

APPENDIX B: Conference Summaries

Bridging Strategic Asia: The United States, Japan, and India

June 28-29, 2007

*Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C.*

As relations between India, Japan and the United States have evolved gradually over the past decade, the three countries, at both the official and unofficial levels, have begun to consider common interests and potential cooperation on a range of international issues. Indeed, the policy communities in all three countries are just beginning to tear down the conceptual barriers that have divided South and East Asia in their strategic mindsets.

On June 28-29, 2007, the International Security Program and South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with the Japan Institute of International Affairs, held a private two-day meeting in Washington, D.C. entitled “**Bridging Strategic Asia: The United States, Japan, and India.**” The objective of the Washington meeting was to continue the process of interaction between the three countries through dialogue on international security issues between a select number of younger U.S., Japanese and Indian foreign policy and security specialists. The meeting was the first of two meetings to discuss international issues of mutual concern to the United States, Japan, and India. A corollary purpose of the initiative in fact was to facilitate contact among a younger generation of experts to build a network that may form the basis for continued interaction and dialogue among the three countries in the future.

There were sessions on each country’s strategic vision, and perspective on China, non-proliferation and energy security. Keynote addresses were also made by Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, James Clad, deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia at the U.S. Department of Defense, Ambassador Ronen Sen, Indian Ambassador to the United States, Sanjaya Baru, spokesman in the Indian Prime Minister’s Office and Ambassador Ryozyo Kato, Japanese Ambassador to the United States.

Strategic Visions

The first session of the conference attempted to identify each country’s global strategic vision, as well as their respective views of their perceived role in East Asia and their bilateral relations with each other. It also attempted to identify issues where their strategic visions coincide.

The American presenter discussed the strategic vision of the United States in the context of the upcoming presidential election cycle. He noted that next year's election will be largely about foreign policy and that all the major candidates have committed to the goal of retaining American primacy in the world. In addition, he believed that all candidates will be broadly supportive of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the transformation of the U.S. relationship with India given that neither Japan nor India is a revisionist power, as both countries have a national interest in sustaining the preeminence of the United States and the neoliberal order. The speaker's remarks concentrated on five areas of debate likely to emerge during the election: 1) the war on terror, 2) the war in Iraq, 3) China, 4) soft vs. smart power, 5) democratic promotion, and 6) non-proliferation. He argued that historians will look back on this period and note the most important shift was the rise of Asia, with the rise of China at its core.

Following the presentation there was discussion on including China in the democracy debate in Asia in order to ensure that it is not seen as a Western or U.S.-led phenomena. There was also debate on the lack of a neat institutional architecture in Asia due to reasons of geography and the contested values of Asia. As such, governments do not want one overarching institution, but rather a variety of forums and tools so they can hedge while building trust and patterns of cooperation, and socializing China into these patterns. Nonetheless, these institutions cannot provide the same public goods that regional alliances provide.

The Japanese presenter argued that there are two issues that shape the direction of Japanese security policy: 1) the globalization of security policy, and 2) traditional issues such as China and North Korea. He noted Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Aso's promotion of "value-oriented diplomacy," which placed emphasis on universal values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and the market economy. Sato noted three developments in Asia that are important to consider in the strategic setting of the region: 1) the rise of China, 2) the concern over a U.S. retreat from its commitments in the Asia-Pacific, and 3) the approaches and the flaws of the multilateral process.

The discussion that followed noted the psychological and cultural distance between Japan and India, which had made it difficult to put India into the Japanese strategic landscape although exists potential for cooperation in peacekeeping operations, securing sea-lines of communication (SLOCs) and energy security. There was also debate on the constitutional barriers for Japan to adopt a more assertive defense policy although there is room for Japan to take initiative irrespective of the pace of constitutional revisions.

The Indian presenter divided his presentation into three parts: 1) the history of India's strategic vision until the 1990s, 2) reasons behind the change in India's strategic vision, and 3) the challenges facing India's strategic vision. He noted that from India's independence in 1947 until the end of the Cold War, India's strategic vision was inward looking and guided by non-alignment. This has changed in the last decade with the end of

the Cold War, India's rapid economic growth, and the rise of international issues such as terrorism.

He noted that India's strategic vision operates on three levels. First, India seeks a peaceful periphery in South Asia. Second, India's interests in its extended neighborhood, including Central Asia, West Asia, Southeast Asia, and China as enshrined in India's "Look East Policy" are tied to its energy security needs and overseas Indian population. On an international level, India's strategic vision seeks to shape a new international order and build strategic relationships with the United States, European Union, China, Russia, and Japan in order to address issues such as energy security, international terrorism and drug and arms trafficking.

In the discussion that followed, participants highlighted the potential for cooperation between Japan and India in democracy promotion and both states' bids for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. There was also discussion on India's strategic culture. An Indian delegate highlighted that India's strategic culture is civilizational rather than embodied by an individual agency, which has fueled the misunderstanding in the West that India lacks a strategic vision for itself.

China

The second session discussed each country's assessment of its bilateral relationship with Beijing and the future of China's role in Asian security, as well as issues where the three sides share a common view concerning China's future and the role it should play in the region.

The Indian presenter began her presentation by stating that India's perceptions and policies of China and Sino-Indian relations have been primarily determined by two events – the border conflict in 1962 and India's nuclear tests in 1998. The former ended the idealistic '*bhai-bhai*' framework of bilateral relations and made China as India's single most important security threat and challenge. The latter shaped the strategic dimensions of the relationship although officially, neither India nor China considers each other a security threat.

She argued that the recent 'rise of China' has been proceeding in parallel with the forces of economic globalization and the emergence of an Asia-centric world order. China's chief strategic objective is to regain its status as one of the dominant global powers through the continuation of communist party rule, which requires preserving and enhancing its legitimacy through high growth rates, raising living standards, social stability and the creation of a "harmonious society".

Externally, China has been focusing on "the creation of a favorable international environment" through political and diplomatic stabilization with neighboring countries; promoting economic interaction and regional integration; and promoting cooperative security through multilateral forums. The debate on whether China is a threat or opportunity continues although there is a general consensus in the region in favor of continued engagement. She argued that Beijing sees Washington as its primary strategic

challenge based on its assessment that it seeks to keep China contained within the region. Nonetheless, the strategy in Beijing seems to be one of neither complete collaboration nor uncompromising opposition to the U.S.

The presenter noted that Sino-Indian relations are undergoing a process of transformation; a mutually advantageous relationship with China based on a clear analysis of the political, economic, security, and social implications of a rising China is one of India's crucial foreign policy objectives. The relationship, she stated, is acquiring a comprehensive, multidimensional character that will help promote mutual interests although both states are far from adopting coordinated strategies to global issues. Furthermore, India has to yet respond to the Chinese role in South Asia. China's presence in the subcontinent has been constant, its economic largesse to India's smaller neighbors unambiguous and deliberate, and its cordial relations with all of them in sharp contrast to the troubled nature of India's ties with the region. The presenter asserted that Sino-Indian relations may be seen as being characterized by a major paradox: the noticeably broadening and deepening multi-level engagement between them and the remarkable increase of trade on the one hand, and the low levels of mutual trust and confidence on the other hand.

The Japanese presenter looked at China's domestic dynamics and external relations. On China's domestic developments, his comments looked at four areas: population, economy, military, and political reform. China was undergoing a "period of strategic opportunity" given its economic growth and potential to emerge as world's largest economy in 2020 by purchasing power parity. Nonetheless, China faces a number of risks including an economic downturn after the Olympic Games, environmental pressure, limited natural resources, and social unrest.

With respect to China's political reforms, the presenter identified positive elements, negative elements, and wild cards. Positive elements include sustainable economic development, generational changes, gradual reforms in local politics, the role of the internet and other media, and international pressure on Beijing to institute reforms. Negative elements include China's size and population, the role of ethnic minorities, income gaps, constitutional rigidity, difficulties of collective leadership, bureaucracy and corruption, inefficiencies of the corporatist model, and China's history of suppression. The presenter also identified a number of "wild cards" in China's development including nationalism, civic movements (e.g., environmentalism), and social unrest. As such, China's road to democracy with "Chinese characteristics" remains uncertain.

In the military realm, the presenter noted that if China continues the double digit growth of its military budget, its defense budget would be 2-3 times Japan's (nominal) defense budget in two decades, although Japan may reassess its own military spending if China continues its military buildup. He noted that China's military technology is still heavily dependent on Russian and European technology, with a focus on establishing a capability to fight limited warfare under conditions of informationalization.

The Japanese presenter stated that while China has been emphasizing peace, stability, and global interdependence, he noted a number of positive and negative factors

in China's diplomacy. The positive factors include China's efforts to become a responsible great power, participation in anti-terrorism cooperation, and support in developing multilateralism in East Asia and Eurasia. The negative factors include China's struggle against Taiwan, and diplomacy without consideration of human rights. He also noted that China favors multilateralism that excludes the participation of the U.S. and Taiwan. Whether China would cooperate with the U.S.-Japan alliance remains a key question for the foreseeable future.

On the Sino-Japanese relationship, the presenter noted that Japan's strategic goal is a "mutual beneficial relationship based on strategic interests." On the positive front, trade and investment, technology transfers, and people-to-people exchanges have promoted cooperation. On the negative front he noted mutual distrust, the role of the media, history, Taiwan, accidents and crises in the East China Sea, Senkaku/ Diaoyudao dispute, Japan-U.S. alliance, and human rights. He also identified several wild cards that might influence the bilateral relationship including regional environmental issues and North Korea. On both issues, China and Japan do not share same priorities. For instance, on North Korea, China's top priority is preserving stability on the peninsula, while Japan cares more about denuclearization and human rights, namely the abduction issue.

As for U.S.-Japan-India trilateral cooperation, the presenter noted that the three parties should promote common views in their engagement with China. He noted that China will be a great but unstable power without democracy for the foreseeable future while Japan could become a balancer, but not a great power. He emphasized the need for "predictability building" and reassurance in the region through engaging China through multilateral efforts with the U.S., Japan, and India forming the core group.

The American presenter began his presentation by noting that the U.S. is not trying to contain China. Moreover, the question faced by both scholars and state officials is not whether or not the U.S. should engage China, but rather how to engage China. In reviewing China's role in cooperation with the U.S. he laid out several factors, both encouraging and negative. Encouraging elements include economic interdependence in an era of globalization, cooperation on energy, health issues and other nontraditional security threats, and on North Korea's nuclear program. As one of the five permanent members of UN Security Council, China has the potential to play a more constructive role in cooperation with the U.S. in addressing both traditional and nontraditional security issues. Negative factors include the currency issue, political values, and human rights. The Taiwan question is also among the most critical issues between China and the United States.

The American presenter also touched upon the issue of value building as relevant to China's rise. He noted that compared to the United States, China has been giving more attention to the use of soft power as a policy instrument in its long-term thinking and planning, as demonstrated by the so called "Beijing consensus" as a possible alternative to the U.S. or Western oriented value system in world development.

In the discussion that followed, questions were raised on the role of Tibet in bilateral relations with China. An Indian participant noted that China's concern about India's intention in Tibet is similar to India's worry about China's interaction with Pakistan. A Japanese participant noted that the Tibet issue is low on Japan's political agenda, although it plays a prominent role in popular culture. On the issue of border disputes a Japanese participant noted that there is a distinction in China's policy on land and maritime borders, with maritime border disputes being much more difficult to resolve. There was also debate on the role of China's internal dynamics on regional peace and stability. An American participant argued that historically when China is not secure internally, it ignores its periphery and external environment. On the other hand, when it is facing a secure internal environment, China may choose to expand. As such, although China has stated that it has no intention to change the status quo, its intention after a decade remains unclear.

Non-proliferation

The session on non-proliferation examined each side's respective views concerning global trends in nonproliferation, as well as the state of efforts by each country on nonproliferation and the prospects for cooperation through the proliferation security initiative, and other vehicles.

The Japanese speaker opened his remarks by emphasizing that Japan, the United States, and India share a common perspective on the strategic importance of nuclear energy to all three countries. He noted that the foundation of Japan's nuclear cooperation rested on three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan's nuclear policy had been shaped by the use of nuclear weapons on its soil during the Second World War, the Oil Shocks in the 1970s and the threat posed by North Korea and China's nuclear capabilities. As such, Japan's civilian program is the largest among all non-nuclear weapons states although Japan remains a staunch supporter of the nonproliferation regime.

The Japanese speaker identified numerous risks to the nonproliferation regime, including the role of China, North Korea and Pakistan, and rivalry between India and China. He noted that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal must be pursued in such a way as to prevent the escalation of a regional arms race, especially given the trend in Japanese society toward supporting a stronger military deterrent. To counter these potentially dangerous trends, Japan must help cap any potential Asian arms race before it begins.

The Indian presenter stated that India resides in a region of proliferation fueled by asymmetric conflicts, regional instability; 'a failing state with nuclear weapons – Pakistan' and the A.Q Khan Inc nuclear 'Wal-Mart' supply chain in technologies, expertise, components and its sub-assemblies. As such, India's concerns about the systemic weakness of the global nonproliferation regime pertain to the relevance of compliance to asymmetric violent non-state actors; the linkages between brinkmanship states and asymmetric violent non-state actors; and the abetted second proliferation by China with regard to Pakistan, Iran and North Korea.

As a rising power, the speaker argued that India's growing economic-industrial power and its strategic military capabilities had endowed its strategic autonomy, which could not be cowed down by the discriminatory rigidities of international treaties. However, India as a non-member had been a "responsible stakeholder" of the non-proliferation regime. India's role would be building its capabilities premised on its strategic autonomy with a cooperative accent to international regimes. Moreover, India's export control system is extensive, well routinized, and over the years has become increasingly comprehensive. The speaker also argued that India's expertise in nuclear power provides an emergent opportunity for the international nuclear export community.

The presenter argued that India's participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency and its support for the 1000 ship navy as an interoperable partner demonstrates the U.S.-Japan-India consensus to thwart 'proliferation rings networks'. The speaker argued that India's growing tryst with globalization and its maritime basis has a strong convergence with the United States. The synergies of this partnership would be the cornerstone of a meaningful India-U.S.-Japan partnership in nonproliferation and counter proliferation.

The American speaker noted that the positions of Japan, India, and the U.S. allow for cooperation on non-proliferation although all three countries have a national philosophy or approach to the issue, which offers opportunities for both convergence and divergence. All three states have common positions on addressing issues of development, nuclear terrorism and proliferation, and regional stability. Also, they each believe in a nuclear renaissance for various reasons. Still, despite these commonalities, there is divergence; they all have "nuclear baggage" and their unique histories affect how they view disarmament and non-proliferation.

The U.S. position on nonproliferation is undergoing a "radical transformation," with a shift from the traditional U.S. position that any proliferation is a danger or threat toward a policy of recognizing "good" and "bad" types of proliferation. Japan meanwhile, which has long championed and promoted both disarmament and non-proliferation, is now conflicted, especially in viewing how the U.S.-Japan alliance will relate to these issues in the contemporary environment.

India is in a state in flux. The American speaker noted that it is clear that nuclear weapons are connected to India's identity as a modern powerful state and helps define its relationships with other powerful states, and yet its non-aligned and other peaceful positions cause a paradox for India. In the past India was hostile to joining multilateral institutions, whereas now India is harmonizing its domestic laws with international standards. As India's status has changed, it has become more important for them to ensure that other states do not obtain nuclear weapons.

A notable discrepancy between the three countries is regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): Japan has signed and ratified the treaty, the U.S. signed it but didn't ratify it, and though India will not stand in the way of the treaty,

India has not signed it. The speaker emphasized that signing the treaty would help influence other states to sign on, assist non-proliferation efforts, and promote trilateral cooperation. Finally, the U.S. speaker contended that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal has been oversold as a non-proliferation initiative. He insisted that increased cooperation and alignment of perspectives on non-proliferation between India and the U.S. is necessary if the civilian nuclear agreement is to succeed as a non-proliferation initiative.

In the discussion that followed, there was discussion on India's use of its record and positions on non-proliferation to help reform multilateral institutions on non-proliferation. Notably on the issue of Iran an Indian participant noted that India is in a dilemma as it is opposed to having another proliferant come into the neighborhood but is also consumed by its energy security needs through the IPI gas pipeline. The exceptionalism in the international energy policymaking structure also made India reluctant to submit to the rules of the system.

Energy Security

The final session on energy security discussed the respective energy security policies of each side. The panel also discussed the challenges faced by each country associated with energy security, and how to deal with pariah countries such as Iran, Burma, and Sudan, whose political characteristics pose difficulties in energy cooperation.

The Indian presenter noted the challenges faced by India in meeting its energy needs, including its rapid growth, significant and burgeoning population, need for internal stability, dependence on coal for over half of its energy needs, and dependence on imports for two-thirds of its oil consumption of which two-thirds comes from the Middle East. The speaker also highlighted the decentralized and fractured structure of India's energy bureaucracy, which has resulted in the lack of a coherent energy policy. This has deterred much needed foreign investment into India's energy sector, prevented reforms to India's power distribution sector, and prevented the removal of subsidies on refined oil products.

The speaker also discussed the challenges for Indian companies in competing with Chinese energy companies on the world stage, fueled by China adopting a more strategic and holistic approach that integrates financial incentives with aid, infrastructure projects, diplomatic enticements and arms packages. Sino-Indian energy tensions have been further fueled by both countries' relations with third parties, namely China's reservations over the U.S.-India nuclear deal and China's support for Pakistan's nuclear program. Finally, the speaker addressed the effect of China and India's energy security needs on their foreign and national security policy, including the development of ports and overland links to bypass chokepoints, improving relations with states adjacent to potential chokepoints in Southeast Asia and West Asia and ambitions to develop blue water naval capabilities. The speaker noted that China has generally been more successful in terms of pursuing energy diplomacy on the world stage by resolving or shelving disputes on its borders and providing a number of monetary and diplomatic enticements to energy supplier countries.

The speaker highlighted a number of areas of friction between India and the United States in the energy sphere, notably in India's relations with pariah states such as Iran. However, the restrained U.S. criticism of India's engagement with Burma compared to U.S. criticism of China suggests that the U.S. may tolerate India's engagement with these regimes as a reflection of the growing strategic partnership between India and the United States. Furthermore, Indian engagement with these pariah regimes offers a potential third way to deal with these regimes from the Chinese policy of "aid without conditions" and Western policy of sanctions and isolation. Another point of contention in the U.S.-India energy relationship is the issue of climate change. India has rejected proposals to impose caps on carbon emissions given its implications for growth and poverty alleviation although it is open to technologies that curb carbon emissions and is actively pursuing alternative energies such as wind and hydropower. Finally, India's exclusion from the International Energy Agency has fueled the belief in New Delhi that it is being dictated energy policy rather than having a role in the global energy policymaking structure.

Nonetheless, there also exist a number of areas of bilateral and trilateral cooperation in the energy sphere, especially in the area of the U.S. providing India with expertise and technology on improving its efficiency, including investment in the electric power sector, clean coal technologies, and resource mapping for oil, gas and renewable energies such as wind power. The most notable instance of U.S.-India energy cooperation has been on the nuclear issue with the U.S.-India nuclear agreement being justified as a means to reduce India's dependence on oil, including imported oil from pariah regimes. In reality nuclear power is unlikely to solve India's energy shortages for the foreseeable future given that it is starting from such a low base. Nonetheless, nuclear power does offer a potential solution to addressing environmental concerns from burning fossil fuels and as such, is relevant to the climate change debate within India.

India and Japan, along with other major energy consuming countries in Asia can cooperate on addressing shared concerns to their energy security such as developing regional strategic petroleum reserves, the protection of sea-lines of communication, collective bargaining to address the Asian premium on imported oil, encouraging joint development of disputed energy-rich territories, and improving energy conservation and efficiency. Tokyo and Washington can also wield their diplomatic and economic strength to promote stability and integration along India's periphery, which in turn can fuel energy cooperation within the region.

The U.S. speaker addressed the issue of energy security on three levels: 1) the geopolitics of the relationship between the United State, India, and Japan; 2) the demand issue; 3) the energy-environment nexus. He began by arguing that today's high prices, tight markets, unstable supplies, and sense of scarcity in world oil markets have resulted in growing anxiety among East Asian powers, the United States and other major oil consuming nations in the form of energy nationalism. These tensions are further aggravated by the resource nationalism from producer governments, which are reducing access to supplies, squeezing the ability to produce, and underinvesting in production.

The American speaker argued that energy has emerged as an issue of high politics of strategy rather than the low politics of domestic economic energy policy. As such, energy has become too important to be left entirely to the markets. He called for the need to refocus on a common interest in a stable world oil market, reduced disruptions, more diverse supply sources and transport, and an environmentally sustainable future.

There are the makings of energy cooperation among the United States, Japan, and India although if the three cooperate without China it will become an anti-China process or at least China will perceive it that way. China needs to be included in this process or it will not have much effect. Comparing India and China in terms of U.S. perceptions, the U.S. speaker noted the contrast between the constant bickering with China over its energy interests in pariah regimes and the muted response to India's interests the same places, which is a function of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and India while the mistrust in the U.S.-China relationship colors U.S. perceptions of China's behavior on energy issues.

The speaker had several specific recommendations. First, more aggressive bilateral dialogues that address broader strategic energy concerns. Second, India must be brought into some kind of alignment with the IEA and other institutions of global energy. Otherwise China, India, Russia, and the Middle East will set up their own institutions for global energy management which will be much more statist and rigid. Third, there needs to be stronger regional energy institutions for energy confidence building in the region.

Next, the U.S. speaker called for consuming nations to cooperate to control demand growth through painful market reforms and changes in domestic energy policies. The speaker said that this will take creative and courageous political leadership because it will require going up against powerful vested interests in each country. The speaker noted that the cost of reducing consumption is much lower than increasing production or other supply side solutions.

The speaker also addressed the energy-environment nexus. He argued that demand reduction, particularly for coal is the best solution for carbon and pollution concerns. The United States and Japan can bring tremendous technologies to bear on reducing India and China's coal demand but this will need to be done with massive financial and technology transfers. The speaker highlighted that the United States and Japan on one hand, and China and India are headed in fundamentally different trajectories on climate and carbon.

The Japanese speaker noted Japan's commitment to improving global energy efficiency by promoting energy conservation with both new technology and existing technology utilization through numerous bilateral and multilateral forums and dialogue and joint actions with emerging economies such as China and India. Another important energy concern for Japan is maintaining the security of supply through dialogue with the major oil producing countries. The resurgence of resource nationalism in these countries is destabilizing as it has unilaterally imposed restrictions against equal access, a failure to comply with contracts, and artificial limits on supply of oil and gas to markets. A third

pillar of Japan's energy policy is to secure critical energy infrastructure, particularly the safety of navigation through the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and securing pipelines from Russia to the Asian market.

In the discussion that followed, an American participant highlighted that the IEA is dominated by industrialized economies although three quarters of the growth in oil demand comes from developing countries resulting in a mismatch, with industrialized countries holding reserves and managing the decision-making process while the growth in demand comes from developing countries. If the IEA is to remain relevant to the oil market India and China must have some sort of institutional alignment if not membership whereby China and India can align themselves with the IEA's collective management of strategic stocks and range of expertise. If not, they will create their own system whereby there is a convergence between the interests of resource holders and insecure new demand countries to create a non-market system.

On the issue of carbon emissions, participants highlighted the fundamentally different viewpoints. Developing countries have three arguments: 1) per capita use is one tenth of the developed world, 2) industrial countries caused the problem, and as such they should fix it, 3) and developed countries are exporting their carbon to the developing world as the latter are producing goods for markets in the former. The need for technology transfer between developed and developing countries was also discussed. The barriers in doing so included the scale of transfer, the willingness of developing countries to accept such technologies, enforcement of intellectual property rights, cost, and reforming the regulatory environment and bureaucracy to encourage investment.

Keynote remarks

In his keynote remarks, Indian Ambassador to the United States Ronen Sen noted that India has been connected to East and Southeast Asia for centuries through trade and religion although these links were later weakened by European colonialism, the Cold War divide, and Indian protectionism. These connections are now being revitalized. Sen remarked that a number of economic and strategic commonalities are growing between Japan and India. India's "Look East" policy envisages Japan as a key partner in East Asia. India also recognizes the United States as a legitimate Pacific power. In this context, a trilateral relationship has begun to emerge.

He continued by emphasizing that India, Japan, and the United States have shared values based on democracy and the rule of law. All three countries recognize that democracy and development are not only compatible but are inextricably linked. India has demonstrated that, not just in developed but also developing countries, free markets work best and are most sustainable in free societies. Sen stressed that democracy and free market economies contribute to stability. The United States and Japan thus realize that India's development will be an instrument of stability in the region.

All three countries realize that potential for economic cooperation is just beginning to be tapped. Japan has assisted efforts to upgrade India's infrastructure. With the combination of U.S. innovation, Japanese technology, and Indian human capital there

are significant opportunities for cooperation in high technology. Energy security is another key area of convergence, according to Sen. All three have interests in diversifying their energy portfolios, and all three are partners on green initiatives. Additionally, the three countries all attach a high priority to combating terrorism as well as combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. He noted that cooperation between the United States, Japan, and India was extensive in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. A number of agreements have identified common defense priorities, and the first trilateral naval exercise was conducted in April of this year. The intersection of shared interests is also evident in cooperation within multilateral institutions. All three countries have a record of contributing positively to the international system. Sen concluded that this trilateral cooperation has not emerged from a decision to form a strategic alliance, but rather as a product of converging ideals and interests.

In the discussion that followed Ambassador Sen identified opportunities for investment in India's economy, including its aviation and telecom sectors. There was also discussion on the role of India's soft power. Ambassador Sen noted that Indian power has always tended to be soft power with the example of Gandhi's nonviolent movement. He noted that Indian identity is a civilizational identity with democracy as one of its core values.

Sanjaya Baru of the Indian Prime Minister's office also noted areas of common concern and cooperation between India, Japan and the United States. On China, all three states have China as a major trading partner and share concerns over China's role on nuclear proliferation. All three states also adopt common positions on addressing Islamic extremism in Asia, promoting modern, secular education in the region, recognizing the legitimate interests of the United States in the Asia Pacific region, energy security, particularly on new technologies such as clean coal, renewables, and nuclear cooperation, and democracy promotion.

Baru noted that India continues to hold democracy as one of its strengths, and is committed to promoting and strengthening democracy throughout the world. He noted potential for trilateral cooperation in developing Afghanistan into a modern democratic Islamic state, as well as addressing problems in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. He noted differences of opinion over Pakistan and Burma, which are unlikely to be resolved in the short term. China's rise continues in the background and must be taken into consideration for trilateral cooperation. China's relations with India's neighbors and ensuring that regional multilateral forums are not transformed into a club for China will be necessary. Finally, Baru noted that for the next fifty years India's relationships and foreign policies will be defined by its development priorities. He noted that Japan and the United States have a responsibility and opportunity to help India invest in its development.

Conclusion

In concluding the conference, it was noted that a key question that remains to be addressed is how to deal with institutional challenges to trilateral cooperation. Considering the different histories and mindsets among the three countries, as well as between the three and other international and regional actors, it is necessary to enhance mutual trust and cooperation. Among the three countries, such issues as non-proliferation and global governance will continue to test the partnership since that the three countries tend to choose different ways to tackle the problem, though they may share the same philosophy. It was also hoped that the depth of discussion would encourage the network of scholars from the three countries to expand.

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As relations between the United States, Japan, and India have evolved gradually over the past decade, the three countries, at both the official and unofficial levels, have begun to consider common interests and potential cooperation on a range of international issues. Indeed, the policy communities in all three countries are just beginning to tear down the conceptual barriers that have divided South and East Asia in their strategic mindset.

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The Tokyo conference had sessions on economic convergence, Southeast Asia, counter-terrorism, maritime security, and human rights and democracy. Keynote addresses were made by Sasae Kenichiro, deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Hemant Krishan Singh, Indian Ambassador to Japan, and Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka and deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia.

Economic Convergence

The first session of the conference focused on economic convergence among the three countries.

The presenter discussing India opened the first session by noting that U.S. and Indian interests converge more in Asia than anywhere else in the world. She noted that India's foreign policy is becoming more and more economically driven and with its neighbors to the East, particularly China and Japan, are becoming increasingly higher priorities. India's partnership with Japan is particularly valued due to Japan's increasing investment in India. Moreover, the fact that Japan actually completes its projects is noted in India, in contrast to investments made by unnamed other countries.

Krishen Mehta spoke next, drawing on this more than 20 years working in the private sector in Japan. His overarching observation was that significant capital is moving to

Asia and this is where his firm is seeing its strongest growth – growth that will continue even if the U.S. economy faces difficulty in the near- to mid-term. He is particularly upbeat about Japan, which he reminded the audience that it remains the second largest economy in the world and is a leader in the “green” economy, which will undoubtedly grow in the future. Regarding India-Japan economic relations, he noted that there are about 400 Japanese companies in India and that increased trade is likely on the horizon since it will follow investment. Regarding prospects for future growth, he suggested that lessons learned in Japan regarding efficiency could be applied to India, as well as “greening” technologies, which he said hoped Japan would share with India “generously.”

Fukunari Kimura discussed Asian economic convergence with an emphasis on free trade areas (FTAs) in the region. His first observation was that the ASEAN FTA has been a success, as tariffs on goods among the original six ASEAN members have almost completely been eliminated. However, Northeast Asia has been a failure in terms of free trade, with Japan, China, and South Korea having difficulty signing any sort of FTA among them. As a result, the Northeast Asian powers are striking out elsewhere. He contended that ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 will not be the end point of Asian integration because Asia is unwilling to set boundaries. Regarding the United States, he noted that Asia is a very open region and that U.S. participation is contingent on its own decision to engage. As for India’s regional, economic integration, while a Japan-India FTA is going to be very difficult to achieve, Japanese industry is behind the idea.

The discussion that followed focused on the current status of the Indian economy, the role of China and South Korea in the economic web, and understanding of India in Japan.

The discussants agreed that India’s economic emergence should be viewed somewhat cautiously. An important reason for this caution is the underdeveloped state of India’s infrastructure, an area that all parties agree must be a priority. For this reason and others, Japan and U.S. trade and investment with India are still in their infancy, compare, for instance, with their interests in China.

Other reasons for a deficit of Japanese trade and investment in India were also drawn out during the discussion. One reason cited by several members of the group was a general unfamiliarity with India in Japan. Compared with China, very few Japanese students study or focus on India. Another problem is that Japan is often risk-averse, something that Korean firms, for instance, are not. All in all, despite some immediate challenges, the group agreed that Japan-India economic links will undoubtedly grow in coming years.

Southeast Asia

The second session focused on Southeast Asia, with presenters from each country offering assessments of their country’s assessment and strategy of the region.

Ben Dolven began this session with discussing recent U.S. neglect of regional multilateral organization and some of its historically strong bilateral partnerships in

Southeast Asia, which is in stark contrast to China's engagement in the region. He noted that there is potential for change in the near term if the next president were to undertake a number of initiatives, such as working with regional leaders on soft power issues such as climate change, signing ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and making sure that the secretary of state attends ASEAN Regional Forum summits. Ideally, policy toward the region would be coordinated to some degree with Tokyo. He continued by noting that the U.S. position in the region is a bit paradoxical; it is weak in terms of multilateral diplomacy and public opinion, but strong in terms of bilateral relationships and partnerships. All together, this suggests that, while the United States is not sufficiently using its many levers of influence today, there is potential for change in the short- to mid-term.

The Japanese presenter continued the session by highlighted the changing geopolitical dynamics in Southeast Asia due to the rise of China. He noted his belief that China's end goal is to supplant the traditional regional order, which was dominated by the United States and Japan. This shift is already apparent, with China and Japan's rivalry putting Southeast Asia nations in an uncomfortable and difficult position. One result of China's emergence is a stronger form of regionalism that is marked by the transformation of ASEAN as a major factor in Southeast Asian affairs and East Asian affairs more broadly. Much like the United States, Southeast Asian nations have adopted three policies - constructive engagement, hedging, and balancing - to manage challenges and opportunities posed by China's rise.

Sadanand Dhume began by reminding the group that India's 1990s "Look East" policy was a marked departure from decades of inattention to Southeast Asia. Since this time, India has changed considerably internally and its relations with Southeast Asia have grown. However, the reality is that Indian interests and influence are very small compared to those of the United States and Japan - and even South Korea and Australia - and are more about future potential than present conditions. Even moving forward, India faces difficulties. One reason is that India's "assets," such as democracy and pluralism, which are appealing to the United States, are less important to Southeast Asians than economic development. Instead, they see decrepit infrastructure, a country poorer than China, real "downtowns," in certain cities and the like. Another problem that India faces is its own rough neighborhood, which has failed to stabilize, making it difficult for India to claim a role in Southeast Asia. From the Southeast Asian side, the question of how it views India's democracy is related to its own democratic development. If democracy had truly taken root in Southeast Asia, India would be more appealing, but, to date, it has not. Ultimately, however, India's influence in Southeast Asia will be dependent on its domestic economic performance.

The discussion that followed focused on a variety of issues, in particular the role of diasporas in forging ties, and perspectives on Indonesia and Burma.

It was noted that diasporas, including the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia, have the potential to serve as bridges between one's homeland and the land of one's ancestors. However, two major problems were pointed out in the case of Indians in Southeast Asia.

First of all, there are very few Indians compared to Chinese in Southeast Asia. Second, the largest ethnic-Indian population in Southeast Asia (Malaysia) occupies a complicated – and disadvantaged – place in Malaysia society. As an example of the potential that diasporas can hold, however, it was pointed out that one should look at the Vietnamese-American community as a driver of stronger U.S.-Vietnam relations.

When asked if American, Japanese, and Indian strategic objectives converge in Indonesia, the group offered a mixed picture. On one hand there are common interests such as maritime security and the consolidation of democracy. However, there are problems in Indonesia's bilateral relationship with each country. Regarding India, the two countries are often rivals because they're both big and poor, people-to-people relations are very thin, and the rise of pride in Islam in Indonesia has diminished the country's Indic underpinnings. As for the United States, it must be careful to be delicate as it administers its programs in Indonesia due to popular distrust of Washington. It was agreed that Japan gets little credit for its many contributions to the country.

On the Burma issue, the group had significant disagreements. Some were sympathetic to India's engagement with the Burmese junta, believing that India had no other option due to its security situation in its Northeast and increased Chinese involvement in Burma. Others vehemently disagreed, saying that they didn't think that India had any real interests in Burma. Also, some pointed out the complexity of China's presence in Burma, given Chinese influence is greatest in Mandalay and the North, while the Burmese leadership is hunkered down in Naypyidaw.

Counter-Terrorism

The third session, on counter-terrorism, demonstrated distinctly different perspectives held by the three countries on the issue due to their individual experiences.

Steve Clemons began the session by suggesting that the threat is overstated and that it ought not be at the center of U.S. defense policy. In this spirit, he offered six organizing principles for thinking about the threat: 1) Don't exaggerate the issue; 2) Realize that Islamist groups may collapse on their own; 3) Look to lower the temperature by addressing grievances like Israel/Palestine and Kashmir; 4) Realize that terrorism cannot be neatly thrown in one basket, since groups such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda differ; 5) Look to allies and partners for lessons learned; 6) Need a much "softer" approach to counter the threat. He continued his presentation by sharing his frustration with the "high-fear globalization" that the United States has helped propagate over "high-trust globalization." The United States need to fundamentally change its approach to the world in this regard by working on its soft power, not overreacting to horrific but small events, and being generous with its aid and intelligence sharing.

Naofumi Miyasaka continued the discussion by arguing the threat of terrorism in Japan is relatively low. Nevertheless, he advocated a three-pronged counterterrorism approach for Japan, combining prevention, consequence management, and pursuit, since Japan currently lacks a cohesive and strategic framework. It also does not have a legal

definition of terrorism or system of designating state sponsors of terrorism. Furthermore, he noted that Japan did not even do an independent review following the attacks on the Tokyo subway, so it is need of a comprehensive review to ensure that Japan is prepared for a terrorist attack. All in all, while terrorism isn't such a major threat to Japan, Tokyo should develop a national strategy for counterterrorism both domestically and internationally.

The Indian presenter, Manjeet Singh Pardesi, continued with an assessment of India's unique perspective on terrorism, given its experience with both domestic and international terrorism. He noted that India's fears are heightened by an upsurge in the global terrorism fears, which have led to two important strands in India's counter-terrorism strategy: 1) cooperating with other countries, and 2) sharing India's experience fighting terrorism. Although U.S.-India counter-terrorism cooperation suffered during the 1980s and 1990s for a host of reasons, India offered "unlimited support" to Washington, reviving an emphasis on defense cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives. The presenter also noted the importance of the United States beginning to notice Pakistan as a source of, which has led to a frank discussion of security threats and national interests between top officials in New Delhi and Washington.

Pardesi went on to argue that India's substantial experience with counter-terrorism should be utilized internationally, including with Japan. In this regard, there have been positive developments in India-Japan cooperation with the establishment of security dialogues to identify future areas of cooperation. In the immediate future, Japan's comprehensive counterterrorism assistance to Southeast Asia offers a promising template for building Indo-Japanese security relations. All together, even as there are important differences between New Delhi and Washington and between New Delhi and Tokyo, there remains immense potential for U.S.-India and India-Japan cooperation on counterterrorism.

The group's discussion included a rebuttal by one American discussant of Steven Clemons' view of the terrorist threat, labeling it as somewhat complacent. He argued that it reflected 20/20 hindsight and also doesn't take into account that a government in a democracy has to appear that it is actively addressing an apparent threat. Clemons responded by elaborating on the mistakes the United States has made before and after 9/11, such as failing to fill the strategic void at the end of the Cold War, thinking about counter-terrorism strictly in a security-minded way, freely calling a variety of activities "terrorism," and failing to harden the peace-minded majorities in the Middle East.

Maritime Security

Michael McDevitt, the American presenter, began the session by noting that maritime security is emerging as central security issue both in Asia and globally. Securing sea lanes in the Western Pacific is a major U.S. objective, which largely relies on the U.S. maintaining a global forward-deployed presence to ensure access. The presenter noted a new security reality is emerging. He urged the United States to note the changing regional dynamics, helping allies and friends, particularly ROK and Indonesia to develop

their navies. He argued that protecting sea lanes is paramount for resource and commercial reasons (Strait of Hormuz, oil, etc), and the United States can do it by continuing to promote stability in the source regions (Iraq, Syria, Iran), while empowering friends in Asia to secure and stabilize the destinations.

The Japanese presenter, Hideaki Kaneda continued with a discussion the vulnerabilities of sea lanes in Asia today, as well as the opportunities available for bi- and tri-lateral cooperation on maritime security. He noted that there are many issues plaguing the sea lanes of Asia, including maritime territorial disputes, piracy, international terrorism, and others. He noted that maritime security cooperation is in keeping with the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and that successive Japanese governments had expressed willingness to further these efforts. He discussed the efforts between Japan and China to avoid incidents at sea – the “three P” process (3 P’S) – but indicated that this was far from a comprehensive solution and further confidence building was needed. He also stressed, especially in the case of Japan-China maritime cooperation, the importance of communication, which has been quite weak. The presenter finished by indicating that a partnership among democracies for would be the most successful, because of shared goals, values, and interests. Thus, India is an ideal partner for broader Asian maritime security.

The Indian presenter began by noting that, while the United States worked out the relationship between politics and naval power long ago, India was still working on it. Due to a generally negative attitude toward sea power in India, the Indian Navy is forced to talk about constabulary duties such as anti-piracy, counter-terrorism, and anti-trafficking. However, naval strategy and power is intertwined with geopolitics, and Delhi is becoming increasingly nervous about China’s rise and its ambitions for access to the Indian Ocean, making India feel that *it* is being contained. Moving forward, noted large swaths of common interest among India, Japan, and the United States regarding China, Pakistan, North Korea, Taiwan, terrorism, and other areas. Ultimately it will be politics that will determine what is operationally feasible.

During the short discussion that followed, participants suggested that China and South Korea ought to be part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). China in particular would be a valued partner, according to one participant, as it would be a way to bring it into the current normative framework.

Human Rights and Democracy

The final session dealt with the role of human rights and democracy in the foreign policies of the three countries. Each presenter focused at least time addressing the Burma issue.

The American presenter began by describing the moral challenge in Burma. While Burma should be the logical pivot between South and East Asia, he said, it is instead a problem that divides. On this issue, the major division between approaches is between those who want to manage the problem and those who want to solve the problem. India

is a classic example of a country that wants to manage the problem, as was the United States for almost twenty years before changing its approach decisively after the Burmese junta crushed September 2007 uprising. Regarding the problem's resolution, the presenter argued that conditions must be created inside Burma so that the junta and the opposition can reach a compromise. In order to create these conditions, the international community needs to attack the junta's personal interests through smart sanctions, which ultimately will involve targeting wealth deposited abroad. Only in this way can leverage be created. As for coordination with Japan and India, it is essential that they speak in one voice alongside the United States, that Japan implement targeted sanctions, and that they change from a "managing" approach to a "solving" approach. He closed by pointing out that India's strategic objective will not be achieved with the junta in power, namely, China's port *will* be built and India's wild Northeast *will* still be wild so long as the junta remains.

The Japanese presenter provided an overview of the importance of human rights and democracy in its foreign policy, especially in light of Japan's much-discussed values-oriented diplomacy proposed under Prime Minister Abe. She began by reviewing the increasing importance of human rights policy within Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the last thirty years. She explained Japan's stated philosophy on the promotion of human rights abroad, which she characterized as flexible and having the ability to be tailored to different situations. She also noted that Japanese ODA policy has changed recently to stipulate that countries must have a good track record in human rights, market liberalization, and freedom to be considered for assistance. She also discussed three examples in which Japan has had to balance various interests - North Korea, China, and Burma. On North Korea, Japan has had to balance its security concerns with humanitarian concerns over the abductees issue. On China, Japan has had to balance concerns about its human rights situation with the need to maintain good relations in light of historical problems. On Burma, Japan has had to balance economic interests and sentimental historical ties, with concerns about its human rights record.

The Indian presenter noted that while India should be at the forefront of human rights and democracy promotion globally, it has not taken on this role. While India should have a democratic model for the developing world during the Cold War, it couldn't promote democracy in its foreign policy because it had to focus on growing its economy first, it couldn't choose sides between the United States and the Soviet Union for domestic reasons, and because it was bogged down with domestic insurgencies, as well as the Sri Lanka conflict, which turned it inward. The end of the Cold War has allowed India to consolidate its democracy and develop its economy, which is changing its character and offered an opportunity to rethink the importance of democracy to its foreign policy. Nonetheless, she said, India remains consumed by internal challenges, insurgencies, and territorial defense priorities with regard to Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma. She closed by saying that the outlook for democracy as a conceptual frame for Indian foreign policymaking was mixed, since some Indian leaders see it as an important component and some simply do not.

The discussion focused on Burma, which remained an area of disagreement between the three countries and thus an interesting case study on values based cooperation. One Japanese participant wondered if Japan is really sticking to its principles in the Burma case and wondered if it might be using the “Asian values” excuse once more. On the Indian side, a participant noted that no amount of cajoling would convince Delhi that engagement was not in their national interest, while an American participant argued that Indian-backing gives the junta precious confidence and that India doesn’t realize how much damage this may do to its image in Washington. It was also pointed out by more than one participant that Burma could potentially be an area of U.S.-Japan-India cooperation if the junta were to fall and the international community had to pick up the pieces, and that near-term cooperation should begin to prepare for that eventuality.

Turning to the U.S. approach to human rights and democracy abroad, the group found agreement that the United States is selective in its policy. When it has significant national security interests (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan), it is quiet; where it doesn’t have major security interests (Burma), it can speak loudly. However, one participant argued that regardless of inconsistencies, when there is an opportunity to speak out, like with Burma, it is important to act.

Keynote Remarks’

Sasae Kenichiro, deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, began his remarks by noting that Asia is relatively calm and prosperous, despite a few outliers. He outlined Japan’s strategic outlook, noting its expectations and hopes for the United States, China, North Korea, India, and Asian regionalism in turn.

Sasae said he expected more active and consistent Japanese engagement from the United States. He contended that the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to be strong, because it serves the region broadly. Although there are natural adjustment periods after leadership changes, it should be recognized that Japan is the United States’ most important ally in Asia.

Turning to China, Sasae noted that China’s rise is a fact that must be accepted and welcomed. Rather than trying to contain China, a new, constructive approach is necessary. However, he noted, one must remember that China faces huge challenges, both foreign and domestic.

Sasae added that it is a critical moment for U.S.-Japan cooperation regarding North Korea. While acknowledging that U.S.-Japan collaboration has been reasonably good and has come a long way, priorities still need to be set between the two countries. Most importantly, the United States should work with Japan and South Korea, as opposed to thinking about its policy towards North Korea alone.

Sasae expressed his government’s desire to see more active participation by the United States in Asian regional fora. At the same time, the United States should be able to trust

Japan to lead the process. Noting that both track I and track II dialogues are expanding, he said he sees the need for more regional for and more U.S.-Japan-ROK dialogue on North Korea and other issues.

Turning to India, Sasae noted that Japan and India have a lot in common, since they are both large democracies and that India's role is being felt more prominently in the region as of late. As India's attention shifts East, Sasae sees possibilities for more U.S.-Japan-India cooperation in trilateral relations. Currently, Japan would like to see more from India on Burma, climate change, and non-proliferation. He also noted that India's nuclear program remains a concern for Japan, which will be a major issue at this summer's G8 summit.

All in all, Sasae thinks that Japan's top priority, even as it still bids for UN Security Council reform, is to seek harmony between the U.S.-Japan alliance and its partnerships in Asia, including with China. Lastly, the biggest threat is also the biggest opportunity for cooperation is, that being climate change, and issue on which Japan is determined to lead.

Ambassador H.K. Singh, India's ambassador to Japan, focused his remarks on the evolving Japan-India relationship.

Singh began his remarks by reflecting on a history of strong Japan-India relations extending over 1,400 years, and remarked that Japan-India relations are poised to play a critical role in shaping the future of Asia, especially as India turns its attention east.

Ambassador Singh discussed at length how Japan-India relations intensified between 2000-2005 in a variety of areas as a result of growing recognition by both sides of strategic convergences and economic complementarities. On the leadership level, the two countries hold annual summits and minister-level strategic dialogues and bi-annual dialogues with vice ministers. The two navies and coast guards hold joint exercises, and defense officials regularly discuss counterterrorism and nonproliferation, among other issues. Economic relations are developing rapidly, which is anchored by increased Japanese interest in investing in India. While currently limited, people to people exchanges are on the rise. Thinking about the relationship in the context of the broader region, Ambassador Singh discussed his government's appreciation that Japan is supportive of India's involvement in East Asia. All together, the two governments have outlined a roadmap toward an enhanced partnership.

Ambassador Singh also took some time to discuss Japan-India relations in light of the new Fukuda administration in Tokyo. First and foremost, despite changes in Japan's outlook under Prime Minister Fukuda as opposed to Prime Minister Abe, the substance of Japan-India relations remains unchanged, an assessment confirmed by a recent conversation between the nations' prime ministers. There is a mutual belief that a strong India is good for Japan and a strong Japan is good for India. The top priority in the relationship must be to substantiate the economic engagement, an area in which the private sector will be critical.

Ambassador Singh concluded by offering a final thought, “At the end of the day, it does not matter how much goodwill there is between India and Japan and how unblemished their relations have been; what matters is the value each country attaches to nurturing their relationship and the sustained efforts of leaders, governments, and the private sector to play their respective roles in pursuing common objectives. Nothing can undermine our common future more than the benign neglect of our strategic convergences and the opportunities for economic partnership that now surely lie within our grasp.”