


# ASSESSING THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: FROM KANANASKIS TO ST. PETERSBURG



Strengthening the Global Partnership Project

July 2006





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# Introduction

At the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, world leaders announced their commitment of \$20 billion dollars to a Global Partnership dedicated to preventing catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Created in the aftermath of September 11, the Global Partnership was widely hailed as a bold and timely attempt to mobilize broad international support for tackling the world's most urgent security challenge. But observers of past G8 initiatives asked themselves whether the Global Partnership would continue to receive the sustained attention and effort it required or whether it would go the way of some other G8 promises -- ambitious goals but inadequate follow-up. In 2006, we do not yet have a complete answer to that question.

Since 2002, the risk of weapons or materials of mass destruction falling into terrorist hands has only grown more acute. Bombings since 9/11 in Tunisia, Bali, and Kenya in 2002, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 demonstrated that countries other than the United States were targets for Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and evidence has mounted that terrorists intend to attain the world's most destructive weapons. Osama Bin Laden has asserted a "religious duty" for al Qaeda to seek nuclear weapons and prominent clerics have in recent years asserted their belief that the use of weapons of mass destruction is permissible against "infidels." Technical documents discovered at al Qaeda safe houses in Afghanistan in November 2001 had details of nuclear weapons designs, the physics of nuclear explosions, properties of nuclear materials needed to make them, and the effects of nuclear weapons. Rudimentary laboratories and manuals for chemical and biological weapons were also uncovered. Between 1998 and 2001, retired senior scientists of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, including Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, met with bin Laden several times and discussed nuclear weapons and radioactive dispersal bombs. In 2004, revelations about the A.Q. Khan network raised the specter of a "nuclear WalMart."

Policy responses have also evolved since Kananaskis. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was followed by other international actions to minimize this threat: the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G8 voluntary moratorium on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology, the European Union's WMD Strategy, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, among others. Governments and parliaments at the national level have also recognized the urgency of the threat and have declared their dedication to preventing WMD terrorism.

Amongst these efforts, the Global Partnership's role is unique. Partner countries cooperate to secure or eliminate WMD materials at their source or dismantle

associated weapons systems as the most effective means of preventing terrorist access to WMD. Global Partnership countries are addressing non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues through cooperative work, beginning in Russia and other former Soviet (FSU) states. The Global Partnership established principles for meeting its goals and agreed on guidelines for facilitating implementation.<sup>1</sup>

Russia took the helm of the G8 Presidency in 2006, and the St. Petersburg summit in July 2006 offers an opportunity for Russia to demonstrate leadership on WMD issues and a chance to renew and reinvigorate the work of the Global Partnership. In turn, the GP countries must strengthen and continue to expand their engagement with Russia to achieve these common goals. The true test of the vitality of the Global Partnership is whether or not its activities are minimizing the threat of WMD terrorism and WMD proliferation. The fundamental question is whether the generous sums pledged are actually reducing the threat -- whether the response has kept pace with the changing security environment.

The importance of this work is incontrovertible. Stagnation is unacceptable. This assessment is meant to appraise what the Global Partnership countries have achieved in the past three years, take stock of where we are, and spark future action to enrich and reinvigorate the Global Partnership.

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<sup>1</sup> The Global Partnership's principles are to: promote multilateral treaties that help prevent the spread of weapons, materials, and know-how; account for and secure those items; promote physical protection of facilities; help detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking; promote national export and transshipment controls; and manage and dispose of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials. The "guidelines for new or expanded cooperation projects" were designed to overcome impediments to implementation and include: effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures; environmentally sound and safe implementation procedures; clearly defined milestones for each project; use of equipment and technology for peaceful purposes only, no transfer to third parties, and adequate physical protection to prevent its theft or sabotage; exemption from taxes, duties, levies and other charges; procurement of goods and services is to be in accordance with open international practices and national security requirements; adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperative project; appropriate privileges and immunities for donor-government representatives; and effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property. Full text of the G8 statement, Kananaskis summit website, [http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/gp\\_stat-en.pdf](http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/gp_stat-en.pdf)

# I. The Global Partnership Record to Date

The Global Partnership has made hopeful progress in its first four years, but significant shortfalls and challenges remain in terms of funding, project implementation, and achieving its core goals.

## 1. Securing Financial Resources

Of the \$20 billion over ten years the G8 promised to raise at Kananaskis, the Global Partnership has achieved pledges of over \$17.5 billion (including Russia's own contribution). While the U.S. contribution of \$10 billion is included in this figure, the additional pledges represent a substantial infusion of funds by the other donors and an indication that non-U.S. donors are serious about their commitments. Whereas in the 1990s the United States paid for the lion's share of threat reduction work, the Global Partnership has resulted in a more equitable sharing of the burden in this decade.

Russia has stepped up its own contribution to Global Partnership projects. It has pledged \$2 billion over ten years, which includes spending in a variety of areas, including chemical disarmament, nuclear submarine dismantlement, and fissile material security. This reflects the stronger economic foundation on which Russian federal spending is based. Since 2002, when the Global Partnership was formed, the Russian annual federal budget has more than doubled from \$70 billion to over \$180 billion. Global Partnership work has benefited from this increase. Since 2002, Russia has spent over \$1 billion on chemical disarmament and \$206 million on the decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines. Its annual budget for CW destruction has tripled, from \$197 million in 2004 to a projected \$609 million in 2006, and a possible \$800 million in 2007. Similarly, the budget for Rosatom nuclear security programs in Russia has tripled since 2001.

However, GP pledges to date are still not enough to meet the threat. In the Strengthening the Global Partnership project's initial report, published in January 2003, our international consortium encouraged the G8 to make their promise of \$20 billion a "floor not a ceiling," anticipating that \$20 billion would not be enough to complete the work that needed to be done.<sup>2</sup> Yet in the fourth year of the Global Partnership, even the \$20 billion goal has not been reached. While pledges

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<sup>2</sup>The Strengthening the Global Partnership project is a consortium of 24 research institutes in 19 European, Asian, and North American countries working to build political and financial support for the G8 Global Partnership. The consortium's original recommendations to the GP are found in the four-volume report, "Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership," published in January 2003. [http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/publications\\_index.html](http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/publications_index.html)

accumulated quickly at first, they were slow to increase afterwards and most of the recent growth can be attributed to the weakening of the dollar, which has boosted the dollar equivalents of pledges made in Euros. The addition of new donor countries is very positive but has only added incrementally to the resources available. The current tally -- just over \$17 billion -- is insufficient. Funds beyond the \$20 billion level will be necessary to complete the work in the FSU alone, and certainly will be necessary to bring projects beyond the FSU to fruition.

Of even greater concern is that only a small portion of current pledges have so far been turned into projects. Funds expended since the start of the Global Partnership are estimated at approximately \$3.5 billion (between June 2002 and approximately June 2005), or just 17.5% of the \$20 billion target.<sup>3</sup>

## **2. Expanding Participation to Additional Donors and Recipients**

The Global Partnership has been successful in stimulating efforts in countries not previously delivering nonproliferation assistance, including beyond the G8. When the Global Partnership was launched, the G8 countries invited other countries that were prepared to adopt its common principles and guidelines to participate and contribute to the initiative. Donors now include all the original Global Partnership members (G8 countries and the European Union) and 13 other donors-- Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.

The Kananaskis statement said the Global Partnership's initial geographic focus would be projects in Russia. The statement also stipulated that the G8 would negotiate entrance into the partnership with any other recipient countries, including those of the FSU, that were prepared to adopt the Global Partnership guidelines. Ukraine applied to be a Global Partnership recipient in January 2003 and, after over a year of negotiations, was recognized in 2004 as an official recipient of GP funding. There are also discussions underway with other FSU states that may participate in the future, once they are able to comply with the Kananaskis guidelines.

At the 2004 Sea Island Summit, G8 countries agreed to take advantage of the coordinating function of the Global Partnership to discuss related cooperative nonproliferation activities in countries other than the former Soviet Union. Although not recognizing them as official Global Partnership recipients, the G8 agreed to coordinate efforts in places such as Libya and Iraq through the Global Partnership.

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<sup>3</sup>This data is based on Annex A of the Global Partnership Working Group Annual Report prepared for the G8 Gleneagles Summit and is representative of expended funds 6/02-6/05, <http://www.sgpproject.org/resources/Glneagles/AnnualReportAnnex2005.pdf>

The United States and the United Kingdom, for example, have shared information in the GP working group on their programs to redirect weapon scientists in Iraq and Libya.

### **3. Turning “Pledges into Projects”**

#### ***i. Establishing Legal Frameworks for Cooperation***

While the United States has had longstanding legal agreements with Russia for threat reduction work (including the Cooperative Threat Reduction Umbrella Agreement which was renewed in mid-June 2006), other donor countries did not, so the initial three years of the partnership were, in large part, spent completing such arrangements. This process was initially slow-going and in some cases agreements were held up by Russia’s bureaucratic reorganization in the spring of 2004. However, by early 2006 Russia had established intergovernmental agreements with all the major Global Partnership donors.

Once intergovernmental agreements are in place, implementing agreements and contractual arrangements for specific work need to be drawn up. Donors report that they would like to be spending faster but are waiting for approval for implementation agreements. For smaller donors, and for those awaiting completion of a bilateral legal framework, innovative funding approaches -- such as “piggybacking” on other donors’ existing agreements -- have allowed funding to move forward more quickly and have enabled new donors to avoid a lengthy negotiation process with Russia. Piggybacking has been particularly successful in chemical weapons destruction work, where the UK accepts money from a variety of donors for the Schuchy’e facility and related infrastructure.

One of the most important legal breakthroughs pushing cooperation forward was the conclusion of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) Agreement in May 2003. MNEPR has provided a legal model for subsequent bilateral agreements on cooperation on nuclear projects such as submarine dismantlement and the handling of radioactive waste. Russia concluded agreements based on MNEPR with UK, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Canada in 2003-2004 and with France in 2006. The protocol to this agreement included liability provisions as well as a taxation exemption as required by the Global Partnership guidelines.

#### ***ii. Improving Coordination of Global Partnership Work***

An additional benefit of the Global Partnership is that it has established a coordinating mechanism to exchange information on plans for Global Partnership projects, avoid program redundancy, and discuss implementation challenges. A Senior Group (formerly the Senior Officials Group) and an expert-level Working Group (GPWG) meet

throughout the year. The current G8 President's foreign ministry serves as an ad hoc secretariat for the partnership during the year. The GPWG has also become the forum to meet with non-G8 countries about their participation in the Global Partnership as donors or recipients.

The GPWG has also improved public access to information about the Global Partnership's work. Each year it publishes a detailed report and charts that give an account of pledges and the project areas to which they are allocated. This improves awareness of the Global Partnership's mission and the threats it is aiming to reduce.

### *iii. Setting Priorities*

At Kananaskis, the G8 set four top priorities: the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials, and the employment of former weapons scientists. Of these, the Russian government very clearly identified chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of general-purpose nuclear submarines as its two top priority areas of concern.<sup>4</sup>

Of the new work started after Kananaskis, efforts in these two areas have stood out. In particular, the United Kingdom, Germany, United States, Canada, and Norway have made substantial progress towards completing major projects in both submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons destruction. Russian officials estimate that Russia received more than \$687 million for these two priorities (\$313.48 million for submarine decommissioning and \$373.69 million for chemical weapons destruction) from 2002 to mid-2006.<sup>5</sup>

Securing weapons-usable nuclear materials, employing former WMD weapons scientists, securing and converting former biological weapon facilities to reduce the threat of bioterrorism, and preventing the smuggling of WMD-relevant materials have received a lower priority in the new work started after Kananaskis (although long-established nuclear security projects have remained a priority in bilateral U.S.-Russian threat reduction activities). Yet progress in those three areas would have the biggest impact in terms of reaching the fundamental Kananaskis goal of preventing terrorist access to WMD materials and know-how.

### *iv. Projects under way*

Chemical weapons destruction. Progress in this area has been dramatic if still not yet

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<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Concerning the Implementation of the Global Partnership Accord Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction," February 4, 2003, <http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/900b2c3ac91734634325698f002d9dcf/1f5204af606dfcad43256cc3003a4ebe?OpenDocument>

<sup>5</sup> "Globalnoye Partnerstvo 'Vosmerki'," Memo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, May 17, 2006, <http://www.ln.mid.ru/Ns-g8.nsf/arh/432569ED00401C0EC325704300315429?OpenDocument>

sufficient to complete the job. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia needs to destroy by 2012 its 40,000 tons of nerve and blister agents, the largest stockpile in the world. Although to date, Russia has only destroyed three per cent of these stocks, significant advancements were made in the past three years in terms of organizing the destruction work and building new facilities that will soon begin operation. In October 2005, the Russian government approved a plan to have all seven sites operating in five years' time. With partners' help, Russia's first destruction facility in Gorny, Saratov region, completed destruction in 2005 of the total stockpile housed there -- 1,143 tons of lewisite -- after three years of operation. With German and European Union funding, the facility at Kambarka in the Udmursk Republic opened operations on March 1, 2006 to destroy 6,000 tons of lewisite. The Maradykovsky facility, Kirov region, with nearly 7,000 tons of nerve and blister agent should open in the next few months. A long-standing effort to build the nerve-agent destruction facility at Schuchy'e in the Kurgan region is set to be completed and agent destruction to begin by the end of 2009, at the latest. Discussions with GP donors on building additional facilities at Leonidovka and Pochev are underway. As referenced above, Russia has dramatically increased its own chemical weapons destruction budget.

Submarine dismantlement. The Global Partnership has also spurred a substantial increase in activity surrounding nuclear submarine dismantlement in Russia. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union constructed the world's largest fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. Since the early 1990s, 197 Russian general-purpose submarines have been decommissioned, and 133 of them have been dismantled and 26 are undergoing dismantlement.<sup>6</sup> Of the 64 submarines still awaiting dismantlement, 49 boats have highly enriched uranium fuel on board, with enrichment levels of 20-90%. Since 2002, international assistance has aided in the dismantlement of 15 nuclear-powered submarines. Russia funded the dismantlement of 44 of these boats itself.<sup>7</sup> Construction work continues on long-term storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel assemblies removed from decommissioned submarines.

Disposition of fissile materials. The third priority area of work laid out in the Kananaskis statement was the disposition of fissile materials. Prior to Kananaskis, the United States had been working, along with other partners, on a variety of nuclear threat reduction goals, including warhead and fissile material security and disposition in Russia. Those programs continue today.

Data from unclassified sources estimate that over 1,250 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials remain in Russia as of the end of 2003, including at least 600 tons of HEU and separated plutonium outside of weapons. By the end of fiscal year 2005, 49%

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<sup>6</sup> Dismantled into 3-compartment units. S.V. Antipov, "Progress of International Cooperation in the Field of Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines in the Frame of the Global Partnership," Presentation to the PIR Center Conference, "G8 Global Security Agenda," April 21, 2006, <http://pircenter.org/index.php?id=222>

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak, *Global Partnership Update*, April 2006 edition, <http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/GPUUpdates/April%2006%20Update.pdf>

of nuclear materials at the 51 sites containing weapons-useable nuclear materials had received either comprehensive or rapid upgrades. This included 150 buildings at 80% of the sites. Of these, 29% had received comprehensive upgrades. The remaining 51% that had received no outside security upgrades were concentrated at a few large sites -- including the nuclear warhead assembly and dismantlement facilities where a quarter of the nuclear material in Russia resides.<sup>8</sup> In total just over 54% of the 230 buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material in the former Soviet Union had received comprehensive upgrades.

At the bilateral Bratislava summit of 2005, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to accelerate nuclear material security upgrades and complete them at Rosatom sites by 2008. Security cooperation with the nuclear warhead storage sites of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the Russian Ministry of Defense sites are also planned to be completed by the end of 2008. By the end of FY 2007, DOE plans to have carried out security upgrades at more than 80 percent of all the nuclear sites in Russia at which they now plan cooperative work.

The HEU Purchase Agreement/Megatons to Megawatts program reached its half-way mark in September 2005. Since 1995, over 269 metric tons of HEU taken from dismantled nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union have been down-blended and recycled into 7,868 tons of LEU fuel, thus eliminating the equivalent of over 10,000 nuclear warheads. United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and TENEX will recycle a total of 500 metric tons (including the 269 metric tons already down-blended) of warhead HEU by the program's end in 2013, the equivalent of 20,000 nuclear warheads.<sup>9</sup>

The plutonium production reactor shut-down project -- under which Russia's remaining plutonium-producing reactors are to be replaced by fossil-fuel plants -- has seen slower progress, and funds are still needed to complete the project. The U.S. Department of Energy plans to complete construction of the Seversk fossil fuel plant by December 2008, and construction of the Zheleznogorsk plant by December 2010. To remain on schedule, the Zheleznogorsk project needs additional funding from Global Partnership donors amounting to at least \$100 million to reach the estimated total program cost of around \$1 billion. The U.S. DOE anticipates contributing nearly \$690 million between FY 2006-2010, on top of over \$200 million already spent. Funds pledged to date from non-U.S. assistance amount to nearly \$30 million.

The 2000 U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement provides for the safe, transparent and irreversible disposition of 68 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium

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<sup>8</sup> *NNSA Fact Sheet*, "NNSA Expands Nuclear Security Cooperation with Russia," October 2005. <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2005/NA-05-FS03.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> Figures as of April 14, 2006. "U.S.-Russian Megatons to Megawatts Program Status," United States Enrichment Corporation website, [http://www.usec.com/v2001\\_02/HTML/Megatons\\_status.asp](http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Megatons_status.asp)

(34 tons each in Russia and in the United States) through conversion to and use as reactor fuel. The US, UK, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, and the Netherlands have pledged money to the effort in Russia. Donor countries are assisting with design and construction of a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility to dispose of the Russian plutonium. Feasibility and other studies of Pu disposition options have been completed, and design work for the Russian facility has continued. Construction was set to begin in May 2005, but was delayed due to an inability to resolve long-standing disputes on liability protection for American workers engaged in the project.

“Global clean-out.” At the Sea Island summit, the G8 decided to “eliminate over time the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel.” There is currently an estimated global inventory of 175 tons of HEU in civil stocks. A total of 53 countries have one kilogram or more of HEU. Over 130 research reactors currently operate worldwide on HEU, including over 120 civilian research reactors. Ninety percent of civilian HEU research reactors worldwide operate on U.S. or Soviet/Russian-supplied fuel. The United States and Russia are cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to return HEU to countries of origin and shut down or convert these reactors to LEU fuel.

The U.S. Department of Energy consolidated its own efforts and gave new impetus to this work when it announced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in May 2004. The program’s goals are to identify, secure, recover and facilitate disposition of vulnerable high-risk nuclear and radiological materials around the world.

Russia is an active participant in GTRI. There are nearly two metric tons of eligible Russian-origin fresh and spent HEU fuel at more than 24 research reactors in 17 countries. To date, approximately 185 kilograms of HEU have been repatriated to Russia from Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Libya, Uzbekistan, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Uzbekistan (first HEU spent fuel shipment). The target goal as laid out at the Bratislava Summit is to complete the return of all Russian-origin HEU fresh *and* spent fuel from third countries by 2010. To meet these goals, GP countries should work together to use diplomatic influence and financial assistance to give stronger incentives to countries where these reactors are housed to convert or shut them down.

However, there is currently no plan to convert HEU research reactors on Russian territory. The number and security conditions of civilian HEU research reactors in Russia are uncertain.<sup>10</sup> It is estimated that at least some of these research reactors could be converted to LEU fuel with technologies now under development (but Russia has not yet decided to do so).

Employment of former weapons scientists. The employment of former weapons scientists was also listed as a top priority by the G8 when they established the Global Partnership. While some countries have their own national efforts, much of the work

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<sup>10</sup> See summary of sites: <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/tables/rurestab.htm>

in this arena has been carried out by the International Science and Technology Centers in Russia and Ukraine. This multilateral effort predated the Global Partnership by a decade.

The science centers fund work in a variety of areas and have in the past three years been increasing their emphasis on sustainable programs, rather than short-term grants, by pairing scientists and institutes with commercial partners. Funds for much biological cooperation work are also funneled through the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow since there are no bilateral agreements with Russia in this field.

Biological security. Russia has declined to discuss the issue of biological security within the context of the Global Partnership, a point of contention with donor countries. Very little work has been done in this area since Kananaskis. Donors have funded some limited projects focused on physical security upgrades for biological sites through the international science centers, while biological threat reduction work in non-Russian countries of the former Soviet Union has expanded recently.<sup>11</sup> However, this does not come close to meeting the need for consolidation and accounting of dangerous pathogens, and for physical upgrades at the facilities where they are housed. Russia has not yet agreed to any international cooperation at the biological facilities run by the Russian Ministry of Defense or at anti-plague research institutes in Russia.

### ***v. Implementation Challenges***

At Kananaskis, the G8 established “Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects,” anticipating the need to clearly articulate what would be required to avoid the implementation pitfalls of past threat reduction work. However, despite the guidelines, recurring problems have slowed the process. The issues of liability, access, and taxation remain difficult. Progress has been made on liability and taxation, but Global Partnership countries have made only modest strides on the access issue.

Liability. Liability has been a problem for everyone. MNEPR resolved the issue for most donors in the nuclear field after lengthy negotiations. For U.S. assistance, inability to agree on terms of liability has held up two important programs, the Nuclear Cities Initiative<sup>12</sup> and the plutonium disposition program. However, in July 2005, the U.S. and Russia reached a tentative agreement on liability for the plutonium disposition project, under which the U.S. will reportedly accept similar liability provisions as those in the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in Russia

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<sup>11</sup> See “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2007,” found at [http://www.nti.org/research/official\\_docs/dod/2006/040705.pdf](http://www.nti.org/research/official_docs/dod/2006/040705.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> U.S. DoE’s Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) works to create sustainable employment for former weapons scientists in the closed nuclear cities. The program lapsed in 2003 due to a U.S.-Russian disagreement over liability provisions, existing programs continue today but no new programs have started since that time. For details see RANSAC Letter to Secretary Colin Powell, July 2, 2003, <http://www.ransac.org/documents/ransacletteronpu-ncirenewal.pdf>

(MNEPR). The agreement is now in the Russian interagency approval process. Under the renewed CTR Umbrella Agreement, the United States and Russia have agreed to the original blanket liability protection for all existing projects, but liability protection for new projects are to be similar to those agreed for plutonium disposition and MNEPR.

Access. Another key obstacle to implementing projects has been establishing satisfactory access measures at project work sites in Russia for foreign government personnel and contractors. This is particularly true for the terrorism-relevant areas of nuclear material security and biological security. Donor governments rightly insist that recipient countries grant program managers and auditors access to work sites for which funds have been provided. As work on some of the less sensitive sites has been completed and the focus has turned to more sensitive sites, it has become increasingly difficult to find solutions acceptable to both sides.

The access issue has affected different partners differently. The Bratislava Summit has resulted in some alleviation of the problem for U.S. assistance, but problems still remain. The two sites that continue to be off-limits are the nuclear warhead assembly and dismantlement facilities of Elektrokhimpribor at Lesnoy and the Instrument Making Plant at Trekhgornyy. In addition, negotiations for a transparency agreement and amended implementation agreement for the Mayak fissile material storage facility are still underway. No material has yet been loaded into Mayak due to disagreement over what is to be loaded into the facility and how it will be monitored.<sup>13</sup> Other partners have experienced access-related difficulties in the submarine dismantlement area.<sup>14</sup>

The lack of transparency and access at biological sites has stymied security assistance altogether. Although in a 1992 Joint Statement, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States called for visits to any military facility on a reciprocal

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<sup>13</sup> A key problem is finding techniques to confirm that the material being stored at Mayak is weapons-grade and that it will not be reused in weapons in the future. The U.S. side has stipulated that material stored at the Mayak facility should be restricted to weapons-grade HEU and weapons-grade Pu that will never be returned to weapons. Russia's position is that all weapons-grade HEU that meets this requirement is already being blended down in the HEU Purchase Agreement and does not need to be stored at Mayak. Of the 34 tons of weapon-grade Pu covered by the 2000 Pu Disposition Agreement, 9 tons will be stored at plutonium production reactors. Therefore, Russia intends to store 25 tons of weapons-grade Pu in the facility, a quarter of its potential. This is also estimated to be one-fifth of separated plutonium excess to weapons in Russia. See "Securing the Bomb," on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website for a detailed explanation: [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/cnwm/monitoring/mayak.asp](http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/monitoring/mayak.asp)

<sup>14</sup> Ole Reistad, "Naval Nuclear Clean-Up in Northwest Russia: Lessons Learned and a Roadmap to Completion," SGP Issue Brief, November 2004, <http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/SGPIssueBrief/Reistad.pdf>.

basis (subject to the need to respect confidential information), such visits have not taken place.<sup>15</sup> Some analysts believe that negotiating access to closed defense-related biological sites in Russia will require reciprocal access to comparable U.S. facilities.<sup>16</sup>

Taxation. The Kananaskis guidelines stipulate that Global Partnership support is considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges. The Russian tax code has now formalized this stipulation, and it is a part of intergovernmental agreements. However, many of the procedures in the code are difficult to implement, slowing progress and adding to the bureaucratic burden in donor countries.

<sup>15</sup> Joint Statement on Biological Weapons by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian Federation, 10-11 September 1992, <http://www.sipri.org/contents/cbwarfare/cbw>.

<sup>16</sup> Daniil Kobayakov and Vladimir Orlov, "Global Partnership: What's Next?" April 2005, <http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/KobayakovOrlovApril2005GPWhatisnext.pdf>; Jonathan Tucker, "Biosecurity and Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Former Soviet Union: What is to be Done?" Presentation at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Seminar, June 10, 2005.

## II. The Way Ahead

The Global Partnership has been given rhetorical priority but now countries need to turn “promises to reality,” a slogan the Russian G8 Presidency has set as its Global Partnership goal.

### **1. Fostering true partnership with Russia, beginning with this year’s Russian G8 Presidency.**

Global Partnership countries have yet to transform the relationship with Russia from “patronage to partnership.” Russia is now ready financially to take on an increased share of the burden, and it has begun to do so. Russia has shown initiative, particularly with regard to its own Global Partnership priorities, and a true partnership in the future would involve setting priorities jointly with partners. Moreover, many obstacles to progress can be greatly reduced with a combination of high-level political effort and practical acts of reciprocity and joint management.

Russia will need to speed its internal approval process for GP projects, ensure that its own bureaucracy is implementing programs expeditiously, and continue increasing funding from the Russian federal budget. In addition, Russia can and should show leadership this year as G8 President in addressing Global Partnership goals worldwide and participating as a Global Partnership donor elsewhere in the world.

To assist Russia in understanding how much of its own funds it will need to appropriate for Global Partnership projects, donors can seek to increase the predictability and reliability of funding by planning how they will spend their pledges and taking concrete steps to do so. Global Partnership countries should also consider more reciprocity in a variety of areas, with donors demonstrating the nonproliferation and security measures they have taken in their own countries to secure sensitive sites, consolidate materials, or train personnel. The United States, for example, should consider reciprocal access arrangements for nuclear security projects, as was discussed at the Bratislava Summit. And Russia should consider converting or shutting down research reactors using highly enriched uranium on its territory, as the United States is doing and as both countries are working together to do globally. This will alleviate the sense that Russia is being singled-out and emphasize that all Global Partnership countries need to be good stewards of sensitive facilities.

## **2. Ensuring that Global Partnership funds are reducing the most urgent threats.**

The G8's commitment to "preventing terrorists or those that harbor them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology" is the foundation of the Global Partnership.

The critical test for the Global Partnership's effectiveness is whether the work it is doing is minimizing the terrorism threat. Global Partnership funding should be most active in the areas of highest risk. So far, the Global Partnership has lacked sufficient focus on the most urgent threat areas.

To some extent, a natural division of labor is occurring amongst Global Partnership donor states, with many focusing on tasks that are easily supported in their home parliaments or that take advantage of a particular technical competency they possess. However, this strategy risks giving too little emphasis to other, potentially more important Kananaskis priorities. Thus, chemical weapons destruction and submarine dismantlement have received the most attention to date, especially among non-U.S. donors, while reducing nuclear and biological terrorism threats has been a lower priority.

Russia can help adjust priorities this year as G8 President. Considering Russia's existing leadership in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), global clean out could be a good starting place for bolstering the nuclear terrorism prevention agenda. Russia could establish the Global Partnership forum as a coordination body for other partners' contributions to GTRI and demonstrate how they could assist Russian and U.S. efforts to convert or shut-down HEU-fueled research reactors worldwide. In order to meet the deadlines set at Bratislava, additional incentives for conversion or shut-down will need to be offered, an ideal way for other GP partners to contribute.

Russia has identified the fight against infectious disease as one of its top three priorities for its G8 Presidency and plans a conference on bioterrorism in the fall. However, there is no reason to delay this topic until after the summit. Many solutions to the infectious disease problem-set are also valid and important for achieving nonproliferation and terrorism prevention goals. Infectious disease monitoring, consolidation and security for dangerous pathogens, and scientific oversight should be part of the discussion at St. Petersburg in both the public health sessions and in the Global Partnership discussions.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, IMEMO and CSIS recently completed a strategic study on bioterrorism. 20 top scientists and officials from Russia's premier bio-research institutes and their European counterparts identified the most effective means to prevent and counter bio-terrorism and establish cooperative projects between European countries and Russia. The full report is published on SIIA's website: <http://www.ui.se/home.htm>

Global Partnership countries also need to consider how to reduce the terrorism risk at all vulnerable nuclear and biological facilities, not limited to WMD-related military sites. Security culture and nonproliferation training, personnel reliability, and peer oversight should be required and supported for all staff at these sites, not only for the scientists. This is another area where Russia can be a leader in identifying and promoting best practices.

### **3. Dedicating the resources needed to get the job done in the former Soviet Union.**

After four years, some of the Kananaskis priorities are still drastically underfunded. Completing the work that is needed, even just in the former Soviet states, will take far more than \$20 billion. Russia should seek to persuade Global Partnership countries to boost their pledges up to the \$20 billion mark by the time of the St. Petersburg summit. Partner countries should also start planning for work beyond the \$20 billion level.

Although some argue that the problem is not inadequate financing but implementation challenges, once progress is made on the implementation roadblocks, funding will be needed to move ahead quickly. In a number of cases, donors are waiting to pledge more money until they see that Russia has completed necessary legal frameworks (this is particularly the case with the plutonium disposition program). But holding off on committing to additional contributions only lengthens the process because it is harder to make the case within the Russian bureaucracy that the funds will be available if agreements are approved.

There are specific projects that we already know will need additional funding, and countries should work to increase their pledges to these in the near term. They include chemical weapons destruction facilities and the multilateral plutonium disposition program. We are now entering a critical period for chemical weapons destruction efforts in Russia. From 2006-2008, all facilities will need to have been built and started operation. It is estimated that chemical weapons destruction costs may escalate before completion, but for now future costs are estimated at \$7 billion (200 billion rubles). With Russia's own commitments, funding for this effort appears to be in good shape -- Russia anticipates contributing up to \$5.9 billion (160.4 billion rubles) itself, and receiving \$1.27 billion (34.2 billion rubles) from GP countries.<sup>18</sup> However, Russia is seeking GP assistance for chemical weapons destruction facilities at Pochep and Leonidovka.

The multilateral plutonium disposition program will need total funding of roughly \$2 billion (\$1 billion in capital costs, \$1 billion in operating costs) to dispose of the 34 tons

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<sup>18</sup> Viktor Kholstov, Deputy Head of the Federal Agency for Industry, Interview with *Yaderny Kontrol*, April 2006, SGP website, <http://www.sgpproject.org/resources/06-03-30%20kholstov%20interview%20eng.pdf>

of Russian Pu covered by the 2000 agreement; to date, approximately half this amount has been pledged.

The plutonium production reactor shut-down project is a case where a relatively modest contribution could see a project to completion. To remain on schedule, the fossil fuel plant construction at Zheleznogorsk needs additional funding from Global Partnership donors amounting to at least \$100 million to reach the estimated total program cost of around \$1 billion. This is a case where even small donors can make a real difference. Additional projects proposed by Ukraine also need immediate attention.

Certain other priorities suffer from an almost chronic lack of resources. The reemployment of former weapons scientists and personnel stands out in this regard. Reorienting experts to civilian or commercial work and improving the security culture surrounding sensitive materials and technical know-how could have major long-term impact on preventing WMD terrorism and promoting nonproliferation. Given the relative availability of materials and manuals, the “human factor” is often the key to the success or failure of a terrorist attempt to acquire WMD. Yet, these programs get little financial support or high-level attention.

#### **4. Further clearing away the impediments to turning “pledges into projects.”**

Breakthroughs on legal frameworks, liability, and access will ultimately determine how quickly work can get done and, in the donors’ eyes, will demonstrate Russia’s commitment to the Global Partnership. We now need swift action to set up contracts with those donors who have only recently concluded implementing agreements with Russia.

Costs should be controlled by increased transparency and coordination in the project planning and contracting process. Donors should not be put in a situation where they are unintentionally outbidding other donors and driving up costs, as may be happening in the submarine dismantlement work in Northwest Russia.<sup>19</sup>

The agreement on liability for the plutonium disposition project is now in the Russian inter-agency process. Russian approval is needed as soon as possible to be able to raise the funds needed for this effort. A more comprehensive solution to the liability issue should also be sought by the United States and Russia, which should include countries ratifying the Convention of Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Rose Gottemoeller, “Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action,” Aspen Institute paper, 2005, <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-8DF23CA704F5%7D/cpGottemoellerPaper.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> Rose Gottemoeller, “Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action,” Aspen Institute, <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-8DF23CA704F5%7D/cpGottemoellerPaper.pdf>

Access arrangements at the most sensitive sites remains the biggest impediment to the U.S.-Russian goal for completion of nuclear materials security upgrades by 2008 and to achievement of meaningful biological security cooperation. GP donor countries and Russia must continue to explore methods of granting access for foreign nationals. Donor countries understandably insist that program managers be allowed access to assess, track, and verify project funds expended in Russia. Russia is understandably cautious about the presence of these foreign nationals at extremely sensitive nuclear and biological-related sites. However, both sides must work to develop innovative procedures to address their legitimate concerns. For the United States especially, completing the job of securing nuclear and biological materials will largely depend on whether agreeable terms of access can be reached for some of the most sensitive facilities in the Russian complex.<sup>21</sup> This may include establishing reciprocal visits to nuclear sites as President Bush called for in December 2004.<sup>22</sup>

A related obstacle is disagreement over what can be stored at the already-built Mayak nuclear material storage facility and how it would be monitored. To expedite consolidation and securing of weapons-grade nuclear material, the United States and Russia should agree upon transparency arrangements immediately so that loading of the Mayak facility can begin in 2006. They should also continue to explore options for filling Mayak to its capacity, including flexible monitoring alternatives such as U.S. monitoring of part of the facility.

Beyond Russia, work with Ukraine has also been progressing since it joined the GP. Ukraine has circulated a detailed list of nuclear-related projects to GP donors for consideration. The United States and Ukraine signed a new CTR agreement in August 2005 to protect biological pathogens in Ukraine and prevent bioterrorism. Moving projects forward in Ukraine is now subject to establishing legal frameworks with the donors and defining specific projects. Other FSU states need to expand their ability to meet the Kananaskis implementation guidelines and work with GP countries to more clearly define projects in their countries.

## **5. Making the Global Partnership truly “global” through widening donor and recipient participation.**

Partner countries can do more to make the Global Partnership truly global. The focus of the Global Partnership has initially, and appropriately, been in Russia and the former Soviet Union. However, the Global Partnership should continue expanding its

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<sup>21</sup> For detailed discussion on access issues at nuclear facilities, see “Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action,” National Research Council and Russian Academy of Sciences joint report, 2005, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11302.html>

<sup>22</sup> President Bush said, “I think one of the things we need to do is to give the Russians equal access to our sites, our nuclear storage sites to see what works and what doesn't work, to build confidence between our two governments,” White House Press Conference, December 20, 2004, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041220-3.html>

donor base and recipient pool to accommodate threat reduction assistance needs wherever they arise.

Some countries, including Russia, have resisted expanding the pool of recipients beyond the former Soviet Union out of concern that resources in that region would be stretched too thin. But the expansion of recipients should not mean that less money would go to urgent needs in the former Soviet Union. By not limiting funding to the \$20 billion, work can be done wherever it is needed to reduce the risk of catastrophic terrorism and proliferation.

A global approach should take advantage of the experience of the former Soviet states in receiving assistance by sharing this experience with others. The Global Partnership countries have a pool of expertise from both donors and recipients and have developed a useful coordination mechanism that could be applied on a global scale to address the Kananaskis goals. For example, as a source of nonproliferation assistance, the Global Partnership could play a role in implementing the global clean-out work described above or in helping countries meet their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to improve export controls, increase border security, and strengthen physical protection of nuclear and biological facilities. ■

### **ABOUT STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP PROJECT**

The Center for Strategic and International Studies leads the Strengthening Global Partnership project, a consortium of 24 research institutes in 19 European, Asian, and North American countries working to build political and financial support for the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The consortium works together to urge governments to secure, account for, and safely dispose of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, agents, materials, and infrastructure in Russia and the former Soviet states. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the primary sponsor of the three-year project, which began in late 2001. For more information see <http://www.sgpproject.org>.

### **ABOUT CSIS**

For four decades, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been dedicated to providing world leaders with strategic insights on -- and policy solutions to -- current and emerging global issues. CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, formerly deputy secretary of defense, who has been president and CEO since April 2000. It is guided by a board of trustees chaired by former Senator Sam Nunn and consisting of prominent individuals from both the public and private sectors. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS is private, nonpartisan, and tax-exempt.

### **ABOUT NTI**

Concerned that the threat from nuclear weapons had fallen off most people's radar screens after the end of the Cold War, CNN founder Ted Turner asked former Senator Sam Nunn in the spring of 2000 to help assess whether a private organization could make a difference. Mr. Turner and Senator Nunn founded the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in January 2001. NTI's mission is to strengthen global security by reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. NTI seeks to raise public awareness, serve as a catalyst for new thinking and take direct action to reduce these threats. In addition to Mr. Turner and Senator Nunn, NTI is guided by an experienced, international Board of Directors who share a common goal of taking action to reduce the gap between the global threats and the global response.

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### **FRONT COVER PHOTO CREDITS**

- 1 Chemical warheads: Fox Cities - Kurgan Sister Cities Program, Inc. <http://www.foxcitieskurgan.org/PhotosShchWeap.htm>
- 2 Research scientist in former Russian biological weapons facility: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, [http://www.dtra.mil/press\\_resources/photo\\_library/ctr/russia/R-1.cfm](http://www.dtra.mil/press_resources/photo_library/ctr/russia/R-1.cfm)
- 3 Nuclear reactor at Seversk, Russia: Defense Threat Reduction Agency [http://www.dtra.mil/press\\_resources/photo\\_library/ctr/russia/R-1.cfm](http://www.dtra.mil/press_resources/photo_library/ctr/russia/R-1.cfm)
- 4 Nuclear weapons transportation container: Defense Threat Reduction Agency [http://www.dtra.mil/press\\_resources/photo\\_library/ctr/russia/R-3.cfm](http://www.dtra.mil/press_resources/photo_library/ctr/russia/R-3.cfm)

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