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Center for Strategic and International Studies  
1800 K Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006  
(202) 775-3270  
Access: Web: CSIS.ORG  
Contact the Author: [Acordesman@aol.com](mailto:Acordesman@aol.com)

# **Iraqi Force Development:**

## **Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?**

**Anthony H. Cordesman**  
**Center for Strategic and International Studies**

**Working Draft: Updated as of August 8, 2005**

Please note that this is a rough working draft of a chapter from CSIS book that will be published by Praeger in the fall of 2005. It is being circulated to solicit comments and additional data, and will be steadily revised and updated over time.

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## *Introduction*

Iraqi force development remained very much a work in progress during the first eight months of 2005, and events showed how much any success interacted with the course of the insurgency and Iraqi politics. The course of the fighting was far less reassuring from April on than during the period immediately after January 30th. As Chapter XII discusses in detail, the seeming pause in insurgent and terrorist activity after the election was followed by a sharp increase in violence, particularly in major bombings and suicide attacks by Sunni insurgent groups that were clearly targeted at trying to prevent Iraqi Sunnis from joining the government and government forces, and at dividing Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurd.

In some cases, this triggered new problems in Iraqi forces and new desertions. By May, Arab Sunni Islamist insurgent attacks had driven sectarian and ethnic tensions to new highs, and created a growing risk that the struggle between the Arab Sunnis, and the Arab Shi'ites, Kurds, and other Iraqi minorities could become a broader form of civil war.

There were serious problems in Iraqi politics and governance that affected the force development effort. The new Iraqi government took nearly two months to agree on a Presidency Council and Prime Minister, and took from February 1st to May 8th to fully select a cabinet and choose a defense minister. The 55 members of the new committee to draft a constitution were not named until May 10th and then included only one Sunni -- although the nominal deadline for completed a draft was August 15th and referendum had to be held by October 15th that could be blocked by a negative vote by two-thirds of the population in any three provinces.<sup>1</sup>

Iraq's already weak governance deteriorated in some areas at both the central and local levels during this interregnum. Tensions grew between the largely excluded Sunnis and the now dominant Shi'ites and Kurds, and there was a surge in the infiltration by foreign Islamist extremists.

New problems arose as some of the supporters of the incoming government called for major new purges of the government and the Iraqi security forces to eliminate all "Ba'athists," including many whose only "crime" had been to go along with Saddam Hussein's regime to survive. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that some of the most effective Iraqi units were largely Shi'ite and Sunni in character, including special police and security units in the Ministry of Interior. These units could sometimes be as ruthless as they were effective, and compounded Sunni fears and resentments. The good news was that they helped lead some Sunni clerics and politicians to call for Sunnis to join the armed forces and police. The bad news was that Sunnis began to accuse government forces of excessive force, targeted killings and disappearances, and deliberately attacking Sunni targets.

Top US officials like Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld were concerned enough to come to Iraq to warn against such purges and the risk of broadening ethnic and sectarian conflict, and to stress the need for effective governance. Senior US officers like General George Casey, the US Commander in Iraq, warned of the need for effective governance and for inclusion of as many Sunnis as possible. US Commanders also made it clear that they felt the insurgency would continue to last for several more years, that developing

effective Iraqi forces would take over a year, and that MNF forces would probably be needed in significant numbers through 2006.<sup>ii</sup>

Nevertheless, the Iraqi force building effort continued to gather momentum in spite of the problems in governance and the new surge of terrorist and insurgent activity. The following chronology illustrates the kind of day-to-day progress that was now taking place, and is supplemented in more detail in the longer chronology in Appendix A:

**February 14** - Reportedly, 10,000 Iraqis arrive at one military base looking to enlist. Half pass the recruiting test.

**February 5** - The MNSTC-I Direct Recruiting Replacement graduated its largest class of Iraqi Army recruits to date at An Numaniyah. 2,867 graduated and will serve the Iraqi Army's 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> divisions.

**February 10** - The Iraqi Police Service graduated 272 officers today from seven specialty training courses taught at the Adnan Training Center located in Baghdad.

**February 17** - 1,491 police officers graduated at Jordan International Police Training Center. Another 183 graduated from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility. Also, contract signed for 6 new Iraqi Al Uboor class patrol ships to be built in Iraq by Iraqis, costing 15 million and will go in service starting in 6 months.

**February 24** - The Iraq Police Service this week graduated 1,993 new police officers from basic police training courses in Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad. Also, another 204 graduated from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility.

**March 3** - The Iraqi Police Service graduated 292 police officers from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility, 27 officers from the Special Weapons and Tactics training course, and 72 police officers from the Emergency Response Unit course.

**March 10** - The Iraqi Police Service graduated 81 police officers from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training.

**March 13** - More than 2,900 Iraqi soldiers graduated today as part of the Direct Recruit Replacement Program at the Iraqi Training Battalion at Kirkush Military Training Base.

**March 16** - The Iraq Police Service graduated 144 new police officers from the Al Kut Regional Training Academy on This was the third class to complete the eight week training course from the Al Kut facility.

**March 22** - The Military Academy at Zahko graduated 73 new second lieutenants destined to join the Iraqi Army. Also, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Civilian Police Assistance Training Team is approaching the halfway point in training and fielding Special Weapons and Tactics teams to each governorate. Seven teams are trained and equipped; two others are currently in training. Also, Iraqi officials state that 85 insurgents died earlier in the day when Iraqi Commandos, assisted by US air and ground support, overran an insurgent training camp located in swamps near Tharthar Lake in the Sunni Triangle. The commandos were part of the 1st Police Commando Battalion. The 85 killed insurgents were the most killed in any one battle since the offensive against Fallujah.

**March 31** - The Iraqi Police Service graduated 2,906 new police officers this month from basic police training courses in Baghdad, Sulaymaniyah, Al Kut, Al Asad and Jordan. They also graduated 159 police officers from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility.

**April 1** - An Iraqi flight crew from Squadron 23, Iraqi Air Force, aboard an Iraqi C-130 transported 51 Department of Border Enforcement soldiers from training in the United Arab Emirates and returned them to Iraq on 1 April. The milestone of this mission was the fact that the Iraqi flight crew prepared the necessary requirements to fly in international airspace, land in a foreign country, and performed all of the flight crew functions.

**April 7** - The Iraqi Police Service graduated 258 police officers from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility. Also, 247 recruits picked up graduation certificates from the Iraqi Highway Patrol Academy April 7 and headed for new jobs guarding their country's streets and thoroughfares. This was the first class to graduate from the new academy.

**April 6** - Iraqi soldiers from the 102nd and 112th Battalions, supported by Coalition forces (Task Force 2-8 Field Artillery), captured 81 suspected insurgents and insurgent supporters, according to a multinational forces report.

**April 11** - US soldiers and approximately 500 Iraqi soldiers conduct sweeps dubbed Operation Vanguard Tempest in the Al-Rasheed district in Baghdad. The sweeps net some 65 suspected militants.

**April 14** - The Iraqi Police Service graduated 260 police officers from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility.

**April 18** - Five battalions of roughly 3,500 Iraqi troops responded to insurgent threats and claims of hostage-taking by taking control of the city in a four-hour sweep that brought in about 40 suspects. The operation by two battalions of police commandos and three public order battalions uncovered several vehicles loaded with explosives and two large weapons caches. No hostages were found.

**April 25** - Joint Iraqi and US sweeps around Baghdad net 41 insurgents and an unspecified quantity of weapons. 10 of the militants are suspects in the shooting down of a civilian MI-8 helicopter.

**April 28** - The Iraq Police Service graduated 2,872 police officers in April from basic police training courses in Sulaymaniyah, Basrah, Jordan and Baghdad. Also, the Iraqi Police Service graduated 204 police officers from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility.

**April 29** - In Baghdad, four suicide car bombers strike in the Azamiyah section of the city. 15 Iraqi soldiers die and 30 are wounded in attacks on an Iraqi army patrol, on a police patrol, and two on barricades close to the headquarters for the Interior Ministry's special forces.

**May 4** - The Army of Ansar al-Sunna claims credit for a suicide bombing in Irbil that targets an office of the KDP political party where more than 300 people were waiting to get approval to apply for Iraqi security jobs. More than 60 are killed and more than 150 injured by the blast. Reports indicate that the suicide bomber seems to have mingled among the recruits before detonating his explosives.

**May 7** - Iraqi soldiers detained 29 suspected insurgents in Abu Dsheer and soldiers from an Iraqi Public Order Battalion detained 44 suspected insurgents in Dora.

**May 8** - In the Rawa area, US and Iraqi forces capture 54 militants and kill six more in a firefight after information gleaned from a captured Zarqawi aide, Ghassan Muhammad Amin Husayn al-Rawi, directs them to the region. They seize bomb making material and two large stashes of weapons.

**May 9** - Iraqi Security Forces conducted two more operations. Iraqi soldiers searched 20 targets and detained 47 suspected insurgents in Dora. Iraqi commandos detained another 34 suspected insurgents in the Abu Dsheer neighborhood.

**May 11** - In Hawija, a suicide bomber detonates his explosive vest amongst a crowd that had lined up to join the Iraqi army. The suicide bomber managed to slip by security. 20 are killed and another 30 are wounded.

**May 12** - Reportedly, Polish and Iraqi soldiers seize a cache of weapons and arrest 29 suspected militants in the Wasit province in a mission dubbed 'Operation Cobweb.' Also, 1,469 police graduated from basic training at centers at Al Hillah and Baghdad. Another 189 police graduated from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility.

**May 14** - An independently planned and executed cordon and search operation by Iraqi forces led to the capture of 26 anti-Iraq forces, according to a multinational forces report. Operation Breadbasket, conducted by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade of the 5<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Army Division, also netted three regional AIF leaders. Officials said this operation is the most recent example of the growing capability of the Iraqi Army.

**May 17** - Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces performed cordon and search operations in Heychal Salama resulting in the detainment of 150 suspected anti-Iraq forces, according to a multinational forces report.

While such events are anecdotal, no element of the Iraqi security forces had been overrun since the elections, although more than 175 were killed per month in combat in the late spring. More broadly, major shifts were taking place in the scale of the training and equipment effort, and gathering momentum in the deployment of Iraqi forces. Moreover, once it finally took shape, the new Shi'ite and Kurdish-dominated government approached the problem of the insurgency and Iraqi force development with more realism than many initially feared.

Key figures like President Jalal Talibani, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari, Defence Minister Sadun al-Dulaimi, and Interior Minister Bayan Baqir Jabr Sulagh al-Zubaydi made it clear that they were committed to taking a strong stand to deal with the insurgency and to creating effective Iraqi forces. The new Ministers of Defense and Interior may have lacked experience, but were more committed to practical solutions than most of their predecessors, were more willing to cooperate with each other and other ministers, and accepted the need to give Iraqi force building the time necessary to develop effective and *inclusive* forces. As Ali Dabbagh, a Shi'ite member of the new National Assembly, put it, "It is true the Iraqi security forces are not qualified enough to face these waves of terrorism, but with the cooperation of the multinational forces, the security situation will improve...and we can see it improving now."<sup>iii</sup>

### ***The Manning Levels of Iraqi Military and Security Forces Following the Election***

The manpower data on Iraqi forces shows considerable progress, although such data are not easy to analyze. They do not provide a basis for assessing how many forces were largely Shi'ite or Kurdish and how many were more broadly "national" in character. The reporting format used in the Iraq Weekly Status Report changed again in early 2005, and eliminated reporting on the 12 individual military and security force branches in favor of six more general categories. The impact of this new reporting system is shown in Figure 21, which compares the resulting manpower totals to the two previous systems used by the CPA and MNF.

MNSTC-I stated that public reporting continued to evolve to properly reflect the focus of the mission at a given time, and explained the shifts shown in Figure 21 as follows:

Numbers of "trained and equipped" Iraqi Security Forces have been reported since last August [2004]. This metric represents an evolution in itself. In the early days of ISF reporting, numbers of forces "on duty" were reported, often without regard for the training or equipment status of that force. At the time, just getting some police visibly onto the streets was deemed critical to public order. After it became apparent that the number of forces on duty wasn't really indicative of their capability, subsequent reports added the training status. In late summer 2004, MNSTC-I started reporting on how many soldiers are both trained and equipped. Then – as now – that is a valuable

metric, but must be considered within a broader context. Focus now is shifting to numbers and capabilities of units. Standing by themselves, the number of units similarly doesn't tell the whole story of ISF capability. The transition readiness assessment system will help in more accurately defining the capability of the ISF. Transition Teams (assigned to all battalions) will provide solid overall capability assessments of the units already fielded. For security reasons, though, that data – like U.S. readiness reports – will not be publicly provided.

Given this background, the data in Figure 21 are important for several reasons:

They show the problems in the earlier reporting systems, which focused on quantity rather than quality, and produced exaggerated expectations as well as major credibility problems for the CPA and MNF.

They show a sharp rise in manpower that did have meaningful training and equipment between from under 96,000 in August 2004, to 186,000 in June 2005, and over 172,000 in early August 2005.

They show the impact of the Eikenberry, MNSTC-I, and Luck assessments in improving the approach to training and equipment Iraqi forces.

They show a clear plan did exist for expanding the Iraqi manpower pool through July 2006, and from 168,000 men in June 2005, to 200,000 in September, 230,000 in December, and 270,000 in July 2006.

They show the importance of merging the regular military and National Guard in giving Iraqi military forces the total strength they needed, and need, to be effective.

They reflect a balanced emphasis on police and security forces that was becoming significantly more effective than the sheer manpower numbers indicate because many low quality men were being dropped or retired, while higher quality manpower was being recruited and trained.

They exclude a major amount of additional manpower with some value in light security missions such as the Facilities Protection Force, Oil Security Service, and Electricity Security Service.

One has only to contrast the figures for "trained and equipped" manpower against the kind of manpower data described in earlier chapters to see that the Iraqi force development program made serious progress just between the beginning of 2005 and the middle of the year. At the same time, Figure 21 makes it equally clear that Iraqi forces still had a long way to go, and that much would depend on taking a consistent approach to executing Iraqi force development plans.

**Figure 21**

The Development of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces: Part One –  
**Historical Perspective**

Source: MNSTC-I

**Figure 21**

**The Development of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces: Part Two –  
Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces**

Source: MNSTC-I

### *Detailed Manpower Trends*

The manpower strength of Iraqi forces in the spring of 2005 are shown in more detail in Figure 22, along with the growing strength of Iraqi combat battalions. It should be stressed that the force goals listed as authorized strength represented a moving target, and had to change to respond to developments in the insurgency and the actual level of success achieved in creating Iraqi force. The various totals for “trained and equipped” for different force elements include personnel with very different levels of training and equipment, and the figures for authorized manpower represent the personnel authorized in May 2005, rather than a stable end goal.<sup>iv</sup> That said, any careful reading of these data, and comparison with the force developments described in previous chapters, shows that they reflect massive progress over the previous year.

Ministry of Defense reporting in May 2005 also reflected progress in developing more effective forces.

The data on the Iraqi Army show regular force strength of over 28,000 men and 34 battalions by May 2005, versus one operational battalion in July 2004.

The Iraqi National Guard was being merged into the Army in a way that would eventually double its force strength and lay the ground work for creating a national army that could defend the country as well as fight insurgents.

Mechanized forces were active and expanding.

Special operations forces were rapidly reaching strength of 3 battalions, and nearly 2,000 men. These forces were being trained by MNF Special Forces and at elite elements, with many of the same training programs being used in the West.

The Iraqi army was beginning to get the mix of combat support, service support, logistics, and training it needed to operate independently and as a self-sustaining force.

The Iraqi air force was still in formation but expanding to strength of six squadrons.

The Iraqi navy was awaiting decisions on procuring major patrol boats, and becoming more than a token force.

Similar trends affected Ministry of Interior forces. The security and Special Police Forces – some of the most effective Iraqi units in Iraqi forces – continued to gather strength. At the same time, a trained regular police force was slowly beginning to emerge, along with the mix of supporting elements necessary to deal with an ongoing insurgency:

The core “trained and equipped” manpower in the police was now up to over 57,000 out of 98,881 on-hand and rapidly expanding.

The civil intervention force now had almost all of the manpower trained needed for its Public Order Brigades, and was rapidly developing a light mechanized brigade that could deal with insurgent attacks.

Similar progress was taking place in creating the Special Police Command brigades and Emergency Response (ERU) units.

Progress was being made in creating effective border forces.

The full Dignitary Protection force was trained, equipped, and active.

If one looks at the overall force strengths in Figure 22, Iraq had a combined total of 100 operational battalions as of May 2005 – 80 in the Army and National Guard and 20 in the Police – plus the Army counterterrorist force and the Police Emergency Response Unit.

Furthermore, Iraqi manpower and force strength continued to improve through the late spring and summer. By early August, the total number of Iraqi military, regular police, and police units that could honestly be described as “trained and equipped” had risen from 96,000 in September 2004, to over 172,000 in early August 2005. The Ministry of Defense forces portion of this total had reached 78,500 men, with 77,700 in the army, 100 in the Air Force, and 700 in the Navy. The Ministry of Interior forces totaled 93,800, with 63,500 in the police and Highway Patrol, and 30,300 in security units and other forces.<sup>v</sup>

Iraqi and MNF-I plans called for total Iraqi manpower to rise to 230,000 forces by the end of December of 2005, and 270,000 by mid-2006.<sup>vi</sup> This involved maintaining a good balance of military, regular police, and police units. Plans called for about 85,000 military in the MOD by December, and 145,000 special police and police in the MOI.

The 85,000 in the military was to include about 83,000 in the Army (including the “national” forces originally envisioned, along with the former National Guard; also including combat support, service support and training units). The remaining manpower was to include the Special Operations Forces and the Air Force and Navy. About 100,000 of the personnel in the MOI were to be station/traffic/patrol police; in addition, nearly 20,000 more will be in the Special Police and the Emergency Response Unit. The rest included the Border Forces, the Highway Patrol and Dignitary Protection.

By June 2006, the total number of men in Iraqi Security Forces (military, regular police and police units) was planned to reach approximately 270,000. The MOD was to have about 90,000, and the MOI about 180,000 – provided that there was no change in the currently planned level of regular police.

These manpower increases were to lead to continuing increases in the number of combat battalions. In July 2004, just after the Iraqi resumption of sovereignty, neither the Iraqi military nor the Iraqi police had any battalions that could be deployed nationally. Given the plans current in early August 2005, the numbers of combat battalions in the MOD were total around 106 by December 2005, with slightly under 30 additional battalion equivalents in the MOI. In addition, Iraq was to have 35 brigade and ten division headquarters providing command and control of MOD forces. Of these headquarters elements, some would be relatively mature, but at least a small number of each would still be relatively “young” or inexperienced.

Much of the Iraqi force generation effort was to shift to giving Iraqi combat forces the combat support and combat service support units they need. By December 2006, Iraq planned to field four Motorized Transportation Regiments (working on the goal of one per division). Iraq also planned to generate six bomb disposal companies (with the goal of one per division). In addition, nearly 70 Headquarters and Service Companies were to have been generated (although some equipment shortages will remain). The goal for these Headquarters and Service Companies is one per battalion.

By June 2006, the number of MOD battalions was planned to reach 114. The number of the MOI battalions was to remain unchanged, although their training will have been improved through recently initiated advanced programs.

**Figure 22****Iraqi Active Manning and Force Development Plans in May 2005**Ministry of Defense

Force Element/Component	Operational as of <u>May 2, 2005</u>		<u>Authorized</u>		Expected 100% Operational <u>Date</u>
	<u>Manpower</u>	Battalions/ <u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Manpower</u>	Battalions/ <u>Squadrons</u>	
Iraqi Army (Combat)					
Regular & IIF	28,215	34	36,315	?	?
Former ING	39,961	44/-	56,727	62	?
Mechanized/Armor	1,237	1+/-	1,679	3	?
Total	69,114	79/-	94,721	104/-	Sept 05
Special Operations					
Combat Support, Service Support, and Training Units	3,091	2/-	5,367	4/-	June 05
Iraqi Air Force	183	-/3	453	-/6	Nov 05
Iraqi Navy	521	-/2	582	-/3	TBD
<b>Total</b>	<b>74,159</b>	<b>83/5</b>	<b>103,390</b>	<b>111/9</b>	<b>Nov 05</b>

Ministry of the Interior

	On Duty As of <u>May 2, 2005</u>	Trained & <u>Equipped</u>	Trained & Equipped As of July <u>31, 2005</u>	Total <u>Authorized</u>	Expected 100% Operational <u>Date</u>
	Police	98,881	57,135	67,500	135,000
Civil Intervention Force					
Public Order Brigades	5,455	4,181	5,774	4,800	July 05
8 <sup>th</sup> Mechanized Brigade	955	955	1,320	1,320	July 05
Total					
Special Police Commando Battalions	11,845	8,131	TBD	9,000	Mar 05
Emergency Response Units	216	212	350	401	Dec 05
Border Enforcement	18,779	15,583	19,156	28,360	Aug 06
Highway Patrol	1,464	1,089	2000	6,300	July 06
Dignitary Protection	500	500	500	500	May 05
<b>Total</b>	<b>138,085</b>	<b>87,786</b>	<b>96,600</b>	<b>176,881</b>	<b>Aug 06</b>

Source: US Embassy Baghdad

### *The Meaning of a Constant Stream of Volunteers*

Manpower quality was improving, but there were ongoing questions about motivation and loyalty. Recruiting and retention standards were being raised, as were the standards for promotion. Vetting was being improved overall, although reliable personnel data were often lacking in a war-torn society. In cases like the police, screening examinations adapted from Western police vetting and testing methods were also being applied for the first time in Iraq's history.

Recruiting did not become a problem in spite of daily insurgent attacks on Iraqi forces. Insurgents stepped up their attacks on the military and security forces after the election, and singled out Shi'ites for attack in events like the religious festivities surrounding the Shi'ite holiday of Ashura. Even so, the US Department of Defence issued an update on February 16, 2005 that stated that between 8,000 and 10,000 Iraqis had shown up at an airfield in southern Iraq to join the army in *one day*.

Both Iraqi and US experts agree that the elections did increase the number of Shi'ite and Kurdish recruits that actually supported the new government. Many of the Iraqis who joined the military, security, and police forces did so because they believed in Iraq's new political process and that Iraqi forces should take over from the Coalition. Much of the total stream of volunteers, however, had little to do with loyalty or patriotism. Serious nationwide unemployment problems continued to exist, and pay continued to be a major factor driving such enlistments. Privates in the Iraqi army earned about \$333 a month while corporals could earn approximately \$543.<sup>vii</sup> These were large salaries for an average Iraqi.

It was also not clear what the end goal of many volunteers was, and how strong their ties were to given sects and ethnic groups versus a belief in a unified Iraq. No breakouts are available by sect and ethnic origin, but Kurds were often motivated more to defend "Kurdistan" than Iraq, and Shi'ites to defend Shi'ite power. The number of ex-ethnic and sectarian militia Shi'ite and Kurdish who joined some branch of the military, security, and police forces also raised questions about the ultimate loyalty of such volunteers.

The fact that Sunni clerics and politicians began to call for Sunnis to join the Iraqi security forces helped make them more national in terms of composition, but many who joined did so in an effort to counterbalance Shi'ite and Kurdish power. Sunni volunteers seemed to be even more motivated by money than Shi'ite and Kurdish volunteers, and at least some Sunnis left or deserted after getting training and became insurgents.

Yet, progress was being made towards creating truly national forces. In the late spring of 2005, three of Iraq's army divisions had a Shi'ite commander, three a Sunni, one a Turcoman, and three a Sunni Kurd. The number of Sunnis volunteering had increased, and officer and NCO training was having some success in creating a leadership core trained as "national" forces.

### *Equipment Levels*

Unclassified US government reporting on the status of plans to equip Iraqi forces continued to be erratic during 2005. The Iraq Weekly Status Reports continued to lack the detailed breakouts of the equipment effort that were a part of the earlier reporting

efforts, and there was no way to relate the data MNSTC-I provided on deliveries to total requirements or requirement by force element.

At the same time, the past reporting of percentages of equipment relative to unit requirement presented problems because there was no definitive force structure for the ISF to which the Iraqis adhered. By the fall of 2004, the Iraqi government had a tendency to create new units that were not part of the regular army force structure, such as the Al Muthana Brigade or "Defenders of Baghdad," and change the equipment mix.

The regular police still had little equipment standardization and often had serious equipment shortfalls at least through April 2005. Unlike the Army and elite security services, the regular police also lacked an efficient system for securing equipment and weapons and tracking actual equipment holdings -- including weapons, ammunition, and explosives.<sup>viii</sup>

Since there was no force plan agreed to by both the Iraqi government and MNSTC-I, there was no way to hold the Iraqis accountable for adhering to a given force mix.<sup>ix</sup> Other MNSTC-I reporting indicated that some 30,000 of the police and security forces in Figure 20.1 were not actually trained, but were waiting to be trained.

There were continuing reports of inadequate equipment and facilities. For example, Chief of Staff, General Richard Myers was told at one police training site in the Jordanian desert during a visit that some recruits use water bottles as simulated weapons during exercises because actual weapons were in short supply.<sup>x</sup> Iraqis often complained about the flow of equipment during a visit in June 2005, and press reports continued to surface that equipment was being stolen and diverted.

In July 2005, Iraqi MOD and US military officials confirmed that they had uncovered a massive scheme to provide Iraqi security forces with substandard equipment that wasted some \$300 million over the course of more than a year. According to these officials, at the heart of the scheme was former CPA appointed weapons buyer and former exile Ziad Tareq Cattan. Cattan was supposed to have flown across the globe dispensing money to furnish Iraq's forces with weapons with little oversight.

Reports indicate that Cattan frequently charged a 10% 'finder's fee' for each contract he negotiated and dispersed kickbacks to Iraqi MOD buyers, even though the various helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and machine guns he acquired were defective, cheap imitations, or extremely worn. Cattan maintained his innocence and asserted that the Coalition so closely monitored the program that such a high level of corruption would be impossible.<sup>xi</sup>

US officials do concede that problems arose because the MNF-I often bought equipment without consulting the Iraqi government, or informing it of the details of such purchases. This allowed MOD officials to claim that they made purchases out of ignorance, although in most cases such purchase clearly involved serious corruption. Several of the Coalition officials interviewed, however, indicate that the Secretary General of the MoD in the Interim Iraqi Government tolerated high levels of corruption and inefficiency, and that it was not until the new government took office in April 2005 that serious efforts were made to eliminate gross inefficiency and corruption in areas like military equipment purchases. One example they cited was that the MoD staff deliberately sabotaged the air

conditioning in the Ministry to get kick backs from the service workers that repaired the equipment.

Nevertheless, the flow of equipment had begun to reach the point where most of the previous shortfalls in basic equipment had been overcome, and some units were getting advanced weapons and equipment. MNSTC reporting does provide useful data on total equipment deliveries during the period, as well as weekly reports that show shorter-term deliveries for part of the period.

Figure 23 shows major equipment deliveries between July 2004 and May 2005. Figure 24 summarizes the unclassified data available on weekly deliveries. Both Figures show that most weekly equipment deliveries were relatively light weapons and unarmored vehicles, although Iraqi forces now had extensive communications gear and were getting steadily more sophisticated equipment such as sniper rifles, night vision goggles, GPS systems, and X-ray vans.

This progress continued into the summer. A report by the Department of Defense in late July described the Iraqi army equipment effort as follows:<sup>xii</sup>

Equipment shortages have been reduced as equipment procured with U.S.-funded contracts began to flow into Iraq during mid-to-late 2004. The Iraqi Army now has 60 percent of its total authorized equipment, including more than 100 percent of AK-47 requirements. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), as provided for by Public Law 109-13, will further enable MNF-I to meet critical requirements. Furthermore, although there is variance in the rate of absenteeism, AWOL, attrition, and desertion among the Iraqi Army, rates have diminished significantly and are now around one percent for some divisions. Still, units that are conducting operations and units that relocate elsewhere in Iraq experience a surge in absenteeism.

U.S.-funded procurement has equipped infantry units primarily with former Warsaw Pact weapons and vehicles. The MOD, using its funds, has also sought U.S.-standard vehicles such as HMMWVs and M-113 armored personnel carriers. Mechanized forces are being trained using T-55 and T-72 tanks, BMP-1s and MTLBs. The ISOF is currently equipped with M4 carbines, M9 pistols, night-vision devices, M24 sniper systems, M240 machine guns, 12 gauge shotguns, 50-caliber machine guns, global positioning systems equipment, and surveillance equipment.

... The Iraqi Navy currently has approximately 500 trained sailors on duty. It is equipped with five Predator Class Patrol Boats (PB), 24 Fast Aluminum Boats (Duel Outboard Engines), 10 rigid-hull inflatable boats, and various small arms and night vision devices. The Iraqi Navy will further equip themselves with six Al Faw Class Patrol Boats (the first of which was delivered in July 2005) and two Off-Shore Support Vessels. With some exceptions, the responsibility for logistical support of the Iraqi Navy has been handed over to the Umm Qasr Base Support Unit (BSU). Maritime and Riverine Advisory Support Team (M&R AST) members provide advice and assistance to both the BSU and the Iraqi Navy Logistics Department in order to cultivate a cooperative working relationship.

... The Air Force currently has over 100 personnel and has a fleet of 9 helicopters (4 UH-1H and 5 Jet Ranger), 3 C-130s, and 8 single-engine propeller-driven observation airplanes (6 CompAir turboprop aircraft and 2 Seeker piston aircraft).

... The IPS uses a variety of equipment, including Chevy Luv and Nissan pick-up trucks, mid-size SUVs, AK 47s, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor. The goal is for each police officer and station to be equipped with mission-essential equipment.

### *The Quality of Equipment Deliveries*

Opinions differ of the adequacy of this equipment in giving Iraqi forces the equipment they needed to stand on their own against the best armed insurgents and insurgent ambushes. A number of US advisors, Iraqis, and outside observers feel that the Coalition was far too slow to provide the kind of armor and protected vehicles that Coalition forces had found to be vital for their survival. In fact, Iraqi forces felt so strongly about the need for added armor that some army, National Guard, and elite police elements started reconditioning abandoned armor in various weapons depots, or “requisitioned” armor taken from the Iranian exile forces in the Iranian People’s Mujahideen.

The MNSTC-I was seeking armor from a variety of sources, including other Arab countries and Eastern European countries that operated the same kinds of Soviet bloc weapons the Iraqis were familiar with and could maintain and sustain. For example, deliveries of Hungarian T-72s were underway to the army, and armored Land Rovers were being delivered to the police.

At the same time, some MNSTC-I experts argue that the lighter equipment shown in Figures 23 and Figure 24 was what the Iraqis needed for most counterinsurgency and counterterrorist missions, and can actually maintain and support. One MNSTC-I expert put it this way:

... light forces are often more versatile and essential in a counter-insurgency (assuming they have the right weapons, body armor, Kevlar helmets, etc.), but would also point out that we are providing heavy forces to the Iraqis. A mechanized division is already in the military force structure plan and an additional motorized division is being considered. The Iraqi Army already has one armored and one mechanized battalion in operation; another mechanized battalion is in training. The police forces have two mechanized battalions operating under a brigade headquarters; a third battalion is in training. The latter, in fact, will be provided U.S.-made Armored Security Vehicles, superb wheeled armored vehicles made by Cadillac Gage and used by our own Military Police. In addition, numerous APCs are now on hand. Up-armored HMMWVs are on order and other wheeled armored vehicles are either on hand or on order.

A heavier force, whether for force protection or for defense against invasion, also costs more. The Iraqis can’t really afford to purchase, operate and maintain such a force – even with the multiple billions of dollars we are providing. Given fiscal constraints that will last for several years, Iraq has to consider opportunity costs before committing to the addition of more heavy forces. The Iraqis might decide that the additional motorized division being considered might better be traded for less-expensive light forces. They could instead decide to spend that money on much-needed infrastructure protection forces, which may be even more important strategically.

It should not be expected that the Iraqi military will eventually look like the American military nor that an American-like military will be needed to defeat the insurgency.

These views have some validity and do recognize the fact that Iraqi forces did need protected vehicles. At the same time, they do not refute the fact that providing nothing but light firepower, and protection in the form of body armor, has presented significant operating problems for Iraqis that have come up against well-armed insurgents.

Figures 23 and 24 also contain a highly diverse mix of civilian vehicles that is likely to create future maintenance problems. Certainly, many Iraqi officers feel their equipment is too light and too vulnerable, and see a dual standard in the Coalition’s steady uparmoring of its equipment. This helps explain why some Iraqi units have taken armor

and weapons seized from People's Mujahideen (MEK) forces, and others have reconditioned abandoned armor taken from equipment dumps.

It should also be noted that the quality of the facilities for security force trainees and fully graduated soldiers remained erratic. While some Iraqi bases and forts were decently refurbished, others remained in an appalling state of disrepair. For instance, in July 2005 the 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade of the Iraqi Army, the unit tapped to guard the Green Zone, was stationed in a filthy hangar at the Muthana airfield with insufficient water supplies for showering, a nonexistent sewage system, and only occasional electricity. Garbage heaps were abundant and the conditions had eroded morale, with some Iraqis considering quitting. Other soldiers could not understand why the US could not seem to fix what seemed to be simple problems and viewed the conditions as a sign of disrespect. Fortunately, air conditioned tents and a row of showers were under construction at the end of July 2005.<sup>xiii</sup>

### *Beginning to Create Logistics and Support Capabilities*

Iraqi forces were also beginning to develop the capability to support, maintain, and sustain their equipment. MNF-I and Iraqi forces had created plans to develop base support units or BSU to support the equipment Iraqi forces were getting, and the creation of motorized transport units to provide the necessary supplies with both transport assets and the firepower to protect themselves. The latter units -- such as the 3<sup>rd</sup> Motor Transportation Regiment -- were beginning to become active in the spring of 2005, and the plans for BSUs can be summarized as follows:

Three major BSUs were to be created to cover the entire country, each to support forces within a 200-kilometer radius. These include one at Kasik in the North (turnover date of August 2005), Tadjji in the center (turnover date of September 2005), and Tallil in the south (turnover date of June 2005).

Smaller standard BSUs were to be created throughout the country to support operations within a 65-kilometer radius. These included facilities at Kirkuk (turnover date of June 2005), KMTB (turnover date of July 2005), Habbaniyah (turnover date of November 2005), Rustamiyah (turnover date of July 2005), Biap (turnover date of September 2005), Numaniyah (turnover date of May 2005), and Umm Qasr (turnover date of March 2005).

Iraqi forces still had a long way to go before they could provide their combat units or "teeth," with the proper mix of combat and service support, major combat unit structures and headquarters, logistics, and other facilities. They still tended to be all "teeth" and no "tail." They had, however, now begun the journey and one that offered real hope that they might be able take over much or most of the combat mission from Coalition forces within a few years.

**Figure 23****Total Equipment Deliveries to Iraqi Forces: July 2004-May 2005**

(As of 1 June 2005)

<u>Type</u>		Ministry of Defense <u>Forces</u> **	Ministry of Interior <u>Forces</u>	Issued in <u>Late Week</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Vehicles	5,665	(1,434)	4,874	114	10,539
Radios	10,537	(6,933)	13,514	0	24,051
PKM Machine Guns	6,595	(2,706)	487	0	7,082
AK-47s	87,740	(36,718)	67,294	3,070	155,034
Pistols	15,160	(6,721)	125,139	6,240	140,239
Ammunition	193,983,724*	(23,431,226)	111,690,813*	3,567,880	305,587,537
Uniforms	280,267	(92,521)	281,301	4,700	561,568
Helmets	87,250	(45,7272)	5,633	40	92,883
Body Armor	80,761	(40,903)	87,343	7,410	168,104

\* Includes 100 million rounds of ammunition prepositioned in 11 sites in Iraq.

\*\* Figures in parenthesis show amounts delivered to National Guard before merger with the army.

Source: US Embassy, Baghdad.

**Figure 24****Typical Weekly Flows of Equipment Deliveries to All Iraqi Forces in 2005 – Part One**

Type	Week Ending					
	Jan. 8	Jan. 15	Jan. 22	Jan. 29	March 19	March 26
AK-47	2,770	3,459	870	3,310	320	200
RPKs	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sniper rifles	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pistols/handguns	1,500	1,140	437	320	-	330
Grenades	-	-	-	-	-	-
Body armor	3,742	1,000	2,000	5,839	1,250	2,400
Night vision goggles	-	-	-	-	-	-
Global Positioning Systems	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mobile generators	-	-	-	-	-	-
A-Back Scatter	-	-	-	-	-	-
X-Ray Vans	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ashook Leylands	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chevy Luminas	-	-	-	-	40	16
Chevy Trailblazers	-	-	-	-	32	62
Chevy LUV trucks	-	-	-	-	-	-
Landcruisers	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nissan pickup trucks	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nissan Cabstars	-	-	-	-	34	8
5-ton trucks	-	-	-	-	-	-
2 ½ ton trucks	-	-	-	-	19	31
Ambulances	-	-	-	-	-	-
Water trailers	-	-	-	-	-	-
Helmets	10,957	3,659	-	1,213	-	-
PKM Machine Guns	153	168	-	331	-	-
Up-Armored Humvees	-	-	-	-	10	-
Explosive Detector Systems	-	-	-	-	2	-
T-55 Recovery Vehicles	-	-	-	-	1	-
BMPs	-	-	-	-	28	-
Vehicles (Unspecified)	64	61	50	90	-	-
Ammunition (million rounds)	9.5	2.8	3.1	3.1	4.7	.42

Source: Adapted from various editions of the MNSTC-I, *Advisor*; data provided by MNSTC-I J-4.

Note: Reports did not indicate supplies delivered between February 5 and March 12, 2005.

**Figure 24****Typical Weekly Flows of Equipment Deliveries to All Iraqi Forces in 2005 – Part Two**

Type	Week Ending						
	April 2	April 9	April 16	April 23	April 30	May 7	May 14
AK-47	2,610	-	7,272	5,724	1,250	3,400	3,900
RPKs	-	54	118	-	50	-	-
Sniper rifles	-	-	-	-	648	4	-
Pistols/handguns	-	500	11,600	5,760	-	-	-
Grenades	-	-	-	-	-	7,512	4,480
Body armor	7,963	6,460	2,200	5,402	1,799	3,860	2,750
Night vision goggles	-	600	12	-	-	-	-
Global Positioning Systems	-	-301	-	-	-	-	-
Mobile generators	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
A-Back Scatter	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
X-Ray Vans	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
Ashook Leylands	-	-	-	18	4	91	15
Chevy Luminas	-	-	126	344	90	33	-
Chevy Trailblazers	26	212	146	250	-	-	50
Chevy LUV trucks	31	523	400	411	240	-	-
Landcruisers	-	-	-	56	-	-	-
Nissan pickup trucks	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nissan Cabstars	23	-	-	-	-	-	-
5-ton trucks	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
2 ½ ton trucks	-	-	-	-	57	4	-
Ambulances	-	-	-	-	20	-	-
Water trailers	-	-	-	12	-	-	-
Helmets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PKM Machine Guns	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Up-Armored Humvees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Explosive Detector Systems	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
T-55 Recovery Vehicles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BMPs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vehicles (unspecified)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ammunition (million rounds)	0.53	0.48	2.5	6.6	21.4	2.9	13.3

Source: Adapted from various editions of the MNSTC-I, *Advisor*; data provided by MNSTC-I J-4.

### *Vetting and Training*

Iraqi forces got steadily better vetting and training in 2005. It is unclear exactly how men and women had as yet been screened the improved vetting process, but MNSTC-I indicated that it could do a better job of checking Iraqi recruits against Ba'ath and other political party records. Iraqis now checked the criminal record of the recruit as well. MNSTC-I reported that all Iraqis now underwent basic training in the Iraqi military and visits to the various training centers involved showed that Iraqis now much of the training and were developing their own training curricula.

There was still some corruption and favoritism in selection of recruits, but much of the problem occurred before actual selection, and the vetting and screening process was becoming more professional once recruits were selected. Military and police units had begun to get serious screening and police recruits had to pass written screening tests modified from those used by US police forces. MNSTC-I stated:<sup>xiv</sup>

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Training – of all forces, but especially police forces – undergoes constant analysis in light of operational experience. The course length and curriculum of the Transition Integration Program has been standardized in all of the Iraqi police academies. The length of basic training for police recruits has been increased by 25% by adding two weeks of regional training on threats and other conditions in the new policeman's area of responsibility. Training at all police schools is now much more likely to be led by an Iraqi and to be "hands on" training instead of simple academic instruction.

MNSTC-I had personnel training the staffs of brigades and divisions as well as Iraqis involved in reconnaissance and surveillance activity. It was deeply engaged in a variety of mentoring programs within ministries and had programs in place for the navy and air force. MNSTC-I was directly involved in training the SWAT Teams and other specialized counterinsurgency and protection forces for each province and now offered a variety of police training courses ranging from case management to forensics.

The progress taking place is illustrated by the following milestones:

4,516 Iraqi police officers graduated in May from basic courses in Al Kut, Sulaymaniyah, Al Hillah, Jordan, and Baghdad.

157 Iraqi officers graduated in May from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility.

The first 213 recruits for the Iraqi Navy's Direct Recruit Replacement program (DRR) began training for anti-terrorist operations and oil terminal security at the end of May.

121 Iraqi police officers graduated in June from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility. 58 graduated from a Basic criminal investigation course, 29 from a Critical Incident Management course, 18 from a course on Counterterrorism Investigations, and 16 from Executive Leadership courses.

As of early June 2005, 32,500 police recruits had completed the eight week new recruit training program and 36,000 police with previous training had completed the three week Transitional Integration Program.

The command of the Kirkuk Military Training base was transferred from MNSTC-I to Iraqi Brig. Gen. Abd Zaid.

More generally, the systematic creation of formal training programs for each of the individual elements of Iraqi forces is summarized in Figure 25. By now, the training programs had become large enough in scale, and sufficiently institutionalized to have real impact. As Figure 26 shows, these basic training programs were now supplemented by specialized training programs for each element of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces.

### *Ministry of Defense Training*

By this time, CMATT had all of the advisors it was authorized, and was broadening its missions to help the Iraqis make the eventual transfer to Iraqi funding, and deal with issues like plans, providing intelligence, and add the necessary sustainment and support capabilities. Ministry of Defense Forces received both general and specialized training: Iraqi Army recruits underwent four weeks of cadre training and eight weeks of basic training.

The MNF-1 summarized this progress as follows in July 2005:<sup>xv</sup>

Training for the individual soldier is divided into two areas: training for new recruits and training

for former soldiers. Training for new recruits takes a total of nine weeks and has usually been conducted at the Iraqi Training Brigade (ITB) in Kirkush. Training for former soldiers lasts three to four weeks and has usually been conducted in divisional locations with graduates generally being assigned to the division that trains them. All personnel receive standard infantry-style training; selected soldiers receive specialized training in Army Military Occupational Specialties, such as Signal, Administration, Supply, Armor, Transport, Maintenance and Military Police.

Membership in the Iraqi Special Forces Brigade requires additional training. All Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) soldiers undergo a three-week Assessment and Selection course. Iraqi Counter Terrorist Forces (ICTF) soldiers receive 12 weeks of training in Jordan on Close Quarters Battle (CQB), Planning, and Leadership before they conduct Direct Action missions. ISOF soldiers undergo rigorous training emphasizing small unit tactics, counterterrorism, and unit self-reliance. Improved qualification and vetting standards minimize absenteeism and the risk of insurgent infiltration. The Brigade's chain of command and officer cadre are assessed as being very effective. ISOF elements have been conducting operations for the past year. They have played crucial roles in major combat operations along side of, and sometimes independently of, Coalition forces.

A small number of Army personnel attend advanced training with NATO and U.S. Army schools.

MNF-I has also implemented, in partnership with the MOD, a program to embed Military Transition Teams at the battalion, brigade, and division level. These teams provide Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to MNC-I identifying areas of progress and shortcomings, ultimately leading to those individual units being ready to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. These assessments take into account a variety of criteria similar to but not identical to what the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units' operational readiness focused on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership.

It is useful to place these readiness assessments in perspective. The first Iraqi Army infantry battalions finished basic training in early 2004 and were immediately required in combat without complete equipment. They had inadequate time to develop unit cohesiveness, staff proficiency, and a leadership chain of command that is fundamental to a military unit. Ministry of Defense forces did not perform well in Fallujah—several battalions collapsed. Absent-without-leave (AWOL) rates among regular army units were in double digits and remained so for the rest of the year.

Although such problems have not been entirely solved, they have been addressed in large measure because of the ability to put to good use the security sector funding from the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund (IRRF) as provided for by Public Law 108-106. Equipment shortages have been reduced as equipment procured with U.S.-funded contracts began to flow into Iraq during mid-to-late 2004

The Iraqi Intervention Force received the same training as the Iraqi Army, with an additional five weeks of Urban Operations training. Former soldiers who sought enlistment in the army of IIF underwent three weeks of Direct Replacement Training, followed by unit training. The Iraqi National Guard (ING) had previously been trained largely by the major subordinate commands (MSC) and the training of the ING varied by unit, but now was being integrated into the army training program.<sup>xvi</sup>

The Iraqi Special Operations Force was divided into the Commando Battalion and the Counter Terrorist Task Force. The Commando Battalion was trained in small unit tactics and experiences other training similar to US Rangers'. This training was administered by US Special Forces and included advanced training in facilities like "shoot rooms." The Counter Terrorist Task Force was specially selected and assessed and then subjected to a 13 week Special Operator Course. Air Force training varied by specialty anywhere from 1-6 months. Some of this training (the C-130 crews) was done in the US. The Navy

recruits underwent eight weeks of basic training and were then relocated to Umm Qasr for specialized training.<sup>xvii</sup>

MNSTC-I's overall training concept had advanced to the point where it could stress "total force development" for the leadership of the Iraqi armed forces, with a clear career path for training both officers and NCO.

Basic officer training took place in a 12 month program at the Iraqi Military Academy at Zahko, using a program Iraqi officers had adapted from the one British forces used at Sandhurst. Promotion led to training at a company commander's course, which was to go into operation in October 2005. The next promotion meant attending a Junior Staff College that was to open in September, and then attendance at a Senior Staff College that was to open that same month. Promotion to top ranks meant attending a National Defense College, which was to open in 2006.

The NCO training program was in development, but former Iraqi NCOs underwent a three week general training course, followed by 3-6 weeks of branch training. Promotion then involved a 4 week squad leader course, and a platoon sergeant course that was to open in August 2005. A 8-12 week first sergeant's course was to open in 2006, followed by a 4-8 week warrant officer and sergeant major course at a new academy scheduled to open in March 2006.

These programs would take years to fully train the leadership of Iraqi forces, and many officers and NCOs would serve for sometime without such training, but the very fact such a program existed and had started to operate showed significant progress.

### ***Ministry of Interior Training***

The vetting and training of the Iraqi Police Force (IPS) continued to lag behind that of the military, in part because of a slower start and more constant changes, and in part because of a lag of resources. In spite of efforts to strengthen CPATT, it only had about 70% of the advisors it was authorized in June 2005, and had staffing problems in getting civilian and other experts in key areas like intelligence, budgeting, manpower, and plans.

A report by the Inspector General of the Department of State and of the Department of Defense, found the following continuing problems in the vetting and training effort as of end-April 2005. While such problems are scarcely unexpected given the heritage of Saddam Hussein and the mistakes made by the CPA, they provide an import set of insights in to the practical problems that occur in trying simultaneously create a force and fight a war, and the lessons that should be learned for the future:<sup>xviii</sup>

*Much of the planning and execution of the IPS training program has been done by Coalition military leaders without sufficient input from Iraqi officials. One high-ranking official in CPATT told the IG Team that ". . . until recently, Iraqi views were given absolutely no consideration. They (the Iraqis) still do not have a deciding vote." Another stated, "We are not learning our lessons. We still develop great ideas and plans, and then lay them on Iraqis."*

*During the time of the CPA, such an approach was both inevitable and, perhaps, appropriate. In the wake of the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, no Iraqi policy makers were in a position to make authoritative decisions.*

*...Overall, there is little consensus on how to train Iraqi police. One exception is the universal agreement that the eight weeks devoted to the basic course is insufficient time to produce a capable policeman. Thus, there is tacit consensus that the training program to date has not created an effective IPS. (There is no consensus on how long a time would be required to achieve the desired results.)*

*...The eight-week training course yields a maximum 320 hours of training time. To accommodate an increase in the hours spent on counter-insurgency training and self-defense skills without increasing*

*overall course length, some class room subjects were eliminated, while other subjects were reduced. Courses on democratic policing principles are critically important to the mission and should not be eliminated or reduced.*

*Currently, the basic course does not include night training. As the Coalition adapts its training plan to deal with the insurgency, it must prepare the IPS to conduct operations in the dark. The enemy is using the cover of darkness to plant improvised explosive devices and conduct other night time operations. Experts agree that police tactics, patrolling, and intelligence gathering activities during day light hours are markedly different than the tactics employed at night.*

The Team observed a lack of discipline among the basic recruits at several of the training sites. This was not the case at those facilities conducting specialized training for the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) and the Public Order Brigades (POB). As practiced in the specialized training programs, the use of properly trained Iraqi drill instructors would facilitate discipline and help to create a sense of esprit-de-corps among the cadets. While it is recognized that Iraqis are family and tribal oriented, the training programs must foster a sense of esprit-de-corps and teach teamwork.

...As this assessment was being conducted, MNSTC-I and CPATT leaders were planning to lengthen the basic training course to 10 weeks... At the outset of the CPA effort to build IPS capacity, the assumption—even to some extent, the reality—was that training could be molded within a rapidly stabilizing political and security environment. The unexpected virulence and scope of subsequent terrorism and insurgency induced changes in the program, but such modifications have lagged the ‘street reality’ in Iraq.

Adjustments in the training course have been and are being made. During this assessment, the JIPTC staff completed a CPATT-directed revision of the basic curriculum to include more ‘hands on,’ self-protection exercises. Other IPS in-country academies are adopting these changes. IP personnel and MOI officials strongly support the adjustments and the shift in emphasis.

...trainees allegedly have been selected more on a basis of favoritism than on capability or potential.

...In the Baghdad area, applicants learn of recruitment via word of mouth. In light of the relatively good pay prospects, this simple system attracts more than enough applicants. Many simply show up at police stations or at the Baghdad Police College (BPC). The IG Team observed recruiting and selection (a sequentially seamless process) at the BPC. After passing through elemental security screening, aspirants are admitted into the walled facility on a first-come, first-served basis. If, as frequently is the case, more show up than can be processed on a given day, identifying data is taken on those who are turned away. They are given numbers (again, in order of their place in the line) and told when to return to be among those first admitted.

Once admitted to the facility, the process is very basic. On entry into a classroom setting, each applicant is given an identifying number that corresponds to his or her file. The first step is a timed written test, designed and administered by an American contractor. Iraqis proctor the test. Results are machine graded in the presence of an IPS official. Since responding to questions involves understanding the written material, the test presumably establishes basic literacy of the person being examined. Applicants who do not achieve the minimal threshold score are called forward by number, courteously escorted off the premises, and dismissed.

A second stage in the process consists of an interview<sup>19</sup> and physical examination. At BPC, the processing observed by the IG Team covered all of the minimum standards prescribed by the CPA.

The physical exam appears especially cursory. At the time of the IG Team’s observation, most applicants appeared to be in their late teens to early 20’s and fully functional without any physical handicaps. However, a physician stated he did not have sufficient time to complete a thorough medical examination of so many applicants in such a short time (70 students on the day in question). Consequently, the examination consisted of completing a medical history questionnaire, checking applicants’ eyes for squinting, and verifying a steady pulse. The doctor then pronounced the applicant fit or unfit. There was no testing to determine physical stamina, dental review, or

body checks for even readily detectable identification marks such as scars or tattoos. The doctor also told the IG Team that a considerable number of students appeared to suffer some form of mental problems, hard to diagnose during the interview process. Elsewhere in the country, MSCs recruit and select candidates to fill available training slots as directed in a monthly "fragmentary order" (FRAGO). The MSCs use various recruiting tools including recommendations from the command's recruiting unit, IPLOs, serving IPS personnel, and from other reliable sources in a given community. These Coalition recruiters are encouraged to accept all recruits who are sponsored by local officials.

Despite the written test, attrition statistics show that illiterates make it into basic training. Less frequent are cases of those with easily detectable physical or mental impairment. Some cadets clearly are older than the established age limits...Occasionally, trainees are separated when information is revealed about past criminal behavior or allegations of involvement with the insurgency. Other common causes for dismissal from training are infractions of discipline, illness or inability to adjust (normally homesickness). The team was advised at JIPTC that a surprising number of students arrive with drugs that are confiscated during in-processing. These instances support a widely shared perception that screening of IP candidates is at best superficial, sometimes inconsistent.

To date, all those going to JIPTC for basic training have been recruited and selected by the MSCs. Even though the processes used by the MSCs theoretically are the same as those used by the Iraqi recruiters, the MOI apparently does not have a sense of commitment to those trainees who enter training via the MSC route.

... Many police chiefs and their deputies are accustomed to the IPS culture that prevailed during the Saddam Hussein era. Old habits and methods (e.g., reliance on forced confessions, taking the initiative only when directed, and rigid delineation of responsibilities) work against effective and efficient policing.

The need for attention to these aspects is self-evident. In instances where good leadership is present (often provided by Coalition military personnel or International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs)), IPs perform satisfactorily and stand their ground in the face of attacks. The absence of such leaders correlates closely with instances in which IP stations have been overrun, often with shocking casualties among ill-prepared and ill-led policemen.

Senior IP officers interviewed by the IG Team were outspoken in identifying insufficient numbers (and quality) of officers as a major weakness within the IPS. They urged restoration of the former 'police college' system, preferably with a three-year curriculum, such as that at the Baghdad Police College (BPC) that predated the Saddam Hussein era. MNSTC-I and CPATT are moving ahead to restart officer training at the BPC, although present plans are for a six-month course rather than the more extended course favored by the Iraqis. In a free-form discussion with the Chargé d'Affaires, IPLOs were equally vocal in identifying leadership development as a major weakness in the present training program.

...Critics within CPATT and among some instructors assert that the MOI's selection of Candidates (for advanced training) appears to be based more on cronyism and loyalties than on merit. For some attendees, the courses are regarded as a reward, not as a serious professional commitment. The IPS major general at Adnan Palace is among those who urge incorporation of more rigorous testing as courses progress. He believes that is the only way to get and keep the students' attention.

...Inducting criminals into the IPS is a continual concern. Even more troubling is infiltration by intending terrorists or insurgents. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that such persons indeed are among the ranks of the IPS. This underscores the need for the most rigorous possible review of each applicant's records. To gain an understanding of the vetting process, the IG Team met with Iraqi police cadets and instructors, International Police Trainers (IPT) at various police training academies, officials of the MOI and Coalition authorities. All Iraqis interviewed suggested that vetting performed by Coalition forces is not as thorough as what could be done by the MOI. The

IG Team was told that, especially early in 2003, only a cursory background check, if even that, was conducted before policemen were trained or entered the force.

In terms of policy, several IPS interviewees expressed reservations about aspects of Coalition vetting. For example, they contended that no Iraqi would recruit or employ a candidate who had tattoos. In their culture body tattoos are indicative of a person who has a criminal record or at least a propensity to violate societal norms. Likewise, the longer-term prospects for female members of the IP are problematic. In some areas, notably in Kurdistan, women are accepted members in both the police and military. In most other regions, it is likely that female IPs will be relegated to supporting roles, at best as administrative staff.

It is widely contended that the vetting process is stymied by the lack or inaccessibility of personnel or police records. As with recruiting and selection of trainees, vetting is especially difficult if carried out by non-Iraqis. Indeed, the Coalition's ability to conduct thorough background checks on IPS personnel is severely limited. Use of polygraph techniques is impracticable, given the numbers of candidates to be processed. Effective communications across language and cultural barriers is an issue too.

...The problem starts with a relative shortage of mid-level leaders and managers. Many police chiefs and their deputies are accustomed to the IPS culture that prevailed during the Saddam Hussein era. Old habits and methods (e.g., reliance on forced confessions, taking the initiative only when directed, and rigid delineation of responsibilities) work against effective and efficient policing.

The need for attention to these aspects is self-evident. In instances where good leadership is present (often provided by Coalition military personnel or International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs)), IPs perform satisfactorily and stand their ground in the face of attacks. The absence of such leaders correlates closely with instances in which IP stations have been overrun, often with shocking casualties among ill-prepared and ill-led policemen.

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These comments must be kept in perspective. The report also found that real progress was being made, that Iraqi forces were becoming more effective, and that the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior was taking over more and more of the burden of planning and managing the development and training of the Iraqi police and security services it also found that the CPATT now was strong enough to have a major impact, and was working closely with the new Minister of the Interior and his staff.

The training program had reached the point where large numbers of Ministry of the Interior forces now had serious training: While the program still had defects, , Iraqi Police Service did give new eight weeks of serious training at the Police Academy, and the program involved significant counterinsurgency training. Those officers who served and continue to serve received specialized training and sustainment training. Advanced police training took place at the Adnan Palace Complex, where specialized police training had been taking place since mid-2004, and is administered by a wide range of US law enforcement agencies.

There were over 500 individuals from the Coalition training Iraqi police officers. A little less than half of these trainers worked from the JIPTC in Amman, Jordan, while the rest operated directly in Iraq. Civil Intervention Force recruits underwent five weeks of specialized training, while the Special Police Commandos got three weeks of specialized training.

Moreover, as the report by the Inspector General notes, a major effort was underway to train those Iraqi police officers with past service that had been retained by the new government:<sup>xix</sup>

One of the challenges of building a viable police force was to retain the veteran policemen who served during the Saddam Hussein era. This group must be retrained with the objective of instilling modern police techniques, respect for human rights, and democratic policing principles. To achieve this goal, CPATT implemented an in-service training program called the Transition Integration Program (TIP). The program also incorporates attention to applicable Iraqi criminal law and procedures to be observed for arrest and detention. Additionally, the TIP was designed to accomplish several other key tasks:

- Identify existing IPS personnel who were academically, intellectually, or morally unsuitable;
- Identify potential leaders within the IPS; and
- Identify potential IPS instructors and field training officers.

TIP training takes place at Coalition forward operating bases (FOBs) and at some of the regional academies. The course is three weeks long and covers 126 hours of instruction. Course subjects include: (1) the philosophy and role of the IPS, (2) prohibitions against torture, (3) police ethics and values, and (4) the code of conduct. About one third of the course time is devoted to firearms instruction on 9mm and AK-47 weaponry.

As of late April this year, 35,526 IPS veterans had completed the TIP program. The program, however, is not without its critics. For example, the Chief of Police at al-Hillah would like to replace the three week TIP course with a longer in-service course that would encompass map reading, hostage rescue, night tactics, etc. As in the case of basic training, the argument is for hands-on training as opposed to the more theoretical approach of the present TIP program.

... the TIP program is a worthwhile and value-added endeavor. By definition, TIP training is for in-service IPs, and satisfies one of the MOI's objectives. Many policemen who have attended the course appear to be well motivated and dedicated to the concept of a rule of law regime at the service of Iraqi citizens. The TIP training imparts skills directly relevant to those objectives...

Members of the Emergency Response Unit got eight weeks of specialized training with follow-on mentoring by Coalition advisors. The recruits for the Department of Border Enforcement received four weeks training at the Academy along with specialized training. The Highway Patrol officers underwent three weeks of TIP training and eight weeks of Academy training. Lastly, the Bureau of Dignitary Protection's training program consisted of three weeks of initial training, 2-3 weeks of advanced training, and final follow-on mentoring by US contractors and Navy SEALs.<sup>xx</sup>

Figure 27 shows the overall pattern of these efforts as of the end of May 2005. There is no doubt that they did not approach the level of training in Western security and police forces, that many training programs would have been longer if the police was not under so much pressure from the insurgency, and that gaps still remained in the effort. At the same time, it is clear that CPATT had made massive progress since the spring of 2004 and done so in the face of considerable obstacles, and many of the problems the Inspector

General of the Department of State and of the Department of Defense had found in April 2005 were already being addressed at that time, and substantial further improvement had been made by the summer of 2005.<sup>xxi</sup>

The MNF-I summarized the level of police and security force vetting and training as follows in late July,<sup>xxii</sup>

Training – of all forces, but especially police forces – undergoes constant analysis in light of operational experience. The course length and curriculum of the Transition Integration Program has been standardized in all of the Iraqi police academies. The length of basic training for police recruits has been increased by 25% by adding two weeks of regional training on threats and other conditions in the new policeman's area of responsibility. Training at all police schools is now much more likely to be led by an Iraqi and to be "hands on" training instead of simple academic instruction.

...Some 62,000 trained police were on duty as of late June 2005. To date, over 35,000 police recruits have completed the 8-week basic police classroom training, and more than 35,500 veteran police have received the 3-week Transition Integration Program (TIP) training. Over 13,500 police personnel have completed specialized training, such as fingerprinting, explosive ordnance disposal, investigations, and counterterrorism. New police academy graduates do not receive the originally envisioned field training by International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) due to the current security situation, so new police receive informal mentoring from veteran Iraqi police.

Police are recruited through a combination of methods depending on the stability of the province in which they live. In stable provinces, recruiting is done by MOI, community leaders, IPLOs, and Multinational Force Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). In areas where insurgents are more active, the MSCs play a larger role in recruitment. The Iraqi police advertise for recruits via radio, posters, police stations, and employment centers. Most recruiting is done from the local population, with the goal of matching the ethnic composition of the local area; however, all police must commit to serving anywhere in the nation if necessary.

Police recruits undergo a physical fitness test, medical examination and background check; increasingly, more sophisticated vetting tools are being developed and employed. Vetting is performed by the MSCs and, on a more limited basis, by an assessment tool developed by an MNSTC-I contractor that screens for literacy, cognitive, and suitability characteristics.

MSCs have increasingly engaged Iraqi Police Service Chiefs in the review of the police candidate rosters. The MOI and MNSTC-I's Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) are working closely together to conduct training and deploy IPS in-processing teams (vetting teams). These in-processing teams will deploy to Al Kut, Basrah, Al Hillah, and Mosul police academies. This process should be complete by November 2005, and thereafter police candidates will be vetted by MOI. The MOI Qualifying Committee has received information on 120,000 MOI employees, and a final screening process has been completed on 90,000 of them. The work of the Qualifying Committee to weed out "ghost employees" (who are being paid but not working) and other police who do not meet minimal standards is ongoing.

The rate of absenteeism, AWOL, attrition, and desertion in the IPS varies by province. Most police units have experienced a decrease in absenteeism as the number of trained police has increased. The exact extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown. Effectiveness of the Iraqi police officer cadres and the chain of command varies by province and the experience level of the chain of command. The P3 teams are focusing their efforts on developing capability at the provincial police headquarters and MOI in a top-down approach.

### ***Embedded Advisory Teams: The Importance of the Luck Mission***

A major advance in training took place in Iraq's forces once they were deployed. The US began to embed large training teams in each Iraqi unit until it demonstrated it could stand on its own. This reform seems to have been at least partly a result of the review of US

strategy and operations in Iraq made by retired four-star General Gary Luck had made in January 2005.

The Department of Defense stated at the time that the purpose of General Luck's mission was "to provide some assessment of how we're doing" in training and fielding Iraqi security units.<sup>xxiii</sup> Other reports have suggested that Luck's mandate may have been far more wide-ranging, extending to an evaluation of the entire US strategy in Iraq. Other reports indicate that by late 2004, the US was also seeking to find some way to largely extract US forces from the counterinsurgency mission by the end of 2005 or early 2006, but the Defense Department has denied this.<sup>xxiv</sup>

In her Senate confirmation testimony, Condoleezza Rice described General Luck's mission and the progress of Iraqi security forces as follows:

We think that, among those people, there clearly continue to be questions about on-duty time, that is, people who don't report for duty. And so this is being looked at. We are trying to provide for some of these units mentors who can help, trying to provide leadership from the Iraqis themselves that can help these people. But this is the reason Gary Luck has gone out, at Secretary Rumsfeld's direction, to take a hard look at the training program to see what General Petraeus...what he's been able to achieve; to work with the Iraqis to address some of these problems of leadership and morale and desertion in the armed forces and in the police forces; and to look at some of the equipping of the police forces.<sup>xxv</sup>

The full results of the Luck mission have not been made public. Reports and interviews indicate, however, that Gen. Luck was satisfied with the progress Lt. Gen. Petraeus had made, and his report focused on providing teams of Coalition advisors to train and fight with new Iraqi units as they deployed. One unattributed defense official was quoted as saying, "Luck's assessment in general is that he feels the commanders have a plan, Petraeus is having an impact, and these forces have a good crack at becoming more and more capable over time."<sup>xxvi</sup>

At the same time, the Luck mission emphasized the need to go beyond formal training and equipment programs, and to put an Iraqi face on the security and military missions, and to embed US training elements in the new Iraqi forces to help them as they built up the leadership experience and unity integrity necessary to operate effectively on their own.

The result was a plan for utilizing embedded US troops as "advisors," as opposed to having entire US units jointly patrolling with Iraqi troops is likely to lower the US profile and quell a degree of the anti-American sentiment. At the same time, such advisers would have the ability to call for US air support and backup forces and would have access to US intelligence.

An early report on the Luck mission in the New York Times summarized its conclusions as follows:<sup>xxvii</sup>

Luck... endorses a plan by American commanders in Iraq to shift the military's main mission after the Jan. 30 elections from fighting the insurgency to training Iraq's military and police forces to take over those security and combat duties and become more self-reliant, eventually allowing American forces to withdraw...The aim would be to double or even triple the number of trainers now at work with Iraqi security forces, up to as many as 8,000 or 10,000, though General Luck has not mentioned a specific number. A senior defense official who has been briefed on General Luck's initial conclusions and recommendations said the plan would draw on a mix of officers and senior enlisted troops from Army and Marine units already in Iraq.

Many commanders say that providing more trainers is meant to bolster the Iraqi will to fight, help train officers who would lead, curb desertion and provide Iraqi forces with the confidence that American units would back them up - in some cases fighting alongside them if needed, military and Pentagon officials said. Two American advisers have died fighting with Iraqi units. But the training would follow a step-by-step approach that would take months if not years, proceeding at different paces in different parts of the country, depending on the troops' performance. American forces would work closely with Iraqis in the most dangerous parts of the country, but would still take the lead combat role there.

The development of Iraqi forces has since reflected a major effort to provide such training and in-unit or "embedded" US cadres. Gen. John Abizaid indicated in an interview in late January 2005 that he felt that close relationships between US forces and indigenous troops made efforts in Afghanistan more successful than those in Iraq. He commented that embedded advisers could foster a similar relationship, likely improving efforts to strengthen Iraq forces.

The program did begin awkwardly. The Iraqis were not consulted when MNF-1 and MNSTC-I came up with advisory teams and requested forces in December and January. When they did discuss the program with the Iraqi Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defense accepted the program, but the Minister of the Interior initially balked. It took some persuasion to get him to agree to a test case with four police stations.<sup>xxviii</sup>

One problem was finding enough advisors. An Army Reserve Unit from Rochester, New York, the 98<sup>th</sup> Training Division, had been the main body from which advisers have been drawn.<sup>xxix</sup> Reportedly, as of February 24, 2005, there were 45 WE training teams assisting Iraqi units and advising their leaders.<sup>xxx</sup> The actual quality of the training, however, has differed significantly by trainer and adviser. According to some reports, Iraqi units trained by the Vinnell Corporation and the US National Guard have been less effective than forces trained by the US Army Special Forces. However, US sources reported in mid-April 2005, that there already were some 2,000 US military advisors working directly with Iraqi forces.<sup>xxxi</sup>

In March 2005, US officials were still engaged in determining the number of embedded American advisers needed to improve Iraqi leadership and overall capabilities. General Abizaid stated that that decision lay with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Referring to the numbers of advisers needed in Iraq, Abizaid commented, "We're trying to figure out how much augmentation will be required."<sup>xxxii</sup>

Since that time, however, the number of advisors has steadily increased, and this has led to changes in the way Coalition manages the advisory effort. In March 2005, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I, the operational HQs under Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)) became responsible for all operations, and all Iraqi Army units were placed under their tactical control. In addition, the Coalition transition (advisory) teams that worked with those units were almost all placed under Corps control as well. This was always the case with former ING units, but now the transition teams in regular army and intervention force units were largely placed under the control of Corps.

The MNSTC-I essentially became an assistant, albeit a very major one, to the Iraqi Joint HQs and Ministry of Defense for fulfilling the role of "force provider." Its function became to recruit, train, equip, base, and sustain. As a result, it did not get operational

reports on the units once they have completed their training and start to conduct operations, or closely track when and where they are assuming battle space. That was MNC-I's responsibility. It did receive information from MNC-I on their manning, equipment, and basing status in order to assist the JHQ in addressing the needs of these units.

MNF-1 and MNSTC-I have worked together with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the interior to implement the program at all levels of Iraqi force development. They use a system where MNSTC-I shapes the training effort and creation of new unit elements and then transfers them to MNF-I operational command. One the units become active they get embedded Coalition advisory teams as they actually become operational that stay until the unit demonstrates it has effective leadership and unit cohesion in actually performing its mission. The desired training levels before and at the time of this transition are shown in Figure 28.

By the early summer of 2005, virtually all Iraqi army units and advanced MoI units had at least 10-man teams of Coalition advisors. There were still serious shortages in the number of advisors assigned to support units and headquarters units, and to Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials at every level down, but combat and major support units not only had the training teams they needed, but a partner unit of Coalition forces to work with until they were capable of independent operations.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

The Department of Defense described the military training effort that resulted as follows in late July 2005:<sup>xxxiv</sup>

MNF-I has implemented a structured training and assessment process for Iraqi Military Forces. Training for the individual soldier is divided into two areas: training for new recruits and training for former soldiers. Training for new recruits takes a total of nine weeks and has usually been conducted at the Iraqi Training Brigade (ITB) in Kirkush. Training for former soldiers lasts three to four weeks and has usually been conducted in divisional locations with graduates generally being assigned to the division that trains them. All personnel receive standard infantry-style training; selected soldiers receive specialized training in Army Military Occupational Specialties, such as Signal, Administration, Supply, Armor, Transport, Maintenance and Military Police.

Membership in the Iraqi Special Forces Brigade requires additional training. All Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) soldiers undergo a three-week Assessment and Selection course. Iraqi Counter Terrorist Forces (ICTF) soldiers receive 12 weeks of training in Jordan on Close Quarters Battle (CQB), Planning, and Leadership before they conduct Direct Action missions. ISOF soldiers undergo rigorous training emphasizing small unit tactics, counterterrorism, and unit self-reliance. Improved qualification and vetting standards minimize absenteeism and the risk of insurgent infiltration. The Brigade's chain of command and officer cadre are assessed as being very effective. ISOF elements have been conducting operations for the past year. They have played crucial roles in major combat operations along side of, and sometimes independently of, Coalition forces.

A small number of Army personnel attend advanced training with NATO and U.S. Army schools.

MNF-I has also implemented, in partnership with the MOD, a program to embed Military Transition Teams at the battalion, brigade, and division level. These teams provide Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to MNC-I identifying areas of progress and shortcomings, ultimately leading to those individual units being ready to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. These assessments take into account a variety of criteria similar to but not identical to what the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units' operational readiness focused on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership.

New Iraqi units were being deployed into the field with stronger cadres of Coalition advisors, including teams that average at least ten men per battalion, brigade and division headquarters, special force elements, and combat support, service support, and logistic units. Such advisory teams stay until such units demonstrate they have the leadership and committed manpower to operate on their own.

Military commanders called this a development “a sea change in methods.”<sup>xxxv</sup> It builds on the lessons learned in Afghanistan and addresses the problems caused by the lack of mid-level Iraqi leadership in all elements of Iraq’s forces, the lack of a history of unit integrity and morale, and the lack of experience at all levels in creating an effective team and fighting force.<sup>xxxvi</sup>

In contrast, efforts to provide such teams for regular police force units lagged in spite of major efforts by CPATT, largely due to a lack of resources and problems in support from agencies in the US like the Department of Homeland Security, but many regular police units either had such teams or were acquiring them. Once again, the report by the Inspector General of the State Department and Inspector General of the Department of Defense provide important insights into the level of progress in April 2005 that are supported by interviews with CPATT advisors and others who served in Iraq:<sup>xxxvii</sup>

A strong mentoring program is integral to the concept of training Iraqi police. Initially, this was to be the function of IPLO field training officers, each working closely with a small number of policemen who had received basic training. This concept would mirror a model that worked satisfactorily in Bosnia and Kosovo. INL contracted with DynCorp to provide the IPLOs. The first 24-member contingent arrived in Iraq during November 2003. Most IPLOs are retired policemen. By March 2005, this number had risen to about 500 (Figure 7 below). INL has proposed funding for an additional 400 IPLOs. In actuality, the mentoring program in Iraq has not materialized as planned. The security situation is so precarious that any post-training mentoring is, at best, intermittent. There have been periods during which the IPLOs were unable to move beyond the confines of their quarters. Consequently, IPLO interaction with Iraqi policemen is largely with instructors/supervisors at the BPC and regional academies or during periodic visits to police stations.

To accomplish the latter, the IPLOs must rely on Coalition military forces for transportation and security. The military police (MP), who provide that logistical assistance, act as additional mentors once on site. As the security situation has evolved, so has the work of the IPLOs. IPLOs now devote much of their time and attention to assessing police stations and units. There, the IPLOs gather data on equipment status and availability, discipline problems, and reports of incidents involving the IPS. This is documented in Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMR), which are derived from the Facility Assessment Forms prepared by MPs and IPLOs. In theory, this information will enable the MOI to more effectively manage both personnel and material resources of the IPS.

Lines of authority and responsibility for mentoring are not well defined. As the contract administrator, INL has administrative responsibility for the IPLO program. This includes providing life support (e.g., food and lodging, basic security, etc.). CPATT provides operational control. However, Coalition military officials tend to rely on MPs for the mentoring function. Consequently, the IPLOs are sometimes underutilized.

*The problems involved in embedding sufficient advisors in the police are illustrated by the fact the number of IPLOs assigned by districted to each region as of May 1, 2005. Region I - Baghdad (98), Region II – Tikrit (94), Region III – Mosul (30), Region IV – Ramadi (34), Region V – Babylon (43), Region VI – Basrah (24), with the CPATT command staff (9), National Assets Bureau (75), Administrative Bureau (26) and various*

*other areas (63). It is, however, important to note that the IPLOs ran even higher risks than the advisors embedded in regular Iraqi Army and security units. For example, on March 9, 2005, a massive suicide truck bomb targeted the al-Sadeer Hotel in Baghdad. Thirty-five IPLOs were injured, the most serious casualty with the loss of an eye.<sup>xxxviii</sup>*

*It is unclear how much progress had been made by the summer of 2005, but the Department of Defense described the process in these areas as follows in late July 2005:<sup>xxxix</sup>*

Police Partnership Program (P3) teams are partnered at the provincial levels with the police to help identify areas of progress and shortcomings to determine when these forces will be able to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. In lieu of the TRA, police partnership assessments look at factors that are more tailored to the tasks of a police force. More than half of provincial police headquarters currently are assessed to have control in their province.

This focus on embedding advisory cadres to develop effective leadership and unit integrity formal training is a key lesson of the MNF-I and MNSTC-I effort. It reflects an underlying reality of military history that transcends cultures and the conditions of particular wars. Soldiers, security personnel, and police are not cars or transistor radios. They cannot be turned out of training centers like a product. They must either be transitioned into effective and proven units, or transitioned into some structure that can substitute for that leadership and experience.

Regardless of the quality of training and equipment, and the political and ideological conditions shaping a war, men who are thrust into combat or high risk operations only function well if they have proven leaders they feel that they can trust. Their primary motivation also ultimately comes to be how they feel about the other men in their units, how important the approval of their peers is in crisis and combat, and how confident they are that their unit will do everything possible to support and protect them.

**Figure 25**  
**MNSTC-I Training Program for Iraqi Forces by Force Element**

Component	Training
Iraqi Police Service	Former Academy Graduates: 3 Week Transition Integration Program New Recruits: 8 Week Academy; 2 Week Integration Training Mid-Careers: Specialized Training
Public Order and Mechanized Police	5 Week Specialized Training
Special Police Commandos	3 Week Specialized Training
Emergency Response Unit	4 Week Basic; 4 Week Advanced Specialized Training
Dept. of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy and Specialized Training
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training, and 8 Week Academy Training
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training, 2-3 Week Advanced Training Follow-on Mentoring by US Contractors and Navy SEALs
Iraq Regular Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks; Basic & Small Unit Training: 8 Weeks, Additional Skill and Collective Training varies
Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks; Collective Training: 4 Weeks
Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks; Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks Urban Operations Training: 5 Weeks
Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Force	Direct Recruit Replacement Training: 3 weeks for former soldiers
Iraqi Special Ops Force Commando Battalion Counter Terrorist Task Force	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit Tactics and Ranger-type training) 13-week Special Operator Course

Air Force	Varies by specialty: 1-6 months
Navy	8 Week Basic Followed by Specialized Training at Umm Qasr

Source MNSTC-I, June 2005.

**Figure 26**  
**Specialty Training Courses**

<b>Professional Development and Education</b>	
Joint Staff College Instructors	24*
Military Academy Graduates	91
Military Cadets	296*
Contracting Capacity Course	40

<b>Combat Support Courses</b>	
Intelligence	425
Engineers	85
Signal	20
MPs	85
<b>Combat Service Support Courses</b>	
Bomb Disposal	192*
Transportation	813
Maintenance	147
Supply	136
Logistics Officer	50
Medical	20
Administration	20
Instructor Training	301
Air Traffic Controllers	4**

<b>Special Police Course (Thru 31 May)</b>	
Basic Criminal Investigation	1,712

Internal Controls	667
Violent Crimes and Kidnapping	648
Junior, Mid-Level, and Senior Management and Leadership	937
Organized Crime, Drug Enforcement and Criminal Intelligence	450
Interviews and Interrogations	371
Explosive Hazard Awareness and Post Blast Investigation	262
Interrogation Techniques	22*
Counter Terrorism Investigations	136
Critical Incident Management and Incident Command System	470
SWAT (13 of 20 Teams)	360
Dignitary Protection, Motorcade Escorts, and Site Security	1,067

\*In Training \*\*OJT

Source: MNSTC-I, June 2005

**Figure 27**  
**Training at Police Academies as of 5/29/05**

8-Week Academies	Total Trained
Baghdad Police College	12,391
Jordan Int'l Police Training Center	17,138
Sulaymaniyah	1,571
Al Kut	334
Al Asad	127
Kirkuk	0
Al Hillah	517
Basrah	452
Mosul	2,457
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,987</b>

TIP Academies	Total Trained
MND-Baghdad (Karada)	1,609
MND-CS (Karbala/Babil/Al Hillah/Babylon)	6,301
MND-SE (Basrah/Diwaniyah)	7,465
MNF-W (Al Quadisiyah)	4,868
MNF-W	4,268
MND-CN (Kirkuk/Tikrit/As Sulaymaniyah)	11,291
<b>Total</b>	<b>35,802</b>

Source MNSTC-I, CPATT June 2005.

**Figure 28**  
**Transition Team Training Model**

<b>CONUS</b>	<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>Taji</b>	<b>Camp Victory</b>	<b>Link-up with MSCs &amp; Iraqi Units</b>
<b><u>10-45 days + travel</u></b>	<b><u>10 days + travel</u></b>	<b><u>10 days</u></b>	<b><u>2-5 days</u></b>	<b><u>First 24 Hours:</u></b>
Individual Tasks: Weapons Commo HMMWV Combat Lifesaver	Live-Fire Training: Convoy TCP/ECP	General Officer and senior Iraqi briefings	Warlock installation and training	Specific tactical situation
Team Building	Individual Equipment Issue	Situation briefings	Make-up training	Security measures and support procedures
Iraqi METL Tasks: MOUT ECP/TCP	Acclimatization	Interaction with Iraqi units and Transition Teams in the field	Team planning & prep	Status of Iraqi unit
Cultural Orientation	Cultural Orientation	Linkup with sponsors, interpreters		<b><u>First week:</u></b> Joint training plan
		Cultural Orientation		
		Draw, test, prepare team equipment		

Source: MNSTC-I, CMATT, June 2005.

## ***Force Developments***

Many of the more detailed aspects of Iraqi force development also showed an increased rate of progress. The MNSTC-I reported on the status of Iraqi force developments as of March 12, 2005 noted that,

On 1 July 2004, for example, there was one "deployable" or "national" battalion available to the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense (i.e., a unit that could be moved to a trouble spot anywhere in the country). Now there are 52 such battalions and 96 battalions conducting operations in total, in addition to regular police, border guards, and other security force elements. All told, there are more than 142,000 trained and equipped Iraqi police, soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

A large portion of these 52 battalions did consist of National Guard units that had been merged into the Army in January, and which had originally been formed for the local mission of supporting the police within a given province. These units now had a national mission as part of the army and the early results were mixed. When National Guard units had previously told they were going to Fallujah in November 2004, AWOL rates then climbed to 70% in some units.<sup>xi</sup>

Nevertheless, the increase in trained and equipped manpower continued at a rapid rate throughout the rest of the spring and summer. By the end of July 2005, the number had risen to 172,300: With 78,500 military and 93,800 police and security forces. The military now included 77,700 Army, 100 Air Force, and 700 Navy. The regular police and highway patrol totaled 63,500, and the security forces totaled 30,300.<sup>xii</sup>

### ***Ongoing Force Developments***

The MNC submitted a report to the UN on April 10, 2005, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1546. This report provided data submitted by MNSTC-I as of May 14, 2005.<sup>xiii</sup> Coupled to other reports from the Iraqi government MNSTC-I, Iraqi force developments had reached the following status as of early August 2005:

#### *Operations:*

- *Iraq was now operating its own joint command centers, and was bringing modern computerized operations centers into operation in areas like Baghdad.* The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior developed and operated a joint command center during Operation Lightning.

#### *Ministry of Defense:*

- *Command and staff structure:* Iraqi forces now operated a full command and staff structure. The Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces was a four star officer, General Babakir. He had a three star deputy: Lt. General Abadi. There were three joint commands: Training Command, Support Command, and Special Operations Command, headed by Brigadier General Najh Hashim. There were also three single service commands: Army Commander (Lt. General Abdul Qadr), Navy Commander (Commander Jawad), and Air Force Commander (Major General Kamal). The Joint staff include Personnel (M1), Intelligence (M2), Operations (M3) Logistics (M4), Plans (M5), Communications (M6), Training (M7), and Comptroller (M8). There were two major Special Staff divisions: Staff Judge Advocate and Surgeon General.
- *The Iraqi Ground Forces Headquarters* was opened in a ribbon-cutting ceremony in Baghdad on May 15, 2005 by General Abdul Qadir Jassim, Iraqi Ground Forces commander.

- *Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Forces:* With the incorporation of the Iraqi National Guard into the Army, the total number of battalions conducting operations was now 80. The Iraqi army had gone from one battalion in July 2004 to 27 battalions of infantry in January, which included nine special Iraqi Intervention Force battalions and three transportation battalions. The total rose to 37 battalions in June, with four more in formation. In addition, 43 National Guard battalions were being merged into the army, and these forces were undergoing a major upgrading in terms of vetting and retention, training, and equipment.

As is discussed in Figure 31, Iraqi military forces now had a detailed order of battle with clear force goals. The merger of the Army and National Guard had created a 10 division order of battle, and as is shown in this figure, overall manning of the combat elements of this force was now relatively high.

- *Creating a 10-division force:* As is discussed in Figure 31, Iraqi military forces now had a detailed order of battle with clear force goals. The merger of the Army and National Guard had created a 10 division order of battle, and as is shown in this figure, overall manning of the combat elements of this force was now relatively high.

The final brigade of the three Division Regular Army graduated on April 20<sup>th</sup>, and brought the number of operational combat brigades to 99.

- *Iraq's first mechanized battalion* became operational in mid-January, along with a tank company and a transportation battalion; the remaining elements of a mechanized brigade were being trained and equipped by the summer. The 1st Mechanized battalion, 1st Iraqi Army Brigade began operations in the Abu Ghraib area south of Baghdad, and an Iraqi mechanized unit began joint duty with US armored forces in provided security for movement through insurgent areas, in late April 2005.
- *MNSTC-I was working to complete the 2<sup>nd</sup> mechanized infantry battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> mechanized brigade, which was to be equipped with BMPs, by the summer of 2005.* The rest of the armored division was projected to be trained and equipped by the end of 2005 and another mechanized division with wheeled armored vehicles was planned for 2006. Other units were acquiring light armored vehicles from the UAE, Jordan, Eastern Europe, and other services. The equipment confiscated from the MEK was being made available to Iraqi units, and some units were getting armor from the various equipment dumps left over from the war. Iraqi units had ceased to wait and had begun to improvise.
- *The Iraqi 7<sup>th</sup> Division was being readied for deployment in the West.* It was being deployed because the locally recruited National Guard units would or could not deal with the insurgency. The end result has been to disband all of the existing units in Al Anbar, make the former Defenders of Baghdad into the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, and create two new brigades for a force designed to deal with the most hostile area in Iraq.
- *The Iraqi Intervention Force was becoming the counter-insurgency wing of the Iraqi army.* It had been organized after the fighting in Fallujah and designed to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq with primary focus on urban areas, and to assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which MOI security forces can maintain law and order. It was organized as the 1<sup>st</sup> division and was ultimately to be comprised of nine infantry battalions and three armored battalions, organized into three brigades, and to acquire a full range of support units. Its armored forces had BMPs taken from MEK units, and were to acquire some 77 refurbished T-72s provided by Hungary. The division became operational in January, and had a total of 170 US advisors embedded by June.

Its forces negotiated the standard eight-week basic training all Iraqi Soldiers go through learning basic soldiering skills such as weapons, drill and ceremony, Soldier discipline, and physical training skills. After graduation, IIF battalions spent several weeks and months in intensive "military operations in urban terrain" follow-on training – otherwise known as "MOUT" training. In this period, Soldiers worked through instruction in the art of street fighting and building clearing operations typical to anti-insurgent operations in

cities and towns. Units worked in close coordination with other Iraqi Army battalions and were scheduled to a completely stood-up nine-battalion force during 2005.

- *Iraq's Special Operations Forces included a Counter-Terrorist Force and a Commando Battalion*, each of which had conducted dozens of successful operations. The unit was formed based on a conversation between the Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and multinational force personnel to give the Iraqi Armed Forces a high-end strike force in its ongoing security mission against anti-Iraqi forces operating in the country.

Special Forces soldiers were the army's unconventional warfare experts, possessing a broad range of operational skills. The forces consisted of two trained battalions, including the 36th Commando Battalion – an infantry-type strike force – and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion. The force had now been involved in many operations throughout the country fighting anti-Iraqi forces with great distinction while continuing the stand-up effort of the unit. The force was to add a third “support” battalion to its ranks in the coming months.

The Iraqi Special Operations Force – the Iraqi Armed Forces' high-end strike force resembling U.S. Special Forces units – continued training and operations in the country with multinational force assistance. Training was conducted at an undisclosed location. “Selection” for the force began in the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi army units already operating in the country, much like typical multinational Special Forces' recruiting efforts in their own countries. Outstanding recruits successfully negotiating the vetting process, including exhaustive background checks, skill evaluations, and unit evaluations along with literacy, psychological, and physical tests, were run through various team-building and physical events meant to lean down the recruit pool. The selection process ran roughly 10 to 14 days.

The Iraqi Special Forces underwent intense physical, land navigation, small-unit tactics, live-fire, unconventional warfare operations, direct action operations, airmobile operations, counterterrorism, survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training.

- *One Motorized Transport Regiment was already in service, and plans exist to create a Motorized Transport Regiment for each division*. This was part of an overall plan to fully staff divisional and brigade headquarters, add combat and service support units, and give Iraqi units the ability to operate independently in the field and end their dependence on base support and Coalition forces for such operations.
- *Other new forces completed their training and would be ready to assume full-time duty between the end of March and June 2005*.
  - Three more Iraqi Army battalions.
  - Several former Iraqi National Guard battalions.
- *Oil security battalions*: The Ministry of Defense was seeking to create 16 new infrastructure -- or oil security battalions -- with an authorized strength of 727 men each, the strength of other army battalions. These Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIB) were being created to defend pipelines and other oil infrastructure at the direction of Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi. They were a response to the fact that the oil infrastructure in the Kirkuk-Bayji area alone had been struck 14 times between March and June 2005.

Four battalions already existed, but lacked manpower, training, and equipment. The others were to be formed by local/direct recruiting, and given suitable vehicles, AK-47s and light machine guns, GPS, night vision goggles, radios and other necessary equipment. Chalabi had approved a \$35 million, 3-month plan to train the necessary trainers, and equip the first four SIB battalions. Part of the plan was to bring the personnel into the military, but the \$35 million did not cover the same equipment as the regular Army. The plan called for training the first 4 battalions trained starting in mid-

July and going on through October, and to assess funding needs for the remaining battalions.

- *Iraq's 600-man Navy operated* with five 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels, and a naval infantry regiment that recently completed training. Boat crews learned the basics in seamanship before moving on to instruction in advanced seamanship, towing, gunnery, sea rescue, chart reading, navigation, anti-smuggling, operations, and rigid inflatable boat integration and small boat drill instruction. Training was put in the context of a democratically based maritime sea force.

Primary duties included protecting the country's roughly 50-mile coastline from smuggling and foreign fighter infiltration operations as well as the port assets at Umm Qasr in Southern Iraq and oil assets in the Persian Gulf. The force patrolled out to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf with five 27-meter long Chinese-made patrol boats and various other support craft.

The force also included a land-based Coastal Defense Regiment resembling western-type "Marine" infantry forces with an active strength of 100 men and building up to a strength of 300. Land and sea based forces negotiate IAF eight-week basic training courses before moving on to follow-on training and sea training for the boat crews.

The US Department of Defense described the Iraqi Navy's progress as follows in late July 2005:<sup>xliii</sup>

The Iraqi Navy is currently executing operational missions that include border and waterway protection from smuggling and infiltration, and site protection of port and oil assets in the Persian Gulf. The force patrols out to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf using 27-meter patrol boats, rigid-hull inflatable boats, and other support vessels. The Iraqi Navy currently has approximately 500 trained sailors on duty. It is equipped with five Predator Class Patrol Boats (PB), 24 Fast Aluminum Boats (Duel Outboard Engines), 10 rigid-hull inflatable boats, and various small arms and night vision devices. The Iraqi Navy will further equip themselves with six Al Faw Class Patrol Boats (the first of which was delivered in July 2005) and two Off-Shore Support Vessels. With some exceptions, the responsibility for logistical support of the Iraqi Navy has been handed over to the Umm Qasr Base Support Unit (BSU). Maritime and Riverine Advisory Support Team (M&R AST) members provide advice and assistance to both the BSU and the Iraqi Navy Logistics Department in order to cultivate a cooperative working relationship. It is anticipated (based on progression along the CTF-58 assessment program) that the Iraqi Navy will assume point defense responsibilities of the oil terminals by September 30, 2005. Assumption of the waterside mission (the afloat defensive screen) is dependent on the acquisition and initial operational readiness of the six Al Faw class

The Iraqi Navy Training Department currently conducts all of its own training, assisted by the M&R AST. All members of the Iraqi Navy received their initial training in Kirkush. Following basic training, they were trained on mission-focused technical skill sets: ship handling, marlin spike seamanship, navigation, engineering, weapons handling, small boat operations, shipboard damage control, etc.

In June, the Iraqi Navy began interoperability training with their Predator patrol boats and an amphibious transport ship. The Iraqi Navy signed the Iraqi Navy Transition Roadmap on the USS Normandy. The roadmap lays out plans to develop the Iraqi Navy to defend its coastal waters, to give it the capability to perform integrated sea operations, shore support, boarding-and-search operations, point-of-defense of oil terminals, and an overall command and sustainment program.

- *Iraq's Air Force had three operational squadrons.* One additional squadron was stood up in late January-early February. It had nine reconnaissance aircraft, a helicopter squadron, and three C-130 transport aircraft.

All Iraqi Air Force pilots and maintenance personnel negotiated comprehensive one to four-month "conversion courses" largely comprised of familiarization instruction. The training brings air force recruits up to speed on current Iraqi Air Force aircraft as well as serving to augment prior skills.

The air force actively recruited from prior-service personnel pools in the country – officially sending personnel to training after the Iraqi Ministry of Defense's vetting and screening process clears recruits for duty. Training was almost entirely conducted in the United Arab Emirates and Jordan by multinational force partners. After "conversion course" training was completed, trainees went to assigned squadrons in Iraq for follow-on training comprised of advanced instruction and specific operational training.

The Iraqi Air Force was initially slated to be a six-squadron force of various-make light reconnaissance aircraft and various support aircraft including C-130 transport planes and other helicopter craft with operations mainly centered on supporting Iraqi Security Force operations on the ground, infrastructure reconnaissance, and border security missions. The majority of the force was scheduled to be operational by Fall 2005.

The US Department of Defense described the Iraqi Air Force's progress as follows in late July 2005:<sup>xiv</sup>

Like the Army and the Navy, the Iraqi Air Force is conducting operational missions while equipping and training. The Iraqi Air Force's counterinsurgency missions focus on aerial observation /surveillance and air transportation. The Air Force currently has over 100 personnel and has a fleet of 9 helicopters (4 UH-1H and 5 Jet Ranger), 3 C-130s, and 8 single-engine propeller-driven observation airplanes (6 CompAir turboprop aircraft and 2 Seeker piston aircraft). There are 19 Iraqi C-130 personnel currently being trained in the United States. Language training and flight training are being conducted at Al Ali Air Base. Crews have previously trained in Jordan on the UH-1H and Seeker.

- *Command centers were being created for Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and joint operations.*
- *Iraq's two Military Academies* reopened in mid-October and each graduated a pilot course of new lieutenants, 91 total, in early January 2005. The new year-long military academy course was underway based on an Iraqi modification of the course at Sandhurst. Britain had taken the lead in shaping the program at the academy, and Italy was taking the lead in creating staff colleges. A senior command defense college was being developed.

#### *Ministry of Interior*

- *Five basic police academies were operational;* together, they produced over 3,500 new police officers from the 8-week course each month, a course recently modified to better prepare the new police officers for the challenging environment in which some may serve. Several other regional academies were under construction.
- *Police operations were being steadily modified to deal with the insurgent threat.* Suicide bombings and other attacks had led to a steady rise in the number of AK-47s and PKM machine guns issued to the police, and increases in the issue of body armor.
- *Iraq's Mechanized Police Brigade* had completed training and began operations in mid-January, using fifty BTR-94 wheeled, armored vehicles. One additional Mechanized Police battalion was in training. The 8th Mechanized Police Brigade (MPB) was a paramilitary, counterinsurgency Iraqi police unit that would deploy to high risk areas

using light armored personnel carriers. The MPB was planned to comprise three battalions.

The MPB was planned to be able to deploy as a company, battalion or even a brigade-level force. The brigade will be stationed in Central Iraq. The Russian made personnel carrier, known as "BTRs," were used to transport Iraqi Security Forces across Iraq. With a three man crew, each carrier was capable of transporting up to 10 officers. The BTR has twin 23mm cannons and a 7.62 machinegun.

The MPB could serve as outer cordon security for military and other strike missions. The BTRs provided the members of the 8th MPB safe transport to high risk areas with lethal fire power capability.

- *Iraqi police mechanized units were starting to receive delivery of armored security vehicles and began training with them in mid-March 2005.* Logistics units at the division level and a brigade each for logistics, signals, MPs, and engineering were scheduled to stand up by 2006.<sup>xiv</sup> Vehicle plans included a battalion of Cadillac Gage ASD armored security vehicles, and two battalions of BTR-94s, and a range of additional procurements were under study. According to MNSTC-I, uparmored HMMWVs were on order as of summer 2005.
- *Civil Intervention Force (CIF).* As of July 2005, there were three main CIF elements: the ERU, the 8th Mechanized Police, and the Public Order Brigade (POB).

Each type of CIF received different training. The ERU personnel received a four-week basic and four-week advanced Crisis Response Training (CRT) course. Selected individuals went through a five-week Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training course. The 8th Mechanized Brigade received a six-week training course. Selected personnel attend an Operator and Maintenance course at Taji for the Armored Security Vehicles. Lastly, the POB receives a six-week training course at Numaniyah Training Base.

The CIF used a variety of equipment: Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK-47 assault rifles, PKC light machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor. The 8th Mechanized Brigade uses BTR armored personnel carriers with 23mm cannon. Each battalion and member is currently equipped with all mission-essential equipment.

The SPTTs embedded with the 8th Mechanized Brigade and the battalions of the Public Order Brigade submitted a TRA at least monthly on the same areas as do the Army Military Transition Teams. The SPTTs focused their efforts on mentoring the cadres with the least experience. Most recruiting is done from the local population, with the goal of matching the ethnic composition of the unit with that of the area in which it is deployed.

The first three Public Order Battalions were brought into the ISF without CPATT-developed training. The 4th Public Order Battalion completed training last month. Each battalion was equipped with all mission-essential equipment. These units were to be fully trained and equipped by the fall of 2005. Notably, the ERU has a miniscule AWOL/attrition rate. The 8th Mechanized Brigade has a moderate rate, and the Public Order Battalions experience AWOL and attrition rates that are inversely proportional to their pay and training. Candidates for CIF are recruited from the surrounding police stations and provinces.

As with other police units, the exact extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown. A vetting process is used to screen out foreign elements. The effectiveness of the Iraqi police officer cadres and the chain of command varies by province and the experience level of the chain of command.

- *Nine Police Commando battalions were operational.* The Special Police Commando Battalions represented the Iraqi Ministry of Interior's strike-force capability similar to Special Forces units. The commandos were highly vetted Iraqi officers and rank-and-file

servicemen largely made up of prior service Special Forces professionals and other skilled servicemen with specialty unit experience. While some reports stated that, "All members of the unit were chosen based on loyalty to Iraq and its new democratic model," it initially was largely Shi'ite and was often criticized for excessive force in dealing with Sunnis.

The police commando force was however, being expanded to develop a strength of 27 battalions, with 4 more battalions in training. The units focused primarily on building raid operations, counter-terrorist missions including anti-airplane hijacker, kidnapping and other similar missions. The force resembled a paramilitary army-type force complete with heavy weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, and 9mm Glock pistols.

- *Nine Public Order Battalions were operational, and three were commencing training.*
- *Iraq's National Police Emergency Response Unit was operational, and its elements had conducted operations in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul. It was an elite 270-man team trained to respond to national-level law enforcement emergencies. The mission of the emergency response unit was to provide a national, high-end, rapid-response law enforcement tactical unit responsible for high-risk search, arrest, hostage-rescue and crisis response operations.*

The \$64.5 million effort was part of a larger mission to create a national-level law enforcement investigative and special operations capability within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to counter terrorism and large-scale civil disobedience and insurgencies throughout Iraq.

Its capabilities were to eventually include a Counterterrorism Investigative Unit and Special Operations Unit.

Volunteers for the force first had to complete the standard eight-week basic training course or three-week transition integration program course for prior service officers before entering the specialized emergency response unit training modeled after the U.S. State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms' training programs.

Of the total force, 235 eligible candidates received rigorous instruction based on the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Crisis Response Team training program while the balance of 35 recruits are part of the Special Operations Explosive Ordinance Team, based on the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Explosive Incident Countermeasures training course. Team members received instruction on terrorist incidents, kidnappings, hostage negotiations, explosive ordnance, high-risk searches, high-risk assets, weapons of mass destruction, and other national-level law enforcement emergencies. Officers also had an opportunity to receive supplementary training in hostage negotiation, emergency medical procedures, and counterterrorism task force coordination.

The emergency response unit was the predominant force for national-level incidents calling for a DELTA/SWAT capability and was only used in extreme situations by local and national authorities.

It is interesting to note that the report on the Iraqi police and security services by the Inspector General of the State Department and Inspector General of the Department of Defense provides a different view of this force from the MNF-I.<sup>xvii</sup>

The ERU is a Coalition-initiated capability that has not been sanctioned or supported by the Iraqi government. As a result ERU members are not on the MOI payroll, nor do they have police credentials or weapons authorization cards. There are currently three ERU companies, with a fourth serving as a headquarters company. Despite non-sponsorship by the MOI, elements of the ERU have successfully participated in several high-level missions with remarkable results. Like the POBs, the ERU companies train and deploy as a

unit. Camaraderie, morale, and esprit-de-corps are high, despite severe pay issues. Nevertheless, given the lack of sponsorship, attrition is a problem.

The ERU units have no element responsible for gathering, analyzing and disseminating intelligence. Students interviewed by the IG Team stated that the ERU relies on US Special Forces for operational intelligence. This intelligence data is filtered through the MOI, an unwieldy and time consuming process. Formal sponsorship and integration of the ERU within existing IPS structures would serve to alleviate this problem.

- *Iraq's First Special Border Force Battalion* was operating on the Syrian border in western Anbar Province; the Second Battalion completed training in early February and has begun its deployments, and a third completed training in March.
- *Five provincial SWAT teams had been trained and fifteen more were scheduled* for training over the next six months. Provincial Special Weapons and Training (SWAT). These Provincial SWAT teams have been formed by some governors and provincial police chiefs. In addition to standard police basic training, the provincial SWAT teams receive four weeks of training consisting of Human Relations and Police Conduct, Firearms Training (with AK-47 assault rifles and Glock pistols), Mechanical Breaching (e.g., multiple entry, multiple rooms), and Specialty Training – Sniper Training, Offensive Driving, Intelligence, and Surveillance. Recruits are drawn from existing IPS officers selected by IPLOs assigned to the province of origin. These forces mainly use Chevy Luv pickups, AK-47s and Glock pistols. These forces are first trained to a basic level and are receiving additional practical skills training. Currently, new SWAT personnel are recruited only as replacements for existing SWAT teams. An increase in specialized training is required. The Provincial SWAT team assessments are included with the Provincial Police TRAs.
- *The Provincial Emergency Battalion units* are formed by the local Chiefs of Police without Coalition Forces' involvement. To date, CPATT has not conducted training for these units and has not provided equipment or supplies. If these units join a recognized MOI unit, then they would receive full training and supplies.
- *Iraqi Highway Patrol (IHP)*: The IHP had about 1,400 members trained and on duty in late July 2005. IHP officers attend a 21-day training program that covers basic policing, driving skills, convoy escort, and weapons qualification with pistol, rifle, and machine gun.

IHP officers used a variety of equipment: Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK-47 assault rifles, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor.

The IHP did not have a TRA at this time. The goal for recruiting was a minimum of 300 cadets monthly until a force of 6,300 was built. All IHP patrolpersons and officers graduated from the four-week IHP Academy. The equipment goal was for each patrolperson and station to be equipped with mission-essential equipment. The IHP began working with the U.S. Military Police Brigade in Baghdad in July 2005 to develop individual and squad skills and defined goals

*Other:*

- Members of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq were now helping to advise and train the Iraqi staffs of the National Joint Operations Center, the Ministry of Defense Operations Center, and the Ministry of Interior Operations Center, as well as the Armed Forces Joint Headquarters and Ministry of Defense.
- NATO trainers were also assisting the cadre of the Iraqi Military Academy and NATO trainers will help Iraq reestablish its Staff College and War College in 2005. A number of NATO nations were already providing equipment for Iraqi Security Forces and of training opportunities in NATO countries, with many additional offers extant.

- The Bureau of Dignitary Protection's protected and safeguarded high level government officials and visiting dignitaries. The MOI does not recognize the BDP. As of April 2005, 395 candidates had completed training. There is no requirement for members of the BDP to be policemen or to have previously received basic police training. BDP agents have no arrest powers, nor do they carry police credentials or weapons' permits. Students undergoing BDP training generally are selected from the guarded dignitary's family and/or tribe. Based on this selection criterion many of the trained BDP personnel were replaced after the April 2005 change in government leadership. Incumbents to office selected their own trusted agents and relatives to serve in this capacity.<sup>xlvii</sup>

### *Near-Term Goals*

No decisions had been taken about the longer-term structure of Iraqi forces, and how it should eventually be transformed from a counterinsurgency force to a national defense force. These include key decisions as to the extent to which it should establish more heavy armored forces, and a large air force or navy.

MNSTC-I experts cautioned against investing in heavier forces before it was clear they were needed. An MNSTC-I advisor put it this way:<sup>xlviii</sup>

A heavier force, whether for force protection or for defense against invasion, also costs more. The Iraqis can't really afford to purchase, operate, and maintain such a force – even with the multiple billions of dollars we are providing. Given fiscal constraints that will last for several years, Iraq has to consider opportunity costs before committing to the addition of more heavy forces. The Iraqis might decide that the additional motorized division being considered might better be traded for less-expensive light forces. They could instead decide to spend that money on much-needed infrastructure protection forces, which may be even more important strategically.

The new Minister of Defense agreed with many of these comments, and it was clear that the future financing of Iraq's forces had become a serious consideration in making such choices

In other areas, Iraq and the MNF-I set the following near term goals and priorities:<sup>xlix</sup>

- Better intelligence,
- Improving the institutional capability of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior,
- Strengthening the police.
- Improving border defense and security,
- Creating an effective army command structure,
- Strengthening national counter-terrorist forces,
- Transitioning detainee operations to Iraq,
- Securing the national electrical and oil infrastructure,
- Integrating Iraqi counter-insurgency planning and execution,
- Force protection, and
- Establishing a process of continuous transition from Coalition to Iraq forces.

The Iraqi government and MNF-I were now focusing on both creating the kind of balanced Iraqi forces that could stand on their own in fighting the insurgency and transitioning operations from Coalition to Iraqi forces. The command guidance that emerged out of these priorities was to build an army, not just combat battalions, with

suitable logistics and institution training. It was to finish manning, training, equipping, and basing the 7th Division (2 brigades and a division headquarters), standard the various infantry battalions, create new forward operating bases in the west and northwest, add special forces as enablers, and fund infrastructure security requirements.

The Iraqi government and MNF-1 also sought to fund new reconnaissance aircraft, develop better support for the Emergency Response Units, man existing Public Order Battalions at 750 men each, and improve existing forces while new elements were being generated. Special emphasis was being put on improving combat service support functions by adding motorized transport regiments, and standardizing headquarters and service companies. Divisional signal companies were being developed, as were intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (IS&R) capabilities.

One other change that illustrated the growing role of the Iraqi government in shaping Iraqi force plans and force development was a new set of goals for the Iraqi police service – although such plans were not without problems:<sup>1</sup>

As Iraqi officials articulate positions on IPS issues, an emerging concept is the development of a ‘third force’—a capability between orthodox police and internal security military units. Consistent with this objective, the MOI enthusiastically embraces the preparation of the Public Order Brigades (POB). An MOI initiative, Special Police Commando Units and an IPS mechanized brigade are now operative. CPATT conceived the POB program and is engaged in training the Special Police Commandos.

At the same time, the MOI has not claimed ownership of the CPATT-trained Emergency Response Unit (ERU), the Bureau of Dignitary Protection (BDP), or even the SWAT teams that have performed well in operations in Mosul and elsewhere. MOI attitudes relative to these units are reflected in frequent failure to pay IPs serving in those units. The IG Team concludes that, as the Iraqis eventually assume responsibility for IPS training, the status of these Coalition-conceived units may languish

## ***Operational Readiness***

As has been touched upon earlier, there was a significant increase in the level of Iraqi military, security, and elite police unit activity during the spring of 2005, and improvements in areas like intelligence and counter-IED operations.<sup>ii</sup> Many of these activities are listed in the Chronology in Appendix A. At the same time, there were still significant problems with the new combat elements of various forces, and readiness and desertions remained serious issues

### ***Concerns over Iraqi Progress Following the Election***

In testimony before the Senate on February 3, 2005, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz acknowledged that many new Iraqi soldiers had failed to return to their posts after going home to deliver paychecks. He stated that Iraqi army units were experiencing absentee rates of up to 40 percent and that 1,342 Iraqi soldiers and police had died since June 2004.<sup>iii</sup> The problem of recruits going home with their paychecks had not been anticipated in the original timelines in the training plan, and delayed some training timelines dramatically.<sup>iii</sup>

In the same hearing, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, estimated that approximately 40,000 of the reported 136,000 members of the Iraqi military and security forces were trained and equipped to ‘go anywhere and take on any

threat' in Iraq. The rest, he acknowledged, were not yet ready for duties beyond policing calm parts of southern Iraq.

General John Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM, highlighted a different concern over the Iraqi military leadership. He stated, "There's a shortage of trained officers that will respect the government, be loyal to the government and support the government over the long term."<sup>liv</sup> Lt. Gen. Petraeus stated, "In an Iraqi unit, the leader is really of paramount importance. He sets the tone for an organization. There is really a premium on finding, investing in and strengthening good leaders."<sup>lv</sup>

These warnings reflected the fact that some Iraqi unit leaders continued to be reluctant or unwilling to lead their unit into the field. In other cases, they deployed but acted like autocrats instead of leaders. Soldiers were sent on personal errands for the unit leader. Other Iraqi commanders take the view that the soldiers have to like the commander and be cajoled into accepting and completing missions. These views frustrated the US advisors and mentors that train these leaders.

The often rigid, hierarchical nature of the Iraqi chain of command presented another problem in creating effective leaders. Junior officers who exhibited promising initiative and leadership could be frustrated by the failure of higher-ups to delegate authority. Patrols and simple tasks could not be performed without the explicit order of the unit commander. US advisors worried that such an atmosphere would discourage the best soldiers and possible leaders from staying with the Iraqi military.<sup>lvi</sup> They saw efforts to train junior officers in initiative and "leading forward" as critical, as well as efforts to create a Western-style force of well-trained and effective NCOs, but they worried about the scale and continuity of such Iraqi efforts to change the "culture" of Iraq's forces.

In spite of major Iraqi and Coalition efforts to create mixed or "national units," observers were concerned that much of the officer corps remained more loyal to region, tribe, religion, or ethnic group than to the country. This presented the risk of separatism in the case of the Kurds and dominance in the case of the Shi'ites.

Both US experts and senior policy officials were concerned that the Shi'ite majority would purge Iraqi forces, and the Ministries of Defense and Interior. One US official in Baghdad reported that Shi'ites were indeed "clearing out political undesirables from the police and army." To what degree this is happening and if it is widespread is unclear, but such actions would only push more armed men towards the insurgency.

The commander of MNF-I, General George W. Casey, highlighted four continuing problems in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2005. He pointed to the challenges of:<sup>lvii</sup>

Providing the training, equipment, and sustainability to Iraqi forces while their force structure is in the midst of serious changes.

Developing Iraqi forces without a system that measures their capabilities

Enhancing loyalty and developing effective leadership in the Iraqi chain of command

Creating police that can do their job in a violent atmosphere while respecting the rule of law.

Despite these challenges, US CENTCOM commander Gen. John P. Abizaid expressed optimism about the ultimate success of the force building effort in March 2005. He

stated that “They [Iraqi forces] will get better and I think in 2005 will take on the majority of the tasks.”<sup>lviii</sup>

### *Increasing Deployment and Activity*

In spite of the problems in their overall readiness, Iraqi forces continued to intensify their military raids, and the number of active Iraqi units actually deployed and fighting the insurgent forces continued to grow. A combination of Coalition and Iraqi raids led to high daily insurgent casualties and captures, and to the deaths or capture of many mid-level fighters and some high level insurgent leaders, although most of most wanted insurgents remained elusive.<sup>lix</sup>

HUMINT slowly improved, with growing Iraqi support, and the capture of insurgents and terrorists helped provide additional information -- as did the capture of many of their records, diaries, and computers. US-run detention centers were nearing capacity. In January 2005, the number of captured insurgents reached the highest levels since March 2004. The US had roughly 7,900 “security detainees” in captivity in January 2005. The total then increased by another 20% to 11,350 by early May. Maj. Gen. William H. Bradenburg, commander of US detention operations in Iraq, declared that US and Iraqi forces were arresting an average of 50 suspected insurgents every day, with the 2005 average approaching 70 arrests per day.<sup>lx</sup>

Press sources on such developments are uncertain, and sometimes conflicting, but they report that responsibility for providing security in parts of Baghdad began to be turned over to Iraqi forces in late February 2005 and in earnest in March 2005. The 305<sup>th</sup> “Tiger” Brigade of the Iraqi Army appears to have been the first unit to assume security responsibilities in parts of Baghdad in February.

In March, it was joined by the 40<sup>th</sup> Iraqi Army Brigade, bringing the total number of neighborhoods in Baghdad in Iraqi Army hands to 10, including the violent Adhamiya neighborhood and Haifa Street. The commander of Iraqi forces in Baghdad, Gen. Mudhir Mawla, stated, “These operations now are being planned and conducted 100 percent by the Iraqi forces.”<sup>lxi</sup> General Mawla recognized the significance of the gradual transfer, stating, “The plan depends on the success of the 40<sup>th</sup> Brigade in Baghdad. If we succeed in controlling Baghdad, then there will be no need for the presence of US forces. They will have bases outside of Baghdad.”<sup>lxii</sup>

The mixed character of Iraqi performance is indicated by the fact that the US could deploy a former Iraqi National Guard unit like the 302nd Battalion to the troubled, Sadr-dominated, Haifa Road area in Baghdad and plan to deploy a force of some 10,000 Iraqis in Baghdad by late 2005 in an effort to replace US troops. The 1,000 men in the 302nd had also taken 26 casualties in 15 months of fighting -- a higher rate than most US units.

The 302nd was also one of the units that now had a 25-75 man US advisory team embedded in the unit, and was a demonstration of the effectiveness of having US forces help Iraqi units make the transition to full combat effectiveness in the field -- a shift in US training efforts that took place early in 2005 and which is described in more detail in the final chapter of this analysis. One special feature of this effort was deploying a team of US Special Forces to train a 30-man strike platoon in raids, targeting reconnaissance, and undercover intelligence.<sup>lxiii</sup>

At the same time, another such unit -- the 305th battalion -- that was deployed to Baghdad in May 2005 had lost 50% of its original strength to desertions since being formed in late 2003, and lost dozens more as it moved toward deployment. Its marksmanship and fire discipline remained terrible (soldiers would "cook" an entire magazine in a single poorly aimed burst), and it tended to "huddle," rather than actively patrol.

The Iraqi Army deployed units to real missions in increasing numbers, and by April, it had two areas of operation (AORs) of its own in Mosul and the Haifa Road area in Baghdad. The units performed well in providing security before the elections and in Mosul afterwards, although Iraqi battalions operated in areas near US battalions. Even in this case, however, two battalion commanders had to be replaced in Mosul, and one company commander after he hid from an angry crowd on election day.<sup>lxiv</sup>

Iraq also began to conduct independent operations in moderate to high threat areas like the greater Baghdad area. The Iraqi Interior and Defense Ministries announced on May 26 that they had launched a joint action dubbed "Operation Lightning" involving more than 40,000 Iraqi security forces in Baghdad. The troops, who manned 675 mobile checkpoints and mounted sweeps throughout the city, moved to gain control of all of the roads in and out of the city.

The US military reported that Operation Lightning led to a 38% reduction in vehicle-borne bombs exploding and a 23% increase in such bombs being detected prior to detonation. The operation decreased Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonations by 10% and the number of coordinated or elaborate attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces fell by 18%.

#### Other major Iraqi operations included:

Iraqi forces rehearsed, planned, and executed an infiltration and raid entirely on their own southeast of Mosul that yielded intelligence used to capture six insurgent suspects on May 26<sup>th</sup>.

At the end of May, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, stated on NBC's Today Show that Iraqi security forces were conducting five operations completely on their own and without Coalition support.

Coalition forces and Iraq security forces uncovered approximately 50 insurgent weapons and ammunition caches in 72 hours in the Al Anbar province in early June. North of Karmah, the joint operation uncovered a series of bunkers that contained weapons, ammunition, night vision goggles, uniforms, cell phones, and living quarters. Reportedly, detainees and local residents providing tips that led to the successful raids.

In June, Iraqi and Coalition forces captured insurgent leader Mullah Mahdi in Mosul after a brief gun battle. Mahdi is believed to be linked to Ansar al-Sunna and to the Syrian intelligence service. According to Iraqi Maj. Gen. Khalil Ahmed al-Obeidi, "He [Mahdi] was wanted for almost all car bombs, assassinations of high officials, beheadings of Iraqi policemen and soldiers, and for launching attacks against multinational forces."<sup>lxv</sup> Despite Obeidi's statements, the exact extent of Mahdi's role in the insurgency is unclear.

At the same time, there were efforts to persuade Sunni insurgent groups to give up their support for the insurgency and join Iraq's new political process. The details of these talks are unclear, as is their scope and success. In a typical press report on such activity, Aiham Alsammarae -- a former electricity minister under the interim government -- claimed that he had been in contact with the leaders of the insurgent groups the Islamic

Army in Iraq and the Mujahideen Army. Alsammarae claimed that he had met with the groups' leaderships approximately 10 times in four months and that the leaders were ready to enter in to negotiations with the Iraqi government and the US. The Iraqi government had not been contacted by Alsammarae and neither had the MNF-I forces.<sup>lxvi</sup>

### *The New Force Evaluation Matrix*

The fact that virtually all active Iraqi units now could take over some missions did not mean they had the readiness to take over most missions, or that more than a small portion as yet could perform demanding missions. The vast majority of Iraqi military, security, and police units only had readiness to perform no more than limited security missions.

Iraq's evolving structure was still a very mixed force. Some units performed well. Others were evolving the leadership and sense of unit cohesion and integrity needed to become effective -- although often only with a major stiffening of US advisors and by a replacement policy that constantly fed in new officers and other ranks until the unit actually held together. However, there were still many cases where new -- and sometimes previously effective -- police and other units refused to fight, huddled in defensive positions, or had serious desertion rates. Corruption, nepotism and political favoritism, false manpower reports, and false activity reports continued to be serious problems -- something that was inevitable in trying to develop security and police forces in a foreign culture and in a country that was governed in a corrupt manner for decades

Iraqi forces had, however, advanced to the point where readiness could be judged in terms of mission capability, and not broad factors like "trained and equipped." The Iraqi Army and National Guard, security services, and police were now being rated by a new evaluation matrix developed by the MNSTC-I. This matrix was developed by a combination of Iraqi brigade and battalion commanders, and their US advisors, and looked at factors like manning levels, equipment levels, training, command and control, leadership, and logistics.

As has been touched upon earlier, this matrix was called the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA). The assessment of operational units conducted through Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Coalition Military Transition Teams embedded at the battalion, brigade, and division level units for the Iraqi Army; Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) with MOI's Special Police Commando battalions and Civil Intervention Forces; and partnership at the provincial levels with the Iraqi police forces.<sup>lxvii</sup>

As Figure 29 shows, the TRAs rated Iraqi units as having one of four levels of mission capability. This ranking system different by force type and evolved over time. For example, in July 2005, the assessments of military units took into account a variety of criteria similar to -- but not identical to -- the criteria U.S. Army used to evaluate its units' operational readiness. They focused on factors like personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership. Overall, operational Iraqi Army units were categories assessed as follows:<sup>lxviii</sup>

Level 1: Capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations independent of Coalition forces;

Level 2: Capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition enablers (Level 2); or

Level 3: Capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations only when operating alongside Coalition units (Level 3).

Level 4: Incapable of operations.

The results of this readiness system are classified because MNF-1 feels that too much detail would effectively target the less ready units for insurgent attack, and deprive them of some of their value as a deterrent and in performing less demanding missions. This is a major consideration since Level 1, 2, and 3 units can and are all perform some useful mission, even if most units cannot stand alone.

Reports have, however, been issued in various “blogs” and press reports. According to some press reports, the Iraqi Army and National Guard had a total of 81 battalions by late May 2005, but a new evaluation matrix developed by the MNSTC-I only rated three battalions at the top level of readiness and capability, and this did not mean they were capable of independent operations. Only one of 26 brigade headquarters had such a rating.

If one included all of the special police battalions, the press reported that the total force rose from 81 battalions to 101, but the number rated in the top category only rose from three to five. The US had concluded that it needed to make further major increases in the number of US advisory or “transition teams” embedded in Iraqi units and was seeking to rapidly deploy 2,500 more men by mid-June.<sup>lxix</sup>

For reasons touched upon earlier, the new rating system found that Iraqi units were particularly weak in logistics, because they were being rushed into combat readiness, and lack support personnel like truck drivers, supply clerks, medics and engineers. Instead of the nearly 50-50 tooth-to-tail ratio in US forces, only 4,000 of the 75,800 men in rated units were performing support function.

As a result, equipment still tended to mysteriously disappear, the manpower rolls sometimes had phantom soldiers, and maintenance and support were provided largely by US forces. This helps explain why the Iraqi government and MNF-I planned to convert one out of five companies in each Iraqi battalion -- some 140 men each -- into service support units; to create separate transportation regiments and an brigade, and set up 10 maintenance and supply bases across Iraq.<sup>lxx</sup>

MNSTC-I did not provide unclassified data on the results of the new ranking system because it was concerned that any detailed reports on the readiness of Iraqi forces would be used by insurgents to attack the weaker units. However, its experts did summarize the status of Iraqi forces in mid-June as follows: No special police units were rated “fully capable” and less than a handful of Army units. Some 40% of the special police units were rated “capable” and 20% of Army units. Some 40% of the special police units were rated “partially capable” and 45% of Army units. Less than 10% of the special police units were rated “incapable” and less than 20% of Army units.

Once again, the system was slower in ranking the regular police than the military and security forces. Only a small fraction of Iraq's 940 police stations had been assessed using the new system as of May 1, 2005.<sup>lxxi</sup> The new readiness system was, however, being steadily expanded to cover the police, and the MNF-I described the effort as follows in late July 2005.<sup>lxxii</sup>

MOI Civil Intervention Forces (CIF), Emergency Response Units (ERU), and Special Police Commando Battalions are evaluated using a Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) process that is similar to that used for MOD forces. MNC-I Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) are embedded with the MOI's Special Police Commando battalions and CIF. The SPTT criteria are similar to those of the MOD forces. Police Partnership Program (P3) teams are partnered at the provincial levels with the police to help identify areas of progress and shortcomings to determine when these forces will be able to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. In lieu of the TRA, police partnership assessments look at factors that are more tailored to the tasks of a police force. More than half of provincial police headquarters currently are assessed to have control in their province.

In any case, more than 60 Army/National Guard combat battalions could perform some role as "partially capable" forces by early August 2005, and more than 20 combat battalions were "capable." In the case of special police forces -- which included the Public Order Battalions, Mechanized Battalions, Special Police Commando Battalions, and Emergency Response Units, there were roughly 28 battalion equivalents authorized and 21 actually operational. Some 10 each of these 21 battalions were "partially capable" or "fully capable." A long way from a perfect force, but a much longer way from the strength of a single active battalion in July 2004.

US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace, spoke to the concerns about the Iraqi security forces' ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations on their own. At a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing in June 2005, Gen. Pace stated:<sup>lxiii</sup>

Only a small number of Iraqi Security Forces are taking on the insurgents and terrorists by themselves. Approximately one-third of their army battalions are capable of planning, executing and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support. Approximately two-thirds of their army battalions and one half of their police battalions are partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units. Approximately one half of their police battalions are forming and not yet capable of conducting operations. The majority of Iraqi Security Forces are engaged in operations against the insurgency with varying degrees of cooperation and support from coalition forces. Many of these units have performed superbly in conducting operations against the enemy, and their operational capability is continuing to improve.

Looking towards the future, the focus of Iraqi and MNF efforts had shifted from force formation to force effectiveness, and by mid-2005, MNSTC-I's goal was to "graduate" most remaining units from basic/small unit training at Level 3 ("Fighting Alongside" coalition forces) by the end of 2005 through mid-2006. Their progression to Level 2 or Level 1 will follow on varying timelines. Some "graduated" units may still be assessed as Level 4 (Forming), but they should be the exception.

**Figure 29**  
**Iraqi Transition Readiness Assessment**

<b>Level 1</b>	<u>Fully Capable:</u> A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
<b>Level 2</b>	<u>Capable:</u> A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.
<b>Level 3</b>	<u>Partially Capable:</u> A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.
<b>Level 4</b>	<u>Incapable:</u> A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Source: MNF-I, June 2005

***Manpower Relative to Force Structure as Another Measure of the Readiness of Iraqi Forces***

Other forms of MNF reporting provide additional insights into Iraqi progress in achieving readiness. Figure 30 shows the manpower in the Iraqi military force structure as of the end of June 2005. Three things are striking about the data in this figure. The first is the clear emergence of a 10-division Iraqi force structure in the Army, and of clearly defined unit elements in the Air Force and Navy. Readiness is not simply a matter of unit capability; it is a matter of developing a force structure that is large enough to be effective.

The second is the high manning levels in many units. There were many battalion and other force elements still badly understrength, but other units were overmanned. Iraqi forces were slowly coming together.

Third, while some 10-20% of Iraqi manpower was still on leave/pass status, the percentages that were actually absent without leave (AWOL) were now relatively low. In short, the basic structure to bring Iraqi military forces to a higher level of readiness was now in place.

**Figure 30****Iraqi Military Force Structure and Manpower Readiness**

As of June 24, 2005

<u>Force/Unit Element and Location</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual Assigned</u>	<u>Percent Manned</u>	<u>Percent AWOL</u>
<b>I. Total Forces</b>				
Iraqi Army				
Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF)	9819	9989	102	2
Regular Army (Does not include ING)	40783	42237	104	2
Iraqi Army (former Iraqi National Guard)	42547	31666	74	2
Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF)	1967	1031	52	3
Army: RA, IIF, IA	92074	81992	89	2
Army: RA, IIF, IA, ISOF	94041	83030	88	2
Iraqi Navy (IQN)	631	763	121	1
Iraqi Air Force (IQAF)	695	256	37	0
<b>II. Iraqi Army</b>				
Headquarters/Training/Trans				
Joint Forces Headquarters	505	292	58	0
Iraqi Military Academy Ar Rustamiyah (IMAR)	238	78	33	0
Zahko Military Academy	N/A	26	-	0
1 <sup>st</sup> Training Battalion (Taji)	240	763	318	0
1 <sup>st</sup> Transportation Regiment (Taji)	765	908	119	1
2 <sup>nd</sup> Transportation Regiment (An Numaniyah)	765	738	96	2
3 <sup>rd</sup> Transportation Regiment (Al Kasik)	765	510	67	0
1 <sup>st</sup> Engineer Regiment	184	181	98	1
Iraqi Army Force Structure				
<u>1<sup>st</sup> Division Total</u>				
1 <sup>st</sup> Division (IIF) HQ (Baghdad-Taji)	9645	9572	99	2
1 <sup>st</sup> Div 1 BDE (IIF) (Baghdad-Al-Rustamiyah)	225	963	428	1
1 <sup>st</sup> Div 2 BDE (IIF) (Fallujah)	174	303	174	1
1 <sup>st</sup> Div 3 BDE (IIF) (Mosul-Ghabat)	174	356	205	8
1 <sup>st</sup> Div 4 BDE (IIF) (Fallujah)	174	319	183	1
1 <sup>st</sup> Div 5 BDE (IIF) (Fallujah)	174	398	229	9
<u>2<sup>nd</sup> Division Total</u>				
2 <sup>nd</sup> Div HQ (Mosul-Al Kindi)	9645	9875	102	1
2 <sup>nd</sup> Div 1 BDE (Irbil-Kesenzan)	225	0	0	-
2 <sup>nd</sup> Div 2 BDE (Irbil-Kesenzan)	174	0	0	-
2 <sup>nd</sup> Div 3 BDE (Mosul-Al Kindi)	727	1160	160	0
2 <sup>nd</sup> Div 4 BDE (Mosul-Al Kindi)	174	534	307	0
2 <sup>nd</sup> Div 5 BDE (Dahuk-fenfil camp)	174	941	541	4
<u>3<sup>rd</sup> Division Total</u>				
3 <sup>rd</sup> Division HQ (Al Kisik)	7290	8078	111	5
3 <sup>rd</sup> Div 1 BDE (Tal Afar)	225	371	165	0
3 <sup>rd</sup> Div 2 BDE (Al-Kisik)	174	414	238	7
3 <sup>rd</sup> Div 3 BDE (Al-Kisik)	174	342	197	11
3 <sup>rd</sup> Div 4 BDE (Al-Kisik)	174	240	138	0
<u>4<sup>th</sup> Division Total</u>				
4 <sup>th</sup> Division HQ (Toahs Kharmato)	8744	8089	93	1
4 <sup>th</sup> Div 1 BDE 1 BN (Tikrit)	225	197	88	-
4 <sup>th</sup> Div 2 BDE (Kirkuk)	727	574	79	0
4 <sup>th</sup> Div 3 BDE (Kirkuk)	174	0	0	-
4 <sup>th</sup> Div 4 BDE (Sulaymaniyah)	174	172	99	0
<u>5<sup>th</sup> Division Total</u>				
5 <sup>th</sup> Division HQ (Kirkush)	8017	9168	114	2
5 <sup>th</sup> Div 1 BDE (Kirkush)	225	312	139	0
5 <sup>th</sup> Div 2 BDE (Kirkush)	174	469	270	1

5 Div 2 BDE (Baqubah)	174	237	136	0
5 Div 3 BDE (an Numaniyah)	174	290	167	0
<b>6<sup>th</sup> Division Total</b>	<b>15635</b>	<b>14436</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>3</b>
6 Div HQ (Baghdad Protection Div)	225	652	290	1
6 Div 1 BDE (Baghdad)	174	190	109	0
6 Div 2 BDE (Baghdad)	174	204	117	0
6 Div 3 BDE (Baghdad)	174	211	121	0
6 Div 4 BDE (Baghdad)	174	211	121	0
6 Div 5 BDE (Baghdad)	174	0	0	-
<b>7<sup>th</sup> Division Total</b>	<b>7290</b>	<b>2487</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>0</b>
7 Div HQ	225	0	0	-
7 Div 1 BDE (Martyr Monument)	174	320	184	0
7 Div 2 BDE (Fallujah)	174	0	0	-
7 Div 3 BDE (Ramadi)	727	0	0	-
<b>8<sup>th</sup> Division Total</b>	<b>6563</b>	<b>6751</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>1</b>
8 Div HQ	225	176	78	0
8 Div 1 BDE (Diwaniyah)	174	105	60	0
8 Div 2 BDE (Hilla)	174	101	58	0
8 Div 3 BDE (Kut)	174	104	60	0
<b>9<sup>th</sup> Division Total</b>	<b>4868</b>	<b>2524</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>2</b>
9 Div (Tadji)	96	0	0	-
9 Div 1 <sup>st</sup> Mech BDE	96	345	359	0
9 Div 2 <sup>nd</sup> Armored BDE	96	0	0	-
9 Div 3 <sup>rd</sup> Mech BDE	96	0	0	-
<b>10<sup>th</sup> Division Total</b>	<b>8191</b>	<b>5468</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>1</b>
10 Div HQ (Basrah)	225	169	75	2
10 Div 1 BDE (Basrah)	174	345	198	1
10 Div 2 BDE (Al Samawah)	174	160	92	0
10 Div 3 BDE (Al Nasiriyah/Oor camp)	174	114	66	0
10 Div 4 BDE (Al Betairah Airport)	174	129	74	0
<b>Iraqi Special Operations Forces</b>				
SOF HQ	143	33	23	0
36 <sup>th</sup> Battalion	829	602	73	4
Iraqi C Task Force	451	290	64	0
Recce Company	190	49	26	0
SPT	354	64	53	3
<b>III. Iraqi Navy</b>				
<b>Iraqi Navy Force Structure</b>				
Iraqi Navy HQ	92	380	413	1
Iraqi Navy (Seamen)	231	191	83	0
Iraqi Navy (Infantry)	308	192	62	2
<b>IV. Iraqi Air Force</b>				
Iraqi Air Force Structure	Air Force HQ	49	17	35 0
3 <sup>rd</sup> Squadron VIP	74	24	32	0
23 <sup>rd</sup> Squadron Transport	144	113	78	0
70 <sup>th</sup> Squadron Recce	84	36	43	0
12 <sup>th</sup> Squadron Jet Ranger	66	13	20	0
4 <sup>th</sup> Squadron Helo	97	0	0	-
2 <sup>nd</sup> Squadron Helo	97	53	55	0
96 <sup>th</sup> Squadron Recce	84	0	0	-

Source: MNF-I

### *Problems and Progress in the Iraqi Police*

For reasons discussed throughout this analysis, reports on the Iraqi police continued to be considerably more mixed than reports on the Iraqi army and security forces, and varied sharply according to unit and the specific mission involved. The largely Iraqi-created Special Police Commandos, for example, got high praise for their aggressiveness, effectiveness, and discipline. The 5,000-man force was formed by former Minister of Interior Falah al-Nqib, with the help of his senior US advisor, Steve Casteel, a former DEA official with extensive experience with narcoterrorism in Latin America. It was led by Adnan Thabit, a former "Ba'athist," and performed well in Mosul, Ramadi, Baghdad, and Samarra, and acquired a reputation for its toughness, although not for its gentleness and respect for human rights.<sup>lxxiv</sup>

In Baghdad, special police commandos under the command of Brig. Gen. Rashid Flaieh became embroiled in a controversy surrounding the deaths of 10 Sunni suspects in July 2005. Flaieh's commandos received fire from insurgents near Amariya. Though several of the commandos were injured, they returned fire and then pursued the fleeing gunmen. When General Flaieh took his wounded to the Noor Hospital, close to Abu Ghraib, an area known for its support of the insurgency, he was informed that several militants were being treated inside. According to General Flaieh, his men recognized 10 of those who had attacked them, restrained them, and put them into an "armored van."<sup>lxxv</sup>

It remains unclear whether the commandos were from the First Brigade as alleged by doctors or whether they were members of a paramilitary force called the Special Security force as General Flaieh maintains. The suspects were locked in the van for two hours according to the general, while witnesses said it was more like 12 hours. When the van was opened up, all 10 Sunnis, all members of the Zobaas and Dulaimi tribes known to be involved in the insurgency, had suffocated. According to doctors who examined the bodies, the victims' bodies indicated that they had been subjected to electrical shock and cable beatings. General Flaieh denied that the suspects had been tortured and asserted that they had suffocated in the van due to a faulty air conditioner.<sup>lxxvi</sup> Virtually all of the details of the encounter were disputed by doctors, witnesses, and other policemen.

Doctors at the al Yarmouk hospital went on strike in July 2005 in protest over rough treatment at the hands of the Iraqi Army. According to medical staff, soldiers entered the hospital with their weapons, actions forbidden by a government order signed by Barham Saleh, pulled blankets off of women patients, and insulted the overnight doctor. The doctors demanded that the soldiers apologize to the doctor, that security be provided for all of the hospital's doctors, and that the MOD and MOI should rigidly enforce the prohibition of weapons in hospitals.

Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr responded to charges of detainee abuse by Iraqi soldiers in July by reiterating the fact that he had strengthened the office of the Inspector General. Jabr stated that he had empowered the Inspector General to investigate human rights abuses and allegations of corruption. The Inspector General was given the ability to bring charges against individuals involved in human rights abuses and instances of corruption. Lastly, the IG was instructed to inform the interior minister of all such cases. Jabr pointed out that the ministry had arrested individuals within the ministry who were found to have been involved in such instances.

The danger, however, is that if such incidents are repeated, the MOI and MOD forces, largely composed of Shi'ites and some Saddam-era soldiers, will fail to attract Sunni support and rather be seen as an instrument of oppression rather than an example of the rule of law. The goal is to create a force that reinforces the law and elicits respect from the Iraqi people, not an apparatus reminiscent of Saddam's police state.

There were also reports of the slow rebuilding of Iraqi police units in Mosul, and in its approaches like the town of Qayyarah on the Tigris and along the main Mosul to Baghdad highway. The area had become a major trouble spot after insurgents fled the battle of Fallujah, and police in the area had suddenly deserted in numbers that cut their strength from 2,000 to 50. By April 2005, however, many units were up to strength and the police were actively patrolling the area.<sup>lxxvii</sup>

General Abizaid and four other high ranking US officers gave briefings in late May 2005 that made it clear that they felt the police had fallen behind the regular military forces, and this meant Army units and elite units had to be used for security duties, rather than replacing Coalition forces in combat. They took an unusually public stance on the issue, and some warned that it would "take years" to make such Iraqi forces effective and deal with the insurgency. They also stated that these problems with the police were a key reason why Iraqi forces could not participate actively in Operation Matador in April, the largest Marine offensive since Fallujah and a key effort to secure main routes in from Syria and the Syrian border area. They claimed the lack of troops was also a reason so many insurgents were able to disperse.<sup>lxxviii</sup>

At the same time, some of these problems had occurred because the police took the brunt of insurgent attacks, largely because they were more exposed and more vulnerable. According to Pentagon sources, the police took the vast majority of the 1,850 casualties in Iraqi forces that Department of Defense sources had counted as of mid-May 2005.<sup>lxxix</sup> Given the lack of training, equipment, facilities and leadership they began with, it is not surprising that there were many cases where police units had high desertion rates, huddled in their headquarters, or did not perform their duties. There were also cases where they performed actions like torturing three Shi'ite militiamen in their custody to death.<sup>lxxx</sup>

The problems in the police were compounded by the lack of a retirement system under Saddam Hussein's government that meant older police, and even their widows, were carried as active to give them some income. Selection and promotion by favoritism, and bribe taking had become part of the police culture, as had passively waiting for complaints from victims, and then taking money from both the accused and complainant. The lack of a fully staffed financial management, manpower, and planning, and financial control structure in the Minister of the Interior also added to these problems.

By the late spring and early summer of 2005, however, things had begun to improve. The Ministry of Defense was now gradually beginning to take shape as a functioning ministry, and with key staff elements like an inspector general. As has been shown earlier, most serious equipment problems had been corrected, although problems existed in the way the inventory was distributed. Figures 25, 26, and 27 have already shown the improvement in training, and "trained and equipped" manpower exceed 91,000 in the early summer (including 58,764 police, 5,136 in the civil intervention force, 8131 police

commando, 205 in the central Emergency Response Unit, 1,118 highway patrol, and 500 dignitary protection), and a tentative force goal of 135,000 men had been established. These figures did not include any men from the older Civil Defense Force, or any of the 74,400 men still assigned to the remnants of the relatively low grade Facilities Protection Service.

The Iraqi Special Police Force had made major progress toward reaching a strength of some 56,000 men, although serious questions remained about how broadly-based its leadership and manpower were, and how many Sunnis were included:

- As of October 1, 2004, there were three Police Commando Battalions, no Public Order Battalions, and no Mechanized Police Battalions; this gave the Iraqi Special Police a total strength of only three battalions, none of which were rated as operational. All were deployed at Ar Rustamayiah in the greater Baghdad area. All were deployed at Ar Rustamayiah in the greater Baghdad area.
- As of May 30, 2004, the *operational strength* of the Iraqi Special police included nine Police Commando Battalions, 12 Public Order Battalions, 2 Mechanized Police Battalions and 4 Special Border Forces; this gave the Iraqi Special Police a total operational strength of 27 battalions. In addition, four more battalions were in training, including three Police Commando Battalions and 1 Mechanized Police Battalion. There were also 27 SWAT teams with an average of 27 men each. Forces were now deployed in the Mosul area, active in the greater Baghdad area, operating in Fallujah and Ar Ramadi, deployed at An Numaniyah and Scania, and beginning to deploy in the west in Al Anbar.

The Special Police Forces now had a clear command structure under Major General Adnan Thabit, and the mechanized battalions were being organized into the 8th Mechanized Police Brigade.

Police training was now supported by regional academies in Iraq, in addition to the training center in Jordan. Regional academies now existed in Adnon, Mosul and Sulaymaniah in the north; As Asad, Taji, Baghdad, Hillah, and Kut in the Center, and Basrah in the south.

These efforts were backed by the same new "top down" approach to embedding trainers and partners in both the Ministry of the Interior and active regular police operations that was now being used in the military and special police. The previous training effort had been restructured to create both a Police Partnership Program (Ministry of the Interior), and an integrated Police Partnership Program (Provincial), called the P3(P), to work with the force in each province.

The teams in the MOI provide a core of trainers to help the Minister become truly functional. The provincial or P3(P) teams were designed to give the police in each province a steadily higher degree of independence and eventually create the conditions for the disengagement of provincial Coalition forces. P3 teams with a nominal strength of ten men, covering the full range of necessary expertise in an integrated team, were being deployed to assist senior Iraqi police, and act as partners in staffing provincial headquarters. A total of 19 teams had been set up by June 2005, although the majority were still in the process of acquiring all the necessary manpower.

These teams operated from forward operating bases near the headquarters and helped police leaders to deal with key problems such as logistics, intelligence, financial accounting and contracts, budget planning and management, special police operations, counter-insurgency, and communications. By June 2005, there were over 480 such advisors active in the field. The goal was to maintain 500 posts and build toward 600,

while developing an effective liaison between their efforts and the work of Coalition forces.<sup>lxxxii</sup>

This improvement in training was accompanied by an improvement in leadership. Much of the old order at the top was gone, and many new leaders were men who had come from the army and who had strongly opposed the old system. By June 2005, 17 of the 18 provincial chiefs were ex-military.

A major crimes unit was being established that actually investigated, rather than simply put people in jail. Police elements were slowly being rebuilt in cities like Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, and Bajji using manpower that was taken from outside the region and less subject to influence and intimidation. Efforts were underway to reduce favoritism, provide proper pay, eliminate corruption, and provide the kind of entry and lower level training that had been totally missing in the regular police force under Saddam Hussein. While illiteracy had not been eliminated, it was being reduced.

The Iraqi people were coming into stations in larger numbers, providing more intelligence, and using telephone tiplines. The result was a major improvement in regular police capabilities in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces.

The CPATT and Ministry of Interior also had developed new reporting systems designed to measure the readiness of the regular police, and their levels of manning and equipment. These included detailed monthly police station reports, which covered manning, training, readiness, and equipment. Personnel quality was surveyed in depth, including activities like prisoner rights and human rights, and property accountability.

These were used to develop summaries of police activity by province. For example, the May report on police stations in Baghdad Province for May 2005 scored leadership at 51%, station manning at 72%, personnel status at 92%, training at 75%, effectiveness at 74%, force protection at 74%, equipment at 86%, and facilities at 86%. Detailed assessments were made within each category, and the reports include data on crime rates and detainees. There had been 86 insurgent attacks on stations in Baghdad Province in May; 102 police were killed in action and 257 were wounded, and the stations held 689 detainees, 56% of which were rated as non-violent.<sup>lxxxiii</sup>

These provincial reports include detailed equipment counts and comparisons against authorized holdings, analysis of force protection systems, percentage data on the adequacy of training by rank, analyses of intelligence capabilities, and analysis of financial management capabilities. There was also an independent assessment by the provincial chief of police. Each province was then rated according to the same four levels of readiness used for the military and special police units.<sup>lxxxiii</sup>

This system was still in the process of implementation in the early summer of 2005, but it again showed that major progress had been made, and that a serious attempt to establish real-world readiness standards was underway.

### ***The Iraqi Border Forces***

The Iraqi Border Police were still a largely hollow force as of the early summer of 2005, but serious efforts were underway to increase their numbers, improve their training and equipments, give them better facilities, and create a new chain of forts along the Iraqi-Syrian border. A tentative force goal of some 40,000 men was shown on their

organization charts, but the border enforce forces only had 15,583 actives, and the Iraqi BDP only had 500 men assigned for an authorized strength of 2,760.<sup>lxxxiv</sup>

While Muhammed Sabr in the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement called his men "desert wolves," this scarcely seemed to be the case. Interviews and Press reports indicated their performance was weak on the Jordanian, Saudi, and Iranian borders, and very weak on the Syrian border. One press report indicated that some Border forts had lost some 80% of their manning, lacked weapons, furniture, and even uniforms. Some had been looted and others destroyed by insurgents. Of the 32 border forts originally planned for Al Anbar Province, many had not been completed, others abandoned, and many were badly understaffed. Trucks (and men) routinely entered Iraqi illegally for small bribes.<sup>lxxxv</sup>

The Department of Defense touched on some of these problems in its July 2005 reporting on the force:<sup>lxxxvi</sup>

To date, more than 15,500 Border Police have been trained. The Border Police receive training in small unit patrolling, vehicle search, personnel search, rights of the individual, life saving, Iraqi Border Law, handling of detainees, and weapons. Border police equipment includes Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid-size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK 47s, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor.

Currently, the ISF do not have a system in place to track the Border Police's readiness and capabilities. The goal is for each member and station to be equipped with mission-essential equipment. No estimate exists on the percentage of desertion and absenteeism, although we know that the Border Police has experienced a significant rate of attrition. The extent of insurgent infiltration varies by province. In some areas of the border, there appears to be a high level of insurgent infiltration.

The effectiveness of the Border Police officer cadres and the chain of command varies widely but is generally moderate to low. An effort has been ongoing to energize the Border Police leadership and recruit for the Border Police Academy.

The border forces were, however, beginning to get the training they needed. Border forts and facilities were largely complete in the eastern border area with Iran, and facilities and equipment were being improved in the north and south. While any such plans had to be tentative, the strength of the Border Defense Force Battalions had already risen sharply and plans for further expansion were under way. These plans are shown in Figure 31. Iraq was increasing the number of regional headquarters from 5 to 8, and planned to establish 16 regional brigade headquarters to provide better coordination and direction. It had created a central headquarters and training academy and three regional training academies.<sup>lxxxvii</sup>

The MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and MOD were working to help Iraq regain control of its borders in the tough spots (primarily the border with Syria) as soon as possible. This effort was in its early stages, but reconstruction of the border forts in those areas, generation of additional border guards, generation of additional Iraqi Army units, and support for the Ports of Entry (where Department of Homeland Security Border Support Teams now provided some support) were all underway.

Iraq's First Special Border Force Battalion was operating on the Syrian border in western Anbar Province by the summer of 2005. The Second Battalion completed training in

early February and has begun its deployments, and a third completed training in March. Construction on new facilities in the West was underway.

Border Transition Teams were to begin linking up with Iraqi Border Guard units in August and September, and were already in Iraq and completing their final preparations. This too was a large and complex effort, but was at least underway and may help reduce the number of foreign suicide bombers and movement of funds/leaders. It will also have an impact on smuggling, which saps some of Iraq's economic power. It will, however, require additional equipment and technology, such as backscatter X-ray machines (already finding contraband at the Ports of Entry) and the PISCES system (which requires significant database development to be effective in the mid-term).

In short, the border forces still had a long way to go, but the situation was getting better.

**Figure 31**

**Iraq Border Defense Battalion Deployments**

Border Defense Battalions by Region	Actual	<u>Planned Additional Units</u>		
	<u>March 05</u>	<u>July 05</u>	<u>Jan 06</u>	<u>August 06</u>
Syrian Border	4-5	4	2	2
Jordanian Border	2	-	-	1
Saudi Border	7	-	1	1
Kuwaiti Border	2-3	-	-	1
Iranian Border	12-13	-	3	8
Turkish Border	7-8	-	-	1
Total Additional	NA	4	10	24
Total Active at Time Shown	36	40	46	60

Construction on new facilities in the West was underway. The border forces had a long, long way to go, but the situation was getting better.

### ***The Issue of Financing***

By the summer of 2005, Iraqi forces had grown to the point where financing was beginning to be a major issue, particularly to those Iraqi officials who were concerned with how the Iraq forces should be shaped and self-financed once the insurgency was largely over.

By mid-May of 2005, some \$6.21 billion had already been made available for Iraqi force development, of which only \$1.0 billion had come from Iraqi funding and \$5.21 billion from US appropriated funds. Some \$5.41 billion of this funding was to be executed in programs run by MNSTC-L. The accounting for these funds was anything but neat, but Figure 32 shows where the money went in broad terms and what the key priorities were during the initial stages of Iraqi force development.

In terms of ongoing funding priorities, money had to be allocated to projects like creating a standardized battalion table of organization and equipment (TO&E), fielding a mechanized division and motorized division, creating a fourth Special Police Commando brigade, and enabling Iraqi Army units to occupy uncovered Coalition bases. The MNF had also worked with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to identify some \$5.7 in proposed funding, including \$2.6 billion for the MOD, \$1.4 billion for the MOI, \$1.1 billion for construction, and \$180 million for quick reaction forces. In addition, \$409 million was to be diverted to such projects as the Jordan Training Center (\$99 million), improving Army operations and maintenance (\$210 million), and Tier 1 personal security detachments (\$100 million).

Key Ministry of Defense proposals included 39 projects. These included completing the 1st Mechanized Division, adding a motorized division, adding sustainment including seven base units and a vehicle maintenance contract, buying more tactical communications equipment, and funding branch schools. They also included funding for more support units such as 3 division-level signal companies, 3 IS&R companies, 9 MP companies, and 5 motorized rifle regiments. It is notable that at this point funds were limited enough so that they could not buy five divisions worth of tactical communications equipment, support companies for some battalions, 18 oil security Battalions, and an additional Motor Transport Regiment.

Key Ministry of Defense proposals included 43 projects. These included life support systems, equipping and training 6 Police Commando Battalions, equipment and training for more personnel for Public Order Battalions, secure communications for major headquarters, training funding, and maintenance contracts for a variety of systems. Funds were too limited to buy full equipment and training for the Department of Border Enforcement, an IT systems architecture for the Ministry, equipment to expand the Highway Patrol, equipment for two more Public Order Brigades, equipment and training for 15 Police Commando Battalions, UHF/HF radios, and expansion of the Mosul Academy.

In addition, there were some 50 detailed construction projects for various elements of the military, security, and police forces.

Such detail may seem relatively mundane until it is realized how important it is in creating balanced force quality in both the military and police services, and the capability to transition from Coalition to Iraqi forces over time. The very fact that such financing plans existed, and were prioritized within each Ministry, also represented a major advance over the previous year.

At the same time, the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior still faced major problems in terms of planning and managing their resources. Both Ministries had several problems in common. The overall structure of financial planning and management in each Ministry was weak, and the departments designed to control the flow of money had limited effectiveness. Coordination with the MNF-I and MNSTC-I was poor, and in critical areas like equipment purchases, there was little coordination. MNSTC-I could place one set of orders based on its force plans, and various elements of the MoD and MoI placed orders for different force plans on their own. The Ministry of Finance exercised little control, and there was little coordination of the Coalition aid effort and the

Iraqi budget at the planning level and at any detailed level of fiscal control and responsibility.

The July 2005 report of the Inspector General of the Department of State and Department of Defense illustrate the practical impact of some of these problems on the Iraqi police services, but such problems affected both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, and every element of the Iraqi forces:<sup>lxxxviii</sup>

On the resource front, an immediate issue is the MOI budget. For FY05 (January 1–December 31, 2005), the MOI budget is adequate to fund salaries of 128,000 employees. Some time before this fieldwork, then IIG Prime Minister Allawi approved funding for 156,000. The Council of Ministers did not ratify this decision; hence, the Minister of Finance did not fund MOI's increased requirement. Meanwhile, present MOI personnel (both IPs and staff, the latter predominantly at MOI headquarters in Baghdad) number about 170,000. By training additional IPs, CPATT effectively exacerbates the budget shortfall.

A factor in the MOI's financial capability to sustain the growing IPS force is the considerable, though undetermined, number of 'ghost' employees on the ministry's roster. Although not productively engaged in the MOI's structure, these persons are, nonetheless, on the payroll. Some encumber sinecures for family or tribal members. Others are retired personnel who draw salaries in a socio-economic system without adequate—or any—pensions.

It is conceivable that the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) may allocate additional FY05 funds to the MOI. Absent such action, some Coalition officials opine that capital development funds could be shifted within the MOI budget to cover salary shortfalls, although the MOI Deputy Minister states categorically that shifting resources between funding 'chapters' is not possible. One senior Coalition official posits that, contingent on

Congressional approval of the DoD supplemental legislation and the requested \$5.7 billion additional training fund, the U.S. may be able to cover the prospective MOI budget deficit relative to IPS salaries. At best, this would be a stopgap measure. More importantly, the IG Team believes any such action would establish an unfortunate financial and political precedent.

...The Coalition IPS training program is capital intensive. Thus far, the U.S. Government has spent about \$190 million in building or renovating training facilities both at JIPTC and inside Iraq.<sup>13</sup> By and large, the Coalition created the facilities. The MOI will inherit them. The Deputy Minister of Interior (Finance) told the IG Team that the "MOI has no funding in the Ministry's FY05 budget for police academies." Thus, the Coalition will bear the full cost of operating and maintaining these facilities. Yet to be determined are the costs for out-year operation and maintenance (O&M) and the MOI's determination and ability to shoulder those costs.

Corruption remained a major problem, particularly in the equipment and purchasing sections of the MoD, although the new government had made a major effort to clean up this aspect of the Ministry's operations and find more honest officials. The hiring of manpower within the services and the Ministries often far exceeded authorized levels, a problem compounded by phantom appointments, favoritism, and nepotism. In short, the progress in force development outpaced the ability to plan and allocate resources – a problem that promised to be far more serious in the future as MoD and MoI expenditures put more and more strain on the budget, and the Coalition spent available aid funds.

It was also clear that these problems would create problems for the Iraqi government as it took over full responsibility from the MNF and MNSTC-I. The Iraqi government would have to exercise far tighter control over planning, costs, and expenditures to keep the cost of Iraqi forces within its budget. Aid would almost certainly diminish, while competing civil needs would take on higher priority as security improved. Iraq would also have to make hard choices in funding forces capable of defending its borders against potential

foreign threat, as distinguished from forces focused on counterinsurgency. As was the case in virtually every aspect of Iraqi force development, “progress” was very different from “success” or “victory.”

### Figure 32

#### Allocation of US Aid Funding to Iraqi Forces

(Millions of \$US Funded as of May 15, 2005)

<u>Category</u>	Initial IRRF: \$3.2 billion in <u>FY04 Supplemental</u>	IRRF Reallocation \$1.8 billion <u>In Reprogramming</u>
Iraqi Army Forces	1,600	-
Special Forces	-	67
Iraqi National Guard	241	84
Basing	-	320
Quick Reaction Force	-	80
Iraqi Police Service	1,040	-
Jordan Training, International Police Advisors	600	-
Specialized Police Training, Adnon Palace	200	-
Specialized Police infrastructure	-	50
Public training and facilities	161	81
BDP/ERU expansion; addition 45,000 IPS officers	-	500
Construction	-	166
Border Enforcement (DBE)	280	-
DBE Border Forts	-	64
Additional 20,000 DBE officers	-	127
Facilities Protection Service (FPS)	73	-

Source: MNSTC-I, Iraqi Security Forces Fund Requirements Review, May 15, 2005.

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<sup>i</sup> Iraq Weekly Status Report, 11 May 2005, p. 7.

<sup>ii</sup> See Jonathan Frank and Bradley Graham, "US Urges Iraqi Leaders to Answer Violence," Washington Post, May 14, 2005, p. A12.

<sup>iii</sup> Jonathan Frank and Bradley Graham, "US Urges Iraqi Leaders to Answer Violence," Washington Post, May 14, 2005, p. A12.

<sup>iv</sup> Iraq Weekly Status Report, 9 February 2005, released by the US Department of State and available at [www.defendamerica.mil](http://www.defendamerica.mil); Additional data provided by MNSTC-I and US Embassy in Baghdad.

<sup>v</sup> Iraq Weekly Status Report, July 27, 2005.

<sup>vi</sup> MNSTC-I planners understood that the December total might lower due to the extension of the police basic course from eight to ten weeks, one of several initiatives to raise the quality of the police and military forces.

<sup>vii</sup> John Diamond, "Pride, Pickups Help Forge New Model Army," USA Today, March 9, 2005, pg. 8.

<sup>viii</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, p. 36.

<sup>ix</sup> Interview, May 12, 2005.

<sup>x</sup> Robert Burns, "U.S. General: Iraq Insurgency on Decline," The Associated Press, March 17, 2005.

<sup>xi</sup> Hannah Allam, "Iraq Arms Scandal Unfolds," Philadelphia Inquirer, July 15, 2005, pg. 1.

<sup>xii</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 20, 2005.

<sup>xiii</sup> Ashraf Khalil, "Tough Times for 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade of Iraq's Army," Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2005.

<sup>xiv</sup> MNSTC-I response to inquiry.

<sup>xv</sup> "Report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 2005.

<sup>xvi</sup> Interview, May 12, 2005.

<sup>xvii</sup> Iraq Weekly Status Report for February 25, 2005. Available at [www.defendamerica.mil](http://www.defendamerica.mil).

<sup>xviii</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>. This series of excerpts takes key points from the entire 96-page report, and rearranges them to provide a clear picture of the key problems the report mentions.

<sup>xix</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, pp. 26-27.

<sup>xx</sup> Iraq Weekly Status Report for February 25, 2005. Available at [www.defendamerica.mil](http://www.defendamerica.mil).

<sup>xxi</sup> For the comments of CPATT and other Coalition advisors, and discussion of possible changes, see Appendixes G, H, and I to Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>. The key recommendations of that report are still worth noting, both in judging Iraq's future progress and as lessons for any future options involving the creation of large-scale police and security operations in nations where insurgency and terrorism present serious problems:

**Recommendation 1:** Coalition authorities should plan and implement training focused on qualitative standards rather than on the numbers of trained IPs. This redefinition of objectives should be made explicit in a revised mission statement for CPATT. (Action:

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MNF-I in coordination with MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 2:** Coalition and Mission Iraq officials should support and encourage efforts by the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to strengthen MOI control over the IPS through re-centralization of administrative processes and development of relevant SOPs. (Action: MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 3:** A working group of qualified instructors, specifically to include Iraqi representation, should design a range of courses suitable to the training needs of inservice IPS personnel. Mutually established parameters for candidate selection should be integral to this process. Changes in curricula for IP training must be negotiated in advance with the MOI and be implemented only after Iraqi agreement to such changes. (Action: MNSTC-I in consultation with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.)

**Recommendation 4:** Coalition authorities should pursue agreement with the MOI to incorporate the existing Emergency Response Unit, Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and provincial SWAT units into the Public Order Battalions, Special Police Commando Units, and Mechanized Brigades. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 5:** Appropriate parties need to explore the merits, feasibility and conceivable sources of any U.S. Government funding to cover MOI salary shortfall during the current fiscal year. This determination should take into account possible outyear implications for such support. (Action: MNF-I in consultation with MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 6:** A joint Coalition/MOI assessment should be conducted to determine operation and maintenance costs of Coalition-built and/or renovated training facilities and to determine how and whether those costs can be sustained. (Action: MNSTC-I in collaboration with Embassy Baghdad and in consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 7:** Coalition and MOI leaders/trainers should identify a mutually agreeable target number or percentage of IPS trainees who demonstrate ambition and talent for subsequent leadership training. (Action: MNSTC-I in consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 8:** A joint committee of Coalition and MOI officials should screen and select officers for advanced training based on mutually established qualification standards. (Action: MNSTC-I in conjunction with MOI.)

**Recommendation 9:** The Coalition recruiting program should be placed under the direction of the MOI, with MNC-I and CPATT providing assistance. (Action: MNF-I in consultation with MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 10:** Coalition authorities should assess the extent and quality of Iraqi Ministry of Interior's records relevant to the vetting process, and then conclude a nonbinding memorandum of agreement with the Ministry on access to and utilization of such material. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 11:** Coalition and Iraqi authorities should establish a non-binding agreement that states the MOI is responsible for vetting candidates for Coalition-sponsored police training. (Action: MNF-I in consultation with MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad and in collaboration with MOI.)

**Recommendation 12:** Coalition planners, in coordination with the MOI, should require that cadets first graduate from one of the police academies prior to entering Public Order Brigade (POB) or Emergency Response Unit (ERU) training. An in-service police training program should be developed for "currently serving" POB and ERU members who are not graduates of a police academy. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 13:** Contractual arrangements with expatriate instructors should specify that individually devised training courses will be submitted in advance for consideration and possible approval by MNSTC-I and CPATT. (Action: MNSTC-I.)

**Recommendation 14:** A non-binding agreement should be negotiated by the U.S. Government with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that specifies that only applicants in possession of MOI-issued identification cards, explicitly stating that the bearer is a member of the IPS, will be accepted for training by the Coalition. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 15:** Tables of Organization and Equipment should be developed for police stations and deployable police units throughout the country. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with MOI.)

**Recommendation 16:** Coalition authorities should establish internal controls to track transfer and accountability of equipment to the IPS. (Action: MNF-I in coordination with MNSTC-I and MNC-I and in consultation with MOI.)

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**Recommendation 17:** Coalition resources, in close coordination with counterparts in the MOI and IPS, should develop an operational IPS Readiness Reporting System for the MOI. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with MOI.)

**Recommendation 18:** Coalition commanders should conduct a requirements analysis to determine the number of International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) who can be gainfully engaged under prevailing circumstances and adjust the number of these mentors accordingly. (MNSTC-I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL.)

**Recommendation 19:** Standard operating procedures should be developed for the IPLOs, to define the relationships and responsibilities among the police liaison officers and military police. (Action: MNSTC-I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL.)

**Recommendation 20:** The Department of State must keep Coalition governments apprised of developments at JIPTC, specifically those that relate to provision of training staff at that facility. (Action: Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.)

**Recommendation 21:** The Department of State should decide whether and where an ILEA should be established in the Middle East. If Jordan is selected as a venue, negotiations for such a transformation of JIPTC should proceed quickly. (Action: Department of State's Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.) **Recommendation 22:** Coalition commanders should obtain from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior a written commitment to assume responsibility for direct payment of the salaries of Iraqis trained by the Coalition at JIPTC. (Action: MNF-I in coordination with MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad and in consultation with MOI.)

**Recommendation 23:** Embassy Baghdad should work with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to define areas in which Coalition advisors can play useful roles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in collaboration with IRMO and MOI and in consultation with MNSTC-I.) **Recommendation 24:** Top priority should be given to recruiting '3161' personnel qualified to fill positions as defined jointly by Embassy Baghdad and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, then to assigning a full complement of such advisors to the Ministry of Interior. (Action: Embassy Baghdad through IRMO.)

**Recommendation 25:** Embassy Baghdad should obtain from the MOI a written commitment to assure Coalition authorities can access data relevant to tracking and mentoring IPS personnel trained in U.S. Government-funded programs. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in consultation with MNSTC-I.)

**Recommendation 26:** Coalition and MOI officials should develop standard operating procedures for personnel administration of the Iraqi Police Service. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 27:** The Department of State should assign one or more INL officers to work directly within CPATT to ensure INL perspectives are considered in the development of the IPS. (Action: Department of State in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and MNSTC-I.)

**Recommendation 28:** MNSTC-I should perform an assessment of security and IPS infrastructure development by province to identify opportunities where additional responsibility for IPS training can be transferred to Provincial Police. (Action: MNSTC-I in consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 29:** The Department of State should propose that the National Security Council establish an inter-agency working group with representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice. The working group should identify issues to be addressed for the transfer of police training responsibilities from DoD to DoS. (Action: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in consultation with Embassy Baghdad, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and INL.)

**Recommendation 30:** The Departments of State and Defense, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), should prepare a memorandum of agreement (MOA) to define funding arrangements for future U.S. involvement in Iraqi Police Service-related programs. (Action: Department of State's Bureau of Resource Management (RM) and Department of Defense's Office of the Under Secretary for Policy in consultation with OMB.)

<sup>xxii</sup> "Report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 2005.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Gerry G. Gilmore, "General Will Assess Iraqi Training, Not War Strategy," Armed Forces Press Service, January 7, 2005.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Peter Spiegel, "US Looking at Rethink of Strategy in Iraq," *Financial Times*, January 10, 2005.

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<sup>xxxv</sup> Condoleezza Rice, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing for the position of Secretary of State, January 18, 2005, time code 3:25 to 3:37 p.m.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> Condoleezza Rice, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing for the position of Secretary of State, January 18, 2005, time code 3:25 to 3:37 p.m.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Eric Schmidt, "General Seeking Faster Training of Iraqi Soldiers," New York Times, January 23, 2005, 04:45; also see Bradley Graham, "Army Plans to Keep Troop Level Through 2006," Washington Post, January 25, 2005, p. A-1.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Interview, May 12, 2005.

<sup>xxxix</sup> Jim Garamone, "Multinational Security Command Trains, Equips Iraqi Forces," American Forces Press Service, January 21, 2005. The 98th will be replaced by the 80th Division in the fall of 2005. The 100th Division is due to replace the 80th a year later, by the 100th is so undermanned that members of the 98th were asked in the spring of 2005 if they would volunteer to return and serve in the 100th.

<sup>xxx</sup> Greg Jaffe, "Change of Command; A Marine Captain Trains Iraqi Colonel to Take Over Fight," Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2005, p. A1.

<sup>xxxii</sup> Eric Schmitt, "US Commanders See Possible Cut in US Troops in Iraq," New York Times, April 11, 2005, p. A11.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Quoted in Ann Scott Tyson, "Iraqi Insurgency is Weakening, Abizaid Says," Washington Post, March 2, 2005, pg. 5. General Richard A. Cody made similar comments on March 18, 2005. See Washington Post, March 18, 2005, p. A20.

<sup>xxxiiii</sup> Even at the top of these Ministries, a single Coalition advisor might have to deal with four offices, when the advisor effectively had a full time job dealing with just one.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 20, 2005.

<sup>xxxv</sup> John Hendren, "U.S. to overhaul Training of Iraqi Forces," Los Angeles Times, January 20, 2005.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> For an independent verification of the value of such efforts in operational practice, see Mike Dorning, "Trainer Leads from the Front," Chicago Tribune, April 8, 2005, C1.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, p. 37.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, p. 37.

<sup>xxxix</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 20, 2005.

<sup>xl</sup> Interview, May 12, 2005.

<sup>xli</sup> Iraq Weekly Status Report, July 20, 2005.

<sup>xlii</sup> The text of the UN report was forwarded to the author by ABC News. The MNSTC data are taken from [http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts\\_troops.htm](http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts_troops.htm), as accessed on May 14, 2005.

<sup>xliii</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 20, 2005.

<sup>xliiv</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 20, 2005.

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<sup>xlv</sup> “Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police,” Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director of International Affairs and Trade at the Government Accountability Office, submitted to the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations on March 14, 2005, pg. 13.

<sup>xlvi</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, p. 28.

<sup>xlvii</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, pp. 29-30.

<sup>xlviii</sup> MNSTC-I response to inquiry.

<sup>xlix</sup> Adapted from briefing on MNF-I priorities of the commanding general, May 15, 2005.

<sup>1</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, p. 13.

<sup>ii</sup> To review the press archives by day, see <http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/advisor.htm>.

<sup>iii</sup> Eric Schmitt, “Many Iraqi Troops Not Fully Trained, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, February 4, 2005, pg. 8.

<sup>iiii</sup> Interview, May 12, 2005.

<sup>liv</sup> “Commander Gives His Take,” Houston Chronicle, January 29, 2005, pg. 29. This is a print version of questions presented to Abizaid by the editorial board of the Chronicle.

<sup>lv</sup> Greg Jaffe, “Change of Command; A Marine Captain Trains Iraqi Colonel to Take Over Fight,” Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2005, p. A1.

<sup>lvi</sup> Greg Jaffe, “Change of Command; A Marine Captain Trains Iraqi Colonel to Take Over Fight,” Wall Street Journal, February 24, 2005, p. A1.

<sup>lvii</sup> “Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police,” Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director of International Affairs and Trade at the Government Accountability Office, submitted to the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations on March 14, 2005, pg. 12.

<sup>lviii</sup> Quoted in Ann Scott Tyson, “Iraqi Insurgency is Weakening, Abizaid Says,” Washington Post, March 2, 2005, pg. 5

<sup>lix</sup> Quoted in Rowan Scarborough, “Bomb Makers’ Skills in Iraq Seen as Eroding,” Washington Times, March 9, 2005, pg. 6.

<sup>lx</sup> Jackie Spinner, “U.S. Prisons in Iraq Nearly Full With Rise in Insurgent Arrests; Detainee Releases Suspended Until After Jan. 30 Elections,” Washington Post, January 21, 2005, p. A12; Bradley Graham, “U.S. to Expand Prison Facilities in Iraq,” Washington Post, May 10, 2005, p. A15.

<sup>lxi</sup> Quoted in Liz Sly, “Iraqi Army Takes 1<sup>st</sup> Step Toward Relieving GIs,” Chicago Tribune, March 6, 2005.

<sup>lxii</sup> Quoted in Liz Sly, “Iraqi Army Takes 1<sup>st</sup> Step Toward Relieving GIs,” Chicago Tribune, March 6, 2005.

<sup>lxiii</sup> Ann Scott Tyson, “Iraqi Unit Brings Calm to a Rebel Stronghold,” Washington Post, April 28, 2005, p. A14.

<sup>lxiv</sup> Steve Fainaru, “Handoff to Iraqi Forces Being Tested in Mosul,” Washington Post, April 7, 2005, p. A1; Peter Grier, “Iraqi Troop Training: Signs of Progress,” Christian Science Monitor, March 29, 2005, p. 1.

<sup>lxv</sup> Quoted in Edward Wong, “U.S. Uncovers Vast Hide-Out of Iraqi Rebels,” New York Times, June 4, 2005.

<sup>lxvi</sup> Jonathan Finer, “Insurgents Reportedly Ready to Talk; Former Iraqi Official Says Two Groups Willing to Discuss Ending Violence,” Washington Post, June 8, 2005, p. A16.

<sup>lxvii</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 20, 2005.

<sup>lxviii</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House

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<sup>lxxix</sup> Bradley Graham, "A Report Card on Iraqi Troops, Washington Post, May 18, 2005, p. A10.

<sup>lxxx</sup> Bradley Graham, "A Report Card on Iraqi Troops, Washington Post, May 18, 2005, p. A10.

<sup>lxxxi</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, p. 36.

<sup>lxxxii</sup> "Report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 2005.

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> General Pace in response to a question posed by Senator Carl Levin before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 29, 2005. Question #40.

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> Peter Maass, "The Way of the Commando, New York Times, May 1, 2005.

<sup>lxxxv</sup> John F. Burns, "10 Sunnis Suffocate in Iraqi Police Custody," New York Times, July 13, 2005.

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> John F. Burns, "10 Sunnis Suffocate in Iraqi Police Custody," New York Times, July 13, 2005.

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> David Axe, "US Forces Rebuild Ragged Local Police," Washington Times, April 13, 2005, p. 13.

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> John Hendren, "General Says US Pullback Depends on Iraq's Police," Los Angeles Times, May 19, 2005; John F. Burns and Eric Schmitt, "Generals Offer Sober Outlook on War," New York Times, May 19, 2005, p. A1.

<sup>lxxxix</sup> John Hendren, "General Says US Pullback Depends on Iraq's Police," Los Angeles Times, May 19, 2005; John F. Burns and Eric Schmitt, "Generals Offer Sober Outlook on War," New York Times, May 19, 2005, p. A1.

<sup>lxxx</sup> Anne Barnard, "Deaths Spur Calls to Overhaul Iraqi Police," Boston Globe, March 31, 2005, p. 1.

<sup>lxxxxi</sup> CPATT Briefing, "Police Partnership Program (P3)," June 2003.

<sup>lxxxii</sup> CPATT Briefing, June 2005.

<sup>lxxxiii</sup> Source: CPATT, June 2005.

<sup>lxxxiv</sup> Source: CPATT, June 2005.

<sup>lxxxv</sup> James Janega, "Too much border, Not enough patrol," Chicago Tribune, April 19, 2005.

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> Department of Defense, Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, July 20, 2005.

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> MNSTC-I briefing current as of May 23, 2005.

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf>, p. 13.