

Counterterrorism Cooperation with the United States and Japan: An Indian

Perspective

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INTRODUCTION

Political violence, insurgencies, separatist movements, and terrorism have been a constant threat to the security of India ever since its independence in 1947. The distinction between these forms of conflict is often blurred in the Indian context and the situation is likely to remain so in the coming years. Summing up the Indian view, Major General Afsir Karim (ret.) argues that “terrorism can form part of guerilla warfare, insurgency and turmoil of various shades...However, a terrorist is neither a guerilla fighter nor an insurgent soldier, a terrorist makes no distinction between combatants and non-combatants.”³

While the vast number of terrorist acts that India has faced is the product of home-grown separatist and ideologically-based groups, India has also been a victim of “cross-

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³ Afsir Karim, “International terrorism: the Indian response,” in *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute, 2007), p. 961.

border terrorism” emanating from its neighbors, primarily Pakistan. This was particularly true for terrorist activities in the Indian Punjab and is also true for Indian-administered Kashmir. Sikh militancy and terrorism in the Indian Punjab from the late 1970s onward had indigenous roots but was abetted by Pakistan as well as elements in the Sikh diaspora in Western Europe and North America.⁴ While violent militancy has been contained in the Indian Punjab since 1993, “an infrastructure in support of violence continues in adjoining Pakistan.”⁵

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan redeployed battle-hardened *mujahedeen* to Kashmir to exacerbate the indigenous uprising against New Delhi that began to unfold in the 1980s. Subsequently, the infrastructure in Afghanistan to train the *mujahedeen* was exploited by Pakistan’s intelligence services to train militants to fight in Indian-administered Kashmir. The infrastructure in Afghanistan was supplemented by terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan itself, primarily in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, to fight in India-administered Kashmir.⁶ There are some worrying

⁴ On the external dimension of Sikh terrorism, see N G Barrier and Paul Wallace, “International Dimensions of Sikh Political Violence,” in *Ethno-Nationalism and Emerging World (Dis)Order*, edited by Gurnam Singh (New Delhi: Kanishka, 2002), pp. 282-300.

⁵ Paul Wallace, “Countering Terrorist Movements in India: Kashmir and Khalistan,” in *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*, edited by Robert J Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 429.

⁶ On Pakistan’s support for militants in Kashmir, see Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 155-85. On the insurgency in Kashmir, see Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

signs that this violence may be spilling out of Kashmir into other parts of India.

These Indian fears are further accentuated by an upsurge in global terrorism that exploits Islam to serve a violent political vision. According to an Indian analyst, this so-called “Islamic terrorism at the global level” with its epicenter in the Central Asian republics, Afghanistan, and Pakistan “is likely to have a persistent effect on India’s internal security.”⁷ In the official Indian view, “the world...has to fight a united battle by pooling resources” in order to check and eliminate the “long arms and global reach” of international terrorism. Furthermore, “India’s long experience in tackling terrorism can be of valuable help to other countries that are facing similar challenges.”⁸ In other words, there are two important strands in India’s strategy to counter global terrorism – (1) co-operation with other countries, and (2) the sharing of India’s experiences in fighting terrorism with partners. In the subsequent sections, this paper will evaluate the prospects and limits of India-U.S. and India-Japan counterterrorism cooperation against this backdrop.

INDIA-US COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

⁷ General V K Nayar, “India’s Internal Security Compulsions,” in *Research Projects on India 2025* (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2003). Available: <http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/sereport/ser/vision2025/intnlsec.pdf> [Accessed: 07 February 2008], p. 8.

⁸ *Annual Report 2002-2003*, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, (n.d.). Available: <http://mod.nic.in/reports/MOD-English2003.pdf> [Accessed: 07 February 2008], pp. 9-10.

Cooperation before the 9/11 attacks

Counterterrorism cooperation between India and the United States can be traced back to at least 1981, even as it was for the most part “a closely guarded and deniable secret” until January 2000.”⁹ At the height of the insurgency in the Indian Punjab in the early 1980s, Indian intelligence officers received training in anti-hijacking and hostage negotiation techniques from their American counterparts. Exchange of intelligence began when the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shared information of a plot to assassinate the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during a visit to the United States in June 1985. In January 1992, counterterrorism experts from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Indian Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) began yearly brainstorming sessions on terrorist threats and assessments. Intelligence-sharing between India and the United States during this period was largely a result of terrorism in the Indian Punjab that was assuming global proportions, primarily due to its links with the Sikh diaspora in the West.

However, 1993 saw the nadir of Indo-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation. In the aftermath of the March 1993 Bombay blasts, India sought help from Austrian, British, and

⁹ Unless stated otherwise, this section is drawn from Bahukutumbi Raman, “Indo-US Counterterrorism Cooperation: Past, present, and future,” in *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than words*, edited by Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup, and Andrew Scobell (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 154-172. The quotation may be found on page 160.

American counterterrorism experts. U.S. forensic experts identified the American timer used in the bombing that was supplied to Pakistan during the Afghan war. However, the United States ruled out the possibility of using this information during trials in India. Later, American officials claimed that the timer was accidentally destroyed and thus was never returned to India.

In spite of what New Delhi saw as state-sponsored terrorism by Pakistan in Indian Kashmir, especially in late 1989 and the early 1990s, India was unable to get this endorsement from Washington. In January 1993, the United States warned Pakistan that it was the subject of “active continuing review” for possible inclusion in the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism for its alleged role in supporting terrorist activities in Indian Punjab and Kashmir. However, Pakistan was not on the list when it came out in April 1993. In the American view, it was believed that Pakistan had implemented “a policy of ending official support for terrorists in India.”¹⁰

Indo-U.S. relations picked up slowly when two American tourists were abducted in Kashmir in 1995 by terrorists belonging to the group Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) operating under the name Al Faran. Although one of the Americans managed to escape while the other was possibly killed, Indo-U.S. cooperation intensified as the two sides worked

¹⁰ Barbara Leitch LePoer, “Pakistan-US Relations,” *CRS Issue Brief for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congress Research Service, The Library of Congress, December 2001), pp. 15-6. Also see, Raphael F Perl, “Terrorism, the Future, and US Foreign Policy,” *CRS Issue Brief for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congress Research Service, The Library of Congress, September 2001), pp. 16-7.

together. According to a retired senior Indian intelligence officer, the United States began to take a more active interest in the activities of Pakistan-backed jihadi organizations after this incident.¹¹ Later, the two countries signed an Extradition Treaty in 1997. This led to the extradition of several Sikh militants wanted for violent acts in India.¹²

In the immediate aftermath of India's May 1998 nuclear tests, bilateral relations, including Indo-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation suffered a serious setback. As a consequence of the sanctions imposed by Washington, the sale of military hardware, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and even night vision equipment, was suspended. These items were deemed critical by New Delhi for India's counterterrorism operations, especially in Kashmir. The suspension of the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group (DPG) further reduced counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries.¹³

The following year in December 1999, an Indian Airlines flight was hijacked from Kathmandu, Nepal to Kandahar, Afghanistan by five Pakistani citizens with links to Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HUM). The hijacking ended only after New Delhi released three militants incarcerated in Indian jails and with links to jihadi organizations in Pakistan.¹⁴

After the incident, India again demanded that Pakistan be declared a state sponsor of

¹¹ Raman, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

¹² Polly Nayak, "Prospects for US-India Counterterrorism Cooperation: An American view," in Ganguly *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

¹³ For the setbacks that Indo-US counterterrorism cooperation suffered as a consequence of India's May 1998 nuclear tests, see Nayak, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.

¹⁴ For details, see "Information on hijacked Indian Airlines Flight IC-814," (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of India, n.d.). Available: http://www.indianembassy.org/archive/IC_814.htm [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

terrorism. The United States denied the Indian request but immediately established a Joint Working Group (JWG) in January 2000 to counter terrorism after high-level talks in London between the then Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott.¹⁵ Later that year, in December 2000, the Legal Attaché Office at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi came to be manned by two FBI officers. In this regard, counterterrorism cooperation became an important underlying factor in U.S. policy towards India, and demonstrated the growing trust between the two countries.¹⁶

The JWG represented the formalization of Indo-U.S. cooperation on counterterrorism after close to twenty years of secrecy. From 1981-2000, Indo-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation went through peaks and troughs but cooperation was essentially limited to operational and tactical issues, as fundamental differences existed between the Indian and American views on terrorism. India's concerns about terrorism were mostly domestic and regional, and were often centered on Pakistan (and to a lesser degree on its other South Asian neighbors). On the other hand, prior to 9/11, Washington viewed terrorism "mainly as a threat to U.S. interests abroad."¹⁷ This is not to deny the existence of domestic terrorist threats in America, but they were far more limited. Given their different priorities, Washington perceived Pakistan's role in Kashmiri militancy

¹⁵ "India and US to counter terrorism," *BBC News*, 20 January 2000. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/608799.stm [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

¹⁶ Josy Joseph, "FBI to set up office in Delhi, train Indian personnel," *Rediff*, 29 September 1999. Available: <http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/sep/29fbi.htm> [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

¹⁷ Nayak, op. cit., p. 136.

through the lens of the India-Pakistan conflict.¹⁸ In America's view, India's terrorism problem was "regional" and as a consequence did not have global implications. On the other hand, given its own foreign policy priorities, India's close relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its reluctance to condemn terrorist acts linked with the PLO were also a major source of irritation for the United States.¹⁹ In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, there has been a greater understanding between United States and India on issues related to terrorism. However, as explained subsequently, important differences continue to exist.

Post 9/11 Cooperation

In a dramatic display of its strategic intentions, India offered "unlimited support" to Washington, including the use of specific air bases, three days after the 9/11 attacks.²⁰ In April 2002, during Operation Enduring Freedom, Indian naval ships INS Sharda and INS Sukanya escorted high-value American ships passing through the Strait of Malacca.²¹ India has also provided diplomatic and political support to the America's global

¹⁸ Nayak, op. cit., p. 137.

¹⁹ Raman, op. cit., p. 156.

²⁰ C Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with India and Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), pp. 76-7.

²¹ "Defense Relations: Shared Strategic Future," (New Delhi: US Embassy, n.d.). Available: <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/7tIuOzAx8UV0mdK5nGCpJw/wwwfpppdef.pdf> [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

counterterror efforts. However, apart from India's limited naval cooperation in the Malacca Strait, India has not participated militarily in America's Global War on Terrorism. "American officials describe India as an important *informal* ally in the global antiterror efforts."²²

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the DPG was revived and its scope was expanded further with an emphasis on defense cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives.²³ During the fourth meeting of the JWG in 2002, the two countries formally launched the Joint Initiative on Cyber-Terrorism. When launched, the United States did not have a similar relationship with any other country.²⁴ In 2002, the U.S.-India Cyber Security Forum was also launched to promote bilateral cooperation in the information age. In 2004, a senior U.S. military delegation visited India's 15 Corps Battle School (CBS) near Srinagar with the aim of learning anti-militancy techniques and unconventional operations before heading to Iraq.²⁵ The same year, India and the United States held a science and technology workshop on counterterrorism in Goa.²⁶ Finally, the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship signed in 2005 gives a high priority, including the need to strengthen their respective military capabilities, to defeat

²² Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions*, p. 1.

²³ Raman, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-4.

²⁴ Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions*, p. 79.

²⁵ Nayak, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

²⁶ Nayak, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

terrorism.²⁷

Importantly, differences between the two countries continue to exist. In the aftermath of the December 13, 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament by terrorists belonging to two Pakistan-based jihadi organizations – Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) – India responded with its largest military mobilization along the Pakistani border since the 1971 Bangladesh War. While India’s attempt at coercive diplomacy failed for a number of reasons²⁸, India is unhappy about Washington’s military and security cooperation with Islamabad as a reward for supporting U.S. operations in Afghanistan, in spite of the growing evidence that links terrorism in India and beyond to sources in Pakistan. However, New Delhi welcomed the U.S. designation of LeT and JeM as terrorist organizations. Finally, India is concerned about the rise of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh, while the United States has thus far remained agnostic about it.²⁹

On their part, U.S. officials remain irritated with what they perceive as “New Delhi’s agnosticism on Iran’s and Iraq’s support for international terrorism.”³⁰ The unpopularity of the U.S.-led war in Iraq among the Indian masses and Saddam Hussein’s

²⁷ “New Framework For The US-India Defense Relationship,” Military Education Research Library Network, 28 June 2005. Available: http://merln.ndu.edu/merln/mipal/reports/US_India_Defense_Framework.doc [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

²⁸ Sumit Ganguly and Michael R Kraig, “The 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” *Security Studies* Volume 14, Number 2 (April-June 2005), pp. 290-324.

²⁹ Sumit Ganguly, “The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh,” *USIP Special Report No. 171*, August 2006. Available: <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr171.pdf> [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

³⁰ Nayak, op. cit., p. 137.

government's support for the Indian position on Kashmir were important factors in Indian decision-making in this regard.³¹ Similarly, public opinion at home as well as India's growing energy needs have led India to engage Iran, even though this has caused significant discomfort in Washington.³²

These differences notwithstanding, the two sides are coordinating their policies in a number of areas. India is playing a significant role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and has made contributions worth \$750 million to date.³³ While India has not deployed its military in support of U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, New Delhi has deployed a very small contingent of its paramilitary forces to protect Indian citizens working on reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.³⁴ India also voted with the United States (in September 2005 and February 2006) on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions finding Iran in noncompliance with its international obligations.

Moreover, there are some indications that the United States is beginning to take note of the problem of terrorism emanating from Pakistan. For example, there is now growing evidence that overlapping memberships of various jihadi groups in Pakistan

³¹ Jyotsna Singh, "India's Iraq Dilemma," *BBC News*, 31 March 2003. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2902847.stm [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

³² K Alan Kronstadt, "India-Iran Relations and US Interests," *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congress Research Service, The Library of Congress, August 2006).

³³ "India's Assistance Programme for Afghanistan's Reconstruction," (Kabul: Embassy of India, n.d.). Available: <http://meakabul.nic.in/intpage/assistancetoafghanistan.pdf> [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

³⁴ Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "India's Role in Afghanistan: Need for Greater Engagement," *IDSAs Strategic Comments*, 04 May 2006. Available: <http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/ShanthieDSouza040506.htm> [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

(especially the Deobandi groups) are targeting not only Indian-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan, but also Pakistan itself. Moreover, there are worrying trends pointing towards the emergence of a local Pakistani Taliban, as well as the Pakistan-ization of Al Qaeda.³⁵ Given these trends, there is the possibility of a certain degree of coordination between Indian and American approaches towards Pakistan, although how exactly New Delhi and Washington should proceed is not clear.

The above trends indicate that even as there are no primary structural impediments to closer counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and India, a significant degree of difference remains. American and Indian interests are congruent, not convergent. While America's counterterrorism efforts are global, India's primary concerns are regional. As a consequence, Indian and American approaches to counterterrorism have at times been at odds, but the transnational nature of terrorism today does not recognize this regional-global distinction. Recent developments in Pakistan are the most vivid demonstrations of the blurring of this distinction. Therefore, it is no longer tenable to merely dismiss Pakistan-backed terrorist groups against India as an exclusive feature of the South Asian security environment. What is therefore needed is a frank discussion of security threats and national interests at the top levels between New

³⁵ On these issues, C Christine Fair, "US-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability, and the Future of US Policy," Testimony Presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 16 January 2008. Available: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2008/RAND_CT297.pdf [Accessed: 07 February 2008].

Delhi and Washington, which highlights their congruent interests and promotes policy coordination. However, for the foreseeable future, the two sides will find it easier to cooperate on tactical issues as opposed to strategic missions.³⁶

Lessons from India's Experiences with Counterterrorism

India's long counterterrorism experience also offers useful lessons, both positive and negative, to American-led coalition forces in Iraq. The visit of a U.S. military delegation to the CBS in India shows America's interest in learning from India's experiences. India's successful containment of the Sikh militancy in Punjab offers many useful lessons, some of which may be applicable to Iraq.³⁷ While an analysis of the operations of India's security forces in the Punjab is outside the scope of this paper, a few points are worth noting. First, the elimination of militant Sikh leadership of Bhindranwale only splintered the insurgent groups that made it more challenging for the security forces to contain them. Second, the excessive use of force directly correlated with an increase in terrorist activities in the Punjab. Third, it was a police operation led by Sikh officers against Sikh insurgents (as opposed to military-led operations), and the creation of mobile police units backed by paramilitary units, that successfully ended the militancy in Punjab. Finally, by

³⁶ Nayak, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

³⁷ For details, see Wallace, "Countering Terrorist Movements in India."

allowing the largely free and fair coverage of several sensitive paramilitary operations by the media (especially in the aftermath of Operation Blue Star), the Indian government won the “hearts and minds” of the people of the Punjab. At the very least, these operations (as well as India’s substantial experience with other sub-conventional operations) should be analyzed for their positive and negative lessons, and their application in the context of Iraq should be determined.

INDIA-JAPAN COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

Japan and India’s bilateral relationship is relatively “undeveloped.”³⁸ The description “estranged democracies” held true for both India-U.S. relations and India-Japan relations during the Cold War.³⁹ Until the early 1990s, “India was guilty of dismissing Japan as a camp follower of the United States, [while] the Japanese in turn, perceived India as a chaotic, dysfunctional, desperately poor country, and not as a potential partner,”⁴⁰ Indo-Japanese relations also suffered a significant setback in the aftermath of India’s May 1998 nuclear tests. As a consequence, Indo-Japanese relations were characterized by low levels

³⁸ Emma Chanlett-Avery and Bruce Vaughn, “Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India,” *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congress Research Service, The Library of Congress, January 2008), p. 10.

³⁹ Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993).

⁴⁰ Lalit Mansingh, “India-Japan Relations,” *IPCS Issue Brief*, No. 43, January 2007. Available: <http://ipcs.org/IPCS-IssueBrief-No43.pdf> [Accessed: 08 February 2008].

of economic exchange and were bereft of a strategic component.

The symbolic breakthrough came with the highly successful visit of former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's August 2000 visit to India when the two countries agreed to establish the "Japan-India Global Partnership in the 21st Century."⁴¹ This was followed by two important security dialogues between the then Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes and his Japanese counterpart Shigeru Ishiba in 2003. Nuclear issues involving North Korea and Pakistan were an important component of these discussions, since some scholars were pointing toward a Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang nuclear proliferation axis at the time.⁴²

In 2005, the two sides held the first meeting of the Japan-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism to identify future areas of cooperation.⁴³ Finally, during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan in December 2006 the two sides injected a strategic component in their emerging partnership when they issued the Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership. During his visit, Prime Minister Singh and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe endorsed the institutionalization of a strategic dialogue between their foreign ministers as well as a policy dialogue

⁴¹ "Japan-India Relations," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 2008. Available: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/index.html> [Accessed: 08 February 2008].

⁴² Mohan Malik, "The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* Vol. XV, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-100.

⁴³ "Japan-Republic of India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism," The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1 July 2005. Available: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2005/7/0701.html#4> [Accessed: 08 February 2008].

between the Indian national security advisor and his Japanese counterpart.⁴⁴

While there are a number of reasons behind Indo-Japanese engagement in recent years, the two countries discovered each other as a consequence of a fundamental reorientation in their foreign and security policies after the end of the Cold War. Most importantly, there are no primary structural impediments to close Indo-Japanese relations given their tension-free bilateral relationship. During his visit to Tokyo in March 2007 for the first foreign minister-level strategic dialogue with his Japanese counterpart, the Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee stated that India and Japan recognized the importance of ensuring “long-term security and stable equilibrium in Asia,” and that their economic prosperity depended on “the shared security of the sea lanes of communication.”⁴⁵ Much of their military-to-military cooperation in this regard, including combating terrorism, is likely to take place on the high seas. Importantly, all three service chiefs of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces visited India in 2006-2007.

In the immediate future, it is Japan’s comprehensive counterterrorism assistance to Southeast Asia that offers a promising template for building Indo-Japanese security relations.⁴⁶ Emphasizing the non-military means of cooperation, Japan has provided

⁴⁴ “Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership,” Office of the Prime Minister of India, 15 December 2006. Available: <http://www.pmindia.gov.in/visits/content.asp?id=147> [Accessed: 08 February 2008].

⁴⁵ “Address by EAM at the Japan Institute of International Affairs,” (Tokyo: Embassy of India, 23 March 2007). Available: http://www.embassyofindiajapan.org/word/2007primeminister/external_affairs_minister's_speech.doc [Accessed: 08 February 2008].

⁴⁶ See “Japan’s International Counterterrorism Cooperation,” The Ministry of Foreign

capability building assistance to various Southeast Asian countries in different fields such as combating high-tech crime, cyberterrorism, and the modernization of police forces. Together with these, cooperation on preventing money laundering, prevention of WMD proliferation, cooperation on information and biometric technologies for immigration control, and aviation and port security are potentially important areas of bilateral cooperation. Given their non-military inflection, such cooperation will not be controversial in both Japan and India. More importantly, it will play a trust building role between Asia's most important democracies that have just embarked on a global and strategic partnership.

However, it must be noted that the India's nuclear weapons status is still an area of "potential contention" between Japan and India.⁴⁷ And finally, the U.S.-Japan alliance also has the potential to become an area of contention with the Left partners of the current government in New Delhi.⁴⁸

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, even as there are important differences between New Delhi and

Affairs of Japan, October 2007. Available: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/coop0710.html> [Accessed: 08 February 2008].

⁴⁷ Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴⁸ Mansingh, op. cit., p. 3.

Washington and between New Delhi and Tokyo, there remains immense potential for Indo-U.S. and Indo-Japanese cooperation on counterterrorism. All three states are concerned with the prevention of state failure in many parts of the world – in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Similarly, maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, and cooperation against cyber- and narco-terrorism are high on the agendas of all three countries. Collaboration in science and technology for countering terrorism offers an important starting point for the institutionalization of a trilateral arrangement between India, Japan, and the United States. The joint development of standards for technologies for diverse applications such as aviation and port security, including standardized hardware and software interfaces, and their coordination through civilian agencies will promote familiarity and trust, but will also be less controversial.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Branscomb has suggested this for Japanese-American collaboration to counter terrorism. Given their overlapping interests as well as India's considerable technological capabilities, this can also be extended to India. See Lewis M Branscomb, "Japanese-American Collaborative Efforts to Counter Terrorism," *The Bridge: Linking Engineering and Society: National Academy of Engineering* Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp 11-16.