

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN BOSNIA

Eric Ridge

Description

Yugoslavia's dissolution in 1991 sparked an extended period of unrest, destabilizing the region and leading to fighting, casualties, and deaths. Amid this growing violence, and after Western attempts to partition the area along ethnic lines failed, a 1994 agreement sought to restore safety in the area by creating a Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹ But that agreement also failed to quell the now-boiling tensions. In subsequent months, three attacks in NATO-designated safe areas – the last of which left 35 people dead the result of shelling in a crowded Sarajevo market on August 28, 1995 – thrust NATO countries into action.² Moving swiftly, NATO launched the Operation DELIBERATE FORCE air campaign just two days later; targeting Serbian-occupied Sarajevo with the ultimate goal of preventing future Bosnian attacks on so-called safe areas.³

The powerful air attacks coerced Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia to forge consensus on several key principles. The December 14, 1995 signing of the Dayton Accords thus sought to end hostilities and facilitate Bosnian reconstruction,⁴ stipulating the retention of Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries and the creation of “a joint multi-ethnic and democratic government charged with conducting foreign, diplomatic, and fiscal policy.”⁵ In order to implement the Accords, NATO sought to establish a strong coalition of countries from which it could deploy peacekeepers. Doing so, however, required a politically unpopular commitment from leaders in a variety of countries, including the United States. With seventy percent of the US public opposed to engagement in Bosnia, President Bill Clinton faced a difficult decision, especially in an election year.⁶ Domestic political leaders reached consensus only after all sides agreed that US engagement in the Bosnian peacekeeping and reconstruction mission would be narrowly bound to avoid mission creep.

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR began in December 1995, harnessing a 60,000 soldier international peacekeeping Implementation Force (IFOR) which sought to

¹ The World Factbook, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>.

² Tom Hundley, “Deadly Bosnia Blast Poses Test For West,” *Chicago Tribune* August 29, 1995, News Section, Final Edition.

³ Roger Cohen, “Conflict In The Balkans: The Overview; Nato Jets Attack Serbian Positions Around Sarajevo,” *The New York Times*, August 30, 1995, A Section, Late Edition.

⁴ Garland H. Williams, *Engineering Peace* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 66.

⁵ The World Factbook, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>.

⁶ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 248.

monitor and implement the military components of the Accords.⁷ Soon after landing in Bosnia, however, IFOR troops confronted the multitude of difficulties they would face in rebuilding a shattered region. One account painted a particularly bleak picture, noting that “Nearly all government functions and activities [in Bosnia had] ceased except waging war.”⁸

The following case study chronicles US Civil Affairs involvement in NATO’s Bosnian peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts, evaluating CA contributions to broader NATO-CIMIC objectives and activities. The case study traces how the General Framework Agreement for Peace’s (GFAP) greater emphasis on implementing military objectives than accomplishing civilian objectives hamstrung CIMIC missions in 1996 and early 1997, significantly limiting US Civil Affairs impact in Bosnia. NATO failure to coordinate with US Civil Affairs planners also hindered initial prospects for mission success. During the first 18 months of the operation, therefore, US Civil Affairs soldiers undertook mostly military tasks which only sometimes also had positive externalities for the Bosnians. Only during the second and third years of the mission were US Civil Affairs soldiers called upon – or in some cases they called upon themselves – to facilitate important non-military activities, such as the holding of local elections and other reconstruction efforts. The case study thus illuminates the broad spectrum in which US Civil Affairs personnel can affect a mission, progressing from a very limited impact to a much greater and proactive one. The progression from the latter to the former in Bosnia led one analyst to describe this operation as a time when “Civil Affairs came of age, especially for NATO and the framework nations” including the United States.⁹

Key Actors:

- **Blue:**
 - NATO
 - Office of the High Representative (OHR)¹⁰
 - IFOR (Implementation Force)
 - SFOR (Stabilization Force)

- **Green:** Coalition included:¹¹

⁷ No Author, *Special Operations Commemorative Book*, (Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company, 2005), 60 and The World Factbook, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>.

⁸ John J. Tuozzolo, “The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1997, p. 54.

⁹ Larry Wentz, *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies), 441.

¹⁰ The World Factbook, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>.

¹¹ Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR FACT SHEET. No. 006-B, December 11, 1995. Site: <http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/fs/fs006b.html>

NATO	NON-NATO
Belgium	Austria
Canada	Czech Republic
Denmark	Estonia
France	Finland
Germany	Hungary
Greece	Latvia
Italy	Lithuania
Luxembourg	Pakistan
The Netherlands	Poland
Norway	Romania
Portugal	Russian Federation
Spain	Slovakia
Turkey	Sweden
United Kingdom	Ukraine

- **Brown:**
 - NGOs and International Organizations, 120 in all, including:
 - International Committee of the Red Cross¹²
 - World Bank
 - UNMIBH (United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina)
 - OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)¹³

Objectives & End States

Although NATO’s engagement in Bosnia eventually developed into “one of the most extensive civil-military operations in US and NATO history,” Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR launched in December 2005 with a decidedly military tilt, principally seeking:

- To enforce peace and maintain security by creating demilitarized zones and separating warring parties; and
- To support UN force withdrawal from the former Yugoslavia.¹⁴

At the early stage of NATO’s efforts in Bosnia, US Civil Affairs personnel primarily executed operations supporting military implementation of the GFAP, in

¹² General George Joulwan, “FY97 Defense Authorization,” House National Security Committee Hearing, March 28, 1996.

¹³ D.S. Gordon and E.H. Toase, eds. *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, (Frank Cass: 2001), p. 233.

¹⁴ John J. Tuozzolo, “The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1997, p. 55. and Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in Bosnia Colonel William R. Phillips Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation SHAPE WEBEDITION Vol. 46 - No. 1 Spring 1998 pp. 22-25 and No Author, “Special Operations Commemorative Book,” (Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company, 2005), 60.

keeping with NATO's overarching emphases.¹⁵ Although CA soldiers at times managed the return of refugees to their homes and worked to restore basic services, CA personnel were generally not asked to initiate many long-term reconstruction efforts.¹⁶ Hardly unique to US Civil Affairs units, IFOR reluctance to engage in long-term reconstruction efforts underscored a broader trend, in which "IFOR took an overall minimal approach towards support to civil implementation" throughout 1995 and into 1996.¹⁷ This marked a dramatic change from the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) modus operandi during the previous three years, which had actually encouraged UN officials to serve as civil administrators.¹⁸ Now to the contrary, Multinational Force (MNF) commanders prevented IFOR from directly involving itself in Bosnian civil affairs, ostensibly to facilitate Bosnia's self-sufficiency.¹⁹

By the spring of 1996, however, IFOR – with the assistance of US Civil Affairs personnel – began instituting principles to encourage greater levels of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and more proactively facilitating Bosnian reconstruction. Throughout the remainder of 1996, "IFOR interaction with civil implementation organisations evolved to include humanitarian support, national elections, longer-term projects, and infrastructure reconstruction."²⁰ US Civil Affairs Personnel played a major role in these efforts, working closely with NGOs and foreign ministries to aid where needed.

Despite these first steps toward progress in civil administration and Bosnian rebuilding, by early 1997 "the reconstruction and integration of Bosnia's institutions lagged dangerously behind the military effort."²¹ The transition from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR to Operation JOINT GUARD at the start of the year, however, ushered in a new military force and a new philosophy. The 18-month operation possessed half the troops as its predecessor force and carried three missions: (1) Deter hostilities, (2) Secure the environment, and (3) Establish civil authority.²² Perhaps most importantly, the new mission brought renewed emphasis toward supporting "the efforts of civil organisations in repatriation, reconstruction, capital investment projects, municipal elections and civil institution building."²³

¹⁵ D.S. Gordon and E.H. Toase, eds. *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, (Frank Cass: 2001), p. 233.

¹⁶ No Author, "Special Operations Commemorative Book," (Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company, 2005), 61.

¹⁷ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, "Soldiers and Civil Power," *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 260

¹⁸ Patrick Hollen, et. al. "Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges," Joint Forces Staff College. Site: www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Pre-Planning_and_Post-Conflict.doc.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in Bosnia Colonel William R. Phillips Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation SHAPE WEBEDITION Vol. 46 - No. 1 Spring 1998 pp. 22-25.

²¹ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, "Soldiers and Civil Power," *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 263.

²² Ibid., p. 263-69.

²³ Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in Bosnia Colonel William R. Phillips Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation SHAPE WEBEDITION Vol. 46 - No. 1 Spring 1998 pp. 22-25

U.S. leadership was instrumental in orchestrating this shift in philosophy. Amid widespread American public disapproval of US involvement in the Balkans, the Clinton Administration began its second term in early 1997 determined to secure a safe and face-saving exit for American troops. US leaders determined that doing so required a shift in mindset from passively seeking solely to end the war, to a more proactive attempt to also build peace.²⁴ In response, NATO leadership soon placed even greater emphasis on civil affairs, relying heavily on US CA personnel to liaise with NGOs, foreign governments, and international organizations.²⁵ US Civil Affairs teams also began undertaking more reconstruction projects, not only restoring public works infrastructure, public health, transportation, and utilities, but also engaging in civil administration missions including an all-important effort to hold elections and form the Bosnian government.²⁶

Building on the intensification in 1997 and early 1998 of civil-military/reconstruction efforts during Operation JOINT GUARD, Mission JOINT FORGE began on June 20, 1998 with a chief objective of “maintain[ing] peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and sustain[ing] the conditions necessary to rebuild that nation.”²⁷ In support of this mission, US CA personnel worked to rebuild civil institutions and provided tremendous assistance in preparing for elections held in the fall of 1998.

In short, during this several-year period NATO-CIMIC and US Civil Affairs missions evolved significantly, shifting sequentially through three phases: (1) Emergency humanitarian assistance, and release of prisoners, (2) Conducting elections, continuing to provide humanitarian assistance, rebuilding infrastructure, and; (3) Repatriating refugees, continued infrastructure reconstruction, additional support for upcoming elections, and direct investment.²⁸

Operational Strategies/Key Missions and Tasks

The GFAP articulated two key categories of tasks to be conducted in support of the objectives and end states it established:

- A “military element to provide for a stable environment conducive to unimpeded reconstruction, and”²⁹
- A “civil-development element critical to the revitalization of Bosnian industry”³⁰

²⁴ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations,” (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 263

²⁵ D.S. Gordon and E.H. Toase, eds. *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, (Frank Cass: 2001), p. 233.

²⁶ No Author, *Special Operations Commemorative Book*, (Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company, 2005), 61.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

²⁸ D.S. Gordon and E.H. Toase, eds. *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, (Frank Cass: 2001), p. 233.

²⁹ Patrick Hollen, et. al. “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College: site: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Pre-Planning_and_Post-Conflict.doc.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

Although drafters of the Dayton Accords had intended these two elements to work closely and generate economies of scale, their coordination was ineffectively operationalized. Although NATO encouraged these military/civilian mechanisms to cooperate, it never enabled them – or required them – to synchronize their efforts in any systematic way.³¹ Given the initial failings of civil-military operations, as it entered its second year NATO sought to move beyond these structural impediments by strengthening IFOR’s civil-military capacity (CIMIC),³² tasking CIMIC elements with the following responsibilities in support of its broader mission of synchronizing civilian and military aspects of the GFAP:³³

- “Promote cooperation with civilian populace, various agencies and national governments;
- “Leverage capabilities of non- governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs) and national governments;
- “Facilitate parallel, unified civilian efforts in support of NATO peace plan implementation;
- “Be prepared to respond to humanitarian, public safety, and public health contingencies.³⁴

Even as it increased its reliance on CIMIC, whose staff eventually reached 450 people, most of whom were USAR Civil Affairs Officers,³⁵ IFOR sought to respect NATO’s previously-stated mission of preventing the operation from becoming a military exercise in nation building. To that end, the military undertook projects in support of IFOR’s primary mission which also had incidental benefits to civilians.³⁶ As then-USD(P) Walter Slocombe told a Congressional Committee in August 1996:

“An example of such a project is the reconstruction of road and railroad networks in northeastern Bosnia necessary for IFOR's own operation and support, but also obviously helpful to economic recovery and to cross-IEBL links. IFOR's measured assistance with the civil aspects of Dayton has been both important and compatible with IFOR's main mission, for it remains true that there can be no overall success in Bosnia without the success of the civilian effort.³⁷

³¹ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 251.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 275.

³³ Patrick Hollen, et. al. “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College: site: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Pre-Planning_and_Post-Conflict.doc.

³⁴ Major General Clinton V. Horn, “Operational Readiness,” House Committee on National Security Subcommittee on Military Readiness, March 19, 1996.

³⁵ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 275.

³⁶ Walter B. Slocombe, “NATO Update on Bosnia,” Senate Armed Services Committee, August 1, 1996/

³⁷ *Ibid.*

Explained another way, the chief mission of civil affairs was to directly support to their military commander, with the externality that local citizens, governments, and civil organizations might also benefit from these activities.³⁸ Thus, US Civil Affairs engineers fixed roads, bridges, and public transportation, and reopened the Sarajevo airport to help the military, even though these activities clearly had fringe benefits for the broader citizenry.³⁹

CIMIC and CA assets also focused on accomplishing broader missions, including the planning of and support to the fall 1996 and 1998 elections, and assisting the fractured police force.⁴⁰ Regarding the former, by some accounts Civil Affairs soldiers were instrumental in preparing Bosnia to hold elections in accord with the GFAP.⁴¹ As operations in Bosnia continued, Civil Affairs personnel constituted increasingly integral components of successes in Bosnian reconstruction. SFOR undertook additional initiatives, for instance using Civil Affairs assets to conduct training in hopes of diminishing the influence of the powerful Bosnian Special Police which served as an instrument of power for those working against the peace process.⁴²

Ends-Means Relationships/Final Thoughts

Although NATO intervention in Bosnia at first did not strongly emphasize CIMIC, “Across the theater, high praise has been levied on the efforts of the U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs assets.”⁴³ Analysts have attributed much of US Civil Affairs’ success to the personnel’s effective interactions with the local citizens, NGOs, and representatives of foreign governments.⁴⁴ NATO intervention in Bosnia was not without its share of hurdles and miscues, however.

- **GFAP Diminishes Importance of Civil-Military Operations.** Before Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR even began, shortcomings within the GFAP threatened the NATO coalition’s ability to effectively accomplish Civil Affairs and CIMIC missions, objectives, and tasks. At the most basic level, the Dayton Accord put its signatories in charge of security and safety of all Bosnians, relegating key missions such as (1) Ensuring freedom of movement (2) Facilitating refugee repatriation and (3) Arresting indicted war criminals to be implemented by “a highly politicized local police, that saw themselves as Serbs, Croats, or Muslim first, and police officers

³⁸ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 277.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

⁴⁰ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 275.

⁴¹ John J. Tuozzolo, “The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1997, p. 55 and Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 277.. Some critics claim, however, that the role of Civil Affairs soldiers in holding the elections was minimal.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 269.

⁴³ Larry Wentz, *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies), 129

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

second,” rather than more dispassionate international peacekeepers.⁴⁵ Thus, before they even landed on the ground in Bosnia, restrictions prevented US Civil Affairs personnel from taking a major role in these efforts.

- **NATO Failure in Planning Civil-Military Affairs.** The fact that NATO was inexperienced at conducting civil-military activities in support of peace operations significantly hindered IFOR’s early efforts.⁴⁶ As one analyst described, IFOR’s early efforts were built on a “shaky doctrinal foundation for peace operations.”⁴⁷ Thus it is not altogether surprising that the IFOR-CIMIC/CA planning process was so limited, focusing primarily on implementing military aspects of the Dayton Accords and providing force protection without paying sufficient attention to Civil Affairs.⁴⁸ Planners’ failure to allocate the extensive time necessary to stand up a functioning CA coordination process also relegated military forces to undertaking responsibilities that could have been left to civilians.⁴⁹ Therefore, NATO/CIMIC failure to engage with US Government planners in Washington led to underutilization of Civil Affairs assets when they initially landed in Bosnia.⁵⁰ The fact that few CA officers were involved in the planning process – for instance, Allied Forces South only included one CA officer in its planning efforts – thus limited commanders’ knowledge of Civil Affairs assets and their ability to use them.
- **Civil Affairs Assets Belatedly Arrive in Theater.** Continuing this series of early mishaps, US Civil Affairs assets were mobilized late, meaning that they consequentially arrived in theater late as well.⁵¹ Conversely, in a perfect world, CA assets would be some of the first soldiers in theater, setting the stage for subsequent general purpose forces deploying in their wake. In this case, late deployment constituted a significant lost opportunity for Civil Affairs assets to liaise with the local population, and with strategic allies including other nations and as NGOs.⁵²
- **Uneven NATO Civil-Military Activities in Early Stages of Operations.** As a result of poor planning, inefficient deployment for Civil Affairs/CIMIC, and NATO inexperience in conducting civil-military missions, NATO implementation at first

⁴⁵ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 253.

⁴⁶ Larry Wentz, *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies), 411.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 411 and Patrick Hollen, et. al. “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College: site:

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Pre-Planning_and_Post-Conflict.doc, p. 6.

⁴⁸ Patrick Hollen, et. al. “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College: site: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Pre-Planning_and_Post-Conflict.doc, p. 6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵⁰ Interview with David Mitchell, December 9, 2008.

⁵¹ Larry Wentz, *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies), 129.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 129.

was uneven.⁵³ The operation started inauspiciously, with the awkward transition from United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) to the NATO-led Multinational Force (MNF), which “generated considerable confusion amongst locals and NGOs, who did not expect such a stark divergence in organization and communication styles.”⁵⁴ Overlapping headquarters structures contributed to this problem as well,⁵⁵ a problem that was exacerbated by internal organizational chaos among the coalition.⁵⁶ When the US Civil Affairs teams detailed to the CIMIC task force began proliferating throughout Bosnia, for instance, they were at first greeted with confusion. In many cases, divisions and brigades on the ground had no prior knowledge that US CA assets would be arriving, and often times these Civil Affairs personnel reportedly did not coordinate their efforts with units on the ground.⁵⁷

- **NATO Coalition Countries Unevenly Contribute to Civil-Military Efforts.** Wide disparities existed among NATO coalition countries’ expectations and willingness to participate in civil-military operations within Bosnia. As one analyst later assessed, “Each of the large number of nations contributing forces (over 30) approached civil-military liaison differently, often with competing agendas.”⁵⁸
- **US Force Protection Requirements/Casualty-Aversion Limits CA Effectiveness.** Some critics claim that domestic political pressures made US policymakers particularly sensitive to the risk of incurring casualties.⁵⁹ According to this logic, in an attempt to keep casualties low, US leaders made decisions that actually hindered the effectiveness of troops, including Civil Affairs personnel. Force protection became a mission unto itself, meaning that Civil Affairs assets had to wear helmets, flak jackets, and all other combat military gear even when working among locals and trying to distinguish themselves from general purpose forces.⁶⁰

Regardless of the reason for the US insisting on these force protection measures and proving unwilling to bend these rules even in regard to non-traditional military assets such as Civil Affairs, however, a US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) After Action Report concluded that “the combination of heavy protective gear and large convoys had the adverse effect of creating the impression

⁵³Patrick Hollen, et. al. “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College: site: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Pre-Planning_and_Post-Conflict.doc, p. 6.

⁵⁵ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations,” (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 277.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 277.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 277.

⁵⁸ Patrick Hollen, et. al. “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College: site: http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Pre-Planning_and_Post-Conflict.doc, p.6

⁵⁹ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations,” (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 255.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 261.

amongst Bosnians that US forces were “more afraid” of the locals and less capable than protecting the public.”⁶¹ The PKSOI report went on to conclude that:

“The Bosnian public perceived the IFOR had come to clean the place up. IFOR had legitimacy in the public’s eye and could have taken a more assertive posture. However, over time the perception of IFOR/SFOR changed. The local community began to view IFOR/SFOR as a less sincere, less capable, less robust stabilization force. Many locals adopted a “wait and see” attitude and lost interest in cooperating.”⁶²

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 262.

⁶² Ibid., p. 260.

APPENDIX I: Order of Battle

Operation Joint Endeavor began in December 1995, quickly amassing an international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops,⁶³ nearly a third of which was composed of the US Army's 20,000 first armored division.⁶⁴

Beginning at the start of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR,⁶⁵ NATO deployed roughly 400 Civil Affairs personnel at any given time. Of those, US Civil Affairs assets in theater constituted a significant majority – numbering roughly 310-320 soldiers at a time.⁶⁶ To maintain that number and to comply with US laws preventing reservists from serving for more than 270 days,⁶⁷ roughly 1,400 CA personnel – mostly reservists – deployed in total during the first two years of the operation.⁶⁸ Over the duration of the Bosnian operation, 2,000 to 2,500 Civil Affairs soldiers – about one quarter of the roughly 8,000 US Civil Affairs Reservists – were deployed to Bosnia.⁶⁹

As the mission, strategies, and tasks evolved, the peacekeeping force's requirements for troops changed too, with less need for combat troops but greater requirement for specialized skill sets, including Civil Affairs personnel and engineers.⁷⁰ Therefore, IFOR was succeeded by the smaller, SFOR which possessed roughly 30,000 soldiers and an eighteen month mandate.⁷¹

The role of reservists – including Civil Affairs personnel – in Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD cannot be overstated, as over 17,000 reservists were ultimately deployed to Bosnia.⁷² Ultimately, the demand was so great that in a 1999 Congressional hearing, a representative from the Reserve Officers Association testified that the “Army Reserve is literally running out of Civil Affairs units to deploy to Bosnia.”⁷³

⁶³ Garland H. Williams, *Engineering Peace* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 68 and The World Factbook, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html>.

⁶⁴ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press),

⁶⁵ General George Joulwan, “FY97 Defense Authorization,” House National Security Committee Hearing, March 28, 1996.

⁶⁶ D.S. Gordon and E.H. Toase, eds. *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, (Frank Cass: 2001), p. 240.

⁶⁷ Department of Defense, “Memorandum For Correspondents,” No. 257-M and 258-M. December 5, 1996.

⁶⁸ D.S. Gordon and E.H. Toase, eds. *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, (Frank Cass: 2001), p. 240.

⁶⁹ Major General Thomas Plewes, “Remarks on Army Reserves at the National Press Club,” July 7, 1998.

⁷⁰ Conrad C. Crane, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won,” *Military Review*, May 2005 - June 2005, Vol. 85 No. 3, Pg. 27.

⁷¹ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “Soldiers and Civil Power,” *Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press), 263-269

⁷² Stephen P. Anderson, “FY00 Defense Appropriations Bill: Personnel Active Military and Civilian Personal Programs,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 24, 1999.

⁷³ *Ibid.*