

## Polish and Czech Support for Missile Defense Has Historical Roots


David R. Scruggs

An important facet of the increasingly heated European missile defense debate is the resolve of the Polish and Czech governments to go ahead with the deployment of U.S. missile defense systems in their countries in the face of growing public opposition. In early April, public opinion polls found 51 percent against deployment in Poland, where Washington wants to station 10 interceptor missiles, and 61 percent against deployment in the Czech Republic, where the United States hopes to build a radar base.

Although some European leaders have come to see the attraction of missile defense in light of the potential nuclear threat from Iran, public opinion in Western Europe reflects an even greater opposition to antimissile defense than does public opinion in Central Europe. Javier Solana, high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Angela Merkel, German chancellor and current holder of the European Union presidency, have accordingly proposed that the U.S. move be debated publicly within the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and with Russia. So why do Polish prime minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Czech prime minister Mirek Topolánek insist on forging ahead with deployment?

The answer requires an understanding of Central Europe's disastrous twentieth century history. While Russia's objections to the placement of an antimissile system in Central Europe have their roots in the Cold War, the reasons for Polish and Czech support for the deployment date back to World War II. At a recent conference in Washington, senior Polish and Czech officials were asked why Article 5 guarantees of mutual support under the NATO Charter did not sway their governments to pursue missile defense talks under the multilateral NATO umbrella rather than bilaterally with the United States. In very diplomatic language, the answer was simple: Treaties are nice, but we don't trust them.

In 1938, Czechoslovakia had treaties and letters of understanding with France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. When Hitler demanded the Sudetenland, a part of Czechoslovakia that had once belonged to Germany, Czechoslovakia's allies stood aside and let him have it. These same allies expressed shock and dismay when Hitler annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia the following year, but by then it was too late to do anything. Similarly, in 1939, Poland had mutual defense treaties with France and Britain. After Hitler launched his invasion in September of that year, France and Britain dutifully declared war on Germany but failed to mobilize sufficient forces or to put enough pressure on Germany to stop the aggression. In both cases, the Poles and the Czechs had treaties apparently guaranteeing their defense but their survival was not intertwined with the national interests of their allies. They are now determined not to make the same mistake again — and this time, despite their recent entry into the European Union, they believe that the only ally that would really count in a crisis is the United States.



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## United States Welcomes EU as Global Partner at Summit Talks

Reginald Dale

Long stuck in the doldrums, the annual United States–European Union summit meeting is emerging as an important forum for strengthening transatlantic relations and promoting European-American cooperation on the wider world stage. In the words of a senior U.S. official, the U.S.-EU relationship is “no longer just about bilateral issues” but extends to “the full range of global challenges” — an enhanced level of partnership that EU leaders have vainly sought for many years.

The main decision at the summit meeting in Washington, D.C., on April 30, 2007, was to launch a new drive to build “a stronger and more integrated transatlantic economy” through the removal of regulatory barriers to trade, and particularly to investment, an initiative championed by Angela Merkel, German chancellor and current president of the European Council. Merkel, along with José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, represented the EU at the meeting with President George W. Bush.

The wider significance of the meeting, however, was the political message it conveyed: both sides of the Atlantic want to deepen their “strategic partnership” at a time when rising powers such as China and India are expanding their global economic and political influence. A

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*Atlantic Outlook* is a newsletter of the CSIS Europe Program, including the New European Democracies Project and the Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership. It provides news, analysis, and commentary on political, economic, and security developments in Europe, the EU and the United States, and in transatlantic relations. It also highlights forthcoming and recent CSIS Europe Program events. For more information please contact Justin Wiseman: [jwiseman@csis.org](mailto:jwiseman@csis.org).

### POLISH AND CZECH SUPPORT *(from page 1)*

The reasoning is as follows. Russian military and economic influence is formidable and increasingly expansionist — especially in the countries falling under the former Soviet sphere of influence. If the United States, however, were to deploy antimissile systems in Central Europe, Washington would be deeply committed to defending not only the systems themselves but also the countries in which they were placed. High-resolution X-band radar systems and long-range ballistic interceptors are very high-value assets, and the United States is not going to part with them easily. The Polish and the Czech governments know this. So do the Western Europeans and the Russians. Of equal importance, bonds that start with physical military investments develop over time into mental and emotional commitments to protect the host countries. The bonds are further tightened by increased personal contact and cooperation between U.S. military forces and those of their allies. The phenomenon was clearly demonstrated by the close links developed by the United States with Germany and Japan during the Cold War. By deploying missile defense systems on their soil, the Poles and Czechs ensure (as much as they can) that the interests of the world's most powerful nation are aligned with their survival.

Furthermore, a deeper probe of public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic reveals that opposition to the missile defense plan often reflects specific frustrations over other U.S. policies and the unpopularity of individual members of the U.S. administration, rather than broader re-

sentment at having the United States as an ally. A major source of bitterness, for example, could be removed if current efforts on Capitol Hill lead to the inclusion of Central European nations in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program — allowing their citizens the same visa-free access to the United States as their Western European EU partners. That in itself would go a long way toward lessening public resistance to missile defense deployment.

Similarly, European public opinion polls repeatedly rank disapproval of the Bush administration and the war in Iraq as the top reasons for anti-U.S. sentiment. If construction of the European missile defense system were to begin in 2008, it would start to become operational in 2011. That would be more than two years after the Bush administration had left office, and the situation in the Middle East would almost certainly be markedly different, for better or worse, whatever happens in Iraq.

Given continuing concerns about Russia, and absent a coherent guarantor of sovereignty within Europe, Polish and Czech governments will continue to look to the United States for protection. The response to the threat of Middle Eastern missiles is simply a means to an end. The priority in Warsaw and Prague is to bind U.S. security interests to those of Central Europe. This may be a fine and rational example of *realpolitik*, but it is hardly surprising if it causes annoyance in other EU capitals that are seeking to build a common European defense more independent of the United States.

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### UNITED STATES WELCOMES EU *(from page 1)*

more integrated Atlantic market, for instance, should help to strengthen the competitive position of the United States and Europe in response to the growing economic weight of Asia.

At the political level, the meeting solidified agreement on a broad new approach to world problems, under which the United States and Europe will make serious joint efforts to find solutions, even if they do not necessarily adopt the same policies to reach broader global objectives. This approach enabled Merkel to pronounce that the two sides had found “a lot of common ground” on climate change and energy, two areas in which transatlantic policy divisions remain widest.

The summit constructed at least a common framework for resolving these divisions, after both sides edged closer on the principles, if not the policies, at stake. Thus the Europeans said they were pleased that Washington had gone farther than before in acknowledging that human activity is contributing to global warming, while the Americans welcomed European acceptance that discussions of climate change cannot take place in isolation but must also include energy security, technological remedies, and economic growth.

Particularly significant was the repeated insistence by U.S. officials that the EU and the United States were now working together on a “global scale.” The phrase confirms a substantial advance in U.S. attitudes to the EU that had previously changed little in the three decades since Henry Kissinger, as U.S. national security adviser, made a sharp distinction between Europe’s “regional interests” and the United States’ “global interests and responsibilities” in 1973.

The Bush administration is thus continuing a trend that began with the president’s visit to the European Commission in Brussels early in his second term, the first by a U.S. president and a symbolic recognition of the growing importance of the EU as a partner, in addition to Washington’s dealings with individual member governments. Bush has since helped to improve transatlantic relations by moving closer to European positions on a number of issues, including diplomatic overtures to Iran and the Middle East peace process.

In contrast to many previous U.S.-EU summits, which received scant attention in Washington, the latest gathering looked more like a miniature version of the Group of Eight. The leaders issued pages of prenegotiated agreements and declarations on world problems from Kosovo, Darfur, and Iran to the Doha Round of world trade talks. In important areas, especially energy and climate change, they saw their talks as preparations for the G-8 meeting to be hosted by Germany in June. While closer integration of the U.S.-EU summit into the deliberations of the G-8 does not ensure results, it should help to develop a more united Atlantic viewpoint.

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## RECENT AND UPCOMING EVENTS

- March 26 — Conference at the House of Sweden marking the 50th anniversary of the EU's founding Treaty of Rome, organized by the CSIS Europe Program, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, and the Embassy of Sweden.
- April 2–3 — Conference on "Security Threats and Responses: Regional Perspectives," first in the series, *Central and East Europe's Security Agenda*, hosted by the CSIS New European Democracies Project and the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group.
- April 11 — Senior European Dialogue, "Germany's Security and Defense Policy: The Dual Challenge of Transformation and Increasing Operational Commitments," with Christian Schmidt, German deputy defense minister, hosted by the CSIS Europe Program and the Hanns Seidel Foundation.
- April 20 — Congressional Forum on Ukraine with Steve Pifer, CSIS senior advisor, and Andrew Kuchins, director of CSIS Russia Eurasia program, organized by the CSIS Europe Program and the CSIS Russia Eurasia Program.
- April 26 — Roundtable on communicating the EU's message to the general public, with Margot Wallström, vice president of the European Commission, responsible for communications, hosted by the CSIS Europe Program's Transatlantic Media Network.
- April 26 — Senior European Dialogue, "The Impact of Crises in the Middle East and Afghanistan on Transatlantic Relations: An Italian Perspective," with Gianni De Michelis, former foreign minister and former deputy prime minister of Italy, hosted by the CSIS Europe Program.
- May 7 — Policy forum with Lulzim Basha, Albanian minister of foreign affairs, organized by the CSIS New European Democracies Project.
- May 8 — Senior European Dialogue on the challenges facing the European Defence Agency (EDA), with Hilmar Linnenkamp, EDA deputy chief executive, cohosted by the CSIS Europe Program and the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group.
- May 11 — Discussion on the future of Kosovo, led by Janusz Bugajski, director of the CSIS New European Democracies Project, and Alexandros Mallias, Greek ambassador to the United States.
- May 14 — Meeting in Berlin of the new U.S.-EU Partnership Committee for Ukraine, cochaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS counselor and trustee, and Volker Rühle, former German defense minister.
- May 24 — CSIS Statesmen's Forum with Haris Silajdzic, president of Bosnia.
- June 10–12 — EU-U.S.-NATO dialogue in Brussels, organized by the CSIS Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, with support from the CSIS Europe Program, and cosponsored by the Transatlantic Policy Network, completing a two-year CSIS project, *A Global Euro-Atlantic Dialogue about the U.S., the EU, and NATO in the 21st Century*.
- June 21 — Second conference in the series, *Central and East Europe's Security Agenda*, focusing on the Black Sea region.

## Serbia's Threats over Kosovo Will Not Help Its Cause

Janusz Bugajski

Serbia has only two cards left in its ongoing struggle to derail statehood for Kosovo — Russian resistance and the threat of conflict. But the emphasis is increasingly on the latter. On the Russian front, Serbia is hoping that Moscow will either veto or delay the plan proposed to the United Nations Security Council by Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president and the council's special representative, a move that would grant Kosovo autonomy under the supervision of the European Union.

Belgrade, however, knows that it cannot depend on Moscow to follow through on its promises of support and is raising the specter of instability as its primary argument to delay Kosovo's progress toward independence. In meetings with EU and U.S. representatives, Serbian officials recite three areas of allegedly looming conflict: within Serbia, in Kosovo, and in the wider region.

First, Belgrade claims that if Kosovo were to become independent, followers of former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, in league with ultranationalists, would attempt to overthrow the Serbian government. And it is true that Tomislav Nikolic, deputy leader of the Radical Party, has threatened a popular uprising similar to the one that unseated Milosevic in October 2000.

Such sensationalist arguments, however, do not necessarily help Serbia's cause, as they appear to imply that Serbia cannot be a consolidated democracy if extremists present a constant menace to the country's system of government. That message will damage prospects for Serbian EU entry, increase international resolve to contain Serbian expansionism, and strengthen calls for Kosovo's permanent separation from Belgrade.

The second danger depicted by Serbian officials is the prospect of resistance by Kosovo's Serbian minority. While Oliver Ivanovic, a leader of that minority, has warned of another possible Serbian exodus, more radical voices have called for the secession of the Serb-dominated north if Kosovo gains statehood. Such an outcome, however, is clearly containable if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are serious about maintaining stability and security in Kosovo. Both organizations would have to take preventive measures to ensure proper policing, to disarm militants, and to keep roads and other lines of communication open.

The border with Serbia would have to be closely monitored by NATO troops, with warnings issued to Belgrade that any attempt to unsettle northern Kosovo would elicit a strong international response. Preparations would also have to be made for accommodating any Serbs who would wish to leave an independent Kosovo despite assurances of extensive protection of minority rights.

In the third scenario, Belgrade is again focusing on the broader Balkan "powder keg." While all Serbia's neighbors have tried to present the Balkans as part of the European mainstream, both in image and reality, officials in Belgrade seem to thrive on the specter of ethnic conflict, territorial disputes, and border wars.

By claiming that Kosovo's independence would unravel Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, Belgrade is in effect threatening its neighbors in a way that is totally unacceptable both to the countries concerned and to the international community. Such saber-rattling suggests that instead of promoting stability, Serbian officials prefer to act as spoilers seeking to reverse the evolution of stable states in the region. But overkill by Serbian officials will certainly not obstruct Kosovo's road to independence and might actually assist the process.

*Janusz Bugajski is director of the CSIS New European Democracies Project.* ■

## Politicians Deliver Yet Another Crisis in Ukraine

Steven Pifer

Ukraine is undergoing yet another of the frequent political crises it has suffered since the Orange Revolution erupted at the end of 2004. The cohabitation begun in August 2006 between President Victor Yushchenko, the winner of the revolution, and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, the loser, took little time to come undone. Within weeks, policy differences had emerged. And within months, the Yanukovich-led majority coalition in the Rada (parliament) had started to chip away at presidential authorities and poach deputies from Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party and the bloc led by Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister and Orange coalition member. On April 2, Yushchenko ordered the Rada dissolved and called new elections for May 27 (later postponed to June 24). Yanukovich and the Rada majority rejected his decree as unconstitutional, and the coalition insisted it would continue to work.

Yushchenko and Yanukovich are reportedly working toward a compromise. Possible elements, in addition to early Rada elections, include: suspension of the dissolution decree, agreement on preventing parliamentary defections, passage of laws to regulate how the government and Rada function, and creation of a commission to suggest fixes to the constitutional ambiguities that are fueling the crisis. The overriding question is whether any such compromise could hold. Earlier Yushchenko-Yanukovich deals have been short-lived.

Should the attempt to compromise fail, Yushchenko and Yanukovich will look to the Constitutional Court to rule on Yushchenko's decree. As charges of corruption swirl around it, the court has little credibility with many Ukrainians. But Yanukovich has said that he would accept early elections if the court upheld the president's decree. Yushchenko has said that he would accept a court decision against him, though that would leave him in a much weakened political position. Failure by the court to reach a verdict could place Ukraine in uncharted territory if Yushchenko presses ahead with elections while Yanukovich and the Rada majority remain opposed.

If early elections are held, polls offer Yushchenko mixed grounds for comfort. His approval rating has climbed during the April crisis. Other polls, however, suggest that there has been no major swing in electoral preferences — raising the possibility that a new Rada would look much like the old one and that Yanukovich could return as prime minister.

In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution and the March 2006 Rada elections, many hoped that Ukraine's leaders — with no national elections due for almost four years — would focus on running the country. Instead, they have waged nearly continuous political warfare. Ukraine will only become a modern European state if its leaders can call a truce and concentrate on the necessary policies and reforms. That means putting aside narrow factional interests, seeking common ground, and pursuing policies in the interests of the country. If the politicians cannot do this, Ukraine is destined for more infighting, and its leaders should expect less attention from the West, which already has a full agenda and little time for a fractious and inward-looking partner.

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### NEWS UPDATES

- In a clear sign of Russian displeasure over U.S. plans to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, President Vladimir Putin declared a "moratorium" on compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that regulates conventional arms deployments in Europe. The treaty has yet to be ratified by NATO nations because of the continuing presence of Russian troops in border countries.
- Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, head of a party with Islamist roots, called early elections for July 22 to resolve a crisis caused by the rejection of his nominee for president, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, amid massive street protests by secularists and barely veiled threats of intervention by the armed forces.
- At a summit meeting in March, EU leaders pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to at least 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 to fight global warming. By that date, the EU wants biofuels to run 10 percent of its cars and trucks and renewable resources to supply 20 percent of its power.
- EU foreign ministers approved a first round of UN sanctions against Iran on April 23 and warned that a second round could follow if Iran did not suspend uranium enrichment in 60 days. The first round blacklists Iranians associated with the nuclear program and freezes assets.
- The EU is to create a rapidly deployable force of 450 border guards from all member states to combat exceptional surges of illegal immigrants, primarily from North and West Africa. The guards will

wear national uniforms, with blue armbands bearing the insignia of the EU and its border cooperation agency.

- Irish prime minister Bertie Ahern called a surprise election for May 24 to try to win a third successive term in office, a feat unmatched in nearly 60 years. Polls are predicting an extremely close race.
- Russia halted deliveries of oil products to Estonia in early May amid mounting tension following the removal of a six-foot commemorative bronze statue of a Red Army soldier from a central square in Tallinn to a military cemetery. The cutoff was widely seen as another example of Moscow using energy supplies as a political weapon. While Estonia's minority ethnic Russians regard the statue as a tribute to Soviet heroism against the Nazis in World War II, for most Estonians it is a bitter reminder of Soviet occupation.

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