

U.S. Civil Affairs Literature Review

I. Introduction/Scope:

This document provides an overview of U.S. Civil Affairs as described in current literature, seeking to establish context for CSIS's assessment of key questions facing the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) regarding current and future Civil Affairs requirements/capabilities. As it relates to the articles reviewed, this document also considers questions regarding the role of Civil Affairs assets within the broader framework of USG priorities in a post-9/11 security environment.

The next section analyzes the relevance and application of literature examined to these questions. The third and final section summarizes the articles.

II. Summary/Analysis:

The post-9/11 security environment places a premium on previously-neglected military competencies: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Humanitarian Assistance, Host-Nation Support, and Refugee Assistance. From Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq/Afghanistan, to hearts-and-minds winning efforts in the Horn of Africa and disaster relief efforts in Indonesia, American strategic priorities today are defined broadly and require the use of an ever-widening array of instruments of national power. Yet, the nation's failure to field a reliable, trained, and deployable cadre of civilian professionals in support of these requirements has necessitated continued reliance on the military's involvement.

U.S. Civil Affairs components stand at the nexus of these intersecting strategic pathways. Mostly located within the Army, and comprised of 96% reservists, Civil Affairs assets provide unique competencies, largely based on the skill set of their reservist personnel, which are unlikely to be found elsewhere in the military. These skills have significant potential for reducing ungoverned spaces, providing emergency humanitarian aid, and undertaking post-conflict reconstruction. The United States must determine how Civil Affairs units fit within its 21st century security toolkit. What are DoD Civil Affairs forces required to do in accordance with U.S. government and DOD policies at the strategic level of war? What are the gaps between USG/DOD policies for stability and reconstruction operations, and DOD Civil Affairs policy, doctrine and structure?¹

Just as U.S. government policy in dealing with the evolving 21st century security environment stands at a crossroads, so too does Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs emerged during

¹ These questions are drawn from Statement of Work: Technical Approach: Department of Defense Civil Affairs Study. (HQ0034-07-A-1007).

World War II and came of age in missions during the 1990s, contributing to reconstruction efforts in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In recent years, U.S. Civil Affairs teams have been deployed to over twenty countries around the world, contributing to numerous missions and creating such demand that they have been unable to meet deployment requests. Therefore, beyond the global questions of how CA should be employed in the world exists a separate set of questions on how to build requisite capabilities:

- How should Civil Affairs be organized to best fit requirements?
- What entity within DoD should be the proponent of Civil Affairs?
- How many (and what type) of soldiers would be best equipped to satisfy this mission?
- Should CA receive more resources?

This document does not seek to answer these questions, but rather to review how prior efforts have addressed them.

As a foundation, perhaps no issue is of greater elemental value than defining Civil Affairs. Conflicts in Kosovo, Bosnia, and elsewhere involving NATO during the past decade have provided ample opportunity for confusion between three terms of art: Civil Affairs (CA), Civil-Military Operations (CMO), and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The U.S. military's chief authority on Civil Affairs, Joint Publication 3-57.1, defines Civil Affairs as:

Civil Affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

The same document defines Civil Affairs Operations as:

Civil Affairs Operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called CAO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

This definition of Civil Affairs represents a change from how the term was initially conceived within the U.S. military. Indeed, Edward Flint posits that since the end of the Cold War, military forces are begin used in ways never before imagined. The DSB Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DOD identifies this change in mission for Civil Affairs, whose principal role was narrowly defined as the prevention of civilian interference with military operations, but now includes other stability-related tasks, including: restoration and

maintenance of order; mobilizing and utilizing local resources; coordinating the fair distribution of services and supplies, and civil administration (15). Flint writes that these changes in the Civil Affairs mission have led to improvement in the civil-military operations, particularly humanitarian assistance (231).

In the post-Cold War world that Flint and others describe, the notion of how Civil Affairs should fit within the broader landscape of U.S. engagement with other nations is a fundamental issue. Paper #3 from the Land Warfare Papers Series suggests that the Bush administration must expand what the author describes as the Administration's current focus on simply waging war to also include securing victory through post-conflict engagement (3). The key to successfully accomplishing these missions, according to the paper's authors, is the use of U.S. Army Civil Affairs assets, which the authors characterize as the only suitable entities able to coordinate emergency aid and reconstruction efforts in the immediate aftermath of hostilities (6).

Although Land Warfare Paper #3 is perhaps most bullish in touting the magnitude of how Civil Affairs assets can contribute to 21st century U.S. global engagement, nearly all papers that dealt with the topic concur that, at the very least, the role of Civil Affairs must be better defined. The House Armed Services Committee Report on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, for instance, notes the importance of Civil Affairs assets by explaining the failings of having non-CA personnel embedded within PRTs, noting that these "non-Civil Affairs general purpose forces personnel deployed [to PRTs] did not have the requisite training or desired technical and specialty skills to perform the PRT mission effectively" (44). The report therefore recommends that the Secretary of Defense firmly identify the role of Civil Affairs assets in the 21st security environment.

Several analyses move beyond the strategic issue of the appropriate role for U.S. Civil Affairs forces to an examination of needed Civil Affairs capabilities. The following list of findings drawn from the existing literature is not comprehensive, but it provides an overview of the many suggested changes within Civil Affairs:

Doctrine:

- Ensure that any increase of CA soldiers is accompanied by corollary changes in doctrine to support recruitment of qualified professionals who have required civil-sector functional expertise and military skills, and not just generalists (Civil Affairs Association)
- Joint Publication 3-57 (as it appeared in 1999 when this article was written), "does not adequately cover the myriad of tasks that should be accomplished in civil military operations" (Chadwick)

Organization

- Civil Affairs should stay nested within SOCOM (DSB 2005)
- Staff working on CA personnel and doctrine must understand CA capabilities, should be engaged exclusively in CA issues, and need to be capable of integrating CA across operations (Civil Affairs Association)

- Need to increase joint CA effort, especially given Army increase in Civil Affairs (CA) personnel, and other services' moves to establish CA units or develop CA capabilities (HASC PRT Report)
- USAR Command Commander should have a single headquarters for all non-deployed Reserve Component civil affairs units (Civil Affairs Association)
- DoD should establish a standing, immediately deployable Joint Civil Affairs Task Force (JCATF) composed of AC/RC in order to provide CA support to a commander until Reserve CA units are activated (Civil Affairs Association)
- The use of a term other than 'Civil Affairs' to describe activities currently understood as Civil Affairs because "civil affairs is too broad a concept to be of practical use as a cover-all term" (Flint 247).
- Create a Civil Affairs Analysis Center within DoD (Civil Affairs Association)
- Create full-time planning cells at OSD, CoComs, Joint Staff, JFCOM, SOCOM and Standing JTFs (Civil Affairs Association)
- DoD Should establish a Civil Affairs Oversight Panel for CA (Civil Affairs Association)
- "JFCOM (or some joint command) should eventually become the single executive agent for CMO/CA, with appropriate Title 10 program and budget authorities" (Holshek)
- Expand CINC (now CoCom) Civil Affairs staff to effectively coordinate CA planning (Chadwick)
- Improve strategic civil affairs planning at various levels of government, including at EOP, NSC, DOD, and within the services (Müller)

Training, Leadership, Education:

- DoD develop a comprehensive Civil Affairs Education and Training Plan (Civil Affairs Association)
- Educate Civil Affairs operators to be experts through focused training. The author writes that "We need professional education in government, infrastructure, emergency management and public administration" (Kimmey)
- CA units' operations and training should inform efforts related to PRTs (HASC PRT Report)
- In addition to its existing duties, "USACAPOC could also maintain the ministerial level expertise that is beyond the scope of tactical or even strategic civil affairs operators. This expertise would bridge the gap between senior diplomatic and military staffs (Kimmey)

Materiel:

- Overhaul tables of organization and equipment, so that CA battalions are capable of supporting maneuver division commander (Kimmey)
- Creation of a DoD-wide CA RD&A Committee to review equipment requirements and propose programs to build requisite capabilities. (Civil Affairs Association)

- DoD establish a DoD-wide CA Information Systems Committee to review specific and unique CA information requirements and propose systems to build necessary capabilities. (Civil Affairs Association)
- Creation of databases of U.S. personnel knowledgeable about various regions across the globe. (DSB 1994)

Personnel

- Better recruitment of qualified candidates to serve as Civil Affairs personnel (Civil Affairs Association and DSB 2005)
- Increased numbers of Civil Affairs Units to better fit requirements (Civil Affairs Association)
- Better pay for those personnel – particularly reservists – who enlist as Civil Affairs soldiers (Civil Affairs Association)
- Recruitment of more women to help Civil Affairs personnel deal with a broader range of issues (Flint)
- Achieve pay parity between the AC/RC, establish proficiency pay for specific civil-sector functional experts, increase the use of bonuses (Civil Affairs Association)
- Offer economic incentives for CA personnel to voluntarily extend deployment or re-deploy to previous assignments, both in a TDY or TTAD capacity. Doing so could encourage soldiers to voluntarily accept more frequent deployments, thus reducing the stress and negative externalities that longer or increased deployments would have on soldiers’ professional and personal lives (Brewer)
- Provide space in already-established units by increasing “structure within the current RC CA units and begin to cross-level from non-deployable or rarely deployed units,” thus avoiding growth in RC end-strength but nonetheless attempting to diminish the current strain (Brewer)
- Active Component/Reserve Component CA Mix
 - Maintaining balance of AC/RC Civil Affairs personnel (DSB 2005)
 - Radically shift balance of AC/RC Civil Affairs personnel, by moving most or all slots from RC to AC (Kimmey)
 - Shifting at least two-thirds, or 3,500, of Civil Affairs personnel from the RC to AC (Korb)
 - Increase active-duty CA personnel without stealing from other branches. The author envisions increasing strength of the 96th CA Battalion, and creating three additional active component battalions as well. This “would allow for a lesser, but still important, role of the RC CA units to conduct follow-on missions as needed,” while also shortening RC Civil Affairs deployments (Brewer)

Lastly, the papers surveyed also provided a number of suggestions of topics that deserve future study. They include:

- Anticipated Civil Affairs requirements (HASC PRT Report)
- Civil Affairs Force Structure (HASC PRT Report)
- Proponency (HASC PRT Report)

- Existing designations of civil-sector functions and the personnel skill identifiers warrant review based on trends in emerging requirements for both. (Civil Affairs Association)
- Whether additional authorities could attract “needed CA competencies into the force on a temporary basis (HASC PRT Report)
- Whether the AC/RC split for CA is appropriate (HASC PRT Report)
- Capabilities gaps within CA must quickly, wisely, and comprehensively be studied/addressed to synergize civil-military power (Holshek)
- Existing AC Civil Affairs capability is not strong enough to meet requirements of most operations. This shortfall should be reevaluated to determine whether creation of more AC Civil Affairs forces would be helpful (Chadwick)
- Explore the possibility of creating separate rotation policies for separate types of units. Under this arrangement, for instance, RC Civil Affairs assets could be deployed for 180 days on a temporary basis. This would provide short-term assistance while avoiding any major restructuring (Brewer).

III. Literature Review Summaries

Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare Paper “US Army Civil Affairs – The Army’s Ounce of Prevention” (Mar 2003) p. 1-41.

Land Warfare Paper #3, “US Army Civil Affairs – The Army’s Ounce of Prevention.” frames the issue of Civil Affairs by first characterizing the U.S. response to the 21st century security environment as unhelpfully favoring a symmetric force in waging war against an asymmetric threat (2). Criticizing that posture, the authors claim that this strategic decision might allow incremental strides, but will not effectively “secure victory.” (3) The article casts U.S. Army Civil Affairs as the most immediately qualified entity to shoulder additional responsibilities – notably the management of reconstruction efforts – required to “secure victory.”(6) The authors define four missions of Civil Affairs:

- Conventional operations
- Support for special operations
- Civil administration
- Military assistance to domestic civil authorities

After establishing these four missions, the authors paint a scenario in which the country that wins in battle later fails to secure victory amid a bevy of violence, failing governance, and instability after the end of a war. In seeking to avoid these pitfalls and therefore achieve the ultimate end state of stability, the authors advocate the continuation of military operations after battlefield victory in support of long-range recovery. The authors argue that this recovery plan is comprised of a three-tiered CA mission that moves the operation across the “Bridge to Stability”: (1) Civil-military operations and humanitarian assistance (2) Functional Team Assessments and (3) Civil Administration. Describing Civil Affairs personnel’s unique competencies at successfully accomplishing these three types of operations, the authors conclude that CA assets are “by far the most qualified, skilled and capable entity in the inventory of the U.S. government to go into troubled areas immediately after the end of hostilities and guide a nascent democracy in starting the recovery and reconstruction process.”(18) As a result, the authors advocate recognizing “that the Civil Administration mission of the U.S. military is the bridge to stability as the civilian agencies bring their development programs online.”(19).

LTC R. Christian Brewer, “U. S. Army Civil Affairs and the Fate of Reserve Special Operations Forces in Support of Current and Future Operations,” USAWC Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: 1-25. May 2004.

The author begins by explaining the stresses on the Civil Affairs force, noting that CA personnel have – since the 1980s – been the most frequently deployed component of USAR, and that this tempo continues as CA units support operations in five separate theaters (iii). LTC Brewer identifies several causes and effects of this high OPTEMPO, including lack of CA units to fulfill requirements and the risk of high OPTEMPO hindering retention and recruiting (5). Predicting that the United States will continue to rely heavily on RC Civil Affairs forces, LTC

Brewer concludes that “the CA community cannot maintain the pace the Army has set for them” (10). He offers four recommendations to help the Army keep this pace:

- Explore the possibility of creating separate rotation policies for separate types of units. Under this arrangement, for instance, RC Civil Affairs assets could be deployed for 180 days on a temporary basis. This would provide short-term assistance while avoiding any major restructuring (10).
- Increase active-duty CA personnel without stealing from other branches. The author envisions increasing strength of the 96th CA Battalion, and creating three additional active component battalions as well. This “would allow for a lesser, but still important, role of the RC CA units to conduct follow-on missions as needed,” while also shortening RC Civil Affairs deployments (10-11).
- Offer economic incentives for CA personnel to voluntarily extend deployment or re-deploy to previous assignments, both in a TDY or TTAD capacity. Doing so could encourage soldiers to voluntarily accept more frequent deployments, thus reducing the stress and negative externalities that longer or increased deployments would have on soldiers’ professional and personal lives (11).
- Provide space in already-established units by increasing “structure within the current RC CA units and begin to cross-level from non-deployable or rarely deployed units,” thus avoiding growth in RC end-strength but nonetheless attempting to diminish the current strain (11).

LTC Bob Chadwick, “Civil Affairs Campaign Planning for Complex Contingency Operations: Getting it Right,” 1999, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1-42.

Chadwick, writing in 1999, discusses then-CINC-led CA campaign planning, with particular attention to interagency and military planning, training, force requirements, deployment, and coordination in complex contingency operations (6). Chadwick an expanded CINC Civil Affairs staff would make a major impact on CA ability to coordinate tasks.

Regarding force requirements and availability, the author criticizes U.S. inability to quickly deploy Civil Affairs assets because most deployments require a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up. This creates political pressure on the President that at times – such as in Somalia – prevent the call up of CA reservists (19). Chadwick writes that “The current AC Civil Affairs capability is not robust enough to meet more than minimal manning for any operation. This shortfall should be reevaluated and perhaps more AC Civil Affairs forces created” (20). In Bosnia, for instance:

The requirement for RC Civil Affairs personnel was identified early in the planning for Bosnia. To be effective, the plan required Civil Affairs personnel to be in theater 30 days prior to the operation commencing. In fact, the PSRC order

was signed after the deployment had begun and the first mobilized RC soldiers did not begin arriving until 30 days after the deployment had begun. (20)

The paper also casts doubt on U.S. military doctrine in support of Civil Affairs missions. The author writes that existing doctrine must also be remade to have greater relevance to future operations. Specifically, Chadwick criticizes Joint Publication 3-57, claiming that the document “does not adequately cover the myriad of tasks that should be accomplished in civil military operations. (23).” He offers a series of recommendations, the following of which apply to Civil Affairs:

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #1: Civil Affairs Force Structure (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #1 explains as background that civil affairs soldiers are increasing across services and that the Army is restructuring its civil affairs units. The paper also notes that in contrast with past practices that encouraged the use of Civil Affairs functional specialists, current U.S. Army doctrine deemphasizes these civil-sector functional specialties in favor of civil affairs generalists. (1-1)

In the discussion section, the paper underscores the potential limitations of increasing CA soldiers if this augmentation is not accompanied by recruitment of qualified professionals with required civil-sector functional expertise and military skills, in addition to generalists. (1-1) To that end, the paper laments that services base their numbers of Civil Affairs assets in terms of their support to maneuver units, rather than taking into account of how Civil Affairs forces are actually used, particularly in the joint environment.

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #3: Civil Affairs Oversight and Proponency (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #3 criticizes CA oversight/proponency office understaffing, arguing that staff is often non-existent or overstretched. Among the few existing staff, the paper suggests that many do not understand the basics about Civil Affairs concepts, doctrine, policy, and issues, nor are they able to devote their full attention to Civil Affairs issues due to competing priorities. (3-1) Among the solutions the paper proposes:

- DoD Establish a Civil Affairs Oversight Panel for CA
- CJCS designate a general officer as a CA Advisor
- CJCS establish a CA staff office in one of the Joint Staff directorates.
- DoD ensures that the Services designate an official on the departmental headquarters staff to provide oversight of civil affairs.” (3-2)
- Proponents for personnel and doctrine understand CA capabilities, are exclusively engaged in CA issues, be able to integrate CA across operations. (3-2)

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #4: Command and Control of US Army CA Units (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #4 explains the changes in command and control of CA assets, given that USASOC and USACAPOC, respectively, are now delegates of administrative commands charged with providing forces to the Combatant Commanders. The paper recommends that Services address these command and control issues created by the division of CA forces between SOF Forces and General Purpose Forces by creating a single headquarters for all non-deployed RC civil affairs units. (4-2).

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #5: Civil Affairs in Support of Joint, Interagency, and Combined Operations (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #5 examines how Civil Affairs personnel support Combatant Commanders and how those Commanders deploy CA personnel in missions alongside U.S. general purpose forces, U.S. interagency assets, and soldiers from allied nations. The paper offers a number of recommendations:

- Advocating the high value of a rapid-response CA capability, the paper recommends that DoD create a standing Joint Civil Affairs Task Force (JCATF) comprised of AC/RC personnel, deployable on short notice to buy time for mobilizing and deploying RC Civil Affairs units (5-2).
- Given the complexities of Joint and Combined operations – and the risk that Commanders in these operations may not be innately familiar with CA capabilities – the paper advocates increased CA participation in exercise planning, and CA liaison exchange programs between officers within Combatant Commands.
- The paper also suggests that DoD consider mission requirements and geographic assignments in addition to unit support when identifying civil affairs forces needed for operations.
- Lastly, when planning interagency components of military operations, the paper advocates DoD relying more heavily on its own personnel working in other agencies. To do so, the paper advocates establishing a mechanism for tracking those DoD personnel working in these other agencies (5-2).

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #6: Civil Affairs Planning (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Paper #6 discusses the importance of Civil Affairs planning, and in so doing draws a stark contrast between existing planning efforts and desired levels of planning. The paper concludes that although civil-military operations occur in nearly every conceivable U.S. military operation, civil affairs planning generally constitutes a low priority and no standing CA

planning capability even exists. (6-1) To fix this shortfall, the paper recommends establishing a DoD Civil Affairs Analysis Center and creating full-time planning cells at OSD, CoComs, Joint Staff, JFCOM, SOCOM and Standing JTFs. The report advocates starting civil affairs planning concurrently with planning for military operations. During the early stages of planning, therefore, Combatant Commanders would create a civil-sector functional expert-staffed CA planning cell to coordinate across agencies synchronize goals and plans. (6-2).

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #7: Civil Affairs Training, Education, and Research (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Paper #7 criticizes the lack of any DOD institution solely dedicated to providing education or conducting research on CA/ CMO, thus contributing to the existing lack of standardized Civil Affairs education, training, and capabilities (7-1). The paper identifies the strategic and operational levels as having the greatest need for civil affairs training, education and research and suggests that AC/RC must deploy in modular configurations and be ready to immediately support any phase of operations (7-1).

The paper recommends that DoD create a Civil Affairs Center of Excellence, conduct a two-week Strategic/Operational CA Course for RC CA Colonels, support existing CA graduate programs, establish training curricula and foreign exchange programs, and develop a comprehensive Civil Affairs Education and Training Plan that includes standards for qualification as CA professionals, familiarization with CA assets, and various training components for CA officers and functional specialists. (7-2)

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #8: Recruiting and Retaining Civil Sector Functional Specialists (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Paper #8 concludes that the number of CA functional experts fails to meet requirements of Combatant Commanders and criticizes the lack of specific DoD programs to recruit and retain civil-sector functional specialists (8-1). The paper recommends that:

- DoD review current civil-sector functions and the personnel skill identifiers based on existing trends and current/future requirements (8-2).
- DoD conduct a study to assess and develop recommendations for on these issues (8-2).
- DoD hold recruitment drives specifically targeting mid-career, 30–45-year-olds possessing a civil-sector skill set (8-2).

Civil Affairs Issue Paper #9: Pay, Allowances, and Benefits for Civil Affairs Reservists (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Association Paper #9 posits that the preponderance of reservist CA forces makes the impact of pay, allowances, and benefits especially critical to recruitment and retention (9-1). The paper finds that inequities among AC/RC pay negatively affect RC Civil Affairs recruiting and retention (9-1). To solve these problems, the Association recommends that DoD seek to achieve pay parity between the AC/RC personnel, establish proficiency pay for specific civil-sector functional experts, increase the use of bonuses, and – given RC’s evolving role from serving in a strategic to an operational capacity – consider recommendations to increase allowances, benefits, and pay for all Reservists (9-2).

Civil Affairs Association Paper #10: Civil Affairs Equipment and Information Systems (Columbia, MD: The Civil Affairs Association), 2007

Civil Affairs Association Paper #10 argues that insufficient equipment capabilities are hindering the ability of CA units to meet mission requirements, referring specifically to Iraq and Afghanistan as cases where Civil Affairs units have suffered equipment and supply shortages (10-1). The paper criticizes existing military practice of requisitioning equipment from future-deploying CA units to outfit imminently-deploying units. To resolve these ongoing equipment shortfalls, the paper advocates DoD establishing a two DoD-wide committees: One to identify CA equipment requirements and provide programs to match requirements, and the other to identify CA information requirements and provide information systems to match requirements (10-2).

Edward Flint, “Civil Affairs: Soldiers Building Bridges,” D.S. Gordon and F.H. Toase, *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, p. 231-252 Frank Cass Publishers: Portland, Oregon, 2001.

The author posits that global changes since the end of the Cold War have ushered in an era in which military forces are now used in new ways (231). Specifically regarding civil affairs, the author concludes that this evolution has been a cause and effect of “developments and improvements in the area of civil-military interaction, particularly in humanitarian support, coordination and consent-building activities” (231).

In his wide-ranging treatise, Flint discusses differences in national Civil Affairs models, casting U.S. and Russia’s approaches as narrow, and almost entirely comprised of activities solely conducted based on how each benefits the military operation. Contrastingly, Britain and France which both take a broader approach, encourage flexibility and ultimately allow for a wider range of policy actions (237). The author concludes that this dichotomy may lead to increased reliance on U.S. civil affairs teams. Regarding U.S. Civil Affairs assets, Flint generates a number of additional findings and recommendations, including:

- A finding acknowledging the difficulty of measuring success of Civil Affairs operations due to the lack of tangible metrics, and the time it takes to account for the few metrics that do exist (241).

- A recommendation to recruit more women into Civil Affairs units to neutralize what critics claim is the inability military personnel to “ identify sex-related issues and the needs of vulnerable groups” (242).
- A recommendation that “Civil affairs is too broad a concept to be of practical use as a cover-all term” (247).

Christopher Holshek, “Scroll and the Sword Synergizing Civil-Military Power,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050, March 15, 2006, USAWC Strategy Research Project

Holshek paints today’s security environment as increasingly stressing the nexus between military and non-military instruments of power, and laments that “a unifying concept of national strategic principles for synergizing civil-military power has yet to find full articulation.” (Abstract). He attempts to rectify this problem by examining principles of Civil Affairs and Civil Military Operations.

Specifically regarding Civil Affairs, Holshek writes that Civil Affairs is “at the forefront of stability, transition to peace, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations,” listing CA missions as ranging from: provision of emergency humanitarian aid, to creation of governance structures, intelligence collection, early warning of trouble in strategically significant environments, to coordination with NGOs and eventual turnover of control to local governance and administrators (Abstract-8).

Given its high importance yet low profile, Holshek casts CA as the “low-tech solution to the low-tech problem” (9). Accordingly, he writes that demand for Army CA has dramatically outstripped supply, and that CA struggles to fulfill its many requirements. He faults the all-consuming debate regarding Civil Affairs’ status under the umbrella of SOF as having crowded out important topics of force management, education, training, and doctrine (10). Ominously, he predicts that “Although the value-added of CMO and CA, as the military exemplar of strategic ways and means to synergize civil-military power is becoming more apparent, CA as a strategic capability may be on the verge of collapse.” (10) He suggests that these capabilities gaps must quickly, wisely, and comprehensively be addressed to synergize civil-military power (10). In so doing, he provides three strategic principles:

- “CMO and CA are synergistic and integrative as ways and means.” (12)
- “CMO and CA are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational.” (12-13)
- “Applied CMO and CAO involve a strategic, enabling style of leadership.” (13)

Beneath this layer of strategic principles, the most-CA relevant finding is that since no single executive agent exists for Civil Affairs, “JFCOM (or some joint command) should eventually become the single executive agent for CMO/CA, with appropriate Title 10 program and budget authorities (13).”

House Armed Services Committee, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan” (April 2007)

The House Armed Services Committee report, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan” discusses civil affairs in the context of Provincial Reconstruction teams.

The report lauds the attributes of CA reservists whose functional expertise acquired through civilian experience and education facilitates the conduct of Stability Operations as described in DoDD 3000.05. To that end, the report suggests that PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have experienced a marked advantage when working with CA assets as opposed to general purpose forces. The authors write that non-Civil Affairs general purpose forces personnel embedded in PRTs have proven unable to support the mission because they lack necessary training and technical/specialized skills. (44)

The report acknowledges high Civil Affairs OPTEMPO, noting that CA personnel have only periodically served in PRTs because, despite projected increases of Reserve Component and Active Duty Units, there still simply are far too few CA assets to staff the ongoing mission (39). Moreover, despite this force augmentation and the increased attention to Civil Affairs assets throughout the U.S. military, the report also finds that “there exists no joint CA effort or command” (44). Lastly, regarding training, the report criticizes the lack of synchronization between CA training with PTR training.

The report makes the following series of recommendations, asking the Secretary of Defense to identify the role of Civil Affairs, by specifically determining:

- Current/future requirements for Civil Affairs
- Whether the Civil Affairs force structure is sufficient with the increased emphasis on stability operations as articulated in DoDD 3000.05
- “Whether proponentcy for the general purpose CA units is appropriately placed;
- “Whether sufficient stability operations competencies are being developed in the non-CA general purpose forces;
- “Whether additional innovative authorities would assist in bringing needed CA competencies into the force on a temporary basis;
- “Whether the active/reserve component mix is appropriate given the continued demands for CA units and personnel; and
- “Whether a joint command structure for CA is appropriate. (45)

Mark Kimmey, “Transforming Civil Affairs” *Army*, March 2005, Vol. 55, p. 17-27

The author posits that nation building will remain a major component of U.S. foreign policy – whether the military likes it or not – and that Civil Affairs assets constitute the chief instrument for U.S. policymakers in conducting these missions. But Kimmey argues that Civil Affairs assets have failed to keep pace with Army general purpose forces transformation/improvements and that CA is therefore unable to meet increased mission requirements. To close this gap between CA capabilities and requirements, the author concludes that CA assets – particularly reserve battalions – require significant transformation. In making this case, the author identifies five “stressors” that have the potential to hamstring CA activities: (1) Too many reservists, (2) OPTEMPO stress, (3) Education/Training of CA operators poorly matched with requirements, (4) Need more CA operators on ground with maneuver units, and (5) Role of USACAPOC.

In direct response to these five “stressors,” the author offers five recommendations:

- Move most (or even all) CA slots from RC to AC.
- Re-arrange CA assets so that maneuver battalion, brigade and division (tactical) levels are comprised of CA generalists trained to assess situations, while the CA brigade level is fitted with functional expertise.
- Overhaul tables of organization and equipment so that CA battalions can support maneuver division commanders. Specifically, each battalion must be able to support CA planning at division level, to each brigade headquarters, and an 8-person CA unit to each maneuver battalion.
- Educate Civil Affairs operators to be experts through focused training in areas including government, infrastructure, public administration, and emergency management, and then encourage incentive schemes to maintain these specialized skill sets.
- Nest within USACAPOCS “ministerial level expertise” to bridge civil-military gaps and ensure that retiring top CA thinkers remain engaged helpful to the community.

Lawrence J. Korb, “Fixing the Mix: How to Update the Army's Reserves,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 2-7.

Writing in *Foreign Affairs* during the spring of 2004, Lawrence Korb discusses the U.S. military’s failure to match its overall transformation initiatives with a corollary transformation of its personnel system, leaving the U.S. military reserves in peril. He refers to the decision long ago that noncombatant entities, including civil affairs, were largely civilian functions and therefore would reside within the Reserve Component. Today, Korb writes, as the U.S. military is used in peacekeeping efforts more frequently than ever expected, the costs of nesting these

functions within the Reserve Component are heightened (3). The author thus proposes a rebalancing in which a higher proportion of the forces needed for peacekeeping, including civil affairs units, should reside within the Active component (7). In support of this point, Korb argues that the U.S. Army needs 2,000 civil affairs soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, a total deployment now impossible given the only 200 active component Civil Affairs officers. He recommends, therefore, that “to maintain 2,000 civil affairs personnel in those countries will require keeping about half of the reserve component on active duty continuously. Moving at least two-thirds, or 3,500, of the civil affairs personnel from the reserve to the active component would help alleviate the problem.” (7)

Kurt E. Müller, “Toward a Concept of Strategic Civil Affairs” PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Winter 1998 pp. 80-98.

Müller explores the use of military force as a means to achieving political ends, arguing that intervening states often leave occupied territory ripe with potential for future instability. The author concludes that the U.S. military could “develop and maintain a long-range perspective on conflict termination” but generally fails to do so (80). Müller envisions assigning Civil Affairs personnel at the national, theater and, operational levels during crises to guarantee equitable treatment of citizens. (1) He describes ways to best utilize these forces in: Conflict Termination, Reconstructing Infrastructure, Civil-Sector Economic Concerns and Military Operations, and Reconstructing Government. (82-99). Müller notes that despite the success of Civil Affairs assets working at the tactical level, personnel at that level deal with resource constraints rather than set them (92). As a result, he endorses the improvement of strategic civil affairs planning at various levels of government, including at EOP, NSC, DOD, and within the services (93).

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force On Military Operations in Built Up Areas (MOBA), November 1994, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Operations in Built Up Areas (MOBA) sought to identify DOD current/future capabilities and requirements for conducting operations in MOBA environments (1). The report concluded that Civil Affairs assets are extremely valuable to commanders functioning in a MOBA environment but could be made more effective (29). Specifically, the report lamented that CA assets are deployable quickly only through Presidential call-up or volunteers, characterizing the latter as “disruptive, inefficient, and does not guarantee either the availability of requisite skills or their continued availability” (D-14). The report underscored the importance of identifying individuals to deploy who possess the most relevant skill sets, specifically noting that CA units are most effective when populated with personnel familiar with the region, its language, traditions, customs, and infrastructure. In order to facilitate deployment of the maximal personnel with the most desirable skill sets, the report recommends the creation of databases of U.S. personnel knowledgeable about various regions across the globe. (30)

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DOD September 2005 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Washington, D.C. 20301-3140, P. 1-55.

The DSB Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DOD begins by recognizing Civil Affairs' key role in the execution of stability operations. The report also acknowledges the change in mission for Civil Affairs assets whose principal role was once narrowly the prevention of civilian interference with military operations but now includes: restoring and maintaining order, mobilizing, coordinating, and utilizing local resources, coordinating distribution of services/supplies, and civil administration (15).

The Task Force considered several key questions:

- Should CA be reassigned from SOCOM to another entity such as the U.S. Army, JFCOM, or STRATCOM?
- How can CA better recruit more of the most highly qualified personnel?
- How should CA be mobilized/deployed?
- Is the existing size of reserve CA capability sufficient to meet requirements? (45-46)

The Task Force concluded that:

- CA should not be moved from SOCOM because the report failed to identify another destination/reporting chain that would lead to marked improvement
- There should be no rebalancing of AC/RC Civil Affairs ratio because so much of CA competencies require skills/experience best acquired through reservists
- Civil Affairs needs a new recruitment process with increased focus on 35-45 year old professionals, with specifically targeted skills (based on requirements)

John J. Tuozzolo, "The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1997, p. 54-58.

The author discusses the importance of civil-military operations, using as case studies two tasks in the Bosnian Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: (1) The conduct of successful municipal elections and (2) Restoration of the judicial system. In regard to each of the two cases, Tuozzolo writes:

- Regarding elections, in support of this mission, Civil Affairs soldiers conducted essential tasks –locating the 1.5 million voters who had fled their homes, registering

- additional voters, publishing and publicizing rules, and ultimately conducting the elections (57).
- Regarding the judicial system, Civil Affairs personnel discovered that many judicial positions were vacant, statues sometimes were impossible to locate, and legal texts simply did not exist. (55) CA personnel not only identified the problems, but called upon their civilian expertise to help identify solutions. (55)

From these two short cases, the article concludes – unsurprisingly -- that “reconstructing and rejuvenating a war-torn country is no simple task” and that in the case of Bosnia, “civil affairs soldiers made an important contribution to peace” (58).