

**CENTER FOR  
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
(CSIS)**

**BOB SCHIEFFER SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM DIALOGUE  
STATUS OF THE NORTH KOREAN PARTY TALKS**

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**THURSDAY, MAY 29, 2008**

*Transcript by  
Federal News Service  
Washington, D.C.*

JOHN HAMRE: Okay, ladies and gentlemen. Ladies and gentlemen, my name is John Hamre. Here at CSIS, I'd like to welcome you. I think this is now the fourth or the fifth – fourth of the series that we're hosting jointly with the Schieffer School of Journalism down at TCU. We're partnered with them on this wonderful series.

I want to say a special thanks to you, Bob, for keynoting this and bringing this all together. I'll have to honestly tell you this is one of the easiest programs that we have to put together because when I can say that Bob Schieffer's going to be moderating it, lots of people want to be a part of it because you know it's going to be fair, honest, decent journalism, and every one of these sessions has certainly proven that.

This is a fascinating discussion tonight. This is going to be probably one of the most important issues that is going to be at the end of the Bush presidency and clearly is going to be carrying over and shaping the next presidency, and that is the situation in Korea and the Six-Party Talks. And we have four superb individuals that'll lead us through this discussion.

But let me turn it to you, Bob, and again, thank you for everything.

BOB SCHIEFFER: Thank you very much, Doctor. And on behalf of the TCU journalism school, this is a wonderful thing for us. And the opportunity to do something in partnership with CSIS is just a great thing for us, and we're very pleased to do it.

I think this may be the best panel we've had thus far, and to talk about a subject that, no matter who's elected, he or she is going to have to deal with this problem in the next administration. Joseph DiTrani is North Korea mission manager for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He is responsible for integrating collection and analysis on North Korea across the intelligence community. He comes to the ODNI after a distinguished career in government, most recently served as the special envoy to the Six-Party Talks, where he had the rank of ambassador. Before that, he was with the Department of State, served as a U.S. Air Force officer, and he was also with the CIA as an economic analyst. Thank you for coming.

Robert Einhorn, a senior advisor here, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation arms control and other national security issues. Before joining CSIS, he was in the U.S. government 29 years. From November 1999 to August of 2001, he was assistant secretary for nonproliferation at the Department of State.

Michael Green, a senior advisor and holds the Japan chair here at CSIS, as well as being an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and was senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. From January 2004 to December 2005, he

joined the NSC in April 2001 as director of Asian affairs with responsibility for Japan, certainly one of the key posts there.

And of course, David Sanger, my colleague; he's the chief Washington correspondent, of course, for the New York Times. He's one of the newspaper's senior writers. He's been at the newspaper for 25 years, was on the team that won the Pulitzer for coverage of the Challenger space shuttle disaster. He's currently on book leave and is working on a book called "The Inheritance: The World that America Now Faces," which will be published in January of 2009 and will basically outline the foreign policy challenges of the next president, whoever that may be; we'll have to meet.

So I've asked David, since – I guess, David, you broke this story, did you not, about the Syrian – that was your story?

DAVID SANGER: Yeah.

MR. SCHIEFFER: When they found the nuclear facility in Syria, that was David's story and it stayed his story for a couple of days. It took awhile for other people to catch up on it, really one of the big scoops of the year.

So I've asked David today to join me as a questioner of – to start at where we ought to start here, and we will take questions from the audience, as we always do. September 2005, a joint statement was agreed on in the Six-Party Talks, and it sounded promising. The United States would ease economic sanctions on North Korea; in exchange, North Korea would disable its nuclear facilities and account for its past activities. On October 3<sup>rd</sup> of last year, North Korea committed to a complete and correct declaration of all their nuclear programs by the end of last year. Now, they missed the deadline on that. Most of you know where we've been standing on that. But today, there was another development on that. Chris Hill, the man who is doing the negotiating for the United States, said – and here's what he said; he said that he hoped this accounting would be done soon.

And so Joe, since you're the government official here now that's in the government right now, bring us up to date. I mean, what does soon mean and where exactly are we?

(Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR JOSEPH DITRANI: That's a very good question. I see a lot of experts in the room. (Chuckles.)

No, indeed Chris Hill had two days of very good talks in Beijing, and we are looking for a complete and correct declaration from the DPRK. And you referred back to September 2005; that's key because there was a very clear understanding of September 2005. We're talking about all nuclear programs, all nuclear programs, and that was put

on the table, all nuclear programs, nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs to be dismantled.

So what we're hoping is that the DPRK provides to the chair – that's the PRC and the person over there, Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, a declaration that would then be shared with the other five countries, the heads of delegation, which speaks to their nuclear programs. And as we describe it, a complete and correct declaration, and that obviously is the discussion. So the discussion is, indeed, when they go forth with the declaration we'd like it to be as complete and as correct as possible, but we realize it's an iterative process and will take some discussion.

But we've made significant progress. We have disablement going on at Yongbyon, rather significant disablement going on at Yongbyon. Eight of the 11 benchmarks have been accomplished at Yongbyon, under the disablement at Yongbyon. We have over 300,000 metric tons of heavy fuel that's gone to North Korea. I mean, that's rather significant. And equivalency in energy assistance, also to North Korea. And as we speak, the U.S. is preparing for a 500,000 metric tons of food aid to DPRK, and this is a humanitarian not linked at all to the Six-Party Talks.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Is this going to be a good agreement? As you know, the political side of it is there are many people who say that the administration is just now looking for something they can hang a legacy on, that it's a legacy agreement and that legacy agreements are never good. Do you think that this is – is this going to be a good agreement if we can get one?

MR. DITRANI: We have – the sense is that we are working, the U.S. government certainly, the secretary of State. Assistant Secretary Hill, he's been tireless going back and forth with the – obviously with the president's encouragement and direction. This is an agreement we want that is complete and correct. It needs to be complete and correct to be a good agreement because everything's on the table for North Korea. Everything's on the table: ultimately, a normal relationship with the United States and all the benefits that accrue there, and so forth. So there's much there, but also it's a complete and correct declaration.

But I would add one other thing: It also speaks to Japan and the abductee issue, that there needs to be a dialogue with the government of Japan. There needs to be some progress on the abductee issue, which is another piece to it. And as we move forward with the DPRK into the third phase, which is what we're hoping for, we move from the second phase, which is the disablement of the facility at Yongbyon, to a third phase, which is dismantlement of all their nuclear programs. All the other pieces come into play, and certainly progress with the abductee issue. We will speak to the issues that speak to illicit activities and so forth. The human rights issues are part of that equation, also, benchmarks of success. So the third phase will open up the arena and permit the U.S., with the other partners of the Six-Party Talks, to move in a very, very progressive, effective way.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Michael Green, you of course were in the administration, played an active role on this. What are we going to get if we get an agreement, and what are we going to have to give? In the end, will we be pleased with it?

MICHAEL GREEN: Well, the – you know, a lot of people, as Joe said, in this room, it looks like the interagency that we had to deal with in government on this. The reality may be that there's no such thing as a good deal with North Korea. It's just a question of how good a bad deal you can get because they have pursued nuclear weapons for decades and devoted enormous resources for it, and don't appear to want to really give them up.

The report suggests that what we might get would be disablement of Yongbyon, which is their main and current, as far as we know, only active source of fissile material; a declaration, it appears, on the plutonium piece, which would be good to have. And what we would give up would be the things Joe said: aid, we'd be lifting some sanctions. And we may get something on abductees.

On a transactional basis, that's pretty good. You're getting some purchase on the plutonium problem, which is the core of the whole nuclear program. The downside risk, the sort of collateral problems that may come out of this, though, are that we may end up giving away these sanctions for a declaration that does not cover nuclear weapons production capability, that does not cover the highly enriched uranium program, and that doesn't really give us what we need to know about proliferation, which are all hard things to get at. So the risk you run is that you might end up getting some purchase on the plutonium piece, but make it much harder later to get at some of the real problems.

Again, there's no perfect deal with North Korea. We'd have to consider, when you look at it, whether this sets us up for the next phase and also have to consider how this looks for our allies. And I think in Japan and to some extent Korea, there's been concern that perhaps we are going for too little, and that even in the Japanese Diet there's open debate saying we need to get a declaration that gets at the nuclear weapons, that gets at the uranium enrichment. So we'd also have to consider is this a deal that's going to be credible with our allies and that's going to make them believe we continue to work on this actively.

Joe may know; we don't know exactly what's going to go into it. But those are the concerns I would have about whether it's too narrow, recognizing that with North Korea you're not going to get everything, and you kind of have to pick what you want to give up for what you get.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Robert Einhorn, you worked on this earlier, some years back. Would you be comfortable with this agreement, as you now understand it's structured, if in fact they got an agreement?

ROBERT EINHORN: Well, if we got a complete and accurate declaration, I'd be comfortable. The question is whether we're going to actually get that. You know, a deal

was struck with the North Koreans by the U.S. that they would give us a plutonium – you know, their declared history on plutonium, how much they had produced, and on the two other issues, North Korea's assistance, nuclear assistance to other countries, especially Syria. And on the question of the uranium enrichment program, we would essentially state our concerns, our understanding of what they had done. They would not explicitly agree with our understanding; they would acknowledge that we were concerned. They would acknowledge our concern.

The question is, is this adequate? Sig Hecker, former U.S. weapons laboratory director, and Bill Perry did an op-ed piece a few weeks ago saying it's the plutonium, stupid; that's what we really ought to be worried about, and they're right. I mean, I think, you know, people have real doubts whether the uranium enrichment program made any progress, so I think you're getting most, if not all of it by getting a good declaration on plutonium.

But you've got to be concerned about what they may have done surreptitiously. And so I think it's important to focus on the plutonium, but you can't let the uranium enrichment problem be – you know, be considered by the North Koreans to be resolved. They will say we did that; you know, we don't have uranium enrichment program, why do you keep bothering us about this. But I think it's important that we continue to follow up, and if we have concerns we have to be able to go to the North Koreans and express those concerns.

The other piece, of course, is prospect of North Korea cooperating with other countries. The Syria case, from the evidence I've seen, it looks pretty incriminating as far as North Korea's assistance to Syria. And we certainly don't want North Korea engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran and other countries. They claim – they don't talk about what they've done in the past. They say we've never cooperated with another country in the nuclear sphere but we're not going to do it again, basically – (laughter) – is what they've said. And I think it's very important that we have a mechanism in place, and measures in place, to make sure that they're not going to help anybody else's nuclear program.

For example, I've seen press reports that say that North Korean front companies were located in Beijing, and these front companies would import stuff ostensibly for China, but then they'd be shipped to Syria. We ought to insist with the Chinese that they shut down those front companies. There's a lot that we can do to make sure that North Korea won't assist anybody else's nuclear weapons program that doesn't require that we know the entire history of what they did in the past.

MR. SCHIEFFER: David?

MR. SANGER: Mr. DeTrani, the history that Bob laid out started in 2005, but of course the history of the North Korean nuclear program goes back to just after the Korean War. And the history of the Bush administration goes back to, of course, 2001, when the

president came in and declared that there was going to be a complete review of everything that President Clinton had done.

The moment when the North Koreans obtained most of the fuel that they had used to make the weapons that they've produced during the Bush administration came, I think, when you were at the State Department and when Mr. Green was at the NSC, and that was early 2003. We were headed to Iraq, and North Koreans threw out our inspectors after we had made an accusation about the – that they had a second program, the enriched uranium program we've been discussing, and then they moved those rods. And from that moment on, we have not known where that fuel was and whether the North Koreans are correct when they claim that they have turned them into weapons.

As you look back at the history of the past eight years, and I'm going to ask the same question of Mike after this, is there anything differently we could have done or should have done in 2003 that would have kept the situation from one in which the North Koreans were able to greatly expand their weapons capability, if not their actual arsenal? Everything that Chris Hill is out there trying to get back today.

MR. DETRANI: Well, let me just start and then I'll look to Michael, but a very good question.

Let me just say, David, we – in 2002, October 2002, when the North Koreans were confronted with the information that the United States had that North Korea was making acquisitions that spoke to achieving a capability to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, it was presented to the North Koreans because this was in violation of the North-South denuclearization agreement, 1991, '92; certainly, the NPT and indeed, the spirit of the agreed framework. And we were building light water reactors at Kumho; we were providing heavy fuel as this was happening.

So I don't believe there was any other option but to present this to the North Koreans, and the response was rather surprising, to be honest. That, you know, indeed the others, and we have other things, and so forth, which was not in the spirit of let's cooperate, let's move forward because we have the agreed framework and we've been making progress with Kumho. So now we're saying we teed up the uranium enrichment issue based on some very solid information, thinking that we could move forward with the dialogue rather than we have this, and we'll have other things, and so what are you going to do about it. And then, things – you described it – 2003 came in quickly. They took the spent fuel rods out of the pond, the cooling ponds. They reprocessed it, they informed us, using the Nuyo (ph) channel initially. And it just moved forward very, very quickly.

Now, with the speed of their actions there one would have thought, one would have thought they had so much on the table, not only with the light water reactors but with ultimate normalization of relations of the U.S. They just had a very good meeting with the prime minister of Japan, and we're talking about 12, maybe \$13 billion of normalization with Japan. Why would you put all that on the table and risk all that by

walking away from the NPT, taking those spent fuel rods out and reprocessing it? The action was with Pyongyang; it was not with Washington.

MR. SANGER: But Washington, at no point, did what the Clinton administration did in 1994, which was issue a threat as vague as it was – I think you probably were around during this time – and said if you move these rods and thus are on your way to making weapons, there are possible consequences, including military consequences. I think Secretary Perry was hinting to them at the time.

MR. GREEN: There were some differences. In 1994, North Korea did not have 200 Nodong missiles capable of striking Japan, for example. I'm pretty certain I'm right when I say that in 1994, there was not an assessment yet that they had a nuclear weapons capability, but in 2002 there was a public NIE –

MR. SANGER: I think in 1994 there was. I think the CIAS would have been maybe one weapon.

MR. GREEN: I think the public estimate was after. But there were significant sort of, you know, military and strategic factors at play. Hood, after – and there are at least two other people in the room who were in Pyongyang when Assistant Secretary Killey (sp), you know, confront Kon Sok-Joo (ph) with the HU program. And the unanimous view of everybody, including me, who was there was that they essentially acknowledged it.

Could the U.S. have kept the agreed framework and continued delivering the heavy fuel oil, which is what – cutting off the heavy fuel oil is what the North Koreans said prompted this. I think the answer legally, under U.S. law, is no. It was not an option. Shortly after all this happened, Hwang Jang-yop, who is the senior-most North Korean defector, came to Washington. And I and a couple of other people met with him, and he said some of this publicly since. And he essentially said that in 1995, when Kon Sok-joo came back from negotiating the agreed framework in Geneva, and the North Korean leadership asked – and Hwang Jang-yop witnessed this – asked what will you do when the Americans demand inspections under the agreed framework, he said that will take five to 10 years and then we will confront them with our nuclear deterrent.

There's a lot we don't know about North Korean intentions. That's one window; it may not be 100 percent foolproof. He's a defector, after all. But I think it is revealing and suggests, as Joe is perhaps suggesting, the North Koreans moved awfully quickly. And I think there's a through line to their behavior and a determination of their behavior that, to me, would lead to the conclusion that they were moving down this path, one way or the other. Could we have stopped them by keeping the agreed framework as a legal matter? We could not have continued the heavy fuel oil shipments.

MR. EINHORN: Let me just –

MR. SANGER: Bob looked like he wanted to get in on this.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Yes, because I wasn't in the administration at this time. And I do think the Bush administration made a mistake in the handling of the uranium enrichment program. I'm prepared to agree that the evidence was compelling, that they were procuring items for an enrichment program. I believe they probably were exploring that, don't know how much progress they made on it. But after, you know, Jim Kelly confronted them with it, they denied it then admitted it, what we did – the team came back to Washington. Basically, we – you know, we washed our hands of the agreed framework. It's no secret the Bush administration wasn't happy with the agreed framework. Many of the administration were unhappy with the agreed framework, wanted to get out from under it as soon as possible. This was a good opportunity to do that.

I think a better approach, at that point, would have been confront them with it and tell them we are prepared to get this agreement back on track. You appear to be violating it; this is our information. We are temporarily going to suspend our heavy fuel oil shipments to you because we're concerned about this, but let's meet again soon and let's try to get an explanation of what's going on. If there's a uranium enrichment program, you got to stop it. And I would withhold shipments for awhile to see what they did.

I think there was almost relief on the part of some in the administration that this was a good opportunity to get out from under this agreement that Clinton had concluded. I think that was a mistake. One person mentioned dealing with the North Koreans is like playing whack-a-mole. You know, you see a problem come up, you got to smack it down. It's going to come up someplace else, but you got to keep whacking that mole. And I think we would be much better off today if we had played whack-a-mole with the North Koreans.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Do you want to respond?

MR. DETRANI: One comment on that, Bob, not the whack-a-mole. (Laughter.) But we – at that time, the Korea Energy Development Corporation suspended work on the construction of the light water reactors at Kumho. And I use the word suspension; we did not cut off anything, we did not say we will cease and desist, we did not say we'd walk out at Kato and so forth. So there was a suspension out there because there was an issue that was now on the table that should not have been on the table, short of begging for some sort of a dialogue, explanation and so forth.

The same thing with the heavy fuel oil: We ceased sending the heavy fuel oil. We didn't say we would cease and desist ad infinitum; we ceased at that time because there was an issue on the table. The reaction to that issue on the table was those spent fuel rods came out of the cooling pond and they were reprocessed, and we were then told they were being reprocessed. I mean, we weren't told they would take them out of their cooling pond; we were told they had taken them out of the cooling pond and reprocessed them. Not much opportunity to sort of interject oneself to delay that process.

MR. GREEN: And the thing I would add is the message you've just described is basically the message they were given. We went to Pyongyang and we said there were ideas on the table the president had for a much larger negotiating framework, and for much bigger things, but we couldn't move forward until North Korea came into compliance with the agreement framework, which was violating. So it was essentially the same message, and the North Korean response was if you want to talk about this, here are four enormous things you need to do for us, including – well, enormous things that related to alliance structure, our nuclear deterrent and so forth.

So then it was do you go back in and say, okay, we'll talk about that, or do you try to find some other way, which eventually emerged in the Six-Party Talks to get regional pressure and leverage to bear.

A lot of these, to me – and I agree, actually, on one point. I, in retrospect, and at the time, to some extent, felt we could have kept some aspects of the agreed framework, not the heavy fuel oil. But a lot of these are sort of tactical decisions that were running in the face of what struck me at the time, and certainly in retrospect, as a pretty clear North Korean determination to move to where they wanted to be, which was nuclear weapons status and pursuing a, quote, unquote, “normal” relationship with the United States as a nuclear weapons state. I think that's the through line in their intentions that was quite clear at that point.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Let me – I have to ask you about this whole business with Syria. Do we think that North Korean is doing anything else on proliferation, and what exactly is their relationship with Syria, I guess, specifically? Are they doing anything else in Syria?

MR. DETRANI: Well, I mean, they have a very close mil-to-mil. I mean, missiles, they have a very close relationship there when it comes to weapons exchanges and so forth, sales of weapons and what have you. This goes way back. It goes back a number of years, certainly to the '90s, where they'd been working with the government of Syria for some time on that.

So, but on the issue of nuclear, no; I mean, my answer would be beyond what was disclosed very clearly, as the cooperation with the government of Syria on this nuclear area, we do not see that with other countries.

MR. GREEN: I don't know what else is going on. There are various press reports, but I don't know. But here's what worries me about the Syria piece: In 2003, we had a U.S.-DPRK-China trilateral, which was a step towards the Six-Party Talks. And on instructions from Pyongyang, Li Gun (ph), the senior North Korean representative, pulled aside Assistant Secretary Kelly and said if you do not stop your hostile policy – and hostile policy to the North Koreans is a long story and changes, but it's basically us being us – if you don't stop your hostile policy, the DPRK will demonstrate its deterrent, its nuclear deterrent, will expand its nuclear deterrent and will transfer.

This was about the time that the reprocessing was starting, so they were already expanding, it appears. They tested, of course; they demonstrated in October 2006. And I think what Syria represented was the transfer piece. And it was concrete and equipment on the ground, it appears. It was not fissile material. So it was perhaps short enough of a redline that the North Koreans felt they could sort of test that.

And I worry that that's going to be the new area that North Korea uses for leverage on us. There were no consequences for that, other than the Israeli air force destroying the facility. So in some ways for the North Koreans, this may be the gift that keeps on giving. It was short enough of a redline that we weren't going to us military force. They didn't pay a serious cost for it, and I don't see what dissuades them from exploring that avenue in the future for leverage, for resources. And I worry that we're going to see this kind of thing – not a fissile material or bombing transfer, but this kind of testing of us, come back for the next administration. I think it's going to be a challenge.

MR. EINHORN: You know, the North Koreans don't engage in this kind of cooperation and assistance for ideological reasons, political reasons. This is entirely a, you know, question of earning hard currency. That's what they do it for. I remember I was the negotiator with the North Koreans on missiles. And I started off with a long lecture on how it's important for international stability and for this, that, and he said please, Mr. Einhorn, stop it; you know, we don't need to be lectured on that. If you can compensate us for the sales we will miss, we'll stop exporting stuff. And mostly it was missiles in the past. It's much more worrisome when it becomes nuclear assistance.

And you know, one of the, I think, fortunate things of the Israeli action is that maybe North Korea didn't pay a cost, but North Korea's customer paid a real cost. And this may make other potential customers think twice about buying from North Korea.

MR. SCHIEFFER: David, do you want to follow up on this?

MR. SANGER: Yeah, when the information was declassified about this in March or April, I guess, you saw Director Hayden turn out a statement saying that this was a great success for the American intelligence community and showed, numbered the photographs that we've all seen since that time. But as you said, this probably started in the late '90s; this project may have started in the early 2000s. It wasn't until May of last year, when the Israelis came to the United States and presented the photographs that we ultimately saw and other material to say hey, what's going on in that big box of a building you've been looking at 100 miles from the Iraqi border is actually a reactor.

And so I guess my first question is what does it tell us, given the amount that we examine North Korea, the amount that we examine Syria, its geographical proximity to Iraq, a place in which we have a lot of interest, that we missed this for six or seven years?

MR. DETRANI: No, I disagree with that, totally disagree with that. We did not miss this for six or seven years.

But first, let me just say when I spoke about Syria-North Korea cooperation, we're talking about missile cooperation, conventional weapons and so forth.

MR. SNAGER: But the reactor building looks like it went up starting in 2002 or earlier.

MR. DETRANI: And indeed, things are being watched very closely. This was something that was being watched very closely. When it became very, very compelling and close to becoming operational, action had to be taken because we learned then – you know, we're getting to a position where the facility could go up or –

MR. SANGER: But did you know that the facility was a reactor until your ally came with evidence to present that?

MR. DETRANI: Well, let me say this – I cannot answer you fully on that, for obvious reasons. But I will say this: We were watching that facility for some time, for a number of years. We were watching the area for a number of years and we were working very closely with that. So I think it goes beyond Syria because it gets to Michael's point here. And there are capabilities that not only the U.S. has but our allies have, and others, certainly as PSI and 1718 and so forth, where we do watch proliferation issues; part of the NPT and part of the counter-proliferation initiative and so forth. This is an imperative; this is very key.

And the second thing is – this may be sort of a technical aspect to it. Mr. Schieffer, you mentioned the October 2007 joint statement and there is a very clear statement from North Korea that indeed, they will not – they had no intention of proliferating, whether it be fissile material or technology or expertise, and so forth. I mean, that's very explicit. Chris Hill was able to ensure that there was language, very clearly, on this point to get a commitment on the part of the North Koreans.

Having said that, there's a regime in place that watches this very closely. Could this ever happen again? Who knows, but the fact is this is not a failure. This was something that was being watched. Action was taken but it was going operational, and they now are out of the business.

MR. SANGER: Bob, you spent a lot of time looking at both Syria and North Korea in your time. What's your assessment? Was this a successful intel operation and if so, was it a successful Israeli intel operation or a successful American intel operation?

MR. EINHORN: Well, I don't know. The photography seems to have been provided by the Israelis, and that was decisive in identifying this unknown facility as a nuclear reactor, so I think they deserve much of the credit for it.

But I know often what happens is, you know, you're looking from, you know, miles up. You're looking at some facility, it's kind of put in the category as unidentified. But it can't be specifically identified until you have some better source of information. I

guess this is the case at that point. You know, an issue – you know, according to the Director General of the IAEA, we should have provided him information, have him investigate.

Well, it may be so, but I can – from an Israeli perspective, the agency hasn't been all that aggressive at dealing with the Iran problem, certainly in the last couple of years. And from the Israeli perspective, they may have thought that what would have happened is the Syrians would have said, oh, that reactor. You know, we're sorry, we didn't realize we were obliged to report this. Now, this is a peaceful reactor; we are – you know, we'll let the IAEA in and the Israelis will be there with a plutonium factory, you know, next door.

MR. SANGER: Mike, when the Bush administration first was running for office in 2000, when he first came in and then when you joined later on, when you heard about the external threat from North Korea what you usually heard, particularly from Secretary Rumsfeld, was a missile threat. They figured out how to marry up their nuclear weapons and their missiles; they could hit Tokyo, they could hit Seoul, and one day they could hit Los Angeles, but their aim isn't that hot. (Chuckles.) Do you think that the administration was too focused on the missile threat and not enough on the threat we've just been discussing?

MR. GREEN: Well, I do think, and I don't know if Bob agrees, but I do think that the trajectory that the DPRK has been on for some time has been just that, to be able to marry up these warheads, if they can produce them, with Nodongs capable of hitting Japan and eventually, they hope, Taepodong, which is a much less successful program technologically, to threaten the United States. And that would give them enormous deterrence and military leverage, and enormous diplomatic leverage, and I don't personally think they've given up on that, although they clearly have had some technical problems with the Taepodong.

You know, the missile threat's pretty important to Japan. Japan's a pretty important ally, so I don't think it's a mistake to focus on it. In June 2001, the White House put out a statement saying we will continue with the agreed framework, obviously depending on North Korean compliance, and engage in negotiations, and listed four areas that were important. Missiles was one of them; nuclear, the conventional military issue, and then human rights. So it wasn't just missiles, but I think the review that led up to that concluded that you can't drop any one of these four areas.

Obviously, in subsequent years, the focus has gone back to nuclear. But at that point, the argument was you have to deal with all four for strategic and military and political reasons.

MR. EINHORN: And I think, by the way, that the next administration, whoever's president, really ought to get back and focus on the missile issue. In the Clinton years, we were negotiating on the missiles – you know, we were making fairly decent progress by the fall of 2000, when Secretary Albright went to Pyongyang. But, you know, this – I

guess there's been no dialogue specifically on missiles for the last six, seven years, and I think that's unfortunate. But as you say, you know, they may have nuclear weapons or plutonium but you can't deliver that without some vehicle to do it, and missiles are the best way for them to do it. And we ought to, I think, really go back to missile threats.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, what – Joe, how would you sum up the state of their missile technology right now?

MR. DETRANI: Well, I think Michael commented on the Taepodong. I mean, they had a launch on the fifth of July, 2006, and it was not seven, eight seconds. Having said that, that was the second; the Taepodong I was relatively more successful. It did not put a satellite in at all, but at time they got close to it.

But when you look at the more conventional missile systems, if you will, the SCUDs and the Nodongs and so forth, those who are expert at this say some of this is crude technology, if you will, but these are effective systems. These are systems that can deliver, if you will, warheads and so forth, depending on the type of warhead. These are systems that North Korea sells almost with impunity overseas, to other countries and so forth. But again, these are not the most sophisticated missiles, with the missile technology that goes into it, but they're effective enough to pose a threat and to be attracted to other countries to actually have them purchase these weapons.

MR. SCHIEFFER: We'll go to some questions from the audience, but let me just – before we do that, just pose one very general layman's question. And that is do any of you believe that this regime has made a decision to give up nuclear weapons, or that it ever will?

MR. GREEN: No and maybe. (Laughter.)

MR. DETRANI: I think that decision is forthcoming. I think, as they see the benefits and they move to a third phase, hopefully – because we've heard often from Kim Jong Il and others that they are committed to comprehensive, verifiable denuclearization – that would be forthcoming.

MR. EINHORN: I doubt Kim Jong Il himself knows whether they're actually prepared to get rid of the nuclear weapons capability entirely. I think now, probably, his goal is to cap, but not eliminate, the nuclear weapons capability in exchange for energy and economic assistance, and normalization with the U.S. and Japan. I think that's what they would like. I agree with Mike. They would like to be a nuclear power – limited arsenal, but a nuclear power, and have the benefits of being integrated with the rest of the world. It's our job to force them to make a choice: They could be a pariah with nuclear weapons, or they could be integrated with the rest of the world without nuclear weapons.

But even under the best of circumstances and they make the right choice, they're going to insist on an elimination period, you know, extending for years and years because they're going to want to hold on to what they consider to be their deterrent capability for

as long as possible. So, you know, my guess is that we're going to face an ambiguous situation for years and years to come, not a clear-cut kind of situation with South Africa decides to give up its nuclear weapons and that's verified, or Argentina and Brazil give up nuclear weapons right away and that's verified. Here, I think we're in for many years of ambiguity as to their intentions and their capabilities.

MR. SCHIEFFER: How stable is his regime, and is it necessary for him to have nuclear weapons to survive?

MR. EINHORN: I think survival is the main objective of this regime. The question is are they going to be more successful at surviving with nuclear weapons or without them. I think we have to make it clear to them that the road to survival is to give up their nuclear weapons capability and if they insist on keeping it, then their future looks very bleak. We have to make that very clear and not just us, it has to be the South Koreans and the Chinese and the Russians, and they've got to really believe that keeping the nuclear weapons is tantamount to suicide.

MR. SANGER: Can I ask just a variant of that question which might – which is do you think that we'll ever have enough information that we can trust from the North Koreans, but even if they said they had given up all their weapons, we would have confidence in that?

MR. DETRANI: See, the key here, David, is verification; verification, verification, verification. That's where the negotiators are going in and they're talking to – as we speak, I mean, that will be a process that will start once we get into that third phase, of putting the verification regime in place, with the monitors in place, with the access to sites and facilities and so forth to do the necessary – to include participation of the IAEA. So I mean, you put a number of – (chuckles) – of people on the ground and obviously, you have a declaration that is complete and correct, so you move in that direction. Now, are you going to be 100 percent sure? Well, obviously you have to work towards that 100 percent.

On the stability issue, we see no indication that there's instability in North Korea. Having said that, we are looking at – North Korea's looking at a 1.4 million gap in food. I mean, there's a delta there where they will need over 1 million metric tons of food to sustain the population, to keep them fed and so forth, thus the U.S. 500,000 metric tons and so forth. So there are pressure points there, I think, in an existential sense where Kim Jong Il has to realize – and that's your point, Bob – it's not just having nuclear weapons. The people don't get nourished on the nuclear weapons. You don't integrate with the international community because you have nuclear weapons. In fact, it's just the opposite. Walking away from the nuclear weapons program will integrate you into the international community would lend itself to investment and so forth, and the well-being of the people improving the situation there because it's quite dire, as we speak.

MR. GREEN: Joe's right, it's verification. We need to get verification on the declaration of plutonium. We may decide that at this point, all we can get is verification

on the plutonium piece. And we have to start somewhere and as you heard, it's going to be imperfect and ambiguous. We're not going to have a Libya or a South Africa or Brazil scenario.

The risk we constantly face, and I think the strategy North Korea constantly pursues is to get us to give what they want up front to get that narrow verification piece. And what they want is not as much as people often think. When we talk about integration, integration for Kim Jong Il is a threat. Foreign direct investment, open societies, open ideas, empowerment of his people, that's a threat. What he needs is legitimacy with the army; he needs something that he can point to that South Korea doesn't have. He needs something he can point to, to deter China in addition to us. Nuclear weapons give him all of that, and I think if he can get a mantle of legitimacy and acceptance, that's a big, big win for him.

And that's where we have to be very, very careful. It's just the reality we have to deal with and that's why this current negotiation, the specifics are very, very important because if we do it wrong, we'll end up giving him enough of what he wants that he's satisfied and we won't be able to get at the hard parts: uranium enrichment, dismantlement of the weapons, a declaration on the weapons, and so on and so forth.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. Well, let's go to some questions. Right here, yellow tie, first hand up.

Q: Leonard Obelander (sp). If we look at the classic elements of this process of the Six-Party Talks, in terms of the negotiation, and two of those are perceived power and information that can be used – we just had comments about if we know what they really want – and the third element, the deadline, and negotiations take place at the deadline in a win-win situation.

So the question is where is, in these talks, the center of gravity of perceived power among the parties in the talks? And in terms of information, can we get to a negotiation regarding the use of weapons or nuclear threat before we get to the answer of what is the information that we are seeking? It seems we have a negotiation right now to get information, and sometimes we're shifting to trying to settle a nuclear issue of weapons. Can we get there without the information, and is this a negotiation right now, trying to get information so we understand and can reach a win-win situation in a follow-up negotiation towards weapons?

MR. DETRANI: Well, let me just start by saying I think we have quite a bit of information. A lot of that information has been given to us by North Korea on 10 February, going back to 2006, that declared that they have nuclear weapons, and then we saw a nuclear test in October of that year. So, and then they had reprocessing campaigns in 1990, 2003, 2005, so there's fissile material out there. And they said they had nuclear weapons and there was a nuclear test, so that's out there. And we see, you know, when the IAEA was there we had the agreed framework and so forth, so we have a basis to work from. And the assessment has been possibly enough fissile material for six to 12

weapons, although we don't know that they have the capability of having weapons. We've never seen the weapons, but our assessment is they could have, based on the fissile amount. So we have a body of information.

Obviously, it's been a closed society. It's very opaque. We need much more information: the provinces and the counties, the food, other issues that speak to human rights, that speak to the conventional military. Mr. Schieffer, you talked about stability and so forth, but there are other aspects to it. That will come from the negotiations, but the key issue has been – and it is – to get to the weapons, to get to the plutonium, to take that fissile material out of those pits, out of those weapons, so there is no threat, period. And then, to move forward for comprehensive, verifiable denuclearization to include other issues, like human rights, illicit activities, the abductee issue with Japan. So we're sort of covering a lot, and what third phase permits is moving in all those directions. So we're right at the cusp of the second phase; with a comprehensive, complete, correct declaration we move to the third, which will give us access to those outlying areas, to address your issue.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Let me just ask a follow-up. We've heard about these, what is it, 19,000 documents –

MR. DETRANI: Eighteen thousand-plus.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Eighteen thousand-plus documents – you know, as one who spent a lot of time up on Capitol Hill, I know something about photo ops. And I know about, you know, congressional aides rolling in these wheelbarrows full of documents and all that, and it's a photo op. Is this a photo op, or are we getting valuable information?

MR. DETRANI: I think we're getting valuable information.

MR. SCHIEFFER: You do.

MR. DETRANI: I do. Not that I'm really –

(Laughter.)

MR. SCHIEFFER: Tell me why, why is that.

MR. DETRANI: Well, the experts who obviously know the business, who are looking at the documents, working with translators and nuclear specialists, they are saying these documents appear to be very authentic. I mean, they go back from 1987 to 2007. This is sort of the compilations that we would have in the United States, going back a number of years. So by those people who know the business, they're saying this would make sense for a reactor, this would make sense for a reprocessing facility. So we believe we can glean some very good information, and I believe we're getting some good information.

MR. SCHIEFFER: And I guess I have to add, being from CBS, and we're very sensitive about making sure the documents are real documents – (laughter) – do you think these are real documents or forgeries?

(Laughter.)

MR. DETRANI: These are photocopies of originals, I –

MR. SCHIEFFER: But I mean, we think they're authentic. We're settled on their authenticity.

MR. DETRANI: (Chuckles.) Our sense, these appear to be authentic, yes.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. (Chuckles.) Next question. All right, sir, right here.

Q: Art Mitvegna (ph), student for foreign policy analysis. For Bob or Joe or Mike, regardless of how the Six-Party Talks turn out, are there implications that are important for us? What I mean, for example, in our relations with China and security arrangements in northeast Asia, just as examples.

MR. GREEN: That's a great and important question because we're playing two games here at the same time. We're playing – one game is to counter proliferation, to end a nuclear threat. But the big-picture, long-term game is the future of Asia, which is increasingly the strategic center of gravity of the international system. And the way you phrased that question, I think, is useful in a way because no matter how this turns out, the reality is the United States is talking to China about North Korea and the security of northeast Asia in a way we never did before. It's not just due for us, the Japanese are, the Koreans are with China.

North Korea and the Korean peninsula, for five decades, has been a source of strategic mistrust in northeast Asia. It's now becoming an area, because of the Six-Party Talks, where the other five, including Russia, are working together. That may or may be enough, in the end, to solve the problem but in and of itself, I think it's a useful outcome of the process.

MR. SANGER: Mike, even if our goals and the Chinese goals may be a little bit different – I mean, our main goal is to get them to give up their weapons. Many believe the Chinese main goal is to ensure stability to keep us from attacking North Korea, to keep North Korea from collapsing so they don't have the – so true, we are working together, but are we working together toward the same goal?

MR. GREEN: You know, it's my sense from four-plus years doing this, and I hear from people in the administration it's even more the case, that we really have come a long way with China. In 2000, I guess it was 2003 in February, when Secretary Powell

pitched this multilateral six-party idea to the Chinese, to Chiang Zhemín and others, the reaction was this was not a Chinese problem; this is a U.S.-DPRK problem. They don't talk about it that way anymore. They recognize it's a regional problem.

We're going to have slightly different tolerance levels. I think the Chinese, perhaps, began this process more worried about us than the North Koreans. Increasingly, they worried a lot more about the North Koreans and that was a healthy learning experience for Beijing, and I think it's made for a much more stable U.S.-China relationship at a time when, you know, there are big, complicated issues that we're trying to deal with, with Beijing.

MR. SCHEIFFER: All right, back in the back here. Yeah, right there, go ahead.

Q: I'm Michael Choy, a former national security education program fellow. And my question is, well, former Assistant Secretary Einhorn mentioned many years, and it certainly does seem to be the case. This is at least a decades-old problem. So I'm wondering how will a change in our government affect North Korean negotiations and the overall process, especially given the high volatility of the debate? We saw how the agreed framework collapsed, and we're also seeing the process of the Six-Party Talks and the current administration coming to the end. So, especially given Ambassador DeTrani's and Assistant Secretary Einhorn's experience in various administrations, gleaning on that, what do you think might happen in the next administration, whether Democrat or Republican? Thank you.

MR. SCHIEFFER: That's a good question. Bob, why don't you give us a thought on that.

MR. EINHORN: I don't think the next administration, whether it's Republican or Democratic, will make the anything-but-Clinton mistake. I don't think there will be a anything-but-Bush policy. I think it's likely, as I understand the positions of the various candidates, that any of the current three would keep the kind of approach that the current Bush administration is taking. I think all perceive that this is promising; it's got pitfalls. We've got to organize the partners in the Six-Party Talks to press North Korea hard. But my guess is that there would be a lot of continuity, whoever is president.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Would you all agree with that, I mean, just in a general way?

MR. DETRANI: I would say absolutely. Indeed, especially if we get into that third phase, when we really move towards dismantlement and we move towards the other aspects to the relationship; looking at other things as we mentioned before, but also looking at North Korea, looking at the advantages they will get.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Need a mike?

Q: Thank you, sir. Agui Agwal (ph), from India – (inaudible) – Today. Negotiation has been going for a long time with North Korea and also with Iran, but

nothing has been happening. And you have given more time to build nuclear weapons and also missiles. Now, unless you put more pressure on China because these are the Chinese and A.Q. Khan of Pakistan nuclear program, missile program, in North Korea and Iran, and nothing will come out, and this will continue. What are you telling the next administration because unless we act and react soon, these weapons may end up in the hands of terrorism or terrorists because they are already in force (?)?

MR. SCHIEFFER: Who'd like to take a shot at that?

MR. GREEN: I will, and maybe I'll take a – add a little bit on the previous question.

You know, the old quip is that North Korea doesn't negotiate under pressure. It's my view that history shows the negotiations don't happen or don't move successfully without pressure. And I have the sense that we have not been keeping enough pressure on North Korea. Resolution 1718 in the Security Council says that if North Korea doesn't comply with the demands of the Security Council, which is a full and complete declaration of disablement and a lot of other things, that the Security Council will reconvene. It said that the sanctions committee would meet to consider implementation. There are a lot of pieces in there we've never used, really.

And we're just starting the trilateral of U.S.-Japan-Korea, the key talk process, which I view also as an instrument of coordination but also one of pressure on China, as well. We're starting that up again, but looking at the overall toolkit, I think there's been not enough pressure not imposing sanctions, not imposing military blockades, but creating a sense of expectation for Beijing and Pyongyang and others that there will be consequences; not war, but a (rheostat?) of consequences for noncompliance.

On the question about the next administration, I think I would refer people to a series of op-eds that John McCain and Joe Lieberman wrote about Asia. And they said six-party – they refer to the six-party process, referred and supported to the September 2005 agreement, but made the point about alliance, coordination and pressure. So there will be some variation in approaches. I don't see – I don't think Bob does, either – a big debate in this presidential election about engaging or not engaging, or diplomacy or not diplomacy, or we're somehow killing the Six-Party Talks. I don't think that's on the table. But approaches, and how much pressure or how much incentives, that's a legitimate topic that I think will be debated.

MR. DETRANI: Can I just make one point on that?

MR. SCHIEFFER: Sure.

MR. DETRANI: I think the China piece – I think China has been not only the host but the chair of the Six-Party Talks, and now we're going on five years. We had the three-party talks going on in April of – (chuckles) – 2003, and now we're going into the Six-Party Talks, with the anniversary would be in August of this year, which would give

us five years. So China has moved from just hosting and then sharing to being a very active player in the Six-Party Talks, ensuring that North Korea is at the table but indeed, very concerned because they are concerned about a nuclear North Korea. They do not want nuclear weapons in North Korea – I don't think one's exclusive to the other – and they want stability in North Korea. One doesn't mean you can't have both. They want stability and a non-nuclear weapon North Korea. So I think China is a major player doing quite a bit.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Right here.

Q: Thank you, Mr. Schieffer. My name is Shyo Kalakito (ph), with the Kyoto News, Japanese news wire service.

I have two questions, if I may, one for Ambassador DeTrani, the other for Mr. Sanger. It seems to me that there are some perception differences among new administrations over the level of threat posed by North Korea. For example, Ambassador Hill has been saying that uranium enrichment program of North Korea is the old story, while DNI's Risentree (ph) released assessments that says they may continue to apply enrichment uranium capabilities. Could you tell us – what can you tell us about that? And that's the first question.

And the other is related to the first question. Mr. Sanger, you quoted in your article in April Ambassador Hill's colleagues, one of Ambassador Hill's colleagues, as saying that he might abandoned by the president and Secretary Rice after the so-called Singapore deal. I have my assessment about what is going on at the U.S. administration, but you should have much, much closer access to the administration. Could you tell us what is going on at the administration? I mean, what kind of tug-of-war is going on among the agencies? Particularly, I'm not 100 percent sure why the U.S. administration made a decision to declassify such sensitive intelligence over Syria-North Korea, nuclear cooperation at a critical moment of the six-party process. Thank you very much.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, let's get the first.

MR. DETRANI: Well, looking at this very briefly, the uranium enrichment issue continues to be an issue of concern, and the assessment is they continue to have this program. And we started in 2002, saying that they were seeking this capability. We believe as in 2008 they are still seeking this capability to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. That's there – so that's out there.

The key, though, is – and I believe it's the emphasis, and I'm not going to put words in Assistant Secretary Hill's mouth because he's doing outstanding work – is we have an immediate issue of plutonium that's been used for these weapons. That's what we need to get at immediately because that's confronting us. And indeed, uranium enrichment's on the table that will be part of a complete and correct declaration. That's not off the table.

MR. SCHIEFFER: David.

MR. SANGER: Every administration wants to tell you that they have the single policy, that they follow it completely, you know, from the time they arrive in office to the time they leave. North Korea has been the classic case of a running policy battle in the Bush administration from almost the first days they got into office, between very different camps whose power has shifted over that time. The negotiations that are going on now, that Secretary Hill is conducting, they involve a give-and-take back-and-forth that, in the first term – and in the audience here are several members of the administration from the first term who were much more involved in this than anybody I can think of – but from the first term they would not have conducted because they made it pretty clear in the first term there wouldn't be a negotiation. The North Koreans would have to give up a bunch of things, and then they would begin to talk about what the U.S. would give in return.

That has shifted. Even to this day, there is running debate within the administration about how much room Ambassador Hill should be given and whether, in Singapore, when he made the announcement that they would be going primarily to focus on plutonium and not on the other issues, whether he was giving up too much. And this is – what my reporting and the reporting of many others in this city have indicated, this is the source of weekly tension within the administration. And my guess is that they will probably be debating this as their packing their offices up.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Next question, Jan?

Q: Jan Smith-Dawson. And this is my question: There were rumors swirling around on the Internet today about the health of Kim Jong Il. And if his health does falter, what's next, and are there others more amenable to moving faster? And what's behind these rumors?

MR. DETRANI: Well, let me just briefly say I've seen the same reporting. I believe that's just what they are, rumors. There's no indication that there's something behind that. But the fact is he does have three sons and their succession – I'm sure he's thinking along those lines, as Kim Il Sung has followed the thought of grooming Kim Jong Il for the position.

But moreover, you have a military – you know, national military commission, you have some senior leaders, you have a brother-in-law there, you have some key players in North Korea. So I mean, obviously, this has to be of concern to Kim Il Sung, but we see no indication that he's passing from the scene or he passed from the scene, or anything of that nature. And obviously, he's got to be looking towards succession, not only his sons but also that military party element that's very close to him.

MR. SANGER: Joe, was there an assessment about whether or not the family legacy would carry on down to a third generation, or whether the military would say two members of the family is enough?

MR. DETRANI: You know, the – (chuckles) – this is in the category of mysteries rather than secrets or something like that, really. Let me just say my personal view on this would be the family name is important in North Korea, whether the Confucian elements to it and so forth, but indeed the military is very powerful. So if you can sort of get sort of a collective there, where you have the military supporting an individual and the party supporting that, I think you have the makings of succession.

MR. GREEN: The Democratic Party may be done with dynasties for awhile, but the Korean Worker's Party – (laughter) – that is their life's blood. But that is an interesting question, which is Kim Il Sung groomed Kim Jong Il. From a very young age, he created a cult of personality for him. He put him in key positions in the party and so forth. Kim Jung Il has done very little of that for his sons, very little.

MR. SANGER: Mike, when we were living in China, I remember one of the sons showed up at Tokyo Disneyland and everybody was trying to figure out how that happened, right. (Chuckles.)

MR. GREEN: Well, that son's star may have faded a bit – (laughter) – but

MR. SANGER: Somewhere in the magic castle, right?

(Laughter.)

MR. GREEN: I think Joe mentioned the National Defense Committee, and Kim Jong Il has, you know, changed the political structure with the army-first policy. And I think most people looking at this expect that the generals would run things, but it's hard to see how they do it without the Kim family. On the other hand, there isn't this grooming and this cult of personality. And people predicted that Kim Jong Il wouldn't last; he did, but we just don't know. There's no precedent in history to suggest how or whether the regime could survive after him.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Yeah, right here.

Q: Jack Richard, a former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea.

Joe, I'm going to put you on the spot here and ask you in terms of what's your clarity about the understanding for phase three. You talked about it here today, about opening up the vistas to dismantlement, human rights, missiles and other things. My colleague, Nicole Finnan (sp), and I were in Pyongyang 30 days ago talking with the same colleagues that Ambassador Hill talks to, and they're very clear: Phase three is dismantlement of the plutonium facilities only. It does not include fissile material and it is an exchange for an LWR. It's very limited and doesn't include nuclear weapons, and it certainly doesn't include human rights or missile discussions. What's your understanding and what's the U.S. government's understanding?

MR. DETRANI: Thank you, Jack. That's Jack; he's always been difficult.  
(Laughter.)

I hope my understanding is not your understanding, or not what's conveyed to you, Jack, and your colleagues. Indeed, phase three is dismantlement. It will be comprehensive and it will be verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear programs. Pursuant to the September 19, 2005, joint statement, which is very clear in that language, and October 2007 joint statement speaks of moving in that direction.

Where does human rights come into it, where do some of the other elements come into it, because part of phase three is movement towards normalization, a more normal relationship, which is again a part of the September 2005 joint statement. So when we move towards a normal relationship, these are issues that the North Koreans have been told, I'm sure, Jack, you did also, they've been told numerous times; this will be part of our dialogue with you. As we move toward a normal relationship, we need to address human rights. We need to address some of the other issues. Indeed, with Japan you need to, even before getting into this, you need to address and have some progress on the abducting issue. So that is not – and our understanding is all nuclear programs, to include certain weapons, all nuclear programs, in a verifiable way.

Q: If I may just follow up, if that's your definition of all nuclear programs, then why isn't that part of the declaration, because the North Koreans certainly don't view that as part of their definition?

AMB. DETRANI: Yeah, I think the understanding we had, Jack, on the declaration is that they would be coming with a complete and correct declaration. And we speak about plutonium, that was mentioned here a little while ago, and the North Korean position is, we're talking about the fissile material. We're talking about the fissile material that's been put into a pit that's put into a weapon.

If we take that fissile material out of the pit, out of the weapon, and give it to you, that weapon is useless. And we will be accountable for that. We will declare that and we will make that available for dismantlement. So basically, they're speaking about dismantling their weapons, but they will provide that fissile material from the pits to ensure that there's verifiable dismantlement and so forth. Indeed, this is iterative; we've got to move into that category of moving towards the verification part to make sure we get it all.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Michael, let me ask you, how does Japan view these talks and how is our ally Japan taking all this? Are they happy, unhappy?

MR. GREEN: Well, as your brother knows – (chuckles) – you know, it would be wrong to say that the Japanese government, in my view, or the Japanese people don't want diplomacy. They absolutely do. And we shouldn't conclude that they want – the Japanese government or people somehow want to be an obstruction to this. They want a

peaceful, negotiated denuclearization of North Korea and very strongly want an accounting for those citizens still unaccounted for who were abducted in previous years.

My very, very strong impression from reading the Japanese press, talking to politicians of all political stripes in Japan over the past year, is that there is deep, deep anxiety. The abductee issue is an emotional issue, it's a political powerful issue, but it goes well beyond that. And the anxiety is that somehow the United States, in its eagerness to get a deal, will sell Japan out on the abductees and will lift sanctions just in exchange for the plutonium piece. And in the diet, as I was saying earlier, there are government ministers saying on the record, we need a full and complete declaration. We need the weapons to be included. They're very worried about missiles.

And I'm encouraged to see that in the most recent round in Beijing, there's a lot of attention to abductees that's going to be reassuring. That's important, and Joe has highlighted that. But even if the abductee issue, if there's some movement on that, we have to think very hard about whether this agreement that we ultimately come up with is credible because if the Japanese side concludes that we're just cutting a deal to cut a deal, that we are in effect legitimizing a nuclear weapons state in North Korea, which is what Pyongyang will likely declare, that's going to have real implications for our alliance, for the credibility of our extended nuclear deterrence. We have to be careful.

I'd also add that with the Korean government, the Korean people, I think, are – I mean, you know, this is a tail-wags-dog story for the Korean people. The Bush administration is cutting a deal with North Korea. But I think within the Lee Myung-bak government, there is some consternation along the same lines about whether perhaps we are a little bit too eager. I'm withholding judgment. I think the verification matters. The details matter, but those concerns are definitely out there and we need to pay attention to them.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Bob, do you want to add anything?

MR. EINHORN: I just wanted to ask, Mike, what does it tell you that in the first term, both of those countries were concerned that we were going to bomb North Korea, and that in the second term, they are both concerned that we will sell out to North Korea too easily? Does that tell you that there has been more shift there or more shift here? (Chuckles.)

MR. GREEN: Well, our allies, God bless them, almost never say you're in exactly the right place. Their job is to constantly move us to what they see is the right place. I don't think the Japanese government was worried in the first term that we were going to bomb North Korea. I never picked that up.

The South Korean government, the government of Roh Moo-hyun that came into power, you know, Ambassador Roberts here, but there was a certain mythology that we were going to attack North Korea because the storyline in the South Korean press, especially among the progressive camp was, the agreed framework resulted after the

1994 crisis where we almost had a war. So if the agreed framework collapses, we'll have a war, was the – it was the storyline that was. President Bush made news in Seoul in 2002 by saying, I have no intention of North Korea, that that was news was revealing because the South Korean storyline – and President Roh bears some responsibility for some of this, and even President Kim Dae-jung, was that we were a bigger threat, but on the Japanese side that wasn't there.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Did you want to add anything? Okay, more questions? Right here, okay.

Q: Bonnie Glaser, CSIS. Thank you. Ever since the Six-Party Talks were launched, there has been the notion that this could be transformed into a more permanent mechanism in northeast Asia, and that notion has evolved, been discussed. Russia heads a working group on it. There is now apparently a draft of principles that might provide the basis for such an organization. So my question to you, this is given the fact that this now seems to have become a new perhaps priority of the Bush administration to actually get this established before President Bush leaves office.

Is this premature? Is the timing right? Should we move forward, given what has and has not been accomplished with North Korea? And are all the parties ready and are we confident that North Korea is up to the task of behaving responsibly enough in this kind of an organization and cooperation on whatever agenda is agreed to, whether it be confidence-building measures, non-traditional security issues, and things like that?

MR. SCHIEFFER: We're kind of coming to the end of our time here. I think that will be a wonderful last question, so why don't each of you –

AMB. DETRANI: Just very briefly on my side, I think, Bonnie, when this was put into play, this was one of a number of initiatives, if you will, programs with North Korea, denuclearization, of regional security architecture, looking at energy and so forth, and they were to move together simultaneously. As we had progress with denuclearization, we would move towards the regional security. And that's the intent here, to bring North Korea into the international community, in the family of nations, as they move towards and ultimately achieve comprehensive, verifiable denuclearization.

MR. EINHORN: But it's – sorry –

MR. SCHIEFFER: Go ahead.

MR. EINHORN: But it's – I would answer by it's premature now. We would only – I mean, I think if we created some kind of a six-party northeast Asian regional security arrangement now, the North Koreans would see that as our accepting the status quo. We are welcoming them in as a nuclear weapons state; I don't think we can do that. If the talks go okay and several years down the road they're eliminating their nuclear capability, then maybe we can progress toward that kind of an arrangement, but until then, I don't see us doing that.

MR. GREEN: Bob's exactly right. It's an important goal. It's a good process. The idea of putting forward a charter of principles that the foreign ministers sign is fraught with peril, as Bob suggested. People may tell themselves, well, look, one of the principles will be a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but it will be a little bit like Article VI of the NPT. Yes, we said we would completely denuclearize. I mean, the North Koreans have learned that there's no real cost and there's a lot of benefit for just saying boiler plate now, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

What Bob is saying is right. They'll point to this as evidence that they – further evidence that they'll argue that they've been accepted as a nuclear weapons state. And I think elsewhere in the region there would be real concern that the North Koreans will lead that.

MR. SCHIEFFER: What have we learned from these negotiations?

AMB. DETRANI: Well, one thing is patience. (Laughter.) You need patience when you negotiate with the North Koreans. I think, Bob, you've had that experience, and Michael. You need patience and you need to stay with it. You need to be focused on the target here, and that's comprehensive and verifiable denuclearization, no way accepting a nuclear, whether de facto or de jure, North Korea. This is not talking about counter-proliferation or anything; this is comprehensive denuclearization and with that the benefits that are accrued to North Korea.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right, well, ladies and gentlemen, that does it. On behalf of TCU and the Journalism School and also CSIS, thank you all for coming. (Applause.)

(END)