. I think the more actors are prepared to contribute material and political resources to peacekeeping, the better in the state where we are where demand vastly outstrips the resource and the supply.

But I'm worried again because, yes, we see more and more organizations getting involved. But sometimes I wonder whether they are getting involved to benefit from their respective comparative advantages. Regional organizations may have a deep knowledge of the regional situation than the United Nations. This or that organization may have more resources. Each has its own comparative advantage.

But sometimes it looks as if this proliferation of organizations like surgeons busybody around a very difficult operation, whether they dilute responsibility rather than mobilize more resources. I wouldn't want the multiplication of organizations working on jointly to lead to a situation where member states, which are the ultimate providers of the real resources, the material and the political, where member states would have more organizations to hide behind rather than to really confront their responsibilities. And sometimes I wonder whether there is a risk of that. That is something very dangerous.

I see time is marching on, so I'm not going to go through all the missions, not the 20, but not even the eight where I think we face major challenges on the basis of what I have just said. I will just mention them and maybe in the question and answer period, we can address those situations.

I'm worried about the whole Horn of Africa, where we are involved in no less than four missions. UNAMID in Darfur, UNMIS in Sudan to address the north/south issue in Sudan and so two missions in Sudan. We have UNMEE, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and we have MINURCAT in Chad. I'm worried for the Horn of Africa because I think there is a solid – there is a foundation of the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan, there is a foundation of the agreement that was

reached between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Algiers in 2000, but agreements need to be nurtured and implemented and moved forward. And there are risks there. And when I look at the whole continent of Africa, as I said, I think there's been real progress in West Africa, I think there is some progress in Central Africa, in the Great Lakes. I have some concerns on the Horn of Africa.

And I have concerns in four other missions. Of course, Afghanistan, where there is a general recognition that there has to be a new beginning, a renewed effort, a renewed commitment of the international community. I have concerns in Lebanon because UNIFIL is doing a fine job and it's a traditional mission where the military deployment is separate from the political process. It hasn't adopted the integrated model that we now favor and, I think, is effective. But Lebanon – the success of UNIFIL is ultimately dependent on the political context there. And, of course, I mentioned Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that's the eight I would mention where we have made real progress, but nothing is completely irreversible. And I'll have to work hard and keep the commitment of the international community.

So there are serious questions. I haven't mentioned situations like Iraq because they're not under my responsibility at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. But for those 20 missions which are directly under the responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, eight flashpoints are at least five too many. (Chuckles.) It's too much and it's dangerous. And you can have surprises in missions that I haven't mentioned. So it is a risky situation and it's a risky situation for the international community, which has put so much in the U.N., which has put so much in U.N. peacekeeping.

Because there is one thing I'm very well aware of and maybe I should conclude on that point. It has required an enormous collective effort from the Security Council, from the Secretariat, from the member states which have provided the troops and the political resource, to make the progress we have made in the last seven, eight years, to rebuild a credibility that had been destroyed by the tragedies of the '90s. I know that it is enough of one – one big failure would be enough to destroy that credibility. And so we can't afford that failure.

And when I say we, I'm not talking about the Secretariat. I'm talking about all of us, the member states, the international community because – and that's a danger of the United Nations, that's its opportunity and that is the risk it incurs. United Nations is nothing more, nothing less than what the member states put in it. Sometimes there is a sense that the United Nations is that organization out there where you can pass the buck if you don't know how to deal with something. That's a dangerous approach because if you pass the buck too much and then there is a big failure, you lose the instrument. You lose the credibility of the instrument.

And so for the member states, which have seen in recent years, how the United Nations can effectively address situations that may not be at the top of the strategic agenda, but that involve the lives of millions and millions of people, that also have a strategic importance because if you let a vacuum develop in a country, it can come back to haunt us and become a strategic threat. So for all those countries – and the U.S. is one of them – that have recognized the importance of having an organization that can address those situations, the instrument needs to

be protected. The instrument needs to be used wisely, because if it is not used wisely, at some point it may break. And if it breaks, it will take years to rebuild. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MS. MENDELSON FORMAN: Well, first, let me thank you on behalf of all of us for that wonderful presentation about not only the eight years of progress, which you had a great deal to do with, but also the types of missions that will continue to plague the U.N. and the international community because of their difficulty and because of the absence of roadmaps that we have to solve them. But let me just put you in my prerogative of the chair in a little bit of a position.

You've been at the U.N. for eight years, having done a wonderful job in bringing peace operation forward. What would be the piece of advice you would leave for your successor in how to make the very important tool, not only for U.S. power, but for all the nations of the U.N. even more effective? And would there be one particular type of reform that you would like to see that has yet not been achieved, but would make the difference in ending the fragility of this most important operation?

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, peacekeeping is a continuous work in progress. I think we need to further strengthen our military component on the one hand and there are ideas on the table to do precisely that. I think, on the other hand, we need to maximize what I think is one critical comparative advantage of the United Nations, is the integration. In the U.N., there is a Department of Peacekeeping Operations that integrates for the peace operation, the political strategy, the military deployment and the civilian strategy. I think that's essential. I think it's essentially a good set-up, which is quite different from what you would have in a national context, where you'd have a Ministry of Defense, you would have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you would have – well, of course, they all report to a prime minister or to a president, but it's a different set-up.

I think that set-up of the U.N. on the ground with a special representative who integrates the military effort and the political strategy, the civilian that integrates, I think that's fundamentally sound. But in terms of reforms, I think we could do much better in integrating the peace-building with the peacekeeping in our operations. I think that the United Nations funds and programs and, generally speaking, the bilateral donors, all that, is far from well integrated. And that's a real issue where we could do better. Now, he will have a lot of work, my successor. (Chuckles.)

MS. MENDELSON FORMAN: Thank you. Why don't we take some questions? When you called upon, there's a microphone, and if you would state your name. Let's start over here with the gentleman in the back.

Q: Hi. Doug Brooks with the International Peace Operations Association. My question is Canada used to provide a lot of the sort of Western peacekeepers that did participate in peacekeeping operations and they sort of got busy in Afghanistan, so they don't put as many troops in the field. Is there any other Western nation that is putting troops in the field to do

peacekeeping operations, or do you see any on the horizon? Do you see the Germans, who have a fairly large Western military, participating more in peace operations? Do you see more of them on the horizon?

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, I mean, there was a significant change when UNIFIL, when our mission in Lebanon deployed, with a significant contingent from a number of European countries, like Italy, Spain, France, Poland. There was a series of European countries that deployed with Blue Helmets in Lebanon. Actually, Germany got involved on the naval side in Lebanon, in the naval task force that we have under U.N. command in Lebanon. But European boots on the ground in Africa, under the U.N. flag, we are not quite there yet. We have the deployments of the European mission in Chad, the U-4 (?), which follows on other European missions that have been deployed in Africa and we had some very useful contribution from Europe in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on two occasions.

I hope that down the road, we will see more Europeans under the U.N. flag, because it's not – it would not be a politically healthy situation if systematically some countries deploy under one flag, but don't deploy under the U.N. flag. We have seen European countries like Ireland, like Sweden, eager to deploy under U.N. flag and they have done it on several occasions. I think we need to see more of that and the strengthening of our military structures may be a way to facilitate that. At the same time, I don't think that as we do that, we should completely emulate the military structures that the U.S. developed or that NATO has developed, because I'm not sure that they're always attuned to what is needed for a peacekeeping operation.

Q: (Inaudible) – with the State Department, the office for reconstruction and stabilization. Of the really problematic missions that you mentioned, I was really struck by UNIMIS – UNAMID, rather, in Darfur. And I was looking at the factors again that you had said were particularly challenging. And there it seems to me you have a combination. You obviously have problems with the material resources. I think there's probably a question with the political will, the international community, and finally, the issue of dealing with the regime in Sudan. And I'd be curious in your thoughts, I mean, as you looked at UNIMIS, which seems particularly fragile and problematic right now, how you evaluate those factors and what you see as possible sort of steps forward in providing the sort of robust presence on the ground that's needed in Darfur.

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, I think in UNAMID, it's a good illustration of the need both to have the material resources, but also not to ignore the politics of the mission. In some ways, a single-minded focus on the deployment of the force would miss the central point. Yes, we have great difficulties deploying the mission for a variety of reasons. Troop contributors are not rushing to Darfur and the troop contributors that have been selected for the mission do not have the self-sustainment capabilities that, for instance, the European troops that deployed in Lebanon very quickly have. And so that inevitably delays the deployment, plus the well-known issues that we are missing, some critical capabilities.

So they are all the material issues of the deployment, but there is the more fundamental issue is what peace is there to keep? What is the agreement? There was a great effort with the Darfur Peace Agreement. Unfortunately, that Darfur Peace Agreement does not have the broad-

based support that people who supported the signature of that agreement expected it would have. And so today, there is a big question whether a solid political base for a peace in Darfur can be developed. And that requires efforts on many fronts, frankly. The government of Sudan to have a unified view between the National Congress Party, the SPLM – (inaudible) – and SLA and on the rebel fronts, where we see increased fragmentation. And so the commitment to a political process is uncertain.

We have seen offensives of the rebels, we have seen offensives of the government of Sudan, we have seen a high tempo of military activities in Darfur. It is not a good context to deploy a peacekeeping operation. And so I think for the international community, if one wants to make progress in Darfur. There has to be a solid understanding by all the parties that the political process is their best option, it's not just one option among a range of tools that they can use to pursue their goals. How does the international community convey that message to all the actors in Darfur? Well, that requires a united international community. So in a way, Darfur encapsulates most of the challenges that have described in my opening remarks.

Q: My name is Ami (ph) Rossman (ph). I'm with Save Darfur Coalition. Just following on what you have mentioned, what would be the implication of the failure to deploy UNAMID on the regions, the Horn of Africa region and the rest of Sudan?

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, when I say I'm worried about the Horn of Africa, what I mean is that I think in the absence of resolution of the conflicts that we see in the Horn, eventually it's the control of recognized, legitimate authorities. That is a challenge. So the consequences of absence of progress in the deployment combined with the absence of progress in the political process, because I always come back to that, means that the situation might become more and more difficult and, in a way, more and more intractable, which means more suffering for the people and which means more difficult to find a solution, a political solution. That's what we have seen in Somalia, where for a long period of time there has been an impossibility to reach an agreement that would commit all those who hold guns and the main victims of that situation have been indeed the people of Somalia. I mean, I wouldn't want that to happen in a place like Darfur, where there's already so much suffering.

Q: Rima Mari (ph). Would you agree that the political context that peacekeeping operations operate in in the Middle East are more challenging than other parts of the world, especially given that the U.S. foots so much of the bill and perhaps the U.N. is losing its comparative advantage in the sense that it is seen as the tool for implementing U.S. objectives in the region? To what extent would you agree with this statement? And do you think that it is by coincidence that the Lebanese – that the UNIFIL forces ended up having Europeans, perhaps to counterbalance the influence of the U.S. in that part of the region?

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, what I would say is that the U.N. has the greatest chance of success when the major powers of the world are interested, but at the same time, when it's not a fundamental, strategic interest, so that there is no polarization and a real consensus can be built. The challenge of the Middle East is that indeed it's a very polarized situation. It's much harder to build that consensus. And in the Middle East, as in any mission, if there is not – as I was saying in my opening remarks, if there is not a solid common strategy, then there is a danger.

Europeans got involved in Lebanon. Well, of course, when they saw that as part – the Middle East is right next door to Europe, there is a great sense, I think, of urgency in Europe that deterioration of the situation in the Middle East is extremely dangerous for fundamental European interest. So I think there is a – it is a positive decision to have that involvement of Europe. I think now what is essential is to recognize that deploying troops opens a window, but that there has to be then political process that takes advantage of the window that has been opened. Otherwise, the situation can become quite dangerous.

Q: Dwali Sambit (ph), Tulane University. You mentioned Congo a lot of times and I know the U.N. has been there now, in the '60s and now the U.N. is there. And the lay people always tie the conflict to the exploitation of natural resources. You talk about the military and the political, but I didn't hear you talking about the – setting some transparency in exploitation of natural resources as part of the peacekeeping.

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, you're right that when one looks at the map of conflicts, conflicts need to be fed, so to speak. And the map of natural resources not always, because I don't want to be deterministic there, but, in some cases, the existence of natural resources helps militias, helps various actors fund themselves and so can be part of the conflict. When we deploy in a place where there are natural resources – and there are a number of places where we are deploying with natural resources, Liberia is a case in point. There are significant – I mean, it's a small country, much smaller than the Democratic Republic of the Congo, obviously, but there are serious natural resources there.

I mean, it's been quite a good experience to see how, in partnership with the authorities of Liberia, and working also with the U.S. government, with the European Union, with the World Bank, we've been able to develop mechanisms that are entirely supported by Liberia to consolidate good governance in Liberia so that those resources that exist in Liberia would be used for the benefit of the people of Liberia.

And this should always be part of an integrated strategy. But it cannot be dictated from the outside. It has to be the result of an engagement between the international community and the country where we are deployed, where the country where we are deployed comes to the conclusion that this improvement in good governance is a fundamental pillar of a sustainable peace.

Q: Thank you very much. My name is Mindy Riser (sp), from the United Nations Association of the National Capital Area. And my question has to do with civilian engagement in the peacekeeping missions. I wonder if you could reflect after your many years now on the job what worked best and what didn't work very well in involving civilians. I know there have been problems finding police and certainly other people with skills that are relevant. What can be done better and what would you advise going forward?

MR. GUEHENNO: Well, the civilians, they are not the most visible part of a peacekeeping operation. One thinks first of the Blue Helmets. But they are a key central element of a successful strategy. The head of the mission in our integrated mission is a civilian

and that's how it should be and is supported by thousands sometimes of civilian personnel. When I consolidate the numbers in our peacekeeping operations, we have more than 20,000 civilians, of which roughly 5,000 international civilians, so a considerable number.

How can they do the best possible job? I'll start from the top, from the special representative himself or herself. Unfortunately, too many times himself, but we are making some progress so that there are more female special representatives. What can the special representative do best? I think it's finding the right balance between not being a bully and at the same time not being irrelevant. I use a double negative; I should find another way to say it.

But a special representative, the head of a civilian effort, and I start from the top because in a way, it's the job description of every member of a peacekeeping operation. You are there in a country that is not yours, that you will leave. So you have to start with a lot of humility because if you come with a sense that you are the new colonial power, we're not in a colonial age and we shouldn't be and the flag of the U.N. if it becomes a colonial flag is no more legitimate than any national flag. So you have to start from a position of humility and of listening. And at the same time, you have to do more, of course, than to listen. You have to be able to push, to convince, and that requires a lot of intelligence and some training.

As we develop multidimensional peacekeeping, we need to do much more in terms of training. You mentioned the police. To be a good police officer in a peacekeeping operation is much more than to be a good police officer in one's home country. Because you can be a good police officer on the beat in Paris or New York or Washington, that's fine. But to be a good police officer in a country that is not yours, where you're going to have to transfer knowledge, where you're going to have to exercise that mix of humility and strength with people who are not your compatriots, that's enormously difficult.

And you also will have to have in mind organizational issues that you don't necessarily possess because you inherit structures when you are in your own country, you inherit functioning structures, while there you will have to create them, to help create them, and you will not be the one creating them, you will help people who are not – and that's not you – get convinced that they have to create those structures.

I think we throw police officers in very difficult jobs without preparing them enough. And what I say of police officers, I could say of many of our civilian capabilities, where we need – it's one thing to be an expert. We don't have the right middle between the operator who does the job and the person who does the report on what needs to be done. What is difficult is intermediate level where you do a bit of the job to share your experience, but at the same time, where you have a certain sense of the system that you are building.

And that intermediate level, I think nobody gets it really right. I think the closest probably to right approach was what the EU did with the accessing countries in Central Europe, where there was a major effort to help those countries prepare themselves for integration into the European Union. But those countries were – I mean, their starting points were infinitely higher than the starting point of countries broken by conflict in which we are deployed. But generally,

speaking, I think this is something that the international community is not good at and where much more needs to be done today.

MS. MENDELSON FORMAN: We have about 10, 15 minutes left. Maybe what I'd like to do is just take a few more questions and then we can go from there. That gentleman, do you want to start over there and we'll just go around. Thank you.

Q: Thank you. My name is Andrew Solomon from the American Society of International Law. And my question has to do with rule of law promotion and justice sector, justice system reform, which many U.N. personnel in peacekeeping operations find themselves working on, whether as part of a mandate or not part of a mandate. My question really has to deal with should there be more emphasis on integrating reference to those types of activities in the mandates? Is that too specific? And then also who, if anyone, should have the lead within the many different U.N. agencies in that area of work?

MS. MENDELSON FORMAN: I'm going to take a few more questions. The lady over here.

Q: Avram (sp) Mam (ph) with Voice of America. U.N. peacekeeping forces are in Cyprus for a long time now and I was wondering how do you see the future of the peacekeeping force in Cyprus and do you think they are still needed there? And do you think there should – should there be a time limit to peacekeeping forces operations in general?

Q: Patricia – (inaudible) – Georgetown University. One of the debates among anthropologists in – (inaudible) – peacekeeping operations, how long is long enough; when is it there too long? Obviously these sources are key elements there when governments withdraw the resources peacekeepers need – (inaudible) – but I wonder if you can reflect on how the debate is going and since you started off talking about lessons learned, what are the lessons – (inaudible)?

MS. MENDELSON FORMAN: That's a whole days' worth of – (chuckles) – this gentleman here and I think you may have –

Q: Yes, my name is Chuck – (inaudible) – I'm with the State Department's – (inaudible) – peacekeeper training program in Africa. And I've just returned this morning from a two-week trip out to Burundi and Rwanda where we held a peace support operations lessons learned workshop with 18 of our CODA troop contributing countries. And many things that came out of that we'll be putting into a report in about two weeks, which we can share with your office up in New York. But one thing that came clear and they asked me to inquire about and today was a fortunate event, I just got back, as I said, this morning, but many of the African countries who want to volunteer for Darfur or any of the other U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa are unclear on the manner in which they need to volunteer and apply and approach the U.N. DPKO to follow up this process. My question to you: is there an SOP or a guide that we can distribute to those troop contributing countries or perhaps develop a short list for them? Because I think you would have no shortage of volunteers for Darfur and other places. Equipment is another question, but in terms of peacekeepers, the numbers are there, sir.

MS. MENDELSON FORMAN: Unfortunately, I think we're going to have to cut off the questions and give our speaker the last word. So with those, thank you.

MR. GUEHENNO: Yeah, first question on the rule of law. I mean, if there is something we have learned I think from the past experience is the importance of integrating our efforts on security, in particular, police in a broader context. If you train police officers, but there is no judiciary, there is no corrections, it doesn't make sense. And so you do need an integrated effort there, which is not easy because, of course, I mean, the judiciary, in particular, it's really at the core of the sovereignty of a state. And for instance, in Haiti, we are working with the Haitian authorities to strengthen the judiciary, but it's a major challenge.

Who should have the lead on that? I think it's – what is important is to mobilize resources because, frankly, often I see discussions on who should do what, when what strikes me is that basically there is not enough resource. And it's basically people are fighting for what they should just try to mobilize more resources. There is a great gap between what is needed and what is available. I think it's very important to have an operational approach to it so as to be able to deploy the kind of people that I was describing when I answered the question on the police that have that experience in the judiciary and the corrections, but also have the capacity to really operationalize it in a post conflict situation.

Cyprus, well, I think we – hopefully, we may be at a time where things could move in Cyprus. I mean, there are two leaders who have met in a very positive spirit. There is now hope that what is – let's not forget that Cyprus is the last city in the world to be divided. There is hope that a crossing is going to be open there. It's a symbolic event, but it's a symbolic event which would have major – which would reverberate politically.

And so Cyprus, we have been there, of course, much, much too long. Cyprus makes the point that a peacekeeping operation indeed prevents the resumption of war. And that is priceless because one day of war, I mean, is very costly, in financial terms and, more importantly, in human terms. But the peacekeeping operation doesn't by itself bring peace; it brings the absence of war, but it is a halfway station. And you need then to have a political engagement to resolve the issues. Maybe today in Cyprus there is that possibility and it should be seized upon.

The timeframe which brings me to the question on the timeframe of peacekeeping operations, I don't think that you can have a kind of mechanical answer to that question. Because again, you see, there are frozen conflicts. I mean, Cyprus was one for many years. Hopefully now, it is unfreezing and there is a real hope of movement. There are other conflicts that are frozen, like the Western Sahara conflict, for instance. Does that mean that a mission should be pulled out? Frankly, I think that even if a mission does not achieve peace, if there is no resolution, political resolution, one should think twice before pulling out a mission and make sure that it does not increase the risk of war. But at the end of the day, it's a decision of the parties.

The timeframe for multidimensional missions, there I think we have to recognize that the quick in, quick out is just unrealistic. And we have to be frank about it and I think the Security Council, when it decides to open a mission, should be aware that – I mean, it should analyze the

situation and if it makes a commitment, should be prepared to stay the course. And that's the case in places like Haiti; that's the case in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo. You cannot cut and run; you have to stay the course because in a country that has been broken, devastated, you're not going to be able to help the state rebuild the basic structures very quickly. It requires a serious, consistent effort.

Now, what is the shape of the international presence? That can be and should be continuously adjusted. And as soon as possible, the military dimension of the present should go down because no force can remain in a country for long without being seen at some point as an occupation force. And so I think we have to be very careful in trying to get out the military side as soon as we can and that's where the importance of building the security sector is essential. Because there are places if we pull out, the security sector is just not there to provide the basics of peace that are needed. So we have to focus from day one on the reform of security sector so as to be able to downsize the military presence as quickly as possible and at the same time be ready to have a longer term presence in other aspects of the peacekeeping effort.

African countries, I think it's – the African missions at the United Nations, they know that whenever there is a peacekeeping mission, we notify all the countries of the world actually of what is required. We conduct briefings for those countries where we explain the details. Where I would disagree with you is that for each mission, we don't want to throw troops at a problem that do not have the training, the equipment, the self-sustainment, that will allow them to face the problem. I think it's not doing a service to troop contributors to accept contribution from troop contributors which would not have the capacity to sustain themselves effectively and which will be – which will not have the capacity to deliver in a very difficult dangerous environment.

Nobody will win from that. The mission will not win and the troop contributor will not win because its people, its soldiers will be put in harm's way and will not be in a position to make a difference and may suffer casualties as has been the case actually in places where troops were deployed that did not have the sufficient equipment and capacity. So I think our duty is to have with the troop contributors a totally honest dialogue, to tell them what the challenges are, to explain them in no unclear terms, to inspect them, that's what we do, and if we see that they do not have the capacities, then find another troop contributor.

MS. MENDELSON FORMAN: Undersecretary Guehenno, it's been a pleasure and an honor to have you here this afternoon. Let's thank him.

(Applause.)

(END)