

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This agreement formally ended a long and brutal civil war in Sudan, and represented the final step in over two years of intensive negotiations since the signing of the Machakos Protocol on July 20, 2002.

Although the CPA was not a truly national agreement as it did not include the marginalized areas—especially Darfur and the East—the CPA represented an historic step in Sudan's history. The peace agreement defined a six-year transition period, which will culminate in a referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan. Throughout this timeframe, the role of the international community in Sudan will be essential to the implementation of an inclusive peace, especially in the initial reconstruction period when trust needs to be built between all parties. A signed agreement and stated good will are not sufficient to ensure lasting peace in a country that has been locked in war for 40 of the last 50 years.

In the year since the CPA was signed, many developments—both positive and negative—have taken place in Sudan. A number of excellent reports have also been published on Sudan in recent months.¹ *Consolidating Peace in Sudan* should complement these efforts by focusing on three major recommendations for the international community:

1. Ensure that the United Nations and the major donors speak with one voice.
2. Integrate China and India into the international strategy.
3. Deploy a rapid response force to Darfur and other crisis areas.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2004, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project at CSIS published *To Guarantee the Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Sudan*. This report proposed eleven recommendations for the Sudanese and international community to address in order to stabilize Sudan and move ahead with postwar reconstruction. It was based on the premise that Sudan's tragic war history would require a post-conflict strategy that can guarantee the implementation of and adherence to a complex peace agreement signed only under immense international pressure. One year later, a progress report outlined additional challenges and recommendations for the international community following the signing of the CPA.²

Since then, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), based on Resolution 1590 (March 24, 2005). UNMIS is mandated to support implementation of the CPA, and to undertake necessary security, humanitarian and development assistance, as well as protect and promote human rights. UNMIS is authorized to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect its own personnel as well as Sudanese civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence.”³ Jan Pronk, a former Dutch minister, is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for UNMIS.

In order to cope with the crisis in Darfur, which erupted in early 2003, the African Union (AU) launched a peacekeeping mission in May 2004: the African Union Mission in Sudan

(AMIS). AMIS is the AU's second peacekeeping mission on the continent, after AMIB in Burundi.⁴ Although it reluctantly agreed to the AU mission under immense international pressure, Khartoum has cleverly used every opportunity it can to prevent and delay additional aid, personnel and material support from reaching hard-hit areas, through the imposition of bureaucratic hurdles and hassles. On March 10, 2006, AMIS extended its mission for an additional six months until September 30, 2006, rather than transferring to a UN force as many had been advocating.

Khartoum was opposed to the UN taking over from the AU, preferring a poorly equipped and undermanned AU force to a more robust and mobile UN option. Unfortunately, throughout the tenure of the AU mission and despite the on-going peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, the situation in Darfur has only deteriorated. The conflict has been responsible for a massive humanitarian crisis with close to two million displaced persons and 180,000 deaths. It has also had a negative spill-over effect on Chad. Even if the UN assumes control at the end of September when the current mandate of the AMIS mission expires, it may be six months too late.

As decisions are being made and policy debated about Sudan, this updated CSIS report, *Consolidating Peace in Sudan*, proposes three critical recommendations for the United States and the international community that could help end the fighting in Darfur and promote a more stable and inclusive peace.

1. Integrated Strategies: Speaking with One Voice

In Sudan, close cooperation between the United Nations and the major international donors is critical for four reasons: (1) to apply pressure on the parties to end the fighting in Darfur and other crisis areas, (2) to ensure that the CPA is a more inclusive agreement by incorporating the marginalized areas, (3) to maintain a common front so that the parties to the peace process adhere to commitments already made, and (4) to prioritize Sudan's emergency and development needs. In the first instance, this means greater cohesion between the UN mission and the United States, European partners, and the international financial institutions (IFIs).

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General has the overall authority for the activities of the United Nations in a mission, and donors typically look to the UN to provide coordination and guidance so that all international actors follow an integrated approach. Even though the SRSG does not have authority over individual donors, nevertheless he or she is expected to develop close working relationships with them. In many peace support operations, a "Contact Group" or "Friends of X-country" is formed, with ambassador-level participation by the top five or six major players, who meet weekly with the SRSG to discuss important issues. This helps ensure that the major actors speak with one voice, are vested in the same priority areas, and prevent spoilers from playing one country off another.

Today in Sudan, no similar high-level group meets regularly with the SRSG. The donors meet and coordinate at senior levels, and the World Bank manages a large multi-donor trust fund. The Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) and the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) also monitor the peace process, the latter chaired by Ambassador Tom

Vraalsen, Norway's Special Envoy for Sudan.⁵ Yet the SRSG himself does not attend these meetings and committees.

During interviews conducted by the PCR Project team in Sudan in January 2006, it became apparent that the major donors do not fully share the same top priorities for Sudan's future, nor do they share a common approach for achieving their goals. If the SRSG and the ambassadors or chiefs of mission of the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the European Commission, and the World Bank joined the SRSG in weekly meetings, they could agree on the fundamental priorities for Sudan and the strategy for implementation. Moreover, they would each feel greater ownership over the peace process. The important point is to keep a Contact Group small, confined to the major actors with high-level representation, and focused on the key strategic issues.

2. West Meets East: Partnering with China and India

Yet a Contact Group comprised of these major donors would not have enough leverage on its own to convince the government in Khartoum to abide by its pledges and to stop the suffering in Darfur, primarily because of the significant investments in the energy sector by China and India. The evidence is everywhere, from freshly paved streets in Khartoum to increased construction to sophisticated weaponry.

In 2005, 5 percent of China's oil imports originated in Sudan, accounting for *half* of Sudan's oil exports. A year earlier, China's investments in Sudan's oil industry were approximately \$1.7 billion, while its overall investments reached \$15 billion, making China the largest investor in Sudan.⁶ China is also Sudan's major weapons supplier, selling over \$100 million of fighter aircraft as well as other arms in recent years. Some of the helicopter gunships reportedly used in Darfur are Chinese-made. Significantly, this aid-for-oil policy comes with no strings attached.⁷

Although not at the same level as China, India too has recently begun increasing its investment in Sudan. In early January 2006, an agreement was reached for a power project worth approximately \$400 million. The year before, India initiated a \$1 billion oil exploration project in Sudan.⁸ According to the *Asia Times*, China has a 40 percent stake in Sudan's Greater Nile Oil Project and India's share is 25 percent.⁹ If China and India could be publicly brought into a Contact Group, despite the inherent difficulties of developing an integrated strategy with such a diverse array of major actors, it would be hard for Khartoum to resist this combined pressure. A high-level Contact Group, with heads of mission/ambassadors from West and East, and chaired by the SRSG, would ensure that all parties to the conflict understand the imperative of peace.

What kind of incentives might persuade China and India to participate in a more inclusive strategy? The establishment of such a high-level group and the invitation to both countries to join would be one motivation, given their interest in multilateralism and in being perceived as responsible international actors. A stable and peaceful Sudan would also safeguard their investments for the long-term.

Off-line, additional inducements may be needed. The United States could initiate a broader discussion on energy security to offer appealing alternatives to China and India, as both countries need reliable, alternative sources of secure supplies. China and India could also become full members of the International Energy Agency as another way for them to meet their energy needs without having to align with unsavory partners.¹⁰

3. Rapid Response Force: African Union Plus

If the international community could speak with one powerful voice in Sudan, serious pressure could also be applied on Khartoum to end the massive suffering in Darfur, which has now spilled into Chad and is threatening the regime there. Moreover, a strong and unified voice could help ensure that the CPA is a more inclusive agreement and implementation is more successful.

Yet these measures alone will not suffice. A peace insurance policy—that is, diplomacy backed by the credible threat of force—is still required. Additional peacekeeping forces, well beyond the current level of 7,000 AU troops, are needed to keep the peace in Darfur. In addition to more peacekeepers, this report advocates a robust, mobile, fully-equipped rapid response force of approximately 1,000 - 1,500 soldiers to work alongside the peacekeepers. If it had significant logistical support, a rapid response force would help to protect civilians in Darfur (and other crisis areas), and to prevent these areas from spoiling the peace process.

A rapid response force could be piggy-backed onto the AMIS force, and could be composed of a mix of the best trained African, UN and/or European troops—an “AU Plus” formula. This additional capability should not require further agreement at the Security Council. Both UNMIS and AMIS already have Chapter VII peace enforcement mandates and both have been empowered to protect civilians. UNMIS is also mandated to “reinforce” the AMIS mission.

In terms of overall coordination, UNMIS currently has an in-house analytical capability, called the Unified Mission Analysis Centre (UMAC), which monitors and reports on human rights, security, humanitarian, and development issues throughout Sudan. The UMAC also has several teams that can be deployed along with ten fully equipped containers to cope with emergency situations (for example, an outbreak of dengue fever) within a 24-hour period anywhere in Sudan. This UMAC could help coordinate the deployment of the rapid response force as needed.

A rapid response force could help stop the violence in Darfur as well as serve as a bridging force until the current AMIS mandate expires in September, when the UN is expected to assume control. The UN currently is able to deploy a total of 3,000 troops per month to *any* part of the world—thus in the best circumstances, it would take the UN six to nine months to reach the desired number of 20,000 for Darfur, assuming that all of the troops could be dedicated to Sudan, which may not be possible. If the AU decides to remain in charge in Darfur after September, it has already admitted it needs a major injection of capability. Thus, a robust, rapid response force would be fully complementary in either situation.

Rebels, militias, Janjaweed, and government forces should be given the stark warning that there will be no more second chances. AMIS troops currently do not have the capability or sufficient manpower to respond appropriately to stop the violence. According to one Rwandan soldier, “We couldn’t defend ourselves with the equipment we currently have. To well-armed forces like those of the Government of Sudan, Janjaweed, SLA we represent little more than a nuisance.”¹¹ A robust rapid response force, working closely with the regular peacekeeping troops and with logistical back-up from the United States, Europe and/or NATO, could provide that capacity. If needed, the United States or NATO could also provide close air support, preferably in the form of helicopter gunships and transport aircraft. Incidentally, Khartoum has not objected to external logistical support for the AMIS mission.

There are precedents for this type of arrangement in UN operations. In Liberia, for example, approximately 600 Swedish and Irish troops have successfully served as a Quick Reaction Force as part of the UN Mission in Liberia.

It may take some time to assemble an appropriate force, however, and time is in short supply in Darfur. During this period, consideration could be given to deploying an EU rapid reaction battle group (EU rapid response forces can be fully deployed within 15 days and remain as long as 120 days). The fundamental recommendation here is to deploy as soon as possible, and not delay while bureaucracies debate appropriate models—the immediate need is for troops that are fully capable of responding with credible force. This “Darfur Option” could become the standard.

The parties to the conflict could see such a force as a form of peace insurance, to reinforce their commitment to a lasting peace. It would meet the demand on the part of the Sudanese people for a serious signal from the international community that it will provide the necessary guarantees to help secure the peace. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) should also push for such a force as it is implicated by association because it too is part of the new Government of National Unity. The GOSS is also responsible for bringing peace to Darfur, as well as to other potential crisis areas, as in the East.

Finally, an international rapid response force will ultimately reduce the length of the international community’s engagement in Sudan by helping to bring an end to the violence in Darfur and other crisis areas. Moreover, it would give the regular peacekeeping troops the latitude to carry out other urgent work necessary to maintaining the peace, such as assisting with the repatriation process so that IDPs and refugees can return home.

CONCLUSION

The signing of the peace agreement in Sudan, while momentous, will not in itself consolidate peace. The UN and the major donors have made significant progress in all phases of the peace process thus far, but Sudan’s reconstruction needs are immense and complicated by tremendous challenges. These include pervasive mistrust and uncertainty, massive debt, poor governance practices, as well as ongoing conflict in the marginalized areas.

Moreover, the new government still has to develop transparent oversight mechanisms over its oil revenues so that Sudan's oil wealth is used to embed peace, rather than exacerbate conflict.¹² Public accounting for all oil revenues is needed to build confidence among Sudanese, and should be monitored in the press so that ordinary citizens can know where the funds are going.

The referendum is only five years away, and a national census and parliamentary elections are two important activities that will have to be successfully carried out before then. The major stipulations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement need full compliance during this period, and the CPA also needs to be expanded to become a fully inclusive agreement. In order to realize these enormous challenges, the major international donors and the UN need to develop a closer working relationship, China and India should become full partners, and Darfur and other potential crisis areas be made secure. Only then can UNMIS and other parts of the international community get on with their job of helping the people of Sudan build a peaceful and democratic state.

Acronym List

AEC – Assessment and Evaluation Commission

AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan

AU – African Union

CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPC – Ceasefire Political Commission

DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

GNU – Government of National Unity

GOS – Government of Sudan

GoSS – Government of Southern Sudan

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda)

JAM – Joint Assessment Mission

Janjaweed – Arab Muslim militia in Darfur, partially funded and supported by the government

JEM – Justice and Equality Movement; a faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army and one of the original rebel groups in Darfur

JMC – Joint Military Commission

JNTT – Joint National Transition Team

MDTF – Multi Donor Trust Fund

SAF – Sudanese Armed Forces, the national army for the government of Sudan

SLM/A – Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army; originally the Darfur Liberation Army

SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary General

SSDF – South Sudan Defense Force

UNMIS – United Nations Mission in Sudan

STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

Several important developments impacting the implementation of the CPA have taken place in the past year:

- In March 2005 the UN Security Council authorized sanctions against those who violate the Darfur ceasefire. The Security Council also voted to refer those accused of war crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.
- In April 2005 the government of Norway hosted the Oslo Donor's Conference, and more than \$4.5 billion was pledged for Sudan.
- In June 2005 the Government and the exiled opposition grouping, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), signed a reconciliation deal allowing the NDA into the power-sharing administration.
- In July 2005 the Interim National Constitution was ratified, which paved the way for the formation of the GNU. Also in July 2005, John Garang de Mabior, leader of the SPLM for 21 years, became the first Vice-President of the GNU. Only a few weeks after taking office, however, Garang died in a helicopter crash. Following the death of Garang, Salva Kiir Mayardit, deputy leader of the SPLM, was chosen to be his successor.
- In September 2005 the GNU was inaugurated in Khartoum. The distribution of cabinet seats in the GNU has already led to disagreement.
- In October 2005 the GoSS was formed. Salva Kiir is the President and Riek Machar, second deputy leader of the SPLM, is the Vice President.
- Also in 2005, the CPC and the AEC, two key institutions envisaged in the peace agreement, were formed. In October 2005, the AEC was established to monitor the implementation of the CPA, including the role of the international community. Other members of the Commission include Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Britain. In August 2005 the second institution, the CPC, was created to oversee the implementation of a permanent ceasefire. The CPC is comprised of similar members to the AEC. Despite these positive steps, however, Sudan has yet to create other key bodies envisioned in the peace agreement, including the JDB and a Boundary Commission.
- In December 2005, the Constitution for Southern Sudan was signed.
- In January 2006 the AMIS decided to support in principle a transition to a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur.

- In March 2006 the African Union Peace and Security Council decided to extend the mandate of AMIS until September 30, 2006.

¹ See, for example, “Imperatives for Immediate Change: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” Human Rights Watch, January 2006, Volume 18 No. 1(A); “Sudan: Saving Peace in the East,” International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°102 – 5 January 2006; “Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad,” Human Rights Watch Report Number 2, February 2006.

² See <http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/reports/> for more information.

³ United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) mandate <<http://www.unmis.org/english/mandate.htm>>

⁴ UNMIS currently has deployed 6,300 troops, though its mandated strength is 10,000, while AMIS has been fully deployed with 7,000 troops trying to keep the peace in a territory the size of France.

⁵ The Sudan Consortium Conference has been a large annual meeting for grand strategic discussions about development priorities, with the SRSG as well as the major donors and Sudanese parties present. In 2005 the meeting was held in Oslo, and this year it was held in Paris, on 9-10 March.

⁶ Yitzhak Shichor, “Sudan: China’s Outpost in Africa”, The Jamestown Foundation, October 13, 2005, www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3491&article_id=2370720

⁷ See Esther Pan, “China, Africa, and Oil”, Council on Foreign Relations, Jan 12, 2006, www.cfr.org/publication/9557/china_africa_and_oil.html.

⁸ See Chietigi Bajpae, “India, China locked in energy game”, *Asia Times Online*, March 17, 2005, www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/GC17Dk01.html; “India to Invest \$392m in Sudan power project”, *The Hindu*, January 24, 2006; www.thehindu.com/2006/01/24/stories/2006012404561700.htm

⁹ Jyoti Malhotra, “India, China: Comrades in oil”, *Asia Times Online*, August 19, 2005, www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GH19Df04.html

¹⁰ The IEA is an ‘intergovernmental body committed to advancing security of energy supply, economic growth and environmental sustainability through energy policy co-operation.’ See www.iea.org.

¹¹ <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05331/612719.stm>

¹² In October 2005, President al-Bashir established the National Petroleum Commission (NPC) to oversee the country’s oil policy. Although a positive step forward, the NPC faces many difficulties in fulfilling its mission successfully. Both the GOS and GoSS lack the management capacity and institutional infrastructure for such vast sums, and the GOS has a history of non-transparent use and allocation of resources, including a pattern of “off budget” use of oil funds that are not openly accounted for. Southerners complain that they are only seeing only a fraction of the funds allocated to them.