

IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT: CAN IRAQI FORCES DO THE JOB?

WASHINGTON, December 1, 2005 – Political forces at home in the United States are placing greater and greater pressure on our leaders to better define the parameters of the War in Iraq. With the U.S. death toll topping 2,000 this fall, and with more Americans dying, our political leaders are clamoring to announce a clear strategy for success. Some are calling for immediate withdrawal, while others urge timelines to help guide the process – and to appease growing public anxiety over the difficulty of the mission. A fundamental question to defining success, however, must be asked in any discussion of drawdown: *Are we leaving the Iraqi people with the requisite capabilities to defend a newly forged democracy?*

In the latest version of his report, [Iraqi Force Development: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?](#) **Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman** details the successes and shortfalls in Iraqi force development, from inception to present. The 322-page report provides an in-depth analysis of recruiting, equipping, and training scenarios; readiness levels and evaluation standards; signs of progress; possible threats to success; the roles of elections and effective government; and more. The report is a factual analysis of the events on the ground that are shaping our chances for success or failure in Iraq.

Other topics covered include:

- Militia and Civilian Disarmament Issues
- The HUMINT Problem
- Operational Readiness Timelines
- Vetting, Training, and Equipping
- Progress and Shortfalls in the Ministry of Defense
- Progress and Shortfalls in the Ministry of Interior
- Force Development Principles and Strategy
- The Iraqi View of Force Development
- The Role of NATO, the UN, and Regional Forces