

THE DEBATE ON NATO'S EVOLUTION

A Guide

A Report of the
CSIS Eastern Europe Project

Principal Author
Margarita Assenova

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Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel: (202) 887-0200
Fax: (202) 775-3199
E-mail: books@csis.org
Web site: <http://www.csis.org/>

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Acknowledgments

This guidebook to the NATO enlargement debate is not an original paper; rather it is a summary, compilation, and guide to the numerous written materials on the topic, and it is meant to serve as a reference, both to the debate literature and to the CSIS NATO Debate database (located online at <<http://www.csis.org/ee/natodebate.htm>>).

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Executive Summary

The CSIS Eastern Europe Project is engaged in the transformation process in several parts of Central and Southeast Europe. The project has worked closely with the governments of the region, the broader nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, and each country's diplomatic representation in Washington, to help states strengthen their relations with the United States and to stabilize their respective regions. The project is additionally engaged in an ongoing analysis of broader political trends encompassing 20 states and aspiring states in Eastern Europe, including the political and security impact of NATO and European Union enlargement.

Working within this mission, the Eastern Europe Project launched an innovative initiative on the extensive debate on NATO's evolution. The initiative began shortly after NATO's Washington summit in April 1999, which was held at a critical time, in the middle of NATO's first military campaign against Serbia, and in the midst of major decisions on alliance enlargement and NATO's evolving mission in a new security environment.

In order to better inform policymakers in the United States and Europe about the context, causes, and consequences of NATO's evolution, it was essential to conduct a comprehensive survey and analysis of the debate on NATO enlargement since the close of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet threat.

The CSIS initiative on NATO's evolution was designed to address the question of enlargement and institutional adaptation by promoting dialogue and informed decisionmaking on issues essential to U.S. national interests and European security. A *NATO Debate Database* was created to facilitate research on the subject matter surrounding NATO issues for the twenty-first century, including NATO's enlargement and evolution, the alliance's adaptation to new security challenges, and the post-Cold War and post-September 11 European security environment. The database contains a substantive classified collection of journal articles, policy statements, radio broadcasts, newswire reports, policy briefs and analyses, security assessments, government reports, books, and academic papers focused on the ongoing debate.

Accompanying the database is this guide, which provides an overview of the ongoing debate through condensed descriptions outlining the key factors in NATO's evolution since the early 1990s. It serves as a general guide to the various texts, positions, and arguments contained in the voluminous materials that are systematically compiled in the *CSIS NATO Debate Database*. The guide helps to frame many of the issues that have confronted the alliance—issues that will preoccupy Washington and other allied capitals in the years ahead. The database is accessible online at the CSIS Web site: <<http://www.csis.org/ee/natodebate.htm>>.

Introduction

Over the past few years, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which keeps the United States closely engaged with and in Europe, has come under increasing scrutiny. Politicians and analysts have expressed a range of opinions on NATO's size, scope, mission, and viability. NATO itself has shifted its primary strategic focus from the mutual defense of North America and Western Europe to an increasing role in collective security, conflict management, crisis response, and institutional enlargement.

The evolution of NATO has important implications for U.S. foreign policy in a number of dimensions. It impacts on the transatlantic relationship, the consolidation and expansion of European security, the longevity of international peacekeeping missions in southeast Europe, the global campaign against international terrorism, the nature of relations with Russia, and the question of defense spending priorities on both sides of the Atlantic. There are several salient and often controversial issues confronting NATO, especially over the coming years, including U.S.-European burden sharing; Europe's defense pillar; NATO enlargement; NATO's new missions; NATO-Russia relations; and the U.S.-led antiterrorism and anti-rogue state campaign.

First, policymakers continue to draw lessons from the 1999 NATO military campaign over Kosovo in which the inadequacies of European defense capabilities were glaringly exposed. Pressing questions about burden sharing and power sharing in the U.S.-European relationship are ongoing, and Washington regularly complains about the inadequacies of European Union (EU) defense spending in the age of terrorism. While the United States is charged by some in the EU as a unilateralist bully, Europe is often accused of dependence and complacency. Some U.S. officials have concluded that, due to EU unwillingness to contribute and its frequent criticisms of U.S. policy, NATO is becoming increasingly irrelevant to future security challenges. Thus, America has no alternative but to act alone or with dependable partners.

Second, Washington remains dubious about the feasibility and applicability of the planned European defense pillar. Questions continue to be raised about European contributions to its own defense and the interface between traditional alliance structures and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in terms of decisionmaking, use of resources, and troop deployments. With Iran and other states developing weapons that can reach Europe, Washington feels that the Europeans should make a greater contribution in developing antimissile systems. The question of costs and capabilities is uppermost, and there is profound skepticism about EU commitments.

Third, the enlargement question may be the least conflictive item on the NATO agenda. There is general agreement that expansion is needed to coincide with planned EU enlargement. Moreover, Washington leads the way in this process as it carries most of the burdens within the alliance. The United States expects the new NATO members not only to contribute within their capabilities to the antiterrorism campaign but also to support U.S. positions that may be less than warmly embraced in certain West European states. Aside from the UK, the United States' most reliable allies are expected to be in Eastern Europe. The newly invited states will also need to reflect that the NATO they are poised to enter may be very different from the one they first petitioned. This will be particularly true if the United States increasingly disregards NATO in its struggle against rogue regimes and terrorist networks and focuses instead on bilateral relations with like-minded allies.

Fourth, allied leaders are assessing the successes and shortcomings of peace enforcement missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the practicality and efficacy of NATO's New Strategic Concept. This will have major ramifications not only for the two NATO "dependencies" in southeast Europe but also for any future peacekeeping and state-building missions, especially as the Bush administration is seeking more substantial U.S. troop reductions. Washington is determined not to undertake any new missions; hence any renewed conflicts in Macedonia or elsewhere will necessitate an all-European force if future peace-enforcement operations are to be undertaken.

Fifth, the question of whether Russia has become a factor of stability and cooperation or remains an unpredictable partner is still uncertain. East Europeans fear that Russia's role in NATO will grow as that of the United States declines. Not only could the alliance lose its political purpose, it may become a militarily feeble organization. The Baltic states in particular fear that Moscow's involvement may jeopardize NATO's effectiveness as a union for mutual defense, bolster Russia's assertiveness vis-à-vis its former satellites, and undermine the stringent criteria for NATO membership that they have labored so hard to meet. If Russia could delay, dilute, or determine NATO policy, then this could damage the incentive for joining the alliance. Russia will of course closely monitor and exploit any transatlantic disputes. It will also seek a strategic partnership with the EU that could further erode NATO's rationale and limit U.S. influence. The Kremlin has favored the development of a European security pillar that can establish a close relationship with Russia and has supported a permanent EU-Russia Council that can oversee the implementation of joint decisions in the security arena. This would provide Moscow with a more prominent security role in Europe.

Sixth, the United States is assessing the progress of the allied campaign against international terrorism. Policymakers and defense planners remain critical about allied participation in the military aspects of the ongoing campaign. The offensive in Afghanistan was an Anglo-American affair, and other conflict zones such as Iraq are unlikely to elicit any significant military assistance from the European allies. The planned "NATO Response Force" is to consist of 20,000 rapidly deployable troops. But it seems unlikely that NATO can be rapidly adapted to fight the new kinds of wars without greater defense spending, modernization, and

specialization. Instead, a permanent division of labor may emerge between U.S. war fighting and European peacekeeping. Such an eventuality could make NATO increasingly superfluous, and the EU would in effect remain a dependency of the United States.

In this context, this short guide to the CSIS NATO Database helps to frame many of the issues that have confronted the alliance over the past decade and which will preoccupy Washington and Brussels in the years ahead.

Database Organization and Storage

An electronic database was created to house most written materials on the international debate surrounding NATO. Topics include NATO's enlargement and evolution, the alliance's adaptation to twenty-first century missions, and the post-Cold War European security environment. The purpose of the database is to provide scholars, students, journalists, policy experts, business leaders, government officials, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) access to a wide range of sources surrounding the ongoing debate. The database is intended to facilitate research on NATO issues during the ongoing evolution of this sole transatlantic alliance. The articles and analyses have been written by a variety of authors, including scholars, journalists, security experts, policy analysts, and government officials. The materials are meant to provide a varied view on a wide range of issues that face the NATO allies at the beginning of twenty-first century. The database is divided into six main topic fields:

- NATO Enlargement
- NATO's Changing Mission
- NATO-Europe-U.S. Relationship
- NATO-Eastern Europe Relationship
- NATO-Russia Relationship
- NATO Military and Political Affairs

Within these six primary topic fields are a broad number of varied subtopics. While some of the materials may be found online, a substantial amount comes from academic journals, the majority of which can be found at local universities or public libraries. Those materials that are available on the Internet are hyperlinked. Those with Web sites are linked, although in many instances these may include primarily publishing and subscription information (most full-length periodical articles are not available online).

This guidebook to the NATO enlargement debate is not an original paper, but rather a summary and compilation of numerous written materials on the topic and a useful reference to the CSIS NATO Debate database.

NATO's Changing Mission

NATO's Role in Post-Cold War Europe

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was initially conceived as an endeavor to provide security for Western European democracies and the United States. Its founding on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C., was a result of the bitter lessons of World War II—but also reflected the new divisions in Europe after the Soviet Union established control over Eastern Europe. Between 1952 and 1982 four more nations joined the military alliance: Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain.

The concept of collective security was fundamental for NATO's existence during the Cold War, and it remained essential after the fall of communism. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty entitles the member countries to a collective defense strategy: "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."¹ This text is based on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which guarantees "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."²

Brussels Summit

Though the alliance's major concern was building systems of common defense among the allied nations, it also provided for systems of stability. These are based on NATO's common values, which include ensuring freedom and security of alliance members by political and military means and protecting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

NATO's major concern during the Cold War was to build reliable defense capabilities and to ensure that the East-West military balance would provide for comparatively peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and Communist worlds. The Brussels summit in May 1989, just months before the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, devoted significant attention to issues of limiting arms and nuclear proliferation, ongoing or anticipated, as a result of the thaw in relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

The alliance's long-term objectives defined in Brussels were the following:

- to ensure that wars and intimidation of any kind in Europe and North America are prevented;

¹ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>>.

² UN, "Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations," NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/bt-un51.htm>>.

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- to establish a new pattern of relations between the countries of East and West, in which ideological and military antagonism will be replaced with cooperation, trust, and peaceful competition and in which human rights and political freedoms will be fully guaranteed and enjoyed by all individuals.

“Based on today’s momentum of increased cooperation and tomorrow’s common challenges, we seek to shape a new political order of peace in Europe,” stated the Brussels declaration.³ NATO’s guiding principles in the pursuit of these goals served the policies of the Harmel Report⁴ in their two approaches: adequate military strength and political solidarity. On that basis, a constructive dialogue and cooperation were pursued, through such mechanisms as arms control, as a means of bringing about a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

The Brussels summit was the first substantial step towards NATO cooperation with the East. Soon after that the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed and by the end of 1990, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO was already exploring a policy of eastward expansion to include some of the new democracies.

The fundamental change in NATO’s role in the post–Cold War world came with the realization that the alliance remained the only credible military structure in Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became clear that the former Communist empire no longer had the resources to feed its military ambitions. At the same time, new security challenges emerged in the Balkans, with regional and ethnic wars becoming the major threat to European security.

London Declaration

Less than a year after the changes in Eastern Europe, NATO held its London summit on July 6, 1990. The alliance acknowledged that it could help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of NATO’s shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.⁵ The declaration underlined the significance of the unification of Germany as an indispensable factor of stability in the heart of Europe. The unification of Germany was de facto the first act of NATO’s

³ NATO, “Declaration of the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (the 40th anniversary of the Alliance),” May 29–30, 1989, NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b890529a.htm>>.

⁴ The Harmel Report was issued in 1967. Its purpose was to determine the influence of such developments on the alliance and to identify the tasks that lie before it, in order to strengthen the alliance as a factor for a durable peace. The announcement by France of its withdrawal from the integrated military structure coupled with the questioning by certain elements of public opinion of the relevancy of NATO led to calls for an in-depth review of the alliance’s aims. At the December 1966 ministerial meeting, on the proposal of the Belgian foreign minister, Pierre Harmel, and recalling the initiative taken by Canada in December 1964, the Council resolved to undertake a broad analysis of international developments since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.

⁵ NATO, “Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (‘The London Declaration’),” July 6, 1990, NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b900706a.htm>>.

expansion toward post-Communist Eastern Europe. For many years during the Cold War, the Soviet bloc had relied on East Germany as its western frontier, and that state had accumulated significant military equipment and Soviet troop deployments.

Another important element of the London declaration was the recognition that the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. The logic of this was that NATO should become an institution to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. In a reflection of its changing political role, the alliance invited the Soviet Union and all the East European countries to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with Brussels. NATO also declared its readiness to intensify military contacts with Moscow and other East European capitals.

NATO decided in London to prepare a new allied military strategy and elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. The London declaration formulated a new vision for the future role of NATO in ensuring lasting peace and security in Europe.

The London summit adopted the Extended Hand Friendship Statement. By 1991, many countries in the former Communist zone were prepared to shake that hand, and the first institutional framework—the North Atlantic Cooperation and Security Initiative (NACSI)—was established. It was later renamed as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with a basic mandate to overcome adversarial relationships stemming from the Cold War period. The work of NACC was very successful according to NATO experts, especially in arranging for Soviet troops to vacate the Baltic states and in dealing with the obligations of the former Soviet Union.

NACC laid the groundwork for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which was launched in 1994. By 1997, the NACC had played a significant role in overcoming the suspicions of the Cold War and moved forward in establishing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) with the objective to assure increased engagement by all the partners in this new framework. One of the differences between the two formations was that EAPC included the neutral non-allies as full members, which was not the case with the NACC. EAPC included 45 members and swelled to 46 after Croatia was admitted as a PfP member at the Florence summit in May 2000.

NATO's Strategic Concept

The new Strategic Concept agreed in Rome in November 1991 reflected the profound political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. The political transformation of post-Communist countries and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had radically improved the security environment in Europe. The former NATO adversaries from Eastern Europe dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected any ideological hostility toward the West. They embraced the policy of building pluralistic democracies, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a market economy.

Western Europe had also changed after unifying Germany and advancing the process of building the European Union (EU) as a political and economic

structure. The development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, could not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the alliance as a whole, states the Strategic Concept document.⁶

Although the fundamental role of NATO to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries remained unchanged, there were practically no direct threats to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of any alliance member. The new Strategic Concept warned that risks to allied security were more likely to result from instabilities caused by serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO began to reinforce its crisis management and crisis prevention capabilities. Its role in these two directions was altered and widened, both substantively and geographically, after the fall of communism. First, NATO started to intervene and manage crises outside the boundaries of member countries; and second, it accepted a role in peacekeeping and stability-building systems.

The Strategic Concept provided the framework for the changes NATO underwent by the end of the decade. The notion that the security of the alliance nations is inseparable from the security of other European nations was a key concept and the premise of Partnership for Peace. This single strategic concept and the catalyst provided by the crisis in the Balkans became the driving force for the fundamental change within NATO.

The Strategic Concept presented a synergy among reality, experience, and the requirements of the real world, which have driven or shaped policy decisions. Policy decisions that were implemented in reaction to actual crises would contribute to subsequent decisions. The Strategic Concept became a strategic-level document that provided a vision, according to NATO officials.

John Kriendler, in his article "NATO's Changing Role and Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping,"⁷ concluded that clear signs of a significant change in the alliance's role appeared in 1993. At that time, NATO announced its readiness to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 816 to enforce the previously announced no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO also offered protective air power in case of attack against the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the performance of its Bosnian mandate. These events graphically illustrated the profound process of transformation of the Atlantic Alliance, and in particular its evolving role in crisis prevention, crisis management, and peacekeeping.

⁶ NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council," November 8, 1991, NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>>.

⁷ John Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role: Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping," *NATO Review*, vol. 41, no. 3 (June 1993): 16–21, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9303-4.htm>>.

Bosnia and Kosovo

The Dayton Peace Accords, which were signed at the end of the Bosnian war in November 1995, presented NATO with a different set of challenges: to help to implement the agreement, first by establishing and leading a multinational, military Implementation Force, known as IFOR, and subsequently by dispatching a follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia.

Another challenge was the war in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, where NATO intervened militarily against Yugoslavia and then undertook a peacekeeping mission in the war-torn province. After the war, in June 1999, the alliance presence enabled hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees who fled Belgrade's repression to return safely to their homeland. Although NATO had successfully ensured the departure of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, the KFOR (Kosovo Force) mission was not equipped to perform a broad array of policing duties.

NATO and Russia

Among its new post-Cold War tasks and goals, NATO focused on developing constructive relations with Russia in order to promote understanding and establish practical forms of cooperation on a long-term basis. Other important goals included the development of NATO's distinctive partnership with Ukraine, launching cooperation with other partner countries throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and preparing the path for further enlargement of the alliance in the coming years.

Geographically, NATO's active cooperation policy went beyond the European continent to extend its joint efforts with countries participating in its Mediterranean Dialogue and to involve countries from the Balkans, the Baltic region, and Central Asia in Partnership for Peace.

Partnership for Peace (PfP) had a profound impact on the former Communist world for two main reasons. First, it opened the NATO alliance to previously isolated or antagonistic countries. Second, it provided for an exchange of security concerns, military experience, as well as opportunities for building common strategies.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was established in May 1997 as the political structure of PfP and was a logical continuation of the amplified trust between NATO and PfP members. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council succeeded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and was designed to provide the overarching framework for consultations among its members on a broad range of political and security-related issues. The cooperative mechanism formed the framework for enhanced efforts in both an expanded political dimension of PfP and in practical cooperation under PfP.⁸

Mediterranean Dialogue

In 1994, NATO initiated a dialogue with six countries in the Mediterranean region: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Algeria became a

⁸ NATO, "Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council," May 30, 1997, NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b970530a.htm>>.

participant in March 2000. The dialogue was aimed at creating good relations and better mutual understanding throughout the Mediterranean area, as well as promoting regional security and stability. Expanding the alliance's outreach to the Mediterranean region was a result of the realization that Europe's security depended on establishing peace and security in a wider area beyond the borders of the European continent.

Washington Summit

The summit in Washington in the spring of 1999 was one of the most important events in NATO's history. It not only marked the fiftieth anniversary of NATO's creation, but it also became a demarcation line between the alliance's Cold War past and its functions in a future globalized world. The member countries underscored their commitment to defend their people, territory, and liberty, founded on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. They also stated that their values and security interests remained unchanged despite the fact that the world had transformed dramatically over the last half century.

Collective defense remained the core purpose of NATO, but another dimension was added to the initial security concept: the commitment to build a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies where human rights and fundamental freedoms were upheld.

The summit became the quintessence of NATO's decade of transformation and involved a clear declaration of support for further NATO enlargement with the participation of three new members—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. It was also a definition of the enhanced NATO mission to stand firm against states violating human rights and waging war. At the same time the summit was held, for the first time in its history NATO was involved in a military intervention on a territory of a nonmember country in order to protect the victims of human rights violations in Kosovo.

The summit declaration welcomed the enhanced impetus to strengthening European defense capabilities, which would evidently enable the European allies to act more effectively together while reinforcing the transatlantic partnership. The allies issued reassurances that the destinies of North America and Europe remained inseparable and declared as the fundamental objectives of NATO an enduring peace, security, and liberty for all people of Europe and North America.⁹

At the April 1999 Washington summit, the Strategic Concept was enlarged and a Defense Capabilities Initiative was issued. The Strategic Concept now acknowledged "the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." More importantly, it stated that NATO members will maintain an "adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defense." Experts point out that the new objectives of the alliance, together with changes in

⁹ NATO, "The Washington Declaration signed and issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., April 23–24, 1999," NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm>>.

its strategy and defense capability, demonstrate that a new NATO identity was emerging.

Media Reports

A brief review of the international media coverage of the Washington summit and the ongoing NATO engagement in the war against Yugoslavia showed a mixed reaction and reflected much of public opinion around the world.

Opinion makers emphasized at the time of the summit that the alliance's new doctrine was undergoing "its toughest test" in the Balkans and that "how it will get out of this morass will decide [NATO's] future." Some European editorialists lauded NATO's new "mission plan" as an effort to formulate "an ethical policy" that "gives priority to protecting human rights." Others expressed skepticism about whether the alliance could complete a shift from a "defensive" to an "offensive" mission in Kosovo: "It is a very big question whether NATO will be able to play the role of Atlantic-European policeman when even the achievement of peace in Kosovo represents a big problem," said a Slovenian writer, summing up a common viewpoint. The vast majority of media from East and South Asia, the Middle East and Latin America voiced strong opposition to NATO's new blueprint.

Many commentators from NATO member states—including voices in Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Canada—concluded that the summit demonstrated the alliance's unity, both on Kosovo and on NATO's long-term vision as embodied in the Strategic Concept. "NATO emerges a more forward-looking alliance with a clearer sense of its global duties and an activist approach to human rights," intoned the *Ottawa Citizen*. Others were not so sanguine. Arguing that there was "only apparent unity," Rome's *L'Unita* held that "the possibility of out-of-area interventions is judged differently by Americans and Europeans... [as is] the role of the UN." Some commentators criticized NATO's development as "a world policeman" in the internal affairs of all states.

An Oslo daily's criticism was even more pointed: "When the new NATO model lies in ruins [in Kosovo] before it is...adopted, it is time to take pause...and give NATO an opportunity to consider if it is really prepared for a bloody crusade in the name of humanity." While many found the new doctrine laudable, they also pointed out that it was open to criticism, including the charge that it is marked by "usurpatory arrogance," according to a Czech writer. Paris's *Le Monde* had this caveat: "NATO is giving the impression that there is a Western camp which stands outside the rules, outside of international laws." A London weekly agreed, arguing that NATO must "seek to reassure a suspicious world that it has not given itself the right to attack sovereign nations at whim."

The views from members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council were also diverse. Noting that "expansion was a keynote" of the summit, a writer from Moscow remarked that "aspirants to NATO sounded more pro-NATO than Uncle Sam himself." Media from most partnership countries, including Belarus, Bulgaria, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, and Romania, focused on their own countries' prospects for NATO membership. While some judged that the summit gave cause for optimism that they could

become “full-fledged members,” others were pessimistic, noting the hurdles to joining.

The new NATO was met with suspicion in France where the U.S. role in Europe has been disputed and argued against for decades. According to *Le Monde*: “The new NATO...is the fruit of a common goal by the United States and Europe. It is also the result of an uncertain compromise on the diverging tendencies of the U.S. superpower and some of its allies. It is clearly a complicated business, full of divisions, in spite of the wishful declarations of unity made during the summit... The United States wants NATO to survive because it wants to remain a ‘European power.’ Europe wants NATO to survive because it finds that sharing the security burden with the United States is very reassuring....The new strategic concept grants NATO a new mission: European conflict management...The final text refers to the UN but only in vague terms...It is understandable that NATO does not want to have to depend on a Chinese or Russian veto to act in matters of urgency. But NATO is giving the impression that there is a ‘Western camp,’ which stands outside the rules, outside of international laws. This is too bad, and probably also dangerous.”¹⁰

International Interventions

The Declaration on Peace and Cooperation agreed on by NATO heads of state and government at the Rome summit in November 1991 stated that “The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America.”

As early as 1991, it became clear that NATO would cooperate with the UN in crisis management and crisis prevention operations in Europe. However, the question about whether, when, and to what extent to intervene in regional crises on the territory of non-NATO states remained open and was raised every time a crisis was developing.

Although the western Balkans were technically not NATO's responsibility, since none of the post-Communist countries were alliance members, the brutal war in Yugoslavia, challenged traditional views about NATO's military involvement. The pro- and anti- intervention debate heated up during the war in Bosnia after the failure of the UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia and Bosnia. Despite the clear realization that the Yugoslav dictator Slobodan Milosevic only understood force, it was only after the massacre in Srebrenica that NATO obtained a UN mandate for military intervention.

The bombing of Bosnian Serb forces in 1995 became the first case where NATO intervened militarily in a nonmember state. The alliance and the UN justified the intervention with concerns for European security, but the real reason for deploying NATO aircraft seemed to be the international community's outrage with the ongoing ethnic cleansing and war crimes in the heart of Europe.

¹⁰ “The New NATO,” *Le Monde*, April 27, 1999, available at <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/www9a28.htm>>.

The decisionmaking process of the international community appeared to be slow. The “dual-key” decisionmaking process between the UN and NATO led to delays in military intervention and allowed Bosnian Serb and Croat nationalists to commit horrifying crimes against civilians despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission. In both cases—Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999—the final decision for NATO’s military action was taken in Washington. In 1992, the answer to a request for intervention in Bosnia was negative, but by 1995 there was an imperative to intervene in the NATO capitals.

The issue of alliance intervention remained salient, particularly in light of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and Macedonia in 2001. The debate became vigorous before the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia, and the decision to engage prevented Milosevic from exterminating or permanently expelling Kosovo’s Albanian population. Some experts argue that NATO is now faced with the prospect of becoming a policing institution in nonmember countries. In the case of Kosovo, NATO, for all practical purposes, ignored the UN in the process of making a decision on intervention.

On November 13, 1998, NATO’s parliamentary assembly voted that the North Atlantic Alliance does not need a UN Security Council mandate in order to intervene in Kosovo. The decision came after Russia and China blocked the UN’s effort to stop ethnic cleansing. One important reason for leaving the UN out of NATO’s decisionmaking was the alliance’s changing mission, which had evolved from defending its members’ territories to protecting “Western interests.” According to critics, ignoring the UN is not in NATO’s interest as “it is likely to lead to more polarization in the world, and possibly inspire other countries to ignore the United Nations and use force in defense of their own interests. Such a decision by Russia or China could destabilize Eastern Europe or Asia,” according to Tomás Valásek of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information.¹¹

Bosnian Mission

In 1995, after forging the Dayton Peace Accords, NATO and non-NATO countries immediately deployed 60,000 troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. After its first year the NATO-led IFOR was replaced by a smaller SFOR, which continues to provide the stable environment necessary for rebuilding Bosnia. Simultaneously, NATO is providing support for a civilian Security Cooperation Program (SCP) designed to promote reconciliation and strengthen stability in the longer term. Presently, NATO leads an 11,000-strong peacekeeping mission (SFOR) in Bosnia. SFOR has a UN mandate not just to maintain, but to enforce peace. The alliance periodically revises the number of troops, which has been reduced from the initial 60,000 as the security situation has improved.

SFOR’s mission is not only to guard the peace in Bosnia, but also to help revive civilian life by helping to rebuild communities and assist refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes. SFOR also works on reforming the Bosnian military, which is currently divided into two armies (the Bosnian-

¹¹ Center for Defense Information, *Question of the Week*, Program No. 453, November 25, 1998, <<http://www.cdi.org/radio/transcripts/453.html>>.

Croat army of the federation and the Serbian army of Republika Srpska). On a visit to Bosnia in the summer of 2000, NATO secretary general Lord Robertson outlined that the country's militaries had to be brought under a single command if the country wished to be considered for NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

Lessons of the Kosovo Crisis

"The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law.... We will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed," so stated NATO's Washington Statement on Kosovo in April 1999. Since the successful intervention, NATO forms the core of the international peacekeeping mission to Kosovo (KFOR), in which some 46,000 military personnel from 39 countries are deployed. Peacebuilding in Kosovo proved to be an exceptionally difficult and long-term task after what Bernard Kouchner, the former head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, described as "40 years of Communism, 10 years of apartheid, and a year of ethnic cleansing."

The KFOR mandate originates in the Military Technical Agreement, or the Kumanovo agreement, signed by NATO on June 9, 1999, as well as from UN Security Council Resolution 1244 from June 12, 1999. The goals of the mission include:

- Deterring renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces;
- Establishing a secure environment and ensuring public safety and order;
- Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA);
- Supporting the international humanitarian effort; and
- Coordinating with, and supporting, the international civil presence, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

With the fall of the Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic, the first task of the mission changed. The Yugoslav army no longer posed a direct threat to Kosovo and with the help of NATO and the new Serbian leadership the Yugoslav army returned to the five-kilometer security zone between Kosovo and Serbia in the spring of 2001. The move followed a year of insurgency by ethnic Albanian guerrillas in the Presevo valley, in southern Serbia.

NATO secretary general Javier Solana stated at the close of the 1999 war that the determination of the international community and the resolute actions of NATO stopped and reversed the ethnic cleansing carried out by Yugoslavia. He claimed that if the international community was to help stabilize the Balkan region, then it must broaden its perspective to include other countries in Southeast Europe. "We must lengthen our perspective to include longer-term goals—such as greater economic prosperity, greater political and security cooperation, and greater integration among the countries of this region."¹² In July

¹² Javier Solana, "Article by the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana," July 27, 1999, NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/articles/1999/a990727a.htm>>.

1999, the South East European Stability Pact was signed in Sarajevo. The pact was to provide funds and assistance for rebuilding the Balkans and stabilizing the fragile economies of the region's new democracies.

NATO's involvement in the Kosovo crisis was a major turning point. The unity of the alliance and especially the firm support of new members, particularly Poland, who joined the alliance on the eve of the bombing, surprised even NATO's officials. Only one member of EAPC—Russia—chose to abandon its partnership with NATO and played to assert its own interests in the Balkans.

According to former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the important lessons of Kosovo pertains to the United States' relationship with Russia. "The bottom line is that cooperation with Russia is desirable, can be quite useful, but that the current Russian government is not trustworthy," said Brzezinski in his congressional testimony in the fall of 1999.

After a careful review of the events in the first days of June 1999, Brzezinski concluded that Russia had a different agenda in the Balkans, a plan that served Serbian rather than European interests. Russia made an unsuccessful attempt to deploy troops by air to Pristina and northern Kosovo, but its former Warsaw Pact allies Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary counteracted that strategy. "The collusion was contrived to outwit NATO by salvaging for Serbia—under Russia's protection—the northeastern part of partitioned Kosovo and to gain for frustrated Russia a significant boost in international prestige. The attempt faltered because three small European countries had the gumption to defy Moscow, and NATO remained firm in not agreeing to a separate Russian sector."¹³

The Role of NATO's Partnership for Peace

The alliance's changed mission has led to a number of new cooperative initiatives, which have gradually brought significant change to the previously divided European continent. NATO's cooperative approach to security resulted in the creation of close relations with non-NATO countries through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace initiative, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

NATO initiated Partnership for Peace (PfP) in January 1994 in Brussels. The founding document calls the initiative "a practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states." PfP was designed to expand beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge genuine partnerships. Partner states were invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The initiative was the beginning of establishing diplomatic relations with a number of non-NATO countries.

States joining the PfP started cooperating in a number of arenas with the alliance, including:

- Facilitating transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;

¹³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Lessons of Kosovo," testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 6, 1999, <<http://www.csis.org/hill/ts991006zb.html>>.

- Ensuring democratic control over defense forces;
- Maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe);
- Developing cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; and
- Developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of members of the North Atlantic Alliance.¹⁴

As part of the larger goal of incorporating non-NATO members into the alliance and its modus operandi, PfP has played an important role in strengthening NATO's confidence-building role. By inviting states such as Ukraine, Russia, and Sweden to participate in many ministerial and military meetings of the alliance, these countries were able to gain an understanding of NATO's mission and goals.

While providing a foundation for various nonmembers to become involved in military missions such as SFOR and KFOR, PfP also provided opportunities for prospective members to gain appropriate military and civilian training. With the intention of providing for European security, the PfP, under NATO guidelines, has also supplied members and nonmembers with the necessary preparations to be effective in the aftermath of a civil emergency, such as an earthquake or flood. NATO has thereby created a means by which all European countries can participate in enhancing stability throughout the continent.

NATO experts often perceive the PfP as a child of NATO since the alliance tried to imbue the partnership with the same type of values and practices that bind NATO together. The initial expectation was that PfP would become like NATO over time; however, several experts believe that NATO is becoming more like the partnership. They argue that the numerous incremental changes that the alliance is undergoing will eventually lead to a fundamentally new military formation.

PfP goes beyond its function to train soldiers for operations such as SFOR and KFOR. Operational partnership is in fact a realization that it is almost inconceivable for NATO to conduct military operations alone, such as those in the Balkans. NATO needs Bulgarian airspace or a Finnish battalion to ensure that its military goals are achieved. One of the main foci in military cooperation has been not only to prepare the partners to operate with the alliance, but to prepare the alliance to operate with its partners. During the last 50 years, the alliance would have fought a potential war in Europe on a national basis, despite its commitment to interoperability. The notion of multinational operations, extended down to the

14 NATO, "Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council," January, 10, 1994, NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b940110b.htm>>.

platoon level, is a new military factor, and according to some NATO experts, many military leaders do not want to admit this fact.

At the operational military level PfP is fundamentally transforming not only the partners' capabilities, but also alliance capabilities. The PfP process also touches on issues ranging from democratic control of the armed forces to the role of parliaments in the national security debates, to defense resource management and transparency, defense budgeting, and military capabilities in the field. It is indeed the platform of change for fundamental military reforms in Eastern Europe.

PfP's fundamental dimension is a bilateral relationship between the partner country and NATO. This relationship impacts on the regional politics of any particular state. One pertinent example is NATO's South East Europe Initiative, which uses PfP tools with a strong regional focus.

Hungary's treaties with Romania and Slovakia, signed in the mid-1990s, were examples of how each country was required by the alliance to contribute to regional stability. It enabled governments to address often-complex interstate disputes such as borders and minorities. The policy of NATO's "open door" to potential membership also plays an important role in helping to settle regional disputes and enhancing cooperation between neighboring countries in Southeast Europe.

In the process of reforming the East European armies, NATO launched a discussion on military interoperability and gradually started to think of political interoperability and political-military interoperability. The starting point of this process is the establishment of democratic control over any country's armed forces, stable civil-military relations, and transparency in decisionmaking.

The biggest challenges for PfP are countries, such as Ukraine, which retain a Soviet military mentality. Moreover, according to experts, NATO needs to focus more on potential crisis points in the Caucasus and Central Asia. During its first few years, PfP managed to develop the military capability to act with partners in places like Kosovo. It may be the case that in future, NATO needs to spend less time developing relationships with states such as Sweden and Finland and more time with transitional countries in strategic regions such as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

NATO Enlargement

The question of NATO's expansion has been one of the primary issues debated in the alliance since its establishment in 1949. The debate became particularly vigorous after the fall of communism when several post-Communist countries announced their aspirations for NATO membership. Since the alliance was founded primarily to serve as a Western security umbrella against threats emanating from the Soviet bloc, the idea of accepting former Warsaw Pact countries as new members seriously challenged NATO's traditional mission. Thus, the issue of enlargement towards post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe for the first time became an issue of changing NATO's focus in the post-Cold War world.

After 12 years of transition, NATO is still reevaluating its new membership policy. If the criteria for membership remain the same, any European democratic country can apply for membership and should be granted accession. On the other hand, some experts argue that if NATO wishes to maintain its efficiency, integrity, and capability, it should limit its membership or at least drastically slow down its new membership policy. For the time being, NATO has left the door open for new members, but the criteria for membership is gradually changing to include stricter military and economic requirements for the new contenders.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty discusses membership and states that NATO may invite "any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty." This text is often cited by aspirant states, which endeavor to prove that they adhere to the NATO principles and democratic values. The procedure to formally join is also laid out in Article 10 noting that any state that wishes to join NATO must do so "by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America." The U.S. administration would accordingly bring this request to the attention of all the other NATO members, and while in session, NATO would determine whether or not to grant membership to the applicant.

Article 10's provisions led to the admission of four additional members between 1952 and 1982. At the London meeting on October 22, 1951, NATO signed the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey.

The reasons for expansion of the alliance were different each time NATO decided to admit new members. In the case of Greece and Turkey, the leading motive was to help the anti-Communist forces in these two countries. The concept derived from the famous Truman Doctrine, in which the U.S. president stated that the United States would extend protection over Turkey and Greece

and, in fact, would assist any anti-Communist battle around the world. Given U.S. influence over NATO, it was only logical to invite the two states to join in the comprehensive Western defense shield so that the United States would not unilaterally support the two countries in case of a potential conflict.

On October 23, 1954, NATO signed the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. This act brought NATO to the border of the Soviet zone of influence and was considered a serious challenge by the former Communist countries. In response, in May of 1955, the Soviet Union and some of its East European satellites created the Warsaw Pact, NATO's equivalent for Communist states.

The NATO map already covered most of Western Europe. However, as the Atlantic Alliance was founded to provide a common defense shield and protection for shared democratic values, NATO was looking for possibilities to include the remaining Western European countries. After Spain started building a Western-style democracy following the death of the dictator General Franco in 1975, the country became an apposite NATO candidate.¹

On December 10, 1981, at the Brussels convention, NATO invited Spain to join the organization in the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain. The Brussels decision secured the membership of a formally authoritarian state and thus established a precedent. Some authors believe that this act raised hope that one day the totalitarian type of governments in Eastern Europe could come under the fold of the alliance. They argued that although Germany's entrance may have been accepted for security reasons, Spain's entrance could have been promoted to encourage democratization in Eastern Europe.

Eight years later, however, the end of the Cold war posed a serious dilemma: was NATO's existence necessary when the enemy was gone? With the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the previous threat of Communist aggression was no longer present. Democracy, however, was far from being established in the post-Communist world, and the suppressed or mismanaged problems started to appear one after another in the changing societies: economic catastrophe, political turmoil, social poverty, and ethnic rivalry. In this new environment, NATO's secondary objective of promoting democracy became its primary goal.

The unstable situation in Eastern Europe convinced NATO members that the alliance should not only preserve its strength, but should also seek the enlargement of its zone of security to include some of the former post-Communist countries. At the January 1994 Brussels summit, NATO leaders stated that they "expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East."

At the Madrid summit in July 1997, the 16 NATO members reevaluated the alliance's Strategic Concept. The Strategic Concept "equips the alliance for the

¹ Following the dictator General Franco's death in 1975, King Juan Carlos led Spain on an ambitious path toward Western-style democracy. The process included the first democratic parliamentary elections in 41 years on June 15, 1977, and was finalized with the adoption of a new constitution, ratified by universal suffrage, on December 6, 1978.

security challenges and opportunities of the 21st century and guides its future political and military development.” The new Strategic Concept reflected the post-Cold War realities in Europe and opened the door for further enlargement.

The Madrid summit was historically important for one more reason: for the first time NATO invited three former Communist countries to join the alliance. The debate for inclusion of some of the post-Communist countries in the Euro-Atlantic defense shield started in the early 1990s soon after the fall of communism. Arguments for and against were presented not only within NATO, but the debate was also heating up in aspiring countries. Public support for joining NATO was growing slowly in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while awareness of the projection of the alliance towards expansion was growing in NATO capitals.

One of the driving forces of NATO expansion was the fact that it was seen as part of a larger goal for encouraging European integration and spreading Western political and social norms. The process coincided with the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the enhancement of East-West cooperation. On March 12, 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all former Warsaw Pact members, joined the alliance, increasing its size to 19 active members.

The admission of three post-Communist countries raised the hopes of other East European countries, and they started to cooperate with each other more intensely in order to attain eventual NATO membership. This was a new phase in their relations, since the NATO aspirants had previously competed with each other for alliance attention. Nine countries joined together to form the so-called Vilnius group or “the big bang group,” insisting on a broad multistate accession. Croatia joined the group in 2000 after a reformist government replaced Franjo Tudjman’s authoritarian regime in Zagreb.

Before the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, there were three possible scenarios for NATO’s future:

- To revert back to the collective defense strategy espoused during NATO’s inception;
- To extend its military initiatives from defending national boundaries to defending national interests; and/or
- To extend the umbrella of security and peace to the rest of Europe, intervening in cases of egregious human rights violations or of nondemocratic elements obstructing the basic tenets of political freedom.

NATO was clearly leaning far more to the latter two than the “reactionary” former option before the attacks on September 11, 2001. In an unexpected twist, all three previous scenarios united in one seemingly global solution: the principle of collective defense now exceeded the national boundaries of NATO members and stretched to provide a security umbrella far beyond Europe. The terrorist strikes led to the application of Article 5 for the first time since the founding of the alliance in 1949. NATO members declared that the attack on the United States must be considered an attack on all of them, and consequently 19 countries joined in a war against terrorism that exceeded their own borders and the boundaries of the transatlantic community.

The events on September 11, 2001, proved that although the NATO states remain vulnerable to attacks, today's threats are incomparable to those posed by the Soviet Union and subsequently the Warsaw Pact in the last century.

The war against terrorism proved that NATO would continue to evolve its collective defense strategy of defending common interests. This was the premise under which NATO acted when it decided to engage militarily in the Balkans. The terrorist attacks only proved that unstable regimes could contribute to threatening established democracies in their neighborhood.

Alliance members were aware of the contemporary security threats when they adopted the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative (WMD) at the Washington summit in 1999. It demonstrated that NATO's concerns about security extended beyond the original defensive posture and led to active engagement in monitoring and negotiating for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Some form of NATO intervention was expected in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and various parts of Asia mostly because the alliance, as well as many other industrialized countries, had a vital stake in ensuring political stability in the regions that supply most of their oil. The new era of terrorism, however, changed the premises for Western interest and security in those areas: stopping terrorism became more important than securing any business interest.

Although Article 5 and the concept of collective defense came to life for the first time after more than 50 years of NATO's existence, this was not a result of a "reactionary" wave. After September 11, 2001, NATO needed loyal partners more than ever before. Most of the countries in Eastern Europe have proven their commitment to peace and security, their willingness to combat terrorism and organized crime, as well as their support for NATO.

The option of expanding NATO to include the current East European contenders may have broad implications and could bring fruitful results. Supporters argue that it would ensure the development of democratic governments, emphasize individual freedoms and minority rights, and most of all would enable open market economies to proliferate. Most importantly, it will expand the boundaries of European security and will have an impact on fighting terrorism by creating new networks between the new members and their neighbors.

New Members: Adaptation, Cost, Capabilities, and Perspectives

The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic was a result not only of NATO's willingness to erase the divisions of the Cold War; it also reflected the general movement toward greater European integration, alongside the enlargement of the European Union. At the accession ceremony in Washington on March 12, 1999, U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright said, "Never again will your fates be tossed around like poker chips on a bargaining table." This allegory summarized the major reasons why the East European countries wanted to join NATO.

NATO secretary general Javier Solana made four points for further enlargement in an op-ed in the *Wall Street Journal* in 1998,² several weeks before the U.S. Senate voted for the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic:

- A larger NATO will mean a stronger NATO, because more countries will commit their forces, as well as financial resources, to the alliance thus expanding NATO's political and military clout;
- An enlarged NATO will not lead to new dividing lines in Europe. The alliance's decision to open doors has led many countries in Central and Eastern Europe to accelerate their political, economic, and military reforms, to bury old enmities, and to reject the destructive nationalism of the past;
- A larger NATO is compatible with a stronger relationship with Russia. The NATO-Russia Founding Act and Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs demonstrated that NATO has established the right mechanisms for political consultation with Moscow;
- The costs of an enlarged NATO are affordable. NATO concluded in 1997 a study on costs based on the most objective and thorough analysis to date of the military situation in the three member countries. The study found that the costs would be modest: only \$1.5 billion over 10 years for NATO's jointly funded programs. They would be shared fairly by all and add up to only 0.02 percent of allied defense budgets.

The question of the cost of expansion and the expected contribution of the new members remained one of the most discussed topics in NATO capitals, particularly in the United States in the months preceding accession. Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, insisted that before supporting expansion, key questions, including costs to the United States, should be fully answered.³

The U.S. Senate wanted to see serious efforts by aspirant countries to join NATO. Even ardent supporters were harboring reservations, including whether the prospective members could afford to modernize. The United States estimated that the three prospective members would need to spend up to \$13 billion each to transform their forces. This provoked concerns that, with European allies beset by fiscal problems, the United States could end up paying many of the bills. With the United States facing its own NATO expansion-related costs—with estimates running from \$2 billion to \$19 billion over 12 years—this was something the Senate was not likely to accept.

NATO's official study in December 1997, written after the decision to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland was made, estimated the cost to the allies at \$1.5 billion over 10 years. This figure did not include the costs payable by new members for modernizing their armed forces. In response to concerns about

² Javier Solana, "Do We Need New Allies? Yes, to Enhance Everyone's Security," *Wall Street Journal*, March 12, 1998."

³ Jonathan S. Landay, "US: 'No Free Lunch' for NATO's New Members," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 7, 1997.

the cost of enlargement, President Clinton stated on March 20, 1998, that “a unilateral freeze on enlargement would fracture NATO’s open-door consensus, it would undermine further reforms in Europe’s democracies, it would draw a new and potentially destabilizing line, at least temporarily, in Europe.”

The British House of Commons approved its third report on the implications of expansion for transatlantic relations on March 31, 1999. The report assessed positively the fact that the three new members, particularly Poland, would add military assets to the collective pool from which the European members of NATO could draw. It also stressed that they would constitute some of the new fabric that would help hold Europe and the United States together in the future. On the other hand, the report pointed out that NATO consensus would be more difficult to achieve at 19, especially where issues may impinge on the direct interests of new members who have common borders with Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, and some of the unsuccessful NATO candidate countries. The report underlined potential problems that the upcoming wave of NATO enlargement could bring:

- First, it might become more difficult to establish and maintain a firm strategic purpose for the alliance, since an enlarged NATO would have to devote more efforts on preserving its internal coherence. The danger could be a NATO that was so intent on internal political compromise that it lost effective touch with its strategic purpose in relation to the rest of Europe.
- Second, in a situation of real pressure, the new members were likely to regard the backing of the United States as their only viable reassurance and remain skeptical about any subtle adjustments of a delicate Euro-American transatlanticism.⁴

The report, however, admitted that the efforts of NATO’s three latest members to enter the alliance as producers rather than mere consumers of security was commendable and more substantial than NATO members might have expected. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland not only reduced the size of their military establishments (as mandated by the CFE Treaty), they changed force postures and deployments, reformed systems of training and education, and made substantial progress in producing the legislative framework required to make democratic and civilian control a reality, the report stated. These countries are also contributing assets and facilities of direct importance to NATO’s new and wider security and peace-support functions.

In the years of preparation to join the alliance, the three new members managed to restructure their armies and create mostly civilian defense ministries. However, major problems remained with command and control and logistics. An insufficient number of military personnel proficient in English was another problem hampering the adjustment of new members.

The report argued that since the first round of enlargement was based on political rather than military considerations, there was a danger that NATO’s

⁴ British House of Commons, “The Future of NATO: The Washington Summit,” House of Commons Defence Committee Third Report, March 31, 1999, <<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmdfence/39/3902.htm>>.

military effectiveness may be diluted by expansion. The British House of Commons did not expect that the integration of new members would be either rapid or straightforward, but it gave a generally positive assessment of the progress achieved by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The standard arguments against accession of the three Central European countries were presented in a Cato Institute analysis in March 1998. In "Flawed Democracies: The Dubious Political Credentials of NATO's Proposed New Members," Thomas Magstadt noted that "the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland deserve high marks for the progress they have made toward liberal democracy," but the process of transition in all three countries was far from complete. Authoritarian elements from the Communist era evidently still controlled the administrative bureaucracy, including the military, the intelligence agencies, and the educational system. "This situation will not be alleviated by membership in a military alliance," warned Magstadt. He concluded that "the West should adopt a wait-and-see attitude toward Eastern Europe, stressing the need for further development of the much-neglected civic and social foundations of democracy. In particular, the U.S. Senate ought to use its constitutional 'advise and consent' power to apply the brakes to the NATO expansion train before it is too late."⁵

Less than two weeks after the formal accession on February 26, 1999, the decision by NATO to bomb Serbian forces over the repression in Kosovo provided NATO's newest members with an abrupt test of their commitment to the alliance. Jan Skorzynski, foreign editor of the Polish newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* told the *International Herald Tribune*, "The simple view in Poland was that NATO was here to protect us, and now the moment comes when we have to do something for others."⁶

The three new NATO members played a significant role in the Kosovo crisis. Poland established a joint army corps with Germany and Denmark and pledged a parachute brigade to any NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The Czechs pledged a field hospital, and Hungary agreed to open its air space to NATO and denied Moscow air passage at the end of the bombing campaign, thus helping to prevent a major Russian troop deployment that could have led to the partition of Kosovo.

Since the formal accession on March 12, 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have experienced integration difficulties, most notably in reducing the size of their armed forces, restructuring their armies, and upgrading their military technology. The force goals adopted in 1995 have not been met due to a lack of political will on the part of the governments, which placed priority on pressing social and economic issues.⁷

⁵ Thomas M. Magstadt, "Flawed Democracies: The Dubious Political Credentials of NATO's Proposed New Members," *CATO Policy Analysis*, no. 297, March 6, 1998, <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-297.html>>.

⁶ See Peter S. Green, "Stern Test for NATO's 3 New Members: Prague and Warsaw Express Support, but Budapest has Reservations," *International Herald Tribune*, March 25, 1999, p. 5.

⁷ Jeffrey Simon, "NATO's Membership Action Plan and Defense Planning: Credibility at Stake," *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 48, no. 3 (May 2001).

Soon after accession, the three new members implemented strategic reviews and lowered their force goal commitments. Instead of restructuring the armed forces, their effort concentrated on producing small “show-piece” military units. This led to a drain on scarce defense resources and provoked civil-military tensions. National Defense University analyst Jeffrey Simon pointed out that confusion still persists over the division of executive powers, especially in relations between general staffs and defense ministries. The national planning processes of the new members were neither compatible nor interoperable with NATO. Finally, according to Simon, the new members failed to prepare their political elites and populations for NATO membership. As a result popular support for the military had been declining in all three countries.⁸

Prospective Members: Objectives, Security Priorities, Prospects

The first post-Communist wave of NATO expansion provided several important lessons both for the alliance and for the new contenders. The most important one was that further enlargement should not be based merely on political reasons, but rather on practical considerations of the new members’ contributions to Euro-Atlantic security. The aspirant countries will be expected to meet certain criteria and implement military reforms before being invited to join the alliance.

During the Washington summit in April 1999, NATO not only adopted an open door policy for future expansion, it also unveiled a Membership Action Plan (MAP), designed to help aspiring countries meet the necessary standards and prepare for possible future membership. The MAP calls for aspirant countries to submit individual annual national programs on their preparations. It also provides mechanisms for feedback and advice on the progress made in implementing these programs. Each year, NATO’s foreign and defense ministers consider their progress within the context of the MAP.

MAP’s program laid out five areas—political and economic, defense and military, resources, security, and legal issues—for states to focus on if they wished to enter NATO. These topics needed to be discussed among decisionmaking bodies within potential member states. MAP, however, was not a guideline for actual membership, since these subjects are general areas of concern rather than a codified list of instructions. NATO does, however, look at active involvement with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as a sign that a country may eventually become a member. The final decision on accession should be “made on a case-by-case basis and by consensus” by NATO’s leadership.

In 1999, the United States conducted defense reform assessments with Bulgaria and Romania, which influenced the plans of the two countries to radically reduce and restructure their large and top-heavy armed forces by 2004. A similar study reflected the need of the Baltic states to build defense establishments from scratch and develop combined military institutions. Military assessment studies and the MAPs proved to be instrumental in devising Slovakia and Slovenia’s annual national military plans and in directing efforts to meet the

⁸ Ibid.

criteria for NATO membership in line with national defense specifications. Each government has learned immensely from the MAP process, which seems to be establishing a valuable mechanism for the planning and coordination that is necessary for a contemporary defense system.

Observers of the enlargement process believe that by introducing the MAP concept NATO practically changed the rules and criteria for membership. While the decision to admit Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary responded to political considerations and did not depend greatly on the progress of economic and military reforms, subsequent new members would have to work harder to meet the new "technical" requirements for membership and assure appropriate spending on defense to achieve military compatibility with NATO. The new requirements could make the process longer and more difficult for the new aspirants, but it is believed that it will also ensure a smoother process of adaptation after admission.

During his visit to Sofia in October 2000, NATO secretary general Lord George Robertson told defense ministers of eight aspiring NATO members that the alliance would not accept those who fall short of NATO defense and modern warfare standards. According to Robertson, "the alliance will enlarge again when NATO is ready, when those nations aspiring to membership are ready, and when their membership will contribute to security and stability in Europe as a whole."⁹ The events of September 11, 2001, only reinforced this concept.

Before the terrorist attacks on the United States, the major arguments for further expansion included the following three points:

- First, the new members will contribute to enhancing the strength of the alliance;
- Second, with the lack of a permanent international fighting force, NATO can be used as a quick and efficient military; and
- Third, NATO is an instrument for the unification of Europe and can prevent massive conflicts on the continent.

The major critics of enlargement argued the following three key points:

- First, the expansion is too costly;
- Second, for a long time Russia argued that enlarging NATO to the east would draw a new dividing line in the post-Cold War era; and
- Third, the large number of members will make the decisionmaking process cumbersome and can introduce the same kinds of problems the United Nations has.

The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent war on terrorism changed the arguments for and against further enlargement. The new war clearly distracted Washington's attention from NATO's next wave of enlargement. Since the start of the campaign against the Al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan, the alliance has struggled to devise a strategy to address

⁹ "Robertson Warns NATO Aspirants Membership Not a Gift," Reuters, October 14, 2000.

the new security challenges, while deciding on a subsequent round of expansion. According to Chris Donnelly, adviser to NATO's secretary general, the criteria for NATO membership are changing together with the changing security environment in Europe and around the world. The challenges currently before NATO and the aspirant countries did not exist in 1997 when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the alliance.

It has become increasingly clear that further enlargement will depend on the level of military preparation of the aspirant countries and not simply on political considerations, as was the case with the first eastward expansion. The problem is that most of the candidate countries are poorly prepared to contribute to NATO's military capabilities and tend to delay implementing their membership action plans. The complex economic and social conditions in the Baltics and the Balkans have led to delays in streamlining the size of post-Communist armed forces and spending more on defense.

Analysts stress the importance of completing the necessary reforms before any country's admission to NATO, because once the alliance admits new members it loses much of its leverage over aspirant governments. The current contenders are far weaker than any of the three newest members, and they will have to work much harder to increase their military capabilities before joining the alliance.

Chris Donnelly emphasized in Washington in January 2002 that while further NATO enlargement is politically desirable, the military and administrative side of the process is much more complex.¹⁰ The alliance's administrative problems have been grossly neglected in light of constantly changing security threats. NATO lacks resources and time to devise a strategy to meet the needs of a bigger NATO, which will consist of a larger number of small countries with small armies.

The issue of further expansion is also directly connected to the ability of Europe to develop its defense capabilities. NATO's response to the terrorist attacks in the United States may have demonstrated the alliance's unity, but it also underscored the fact that only a few members possessed the military capabilities needed to respond to the challenge. At that time, Donnelly claimed that without serious reform efforts to reengineer NATO for the future, the alliance might not be able to invite new members at the Prague summit in November 2002.¹¹

Before September 11, one of the major arguments against further enlargement was the prospect of geographical expansion: the bigger NATO becomes, the larger the geographical region it must defend. The potential existed for some members to pull back their contributions, or in a worse case scenario, leave the alliance because they do not believe they have a vested interest in it or it is too costly for them to stay involved.

The war on terrorism, however, completely altered the old fears and concerns. Not only did NATO employ Article 5 for the first time, it also engaged in military operations far from Europe and the United States. Thus, although NATO's

¹⁰ Kathryn Mazur, "NATO Accession: Expansion Candidates Face Tougher Criteria," *Balkan Times*, January 17, 2002.

¹¹ Ibid.

territory of defense remains the same, its zone of military actions already stretches beyond the borders of its newest contenders.

Impact of Enlargement on NATO's Structure

Post-Cold War relations with Eastern Europe and Russia and the process of NATO expansion have led to structural changes in the alliance. An important additional reason for restructuring was NATO's cooperation with non-NATO countries. An essential part of the process of modernizing the alliance has been the restructuring of military forces and command arrangements. The military forces of most NATO member countries have been significantly reduced and reorganized. New concepts have been introduced to give them greater mobility and flexibility and to facilitate the participation of non-NATO partner countries in NATO operations. One of the most significant innovations has been the development of the concept of combined joint task forces (CJTFs). This provides for force structures, which can be adapted to meet different needs and allow the alliance to carry out more effectively both its collective defense role and its new missions. At the same time, the reform of the integrated command structure has reduced the number of NATO military headquarters by two-thirds, from some 65 to about 20.

The CJTF concept was launched in late 1993 and was endorsed at the Brussels summit in January 1994. Further development of the concept should reflect the readiness of NATO heads of state to make alliance assets available, on the basis of case-by-case decisions by the North Atlantic Council. The decision was directed to support the building of the European Security and Defense Identity. The development of the CJTF concept was also linked to practical political-military cooperation in the context of PfP.

The respective meetings of alliance foreign and defense ministers in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996 approved an overall political-military framework for the CJTF concept. The process of full implementation, which includes the acquisition of necessary headquarters support and command, control, and communications equipment, is currently estimated for completion in late 2004. The implementation process is taking into account lessons learned from NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia.

Since NATO has very few permanent military forces, the majority of so-called NATO forces are those that remain under national control and only become available to the alliance in specific circumstances. The new security environment has allowed NATO countries to reorganize their forces. In most cases, this has meant introducing major reductions in nuclear weapons, cutting back conventional ground, air, and naval forces by 30 percent to 40 percent, and reducing their levels of readiness.

NATO countries have also endorsed a blueprint for developing a new NATO military command structure designed to enable the alliance to carry out the whole range of its missions more effectively, including crisis management, peacekeeping, or other peace-support operations. The new structure will comprise two Strategic Commands (SCs)—one for the Atlantic and one for Europe—with a simplified subordinate structure of regional and subregional commands.

The new structure will be more flexible and will incorporate a framework for commanding operations involving rapidly deployable, multinational, multiservice units adapted to the requirements of the alliance's combined joint task forces (CJTF) concept. The whole process has to be managed within existing resource limitations and will not be fully implemented before the end of 2003.

NATO Expansion and European Security

Will expansion make Europe more secure or less secure? Does bigger mean stronger or will an enlarged alliance become more cumbersome in its decisionmaking process? Both arguments have strong supporters in Europe and the United States. Former NATO secretary general Javier Solana asserted at the Wehrkunde conference in May 1998: "Clearly, Europe is not yet the strategic actor it wants to be, nor the global partner the U.S. seeks. But these shortcomings do not result from 'too much United States,' as some still claim, but from 'too little Europe.' That is why the European integration process is not only relevant for Europe's own identity, but for a new transatlantic relationship as well."¹²

Four years later, the debate about the roles of Europe and the United States in the alliance continues. Europe has yet to develop its defense capacities while the United States fights a global war on terrorism with a few selected partners. Article 5, invoked by the alliance for the first time in its history, meant more in terms of mobilizing moral support to fight terrorism than support for joint military operations of the 19 member states. In reality, Europe did not have much to offer in terms of military power to engage in a complex operation on the territory of non-NATO countries. With the exception of Great Britain's air force and France's special forces, the rest of the allies were not in a position to mobilize appropriate military force. However, they were welcomed by Washington to participate in the peacekeeping and aid operations after the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The effort to strengthen Europe's role began in 1994. The alliance committed itself to supporting the development of a much stronger European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). NATO started working with the Western European Union (WEU), which existed as a European security organization until 2000. The WEU was allowed to use NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. These arrangements were made to allow the European allies to take greater responsibility in European security affairs, especially in circumstances that did not need to involve the entire alliance. The role fulfilled by the WEU was increasingly blending with the structures of the EU itself, enabling a more comprehensive development of European identity in security-related issues. At the Washington summit in 1999, alliance leaders called for continuing work to make ESDI a reality. NATO states initiated discussions to address:

- The means to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the EU and the alliance, based on the mechanisms established between NATO and the WEU;

¹² Javier Solana, "The End of the Post-Cold War Era," May 8, 1998, NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/articles/1998/a980508a.htm>>.

- The participation of non-EU European allies; and
- Practical arrangements for EU access to NATO planning capabilities and NATO's collective assets and capabilities.

The Helsinki meeting of the EU Council held in December 1999, established a "headline goal" for EU member states in terms of their military capabilities for crisis management operations. The aim was to enable the EU to deploy, by the year 2003, and sustain for at least one year, military forces of up to 50,000 or 60,000 troops for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and combat missions in crisis management. Their role would be to undertake military operations led by the EU in response to international crisis, in circumstances where NATO as a whole was not engaged militarily. But preparations for this "European Rapid Reaction Force" have advanced more slowly than expected. The terrorist attacks found Europe as unprepared to meet contemporary security challenges as it was during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

U.S.-European Relations

Burden Sharing and Power Sharing

The security of Euro-Atlantic region was the primary reason for NATO's establishment more than 50 years ago. Since this strategic goal has not changed despite the significant changes of security challenges, NATO continues to emphasize the need to maintain transatlantic ties and agreement. However, with the enlargement of NATO's European scope of security and in the wake of increasing terrorist threats worldwide, the United States started shifting even more responsibility to European member nations for peacekeeping and military missions.

One of the first announcements the new Bush administration made in 2001 was that the United States would gradually withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Although this intention initially caused uproar in Western Europe and the Balkans, the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States quickly altered the allies' perspectives, and they began preparing to substitute for the U.S. soldiers.

The second issue that caused difficulties in the relations between the United States and Europe was the determination of the Bush administration to build an antimissile defense shield. With the exception of Britain, the European capitals fiercely opposed the plan. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, however, the debate about building a robust missile defense seemed to have found its resolution as well. On the one hand, the European allies realized that U.S. territory is indeed targeted by rogue regimes and anti-Western terrorist groups, and they therefore almost dropped their opposition to a potential U.S. missile defense shield. On the other hand, Russia decided to make some concessions to the United States in exchange for receiving certain benefits from the world powers.

At their May 24, 2002 summit meeting in Moscow, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed a treaty under which the United States and Russia would cut their deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,700–2,200 warheads each—approximately a two-thirds reduction from current levels.

President Bush stated that the agreement “liquidates the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility” between Washington and Moscow. The treaty was also considered to be Moscow's official consent to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which was necessary for realizing the plans to build a missile defense shield.

In May 2002, Russia was admitted as an equal member of NATO's Council of Twenty (19 members + Russia). This new body gave Russia an equal role with the

19 NATO countries in decisionmaking on policy to counter terrorism and other security threats.

The debate about Europe's role in its own defense has continued for the better part of the last 30 years. It was agreed in NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept that the Western European Union would be both the defense arm of the European Union and the means of strengthening the European pillar of NATO. However, this double role meant little in practice, because it was hindered by the question of whether ESDI was going to be built primarily inside or outside the framework of the alliance.

The major question in the early 1990s was whether or not Europe could have a common defense within the European Union, separate from the common defense in the North Atlantic Alliance. The fundamental disagreement encompassed the question of whether in the post-Cold War world the United States should continue playing a crucial role when European security was threatened. Transatlantic differences over Bosnia and the ultimate inability of Europe to adequately deal with a security crisis on its own territory only exacerbated European anxieties in this regard.

In 1993, U.S. president Bill Clinton embraced the idea of a stronger European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) as a means of addressing traditional concerns in the United States about insufficient burden sharing on the part of the European members of the alliance. He argued, however, for ESDI based on the concept of "separable but not separate" European capabilities, so that U.S. and European security interests remained linked. This concept of ESDI was endorsed at the 1994 NATO summit. The allies also adopted the concept of combined joint task forces as the mechanism for organizing operations more effectively, whether led by NATO or the WEU.

At the Brussels summit the allies agreed:

- To adapt further the alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defense Identity and endorse the concept of combined joint task forces;
- To reaffirm that the alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries;
- To launch a major initiative through a Partnership for Peace, in which the partners are invited to work alongside the alliance in a new political and military context; and
- To intensify the efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Although ESDI was created in theory at the 1994 summit, it was not until the 1996 Berlin NAC ministerial that the alliance managed to translate theory into practice. From then on, all 16 allies agreed that ESDI would be built within the alliance. The key decision made at Berlin was that NATO assets could be available to WEU-led operations on the basis of a decision by the North Atlantic Council.

The implementation of ESDI led to Spain's decision to integrate its military into the reformed command structure. However, France, the country with the largest army in Europe, remained out of the Joint Command. This meant that France's military forces were not integrated and lacked interoperability with other allied forces, creating serious problems within NATO, where France takes part in the decisionmaking process but is absent from the military command process and thus does not take military responsibilities for implementation of NATO decisions. The participation of France in the Joint Command is crucial for developing a strong ESDI given its military capabilities.

At the Washington summit in April 1999, NATO adopted a Strategic Concept to outline allied objectives over the foreseeable future. Discussion of ESDI was an important part of the debate. The U.S. administration expressed concern that the European Union initiatives should not take a form that would separate European defense from NATO or duplicate NATO institutions such as the North Atlantic Council. Turkey strongly objected to being excluded by EU members in decisions to undertake a military operation and threatened to block agreement on the Strategic Concept. In the end, EU members conceded the point, and the allies agreed at the summit to an ESDI "under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European allies if they were so to choose."¹

As the debate between the U.S. and the European allies unfolded, the observers grew skeptical about the future of ESDI. "The main question remains whether Europe is willing to seize that opportunity—something it showed to be incapable of during the last fifty years," pointed out Dirk Achten, editor-in-chief of the independent *De Standaard*.²

Andrea Bonanni noted in *Corriere della Sera*: "At the summit, NATO has totally accepted, and even encouraged, the creation of a European defense identity... The United States seems ready to recognize the end of the implicit and benevolent tutelage of Europe.... But what is still missing, paradoxically, is Europe itself, its ability to define a common position and to act accordingly—a characteristic of superpowers, which represents the basis of foreign policy in democracy.... Like all superpowers, the United States is capable of mediating among opposing interests and defining a consistent policy. Europe, faced with the same problems, remains instead a heterogeneous patchwork."³

U.S. officials at NATO headquarters pointed out that the United States encourages the building of a strong ESDI with real military capability. What the United States is afraid of is creating a European "paper capability," in other words having the military resources listed on paper but not being able to rely on them

1 NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.," April 23–24, 1999, NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>.

2 Dirk Achten, "A European Defense Identity," *De Standaard*, April 27, 1999, available at <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/www9a28.htm>>.

3 Andrea Bonanni, "American Green Light to European Defense, But No Strategy," *Corriere della Serra*, April 28, 1999, available at <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/www9a28.htm>>.

when they are needed. In such a case, the United State would have to fill the gap and act instead of Europe.

In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 9, 2000, Stephen Larrabee, senior political analyst at the Rand Corporation, posed the question of how serious the Europeans are in developing their military capabilities. He expressed fear that the Europeans would concentrate their efforts on building institutions rather than military capabilities to deal with crises. In December 1999, in Helsinki, the EU decided to create a 60,000-troop European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) by 2003 to be sustained for up to a year. It meant that Europe needed to prepare a force of 200,000 men to allow for rotation. As the EU countries' defense budgets decline, it is doubtful that the promise will be delivered, said Larrabee. Three years after the EU Helsinki decision, the ERRF is still in its initial stages and has not been officially utilized in any international crisis.

There is a danger of creating peacekeeping and humanitarian rescue forces rather than defense capabilities and a danger of creating a two-tier alliance: the United States and a few EU allies dealing with power; and the rest dealing with peacekeeping.

Larrabee stressed the importance of establishing a clear link between NATO and the EU to avoid any arguments over jurisdiction. He also said that the United States must make sure that the ESDI does not lead to duplication of capabilities. If the United States and EU agree on some kind of division of labor—the EU takes care of European security and the United States assures security beyond Europe—this may lead to losing the sense of common purpose of the alliance.

The Role of the WEU and the OSCE

The common understanding laid down in the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, together with the agreement reached by the member states of the European Community and the Declarations of the Western European Union at Maastricht, established the basis of the future relationship between the alliance and the emerging European Security and Defense Identity. In June 1992 in Oslo, the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council stressed the importance of maintaining allies' existing obligations and commitments of forces to NATO. It was reiterated that the primary responsibility of forces answerable to the WEU would remain NATO's collective defense under the Washington Treaty.

The WEU announced in Oslo that it was prepared to support peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available alliance resources and expertise.

Western European Union

The Western European Union (WEU) evolved from the recognition of West European countries that cooperation and collaboration was needed to ensure economic, social, political, and military security following the end of World War

II. The origins of the WEU can be found within the framework of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the Paris Agreements of 1954.⁴

The Brussels Treaty of 1948—signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—outlined the commitment of the signatories for the development of mutual defense policies. In addition to laying the groundwork for integration of air defenses, as well as the establishment of a joint command organization, the Brussels Treaty stated the resolve of the signatories to defend one another should one of them fall victim to an armed attack on European soil.

The Paris Agreements of 1954 came after the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) to be ratified by the French National Assembly. The EDC had called for the establishment of a combined European army that would include the Federal Republic of Germany and fall under the auspices of the Brussels Treaty. In September 1954, the signatories of the Brussels Treaty along with the United States, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy convened a conference in London in order to discuss collective defense and security. At the conclusion of the conference, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy were invited to join the Brussels Treaty. The Brussels Treaty was thereby amended to formally create the Western European Union. The objectives of the WEU, as modified from the preamble of the Brussels Treaty were:

- To create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;
- To afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression; and
- To promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe.

From 1955 to 1973, the WEU remained active as an intergovernmental organization encouraging the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance; restoring the confidence of security amongst Western European countries by undertaking responsibilities for arms control; and acting as a liaison between the founding members of the European Community and the United Kingdom. Once the United Kingdom joined the European Community in 1973, the WEU's relevance steadily declined because of organization's objectives were quickly assumed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe, and the European Political Cooperation.

In 1984, the WEU was once again activated following the Rome Declaration to the Hague Platform. The WEU was activated on the basis of the need for continued cooperation and collaboration to establish common defense policies and ensure the security of Europe. The Rome Declaration stated that the WEU and its framework, as outlined in the Brussels Treaty and the Paris Agreements, was the organization that suited the evolving security needs of Europe. In 1987, the WEU adopted a security policy, entitled "Platform on European Security Interests," which stated:

"We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as Members of the

⁴ Western European Union, "History of WEU," at <<http://www.weu.int/>>.

European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense.”⁵

The WEU continued to operate on a regular basis through 2000 overseeing the development of security cooperation throughout Europe and the evolution of the European Union to include structures to decide upon collective defense and security policies for member states, as well as observer countries. In November 2000, the WEU began to make arrangements to transfer its operational role on the continent to the European Union.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)⁶ is the successor of the CSCE, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE was established in the 1970s to serve as a conduit for relations between Western and Eastern Europe. The CSCE was dedicated to fostering cooperation throughout the continent of Europe by improving communication amongst the countries and reducing the amount of animosity and fear between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CSCE found its role evolving as East European states began to reform their political, social, and economic systems, and the member states decided to turn the CSCE into a permanent organization aimed at fostering democratic societies and preventing regional conflict. Therefore, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was formed. The Dayton Agreement, signed in December 1995, provided for the first mission of the OSCE to be established in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since that time, the OSCE has expanded to 19 field missions and offices throughout Europe dedicated to fostering democracy, improving human rights, and increasing European integration. The OSCE works closely with other international organizations such as the UN, NATO, EU, and nongovernmental agencies that operate throughout the region.

⁵ Western European Union, “Platform on European Security Interests (The Hague, 27 October 1987),” <<http://www.weu.int/>>.

⁶ See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook* (Vienna: OSCE, 2002), at <<http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/index.php3>>.

NATO-East European Relations

Eastern Europe's Transformation

On the eve of the Prague summit in November 2002, when seven East European countries were invited to join NATO, Lord Roberson recalled that his predecessor could not receive diplomats from Central and East European countries in his office in 1989. "Since these countries belonged to the Warsaw Pact, their envoys were not allowed to enter the NATO compound. They had to leave their messages at the gate," said NATO's secretary general.

The majority of the Central and East European countries have managed to successfully transform into fully democratic societies. With the exception of Belarus, and possibly Ukraine and Moldova, all authoritarian regimes in Europe have collapsed or been brought down. Nearly all post-Communist countries profess a common goal: to become integral parts of Europe through membership in the European Union (EU); and to be accepted as full-fledged NATO partners.

Although the fall of communism opened the door for developing political alternatives to communism and authoritarianism by developing viable center-right parties, at the end of 2002, only four countries in Eastern Europe (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Estonia) were governed by center-right governments. All three new NATO members—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—elected to power the descendants of their former Communist Parties after their official accession to the alliance in 1999.¹

Most of Eastern Europe, however, is moving successfully toward the EU and NATO, making significant progress in building market economies and democratic systems. In fact, only the countries that remained "east of center" by preserving their close ties with Moscow—such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova—mirrored Russia's slow pace of reform. Those countries that stayed close to Moscow may need to look for another model of reform in the future, because Russia is increasingly turning to the West.²

A closer look at the platforms of most center-right and center-left parties in the pro-Western, ex-Communist countries shows little difference in their major objectives. Most of them stand for pluralistic societies, free markets, European integration, and rule of law. Often center-left and center-right parties have joined together in coalitions to prevent extremist or authoritarian forces from capturing

1 Margarita Assenova, "Mixed Signals in Eastern Europe," *World & I*, December 2002.

2 Ibid.

power. The most important characteristic of the political parties in Eastern Europe today is whether they are pro-reformist or anti-reformist, regardless of whether they stay left or right of center.³

Economic progress in Eastern Europe, however, has been slow. The latest EU studies estimate that even with 5 to 6 percent annual growth rates, it will take another 30 years for the leading post-Communist countries to match average EU living standards and purchasing power.⁴

Although 13 East European countries were given concrete dates (2004 or 2007) for admission into the European Union, it will be 10 years before they fully qualify for every EU program, because the EU's budget will not allow more. "The new members will get only a fraction of the cash that Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal have received. The hope is after this protracted transition they will still become equals, and that in the meantime the flood of inward investment capitalizing on their low wages and access to rich EU markets will boost their growth rates and living standards sufficiently to compensate," wrote Will Hutton in the *Observer*.⁵

While the Central European and the Baltic states have been making progress faster than the Balkan countries, the gap between them seems to be narrowing with the acceleration of the EU and NATO integration process. As Bulgaria and Romania entered the fast track in EU negotiations, Croatia and Macedonia were granted special status through association agreements with the EU.

Progress is noticeable throughout Eastern Europe, but in much of the Balkans the political culture of statism and authoritarianism remains deeply embedded among a broad spectrum of parties, while a political culture of dialogue, tolerance, and compromise has shallow roots. Slow progress has been achieved in the process of civic and political participation.

The resurgence of nationalism and ethnic politics has proved especially stark in the Balkans where historical competition over territories and minorities was reanimated and manipulated by an assortment of political actors throughout the 1990s. Political extremists and opportunists, especially in the former Yugoslavia, took advantage of widespread public disorientation and deflected mass fears toward vulnerable minorities or ethnic neighbors, which led to three Balkan wars.

Organized crime and corruption became one of the most serious problems in the region, particularly in Southeast Europe. Not only has crime seriously undermined legalism and terrorized a nervous public, but it has also contributed to unsettling the region's fragile economies and quasi-democratic political institutions. Realizing this problem, most of the governments in the region initiated measures to curb crime and corruption in the late 1990s. The Euro-Atlantic integration process has played a catalyst role, stimulating the authorities to take upon themselves the responsibility to solve the problem, especially in light of the war on terrorism.

3 Ibid.

4 Will Hutton, "East is East and West is Rich," *Observer* (UK), December 15, 2002.

5 Ibid.

Civil-Military Reform

In 1999, Chris Donnelly, NATO's special adviser for Central and East European affairs wrote that the major threats to European security were:⁶

- Economic threats;
- Ethnic hostility;
- Insecure and inefficient borders;
- Organized crime;
- Corruption;
- A shortage of competent specialists in governmental and parliamentary structures;
- The proliferation of military or dual technology, including weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and
- Information "warfare."

The military forces of the East European countries are not suitable in meeting many of the threats to security facing Europe in the twenty-first century, concluded Donnelly. Security and defense are no longer synonyms. Maintaining large armies may not be necessary when countries need to resolve internal security issues or tighten border and customs controls.

With a change in the concept of security comes the need for rethinking the overall investment in security. Often today, nonmilitary forces are involved in peacekeeping operations abroad, as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo. The realization of the need to be able to deploy European armed forces "out of area" without excessive dependence on U.S. support has spurred the recent rapid evolution of the European Security and Defense Policy, suggested Donnelly.⁷ Three years later at the Prague summit in November 2002, NATO decided to set up a response force to react quickly to crisis situations around the world. In light of the war on terrorism, however, this force will be a combat unit.

NATO must be able to "field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological, and chemical threats," the Prague summit declaration said.

Leaders at the Prague summit also pledged to:

- Streamline the alliance's military command structures;
- Beef up their military hardware and narrow the gap between U.S. military might and European forces in areas such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, precision-guided missiles, and suppression of enemy air defenses; and

⁶ Chris Donnelly, "Reshaping European Armed Forces for the 21st Century," NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/articles/2000/a000913a.htm>>.

⁷ Ibid.

- Initiate a NATO missile defense study to examine how it could join the United States in setting up an international shield to intercept incoming missiles.⁸

At the Prague summit, NATO invited seven East European countries to join the alliance, which will take the number of post-Communist members of NATO to a total of 10 out of 26 once they officially join. While the expansion will certainly increase the base and the might of the alliance, it will also create new challenges to the process of strengthening the European component of NATO's military capabilities.

Before the end of the Cold War, most European countries had relatively large armies based on conscription and large-scale mobilization, designed to defend their national territories. Since the guiding principle of NATO is that each country maintains its own sovereign armed forces, the decisions on how much to spend on defense has been made by individual states. The fall of communism has prompted most European countries to decrease their defense budgets and armed forces. Instead of changing the structure of the armed forces, however, many countries have simply reduced the size of the military without necessarily preserving their military capability. Both Eastern and Western Europe, as a result, have faced the war on terrorism with much reduced capability.

As NATO specialists have pointed out, most East European countries significantly shortened the conscription periods in order to reduce the size of the armed forces, but they failed to upgrade their military equipment. At the same time, training was cut back for financial reasons.

After the fall of communism, the probability of conflict in Europe was deemed to be minimal, limited to regional wars and interethnic conflicts. Instead of developing capable combat forces, NATO's European allies preferred to maintain a show of military power without the necessary capability to counter contemporary security threats.

There were three factors that particularly affected Central and East European countries after 1990:

- Too large an administrative command and military education infrastructure, taking a disproportionately large share of the defense budget;
- Lack of an effective modern and transparent personnel system that would allow appointing in key positions those qualified to drive reform; and
- Lack of national governmental capacity for defense policy formulation, defense planning, and crisis management as a consequence of the years of Soviet dominance in the Warsaw Pact.

The future armed forces in Eastern Europe face numerous defense and security requirements, the most important of which is the capacity for mobilization to meet unforeseen threats. The ability to deploy rapidly out of area and operate there for a substantive period of time is another challenge faced not only by the East Europeans, but also by most West European countries. Some post-Communist countries, however, provided valuable examples by getting

⁸ "NATO Creates Rapid Response Force," BBC World service, November 21, 2002, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2499455.stm>>.

involved with military or technical platoons in Bosnia and Kosovo, and most recently in Afghanistan.

Since the antiterrorist campaign began in 2001 in Afghanistan, Romania, for example, has served militarily as a NATO ally, contributing over 400 infantry troops, as well as military equipment to the effort. Romanian soldiers have participated side by side with U.S. troops in training operations, patrols, and mission planning, and have completed over 250 separate missions and 25 training exercises in Afghanistan. These activities have fallen under the organization of Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as the broader antiterrorism campaign. Romanian soldiers have played a prominent role in communicating and cooperating with local Afghan representatives.

Although the new NATO members and the invited candidates are working on achieving interoperability with the alliance's forces, this process, especially at military operational and tactical levels, will take time and substantial investment in upgrading and modernizing the military equipment. Future armies will have to maintain a high standard of military education and training for both officers and soldiers and establish a new basis for motivation and morale that is different than defending the homeland.⁹

Both old and new NATO members, as well as candidate members, concur that the army needed for the twenty-first century is a regular fully professional army. This certainly presents a challenge for countries with an underdeveloped economy. Another problem is the expertise to manage a fully professional military force.

For all Central and East European countries, the cost of maintaining a professional army is the most significant problem. The average cost of a regular soldier or officer is approximately 2 to 2.5 times the per capita per year for wage, pension, and social support; this includes training (such an allowance for replacement personnel in the training pipeline). In the United States, for example, this amounts to \$65,000 per year. The cost of military equipment is also rising with the various technological improvements in recent decades.

Experts estimate that for a modern army to be sustained in actual operations, it needs to employ five or six men for every one that would be deployed. Most Central and East European countries face the dilemma whether a modern army should consist of regular forces or conscripts. Some have made a political decision to make their armies professional without fully considering the implications on the cost. Smaller active regular units may cost much more than maintaining large, reserve-based conscript forces. Another factor is the maintenance of the existing infrastructure: the longer the old Cold War infrastructure is retained, the higher the cost will be for maintaining the army.

Regional Cooperation

As NATO has evolved since the end of the Cold War, regional cooperation among European states in the East has become increasingly important. Cooperation, especially among neighboring countries, has been considered a prerequisite for

⁹ Donnelly, "Reshaping European Armed Forces for the 21st Century."

NATO membership. In the post-Communist period, numerous initiatives have formed, a few of which are outlined below.

Southeast European Cooperative Initiative

The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) is an agreement of cooperation signed by Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey. The organization was founded in December 1996 following the adoption of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The SECI developed out of recognition by the United States and other Southeast European states that structures were needed in order to encourage the development of regional economic goals and environmental policies. With the goal of fostering cooperation among the signatories with the aim of furthering European integration, SECI helps to coordinate governmental and private structures region wide. The SECI is also dedicated to fostering cooperation in the harmonization of trade policies, crime laws, and expansion of investment.

Southeast European Legal Development Initiative

The Southeast European Legal Development Initiative (SELDI) is committed to the development of rule of law throughout the region, as well as to the formation of democratic institutions. The focus of the SELDI is to institutionalize cooperation among the public and private sectors throughout the region in developing anticorruption strategies and reforming the judicial systems. The SELDI was initially formed in 1998 by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and the International Development Law Institute (IDLI); it was officially established in 1999.

Black Sea Economic Cooperation

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was founded in 1998 with Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine as signatories. The BSEC principles and objectives were based upon the notion of fostering good relations and increasing confidence among the member states. The members of the BSEC are dedicated to the development of their national economies and improving the quality of life for their citizens. In order to achieve this objective, the BSEC members recognize the importance of economic growth, not only within their respective economies, but also throughout the region itself. The member states have agreed to cooperate in a number of areas including, but not limited to, anticorruption policies, exchange of science and technology, combating the illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons, and human beings, as well as reducing the threat of terrorism.

Adriatic Sea Initiative

The Adriatic Sea Initiative (ASI) was launched in 1998 by the government of Italy. The purpose of the organization is to establish a regional approach among the Adriatic coastal countries towards common issues such as the environment, illegal economic activity, and crime. The expected participants in the initiative will be Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, and Slovenia. The ASI is in

an embryonic stage, and the General Secretariat of Interpol is monitoring its development.

Visegrád Four

The Visegrád Four was founded on February 15, 1991, during a meeting of the presidents of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (Lech Wałęsa, Árpád Göncz, and Václav Havel respectively). The meeting was held in the Hungarian city of Visegrád—hence the group’s name—where the three presidents signed a declaration, aligning their countries for close cooperation in the goal of European integration. The split of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, altered the group’s name from the original Visegrád Troika to the Visegrád Four. The four countries regularly hold high-level meetings with heads of state and work on numerous projects of cooperation.

Vilnius 10

The Vilnius group was established in 2000 in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in order to support their efforts toward NATO membership.

South East European Stability Pact

After three Balkan wars, many voices in Southeastern Europe called on the West to establish a new “Marshall plan” for the region. The Stability Pact is the first serious attempt by the international community to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in the region with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy.¹⁰

The Stability Pact was formally launched in July 1999 in Sarajevo with the help of the European Union, 44 other nations, 36 international organizations, and the World Bank. Its purpose is to create “a democratic and unified Europe without political and economic divisions,” as Bodo Hombach, the first special coordinator of the Stability Pact, described it.¹¹

The Stability Pact is based on key experiences and lessons from worldwide international crisis management. Conflict prevention and peace building can be successful only if they start in parallel in three key sectors: the creation of a secure environment, the promotion of sustainable democratic systems, and the promotion of economic and social well-being. Only if there is progress in all three sectors can a self-sustaining process of peace be achieved.¹²

The structure and working methods of the Stability Pact are modeled on the OSCE process. Representatives of the Southeast European countries participate on an equal basis with the international organizations and financial institutions in advising on the future of the region.

The European Commission and the World Bank were appointed to coordinate the economic assistance measures for the region. They jointly chair a High-Level

¹⁰ See <<http://www.stabilitypact.org>>.

¹¹ Speech in Florence at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on May 25, 2000.

¹² Ibid.

Steering Group in which the finance ministers of the G-8 countries, the country holding the EU presidency, and the Netherlands work together with the representatives of international financial institutions and organizations and the special coordinator.¹³

The Stability Pact is considered to be a significant victory for advocates of peacekeeping and conflict prevention.¹⁴ The traditional military approach of reacting to crisis situations was replaced by the concept of creating conditions for long-lasting peace and stability. For the first time since the beginning of the wars in the Balkans, the United States and the European Union evidently undertook a joint initiative to invest in a long-term solution to the region's problems rather than pursuing short-term results.

The European leadership is crucial for the successful implementation of the Stability Pact. Daniel Hamilton, a U.S. Department of State official, emphasized that the EU should do the lion's share of the work.¹⁵ This required that the EU members develop a leadership function similar to the role the United States played during the post-World War II Marshall Plan.

The Balkan nations also needed to learn to cooperate with each other. Regional economies are rife with smuggling and clientelism. Misha Glenny, writing in the *New York Times*, called them "kleptocracies."¹⁶ Through a history of outside rule, authoritarian regimes, an uneasy ethnic balance, and self-contained personal, family, or clan relationships, democratic citizenship has been stifled in much of the region. A group of prominent Balkan intellectuals emphasized this problem, writing in a report that "the international community, in its administration of Bosnia and Kosovo, has lacked the will and the capabilities to deal with illegitimate economic activity and corrupt behavior."¹⁷

In February 2000, U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright warned that "no one should be naïve enough to think that the Stability Pact will achieve instant results."¹⁸ The infrastructure projects that are well underway now, initially started very slowly, taking the EU up to 42 weeks to draw the plans for clearing the Danube and building new bridges. The money was also slow to arrive proving that "on average, it takes eight years for EU project funding" to work its way through the bureaucratic pipeline, as a State Department official stated.¹⁹

The Stability Pact adopted an additional function after the events of September 11—fostering and coordinating international action on combating terrorism in the region. The current special coordinator of the Stability Pact for

13 Ibid.

14 Jack Seymour and Rick Rust, "Stabilizing South Eastern Europe: When Actions Must Follow Words," *BASIC Notes*, July 12, 2000, <<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2000stabilizingsouth.htm>>.

15 Ibid.

16 Misha Glenny, "So Milosevic Leaves Serbia—And Goes Where?" *New York Times*, June 23, 2000, p. A3.

17 Joint Statement on the Future of the Balkans, presented by Damir Grubisa, Ognyan Minchev, Arian Starova, and Ivan Vejvoda at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on June 29, 2000.

18 "Democracy Advances in the Balkans," *Wall Street Journal*, February 11, 2000, p. A14.

19 Seymour and Rust, "Stabilizing South Eastern Europe."

South East Europe, Erhard Busek, informed an OSCE meeting in Vienna on September 16, 2002, that the pact had been vital in fighting organized crime, illicit trafficking in human beings and small arms and light weapons in the area. The Working Table on Security Issues of the pact has also been active in developing a regional approach to capacity building in the area for an adequate training of national police forces.²⁰

As a prime example in the field, Busek highlighted the Clearinghouse on Small Arms and Light Weapons, located in Belgrade. The Regional Center for Combating Transnational Organized Crime, based in Bucharest, has assisted in the investigation and prosecution of several criminal elements operating in the wider Southeast Europe.²¹ One of the major areas of cooperation between the pact and NATO, as well as the European Commission, is in developing a more comprehensive approach to border security and management issues.

Four years after the Stability Pact was launched, however, the public seems not well informed about its major achievements. As the director of Bosnia project of the International Crisis Group, Mark Wheeler, pointed out to RFE/RL “the profile of the stability-pact organization is so low that it is difficult to know if it is fulfilling any particular useful function.”²²

The initiative has played an important role in putting in place a series of free-trade agreements among the Balkan countries. The pact is presently handling 46 projects, many of them infrastructure projects, with a total expenditure of some 2.6 billion euros. Other projects include supporting human rights and the development of democracy, education, and justice. Busek gave RFE/RL concrete examples of the pact’s infrastructure program, such as the cleaning up of the River Danube at Novi Sad and the rebuilding of the bridge. The program includes building another bridge between Vidin and Calafat, which connects Bulgaria and Romania, and the highway between Bucharest and Cerna Voda. The modernization of the airport in Sofia and improvement in the port of Durres in Albania are important projects as well. The Stability Pact involves work such as the creation of a regional electricity market and the upgrading of power lines. According to Busek, the pact’s function is perceived as preparing its recipient states for eventual EU membership and enhancing regional cooperation.²³

New Threats: International Organized Crime

Since the four 1990s wars weakened public institutions in the Balkans, the region has become the main gateway to the continent for a multimillion dollar business in illegal immigration, drug smuggling, and people trafficking. People have become commodities through illegal immigration and trafficking into virtual slavery as much as drugs and weapons. This trend involves all the countries in

²⁰ “Busek: Stability Pact at Forefront in Fight against Terrorism,” Pravda.ru, September 16, 2002, <<http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/09/16/36662.html>>.

²¹ Ibid.

²² *Balkan Report*, RFE/RL, January 17, 2003.

²³ Ibid.

Southeast Europe, as well as some West European countries, which are used as the final destination of women and narcotics.

European and U.S. officials and crime experts, as well as Balkan statesmen, have expressed concerns that crime and corruption threaten peace and stability in the region. Speaking at the Balkan Forum in Thessalonici in April 2002, Erhard Busek, special coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, stated that the Balkans were situated near the unstable region that extended all the way to Afghanistan. The Balkans are a crossroads for international crime and terrorism and the large quantities of weapons in the region have threatened to kindle ethnic tensions. Chris Patten, the EU's external relations commissioner, said at the same gathering that "the region is still desperately weak and vulnerable. Corruption and crime have swooped down like vultures. This is a big threat to the safety of the EU itself."²⁴

Organized crime in the Balkans has risen not only because the region is on Europe's frontier and serves as a corridor for crime and criminal products from Asia and the Caucasus. Another, more important reason is the fact that the Balkan states and legal systems are weak and fractured allowing corruption and the black market to flourish. The fact that indicted war criminals such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic remain at large in the region also contributes to the overall demoralization of society. Moreover, such outcasts can be sustained only through organized crime.

Organized crime gangs in the former Yugoslavia control some 70 percent of the heroin trafficking in several European countries. Based on recent reports from various international agencies, as many as 200,000 of the estimated 700,000 women who cross borders annually for the sex trade are passing to or through the Balkans.²⁵

A report issued by Human Rights Watch concluded that a prostitution network is flourishing in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the complicity of international and local police. The report says traffickers bring thousands of women and girls from Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine into Bosnia each year.²⁶

Officials attending an EU-led conference on organized crime in Southeast Europe on November 26, 2002, agreed to step up cooperation in fighting corruption, smuggling, and illegal immigration in the Balkans. The conference adopted a final statement outlining what it calls a joint coordinated effort by the international community and the countries in the region to tackle organized crime. The ministerial conference was an initiative of British prime minister Tony Blair and was attended by 57 delegations representing countries from the region, the European Union, the United States, Canada, and Russia, as well as international organizations.²⁷

²⁴ "Crime in the Balkans: Europe is Afraid," *Economist Online*, May 2002, <http://www.economist.co.yu/en/magazin/perspectives/0502/sopt/bal_mafia.htm>.

²⁵ "Balkans: Officials Pledge to Tackle the 'Cancer' of Organized Crime," *Weekday Magazine*, RFE/RL, November 26, 2002.

²⁶ "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Traffickers Walk Free," *World Report 2002* (New York: Human Rights Watch, November 26, 2002), <<http://staging.hrw.org/wr2k2/contents.html>>.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

British foreign secretary Jack Straw said at the conference that “organized crime is a subject that is important not just for the future of the region, but for the greater stability and prosperity of Europe and the wider world.” British home secretary David Blunkett, who hosted the conference, added that “[t]he Balkans have become the gateway to Europe for organized criminals. We can only outwit and track down organized criminals by working ever more closely with the Balkan countries. Closer cooperation is particularly vital in the current climate with the heightened threat we all face from international terrorist networks.”

The new British Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act ensures tougher new penalties of up to 14 years of imprisonment for human smugglers and traffickers and new laws to seize the ill-gotten gains of organized criminals who make money by exploiting the vulnerable.

UK-led projects to tackle organized crime in Southeast Europe have included:

- *An EU Policing Mission, including British police officers.* The UK contributed 56 police officers to the EU Policing Mission, which took over from the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina on January 1, 2003.
- *Drugs and Immigration liaison officers.* A network of UK Drugs and Immigration liaison officers are operating in the region. Working under the NCIS (National Criminal Intelligence Service) umbrella and with local law enforcement agencies, they target the criminal organizers and disrupt and dismantle their criminal networks.
- *Reflex Romania.* An ongoing UK-led joint project where UK officers provide training and advice to local law enforcement agencies in intelligence gathering and the disruption of human smuggling and trafficking rings. This has led to arrests in Romania and around the EU.
- *Project Impact.* A UK-led EU initiative, which tackled human smuggling in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The new State Border Service was provided with expert training and advice, which led to a 90 percent reduction in the number of illegal migrants passing through Sarajevo airport.²⁸

A study by researchers at American University in Washington, D.C., suggested that it will take 30 years or more to establish the rule of law and eradicate the network of organized crime that is pervasive in the Balkan region of Southeast Europe. Whether directly or indirectly, the problem will continue to confront the NATO alliance.²⁹

²⁸ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “UK Leads International Drive to Tackle Organized Crime in Balkans,” British Information Services (New York), November 25, 2002, at <http://www.britainusa.com/balkans/xq/asp/SarticleType.1/Article_ID.2916/qx/articles_show.htm>.

²⁹ Barry Wood, “Study Shows Organized Crime Pervasive in Balkans,” VOA News.com, April 10, 2002, <<http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=A0D6ECE8-1AF7-4C83-A6A347342BE6386E>>.

NATO-Russian Relations

From Bipolar to Unipolar World

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been developing a new relationship of cooperation with its former adversary Russia. Although NATO considered Russia's involvement in building a comprehensive system of European security important, the relationship between them has had fluctuating success. Relations often depended on their differences on issues such as international military intervention in the Balkans, the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, and most recently on their different definitions of terrorism. During the 1990s, Russia and the members of NATO have also been taking conflicting positions on Iraq's ongoing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Russia was a founding member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994. For the first couple of years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia seemed likely to pose no major objections to NATO enlargement, as it was inward looking and pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy often called "Atlanticism."¹ After Russia lost hold of the Soviet empire and ceased to be a superpower, there was a period of reformulating its national interests, and cooperation with the West seemed a necessary avenue. In the following two years, however, Russia switched to a different policy, often labeled "statism," which was focused on ensuring its "security" and projecting its power by dominating its immediate neighbors and exerting influence farther out in order to keep potential rivals at bay.² This was the phase when Russia started raising objections to further NATO enlargement, considering it a threat to its national security.

This policy prompted NATO to seek more effective means of cooperation in order to ensure not only further alliance enlargement, but also to secure proliferation agreements and make Russia a real participant in building the new European security system. The Founding Act of 1997 provided a basis for the development of a durable partnership between NATO and Russia. The document expressed a joint commitment to building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Founding Act assessed that Russia was continuing to build a democratic society and realizing its political and economic transformation. At the same time, Russia was developing the concept of its national security and revising its military

1 Richard L. Kugler and Marianna V. Kozintseva, *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR690/>>.

2 Ibid.

doctrine to ensure that they were fully consistent with new security realities. Russia also carried out deep reductions in its armed forces, had withdrawn its forces on an unprecedented scale from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, and withdrawn all of its nuclear weapons back to its own national territory. The Founding Act stressed that Russia was committed to further reducing its conventional and nuclear forces.

At the time the Founding Act was signed in Paris in 1997, Russia was already actively participating in peacekeeping operations in support of the UN and the OSCE, as well as in crisis management in different areas of the world. Russia started contributing to the multinational forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 1996, soon after the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995 terminated the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The groundbreaking event that preceded the signing of the Founding Act was the Helsinki summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in March 1997. Before that summit, representatives of the U.S. Congress and State Department were at odds over the future of U.S.-Russia relations. The chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.), said at a committee hearing that the allegations Russia was developing chemical and biological weapons, selling dangerous technology around the world, and pushing for bases and troops in Ukraine were souring U.S.-Russia relations. The State Department's ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet republics, James Collins, testified, however, that although relations with Russia were sometimes difficult, it was in the United States' best long-term interest to provide Russia with incentives for economic and democratic reform and continue to pursue a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship.³

The United States proposed an arms control package that included:

- A Russian commitment to ratify the strategic arms limitation treaty (START II) promptly;
- Guidelines for START III negotiations for further reductions beyond START II limits, with talks to begin after ratification of START II; and
- An agreement on the demarcation between antiballistic missile (ABM) systems and theater missile defenses that would preserve the ABM treaty while supporting the U.S. capacity to develop theater missile defense programs in a new threat environment.

Russia also outlined its objective before the summit. Russian foreign affairs minister Yevgeny Primakov warned the Europeans that future relations between Moscow and the West depended on NATO's willingness to agree to a Russian demand for a binding agreement with it before the alliance admits any new members. The agreement would pave the way for Russian ratification of the START II arms control agreement, long awaited by the West. Failure to commit to such an agreement, Primakov warned, would lead to Moscow's reconsidering its

³ Julie Moffett, "Russia: Relations a Disappointment to Some in U.S. Congress," RFE/RL, March 13, 1997, <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/03/F.RU.970313150217.html>>.

relations not only with NATO but also with its immediate neighbors and with the West as a whole.

Despite the high bargaining stakes, the overall assessment of the summit was that it succeeded in achieving a common basis for forging important bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia and laid the groundwork for further developing cooperation between NATO and Russia. But some analysts commented that, although Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton declared their Helsinki summit a success, they only agreed to disagree.⁴

Radio Free Europe's Paul Goble wrote after the summit: "Yeltsin did not back away from his adamant opposition to NATO expansion. He repeated his view that any movement of the alliance to the east would threaten Russian security. Neither did Clinton retreat from his commitment to begin expansion. Recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet space was also not acceptable to the American president."⁵

However, U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright reiterated that the expansion of NATO would go ahead despite Russian objections. She also said that NATO is a new and changed organization as Russia is a changed and new country and that there is room to develop a security arrangement acceptable to all.⁶

By promising that no European democracy would be excluded from future consideration for NATO membership, the U.S. administration made a commitment to continue with the further expansion of NATO regardless of Russia's objections. Albright stated that the Cold War was over, Russia was now the United States' friend, and the two can work together to build a new structure.⁷ However, the Western press assessed the results of the Helsinki summit from different perspectives.⁸

The *Wall Street Journal Europe* wrote: "The Helsinki summit has vindicated, at least for now, President Bill Clinton's belief that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can expand eastward while the U.S. still maintains good relations with Russia." The analysis continued: "Even more important, the two Presidents were able to look beyond NATO, making dramatic progress on several key arms-control issues."⁹

The *Times* (London) wrote: "On the crucial issue of NATO expansion (Yeltsin) achieved almost nothing. Accusations of capitulation echoed around Moscow even before he arrived home."¹⁰

4 Paul Goble, "Russia/US: Analysis From Washington—After The Summit," RFE/RL, March 24, 1997, <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/03/F.RU.970324152432.html>>.

5 Ibid.

6 Paul Goble, "Russia: Albright Says NATO to Expand Despite Objections," RFE/RL, March 24, 1997, <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/news/1997/03/N.RU.970318165735.html>>.

7 Ibid.

8 Don Hill, "Western Press Review: Summit Was (Pick One) a. Triumph; b. Giveaway; c. Trap," RFE/RL, March 24, 1997, <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/03/F.RU.970324152330.html>>.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

The *New York Times* wrote: “Russia remains Europe’s largest country and most important nuclear power. A stable Russian government and economy pursuing a responsible foreign policy is an indispensable condition for achieving Clinton’s stated goal of building a secure and democratic Europe. The Helsinki agreements do not eliminate the potentially troublesome issue of NATO expansion, but they make progress in other areas possible.”¹¹

The *Financial Times* wrote: “The deal infuriated Mr. Yeltsin’s Communist opponents, setting off a wave of criticism over the weekend. The tone was set by Mr. Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist chief, who denounced Mr. Yeltsin’s performance in Helsinki as a crushing defeat.”¹²

The *Los Angeles Times* wrote: “Stability in Europe and adjacent areas is also to Russia’s benefit. Clearly, there’s plenty of room for NATO-Russia cooperation.”¹³

International Herald Tribune commentator William Pfaff wrote: “Russia poses two questions. The first is how a fundamental internal stability will be restored.” He stated: “the second question is Russia’s place in the international system.” Pfaff concluded: “Since 1989, Russia has tried to become fully included in the international system of the democracies. America’s NATO policy excludes it. That is a fundamental mistake.”¹⁴

The presidents of the United States and Russia agreed to “work together” on a charter that would “establish cooperation between NATO and Russia.” They also announced agreement on a variety of issues including the ratification of arms control and chemical weapons treaties, economic assistance, and the integration of Russia into key Western institutions. Clearly, the Helsinki summit opened the way for the Founding Act—the first major agreement for cooperation between NATO and Russia signed in Paris in May 1997. The Founding Act provided for the establishment of a Permanent Joint Council (PJC), as a forum for regular consultation on common security issues. In March 1998, Russia established a permanent mission to NATO.

Although the PJC achieved substantial levels of cooperation between NATO and Russia over the next two years, the Kosovo crisis and Russia’s opposition to military intervention on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians led to a yearlong interruption of the council’s activities due to Russia’s withdrawal. Cooperation in the scope of activities of the PJP was also affected by Russia’s pulling out of the PJC.

In May 2000, Russia returned to the PJC, and consultations were resumed. In February 2001, a NATO Information Office in Moscow was inaugurated to improve “mutual knowledge and understanding.” Marking the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Founding Act, a NATO Military Liaison Mission was established in Moscow to improve transparency and develop practical military cooperation between NATO military authorities and Russia’s Ministry of Defense.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

Impact of Domestic Politics

Russia's relations with NATO have been determined by numerous domestic political and economic issues. Interpretation of Russia's national security interest and assessments of the threats to Russia's security have often put relations with NATO off balance. For example, according to Russian military experts, Russia's national security doctrine defined as threats to the country: international terrorism, "as in Chechnya and Daghستان"; the struggle for spheres of influence in the former Soviet republics; U.S. and NATO assertiveness; advanced weapons systems; large conventional armies; organized criminal groups gaining access to weapons of mass destruction; and extremist and religious threats to the integrity of the Russian Federation.¹⁵

Some analysts believed that Russia's support for further NATO expansion, to include all of Europe, will be predicated on whether or not Russia itself will become a formal member of the alliance. However, Russia has ignored all international pressures over the war in Chechnya, demonstrating that in domestic cases of blatant disregard for human rights it would not be in Russia's interest to hold formal membership in NATO. The likelihood of NATO directly interfering over Chechnya does not suit the present Russian leadership since President Putin came to power by raising nationalistic anti-Chechen sentiment among his voters.

Russia's need to cooperate with the West as economic problems deepened was put into effect by President Putin after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. By joining the coalition against international terrorism, Putin aimed at two major objectives: first, to plug into the economic and financial resources of the West; and second, to justify Russia's grave human rights violations in Chechnya by presenting the war there as a part of a campaign against international terrorism.

Putin has also been using his cooperation with NATO and the West as a whole to defeat his domestic rivals and maintain hopes among the electorate that economic conditions will improve. He has played this card smartly in order not to appear as if he is selling out Russia to the West. A demonstration of this strategy was Moscow's opposition to an attack on Iraq in early 2003. While Putin went along with the Franco-German position against military strikes on Iraq, he also implied the possibility that Russia would abstain from a UN Security Council vote on military action against Baghdad, thereby hoping to gain economic and other concessions from the United States after the war.

Russia's Positions: NATO Enlargement, New Missions

The NATO summit in Washington in April 1999, which was marked by an ongoing air war against Yugoslavia and by NATO's announcement of an open door policy toward new NATO members, evoked a mixed reaction in Russia. Russian defense minister Sergeyev was quick to announce that Russia planned to react to NATO's new strategic concept with a new military doctrine. He left no

¹⁵ "War on Terrorism," *RFE/RL Security & Terrorism Watch*, vol. 3, no. 41 (November 19, 2002), <<http://www.rferl.org/securitywatch/2002/11/41-191102.html>>.

doubt that his country would “never approve” the acceptance of the three Baltic states in a possible continuation of NATO’s enlargement to the East.

Russian press reflected not only the official government reaction, but also the major developments in the domestic debate on the consequences of NATO enlargement.¹⁶ The neo-Communist *Slovo* wrote on April 28, 1999: “NATO has finally made up its mind. After 50 years of fighting the semi-mythical ‘Soviet threat,’ it has decided to try for the role of world policeman. Bombing Yugoslavia is just a ‘test of the pen.’”

The official governmental *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (April 27, 1999) commented: “NATO has usurped what by right belongs to the UN... Confident of its might, NATO has lost a sense of reality. The world is not just the United States, Western Europe and Russia. It is also China, India and many other nations. In the face of NATO’s *diktat*, ever more countries will want their security enhanced. NATO’s concept is a threat to non-proliferation.”¹⁷

The reformist *Izvestiya* (April 27, 1999) noted: “Expansion, a movement eastward, to Russia, was the keynote. In that regard, the supersummit was a success, helped by aspirants [to NATO] who were quite pushy and sounded more pro-NATO than Uncle Sam himself.”¹⁸

The reformist *Noviye Izvestiya* (April 27, 1999) criticized Russia’s absence from the summit: “The summit showed that NATO, not the UN, OSCE or anyone else, will in the years ahead dictate to the world and determine who is right and who is wrong... By not attending, Moscow, while remaining committed to its principles, missed a real chance to discuss important problems with key figures from NATO countries.”¹⁹

The reformist *Izvestiya* (April 27, 1999) called for strengthening Russia’s nuclear power: “With NATO sprawling and adopting a new concept, America considering the renunciation of the basic ABM principles, and Yugoslavia under attack, Russia has to take better care of its security and seriously update the program for its strategic nuclear forces.”²⁰

The weekly *Moskovskiy Novosti* (April 27, 1999) objected to the new security role undertaken by NATO: “NATO is not an enemy but it can become one, unless we stop its degeneration into a world policeman or, plainly speaking, into a special kind of international bandit.”²¹

Arenas of Cooperation

As stated above, recognizing Russia’s critical role in European security, the alliance proposed to Moscow establishing a fundamentally new cooperative relationship in 1996. This idea further developed into the NATO-Russia Founding Act (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the

¹⁶ “NATO’S ‘New Doctrine’ Invites Questions in Europe, Draws Fire Elsewhere,” *USIA Daily Digest*, April 28, 1999, <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/www9a28.htm>>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

Russian Federation) and led to the formation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in Paris on May 27, 1997.

Acknowledging that NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries, the two sides expressed their determination "to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia."²²

The signing of the Founding Act was the culmination of a period of gradually expanding relations since December 1991, when Russia joined the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), along with other former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This was the first formal NATO body, after the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe, bringing together NATO member states and non-NATO countries. Russia joined the alliance's Partnership for Peace program in June 1994.

The Permanent Joint Council was created as the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability. It envisioned meetings at the level of foreign ministers and at the level of defense ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors and permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council.

The PJC outlined the areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia that included a range of issues such as conflict prevention, crisis management, joint peacekeeping operations, participation of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, arms control issues, nuclear safety issues, and consultation on strategy, defense policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia.

The Founding Act also regulated military cooperation between NATO and Russia by expanding military-to-military dialogue. Some other aspects of the NATO-Russia relationship included the opening of a NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow in February 1998.

The useful start in this relationship was soon interrupted by Russia's withdrawal from the PJC in protest against the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. At the end of the military campaign, Russia went even further in undermining its relationship with NATO. Moscow attempted to deploy forces in Kosovo apparently to assist Serbia in dividing the province. Russia's SFOR troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina unexpectedly took over the airport in Pristina while Moscow asked several East European countries to allow Russia's airplanes to transport additional troops to Kosovo. This plan was prevented by Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, which did not allow the use of their airspace by the Russian military.

²² NATO, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation," NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/fndact-a.htm>>.

Military cooperation between NATO and Russia, however, continued without interruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) was guarding the fragile peace in the postwar country. After the end of the military campaign against the repressive regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia, Russia contributed significant forces to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). One year after the Kosovo crisis, the foreign ministers of the NATO nations and Russia met formally in Florence to resume cooperation within the framework of the Permanent Joint Council.

In 2000, Russia contributed about 1,200 troops to SFOR, which numbered approximately 20,000 forces in all at that time; and some 3,250 troops to the 42,500-strong KFOR force. Later troop reductions, left around 305 Russian soldiers serving in SFOR and some 650 Russian soldiers in KFOR, as of July 2002.

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, relations between Russia and NATO entered a new phase. Russia's leadership decided to join the international effort against terrorism using the opportunity to affiliate itself with the West in the wake of a domestic economic downturn. Moscow's calculation included an opportunity to define the war in Chechnya as part of the international war against terrorism.

On October 3, 2001, NATO secretary general Lord Robertson and Russian president Vladimir Putin met in Brussels to discuss possibilities to deepen NATO-Russia cooperation. The initiative to set up the NATO-Russia Council was announced by foreign ministers at the meeting of the PJC in Brussels on December 7, 2001. PJC foreign ministers developed the necessary arrangements for their next meeting in May 2002 in Reykjavik, Iceland.

The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council at the NATO-Russia summit on May 28, 2002, in Rome opened a new page in alliance relations with Moscow. This innovative body brought together the 19 allies and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action "at 20." The Rome Declaration built on the goals and principles of the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security. The NATO-Russia Council was established as a mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action, in which individual allies, together with Russia, were to work as equal partners on a wide spectrum of Euro-Atlantic security issues of common interest. Regular political dialogue on security issues was to enable the early identification of emerging problems, the determination of common approaches, and the conduct of joint actions.

The new council replaced the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which had been set up under the Founding Act. Instead of pre-coordinating all issues among the 19 members and then consulting with Russia, the new council allowed Russia to participate on equal footing with the member states when discussing and deciding on common security matters. Cooperation was intensified in a number of key areas, such as the struggle against terrorism, nonproliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, crisis management, theatre missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.

Chaired by NATO's secretary general, meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) are held at least monthly at the level of ambassadors and military representatives; twice yearly at the level of foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of staff; and occasionally at summit or head-of-state level.

At the Prague summit in November 2002, NATO invited seven East European countries into the alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This latest expansion of NATO put the alliance "right on Russia's doorstep," in the words of Canada's prime minister. NATO devoted significant time at the Prague summit to further enhancing its ties with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council. NATO secretary general Lord Robertson stated in an interview that the NRC had made considerable progress in implementing the Rome Declaration, especially in crisis management and joint Russia-NATO peacekeeping operations. He also pointed out the progress the NRC made in combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The NRC prepared a special report concerning WMD proliferation trends in Eastern Europe and Asia.²³

In the realm of missile defense, many analysts believed that NATO and Russia have still not completely reconciled their differences. However, the current discussion of theatre missile defense (TMD) interoperability between NATO and Russia has been taken as a sign by many security experts that the two sides are earnestly pursuing political reconciliation. Finally, the NRC has discussed military reform in Russia. NATO has consistently made it a top priority that civilians ought to be in charge of any member country's armed services. NATO has been using its experiences under this policy to work closely with Russia to ensure and enhance civilian control over Russia's armed services.²⁴

However, cooperation between NATO and Russia has stumbled over Moscow's reluctance to back the United States in a war with Iraq with full and explicit UN Security Council approval. In February 2003, the Putin government appeared to align itself with the French and German position to allow more time for UN weapons inspectors in Iraq. The rift between Washington and Paris overshadowed the differences with Moscow as Russia appeared to play the "European card" against U.S. "unipolarity."

Military Balance and Conventional Weapons

At the NATO meeting in Brussels on May 29–30, 1989, the heads of state adopted a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. The document says that the overriding objective of the alliance is to preserve peace in freedom, to prevent war, and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The allies' policy to this end was set forth in the Harmel Report²⁵ of 1967; it remains valid. According to the report, the North Atlantic Alliance's "first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression

²³ North American Invitational Model UN: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), February 4, 2003, <<http://www.modelun.org/naimun/background/reg-nato-update.doc>>.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The Harmel Report was issued in 1967. See footnote 4 in chapter 1.

and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur.” On that basis, the alliance can carry out “its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved” The report observed that military security and a policy aimed at reducing tensions are “not contradictory, but complementary.” Consistent with these principles, allied heads of state and government agreed that arms control was an integral part of the alliance’s security policy.

NATO concluded that the possibilities for East-West dialogue had significantly improved, and more favorable conditions existed for the achievement of lasting peace in Europe. The basic goal of the alliance’s arms control policy was to enhance security and stability at the lowest balanced level of forces and armaments consistent with the requirements of the strategy of deterrence. NATO’s guiding principles for arms control were stated in the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament:²⁶

“*Security*: Arms control should enhance the security of all Allies. Both during the implementation period and following implementation, the Allies’ strategy of deterrence and their ability to defend themselves, must remain credible and effective. Arms control measures should maintain the strategic unity and political cohesion of the Alliance, and should safeguard the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance security by avoiding the creation of areas of unequal security. Arms control measures should respect the legitimate security interests of all states and should not facilitate the transfer or intensification of threats to third party states or regions;

“*Stability*: Arms control measures should yield militarily significant results that enhance stability. To promote stability, arms control measures should reduce or eliminate those capabilities which are most threatening to the Alliance. Stability can also be enhanced by steps that promote greater transparency and predictability in military matters. Military stability requires the elimination of options for surprise attack and for large-scale offensive action. Crisis stability requires that no state has forces of a size and configuration which, when compared with those of others, could enable it to calculate that it might gain a decisive advantage by being the first to resort to arms. Stability also requires measures which discourage destabilizing attempts to re-establish military advantage through the transfer of resources to other types of armament. Agreements must lead to final results that are both balanced and ensure equality of rights with respect to security;

“*Verifiability*: Effective and reliable verification is a fundamental requirement for arms control agreements. If arms control is to be effective and to build confidence, the verifiability of proposed arms control

26 NATO, “The Alliance’s Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament Adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, May 30, 1989,” NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b890529b.htm>>.

measures must, therefore, be of central concern for the Alliance. Progress in arms control should be measured against the record of compliance with existing agreements. Agreed arms control measures should exclude opportunities for circumvention.”

In 1986, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreement created an innovative system of confidence- and security-building measures, designed to promote military transparency and predictability. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty marked another major step forward because it eliminated a whole class of weapons, established the principle of asymmetrical reductions, and provided for a stringent verification regime. Other achievements included the establishment in the United States and the Soviet Union of nuclear risk reduction centers, the U.S.-Soviet agreement on prior notification of ballistic missile launches, and the conduct of the Joint Verification Experiment in connection with continued U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear testing.

At the time of developing NATO's comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, substantial progress was achieved in the START negotiations intended to reduce radically strategic nuclear arsenals and eliminate destabilizing offensive capabilities. The Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons reaffirmed the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and provided strong political impetus to the negotiations in Geneva for a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. New distinct negotiations within the framework of the CSCE process had begun in Vienna: one on conventional armed forces in Europe between the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and one on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) among all 35 signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.

Key Arms Control Treaties and Agreements (1963-1995)²⁷

- 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTB)

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Parties to the treaty agree to conduct nuclear weapons tests, or any other nuclear explosion, only underground. Signed August 5, 1963; entered into force October 10, 1963. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) continue in Geneva.

- 1967 Outer Space Treaty

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Prohibits placing in orbit around the Earth, installing on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise stationing in outer space, nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Signed January 27, 1967; entered into force October 10, 1967.

- 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty

²⁷ See <<http://www.nato.int>>.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 179 states signed the treaty. It was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and entered into force March 5, 1970. Originally of 25 years duration, the treaty was extended unconditionally and indefinitely in May 1995.

- 1971 Seabed Treaty

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. Signed on February 11, 1971; entered into force on May 18, 1972.

- 1972 Biological Weapons Convention

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Parties to the convention undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes,” as well as related weapons and means of delivery. Signed on April 10, 1972; entered into force on March 26, 1975.

- 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement

Interim Agreement Between the USA and USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Froze existing aggregate levels of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear missile launchers and submarines until an agreement on more comprehensive measures could be reached. Signed on May 26, 1972; entered into force on October 3, 1972.

- 1972 ABM Treaty

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Limits deployment of U.S. and Soviet ABM systems. Signed on May 26, 1972; entered into force on October 3, 1972. President George W. Bush submitted a formal intent to withdraw from the ABM treaty in December 2001 after negotiations with Russia failed to agree on amending the treaty to allow U.S. testing or deployment of a missile defense shield.

- 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests. Prohibits underground nuclear weapons tests of more than 150 kilotons. Signed on July 3, 1974; entered into force on December 11, 1990.

- 1975 Helsinki Final Act

Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Signed by 35 nations, it provides, inter alia, for notification of major military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops and other confidence-building measures. Signed and entered into force on August 1, 1975.

- 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Limits any individual nuclear explosion carried out by the parties

outside U.S. and Soviet weapons test sites to 150 kilotons. Signed on May 28, 1976; entered into force on December 11, 1990.

- 1977 ENMOD Convention

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Prohibits the hostile use of certain environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, and severe effects. Signed on May 18, 1977; entered into force on October 5, 1978.

- 1979 SALT II Treaty

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Replaces the SALT I Interim Agreement. Signed on June 18, 1979; the treaty never entered into force and was superseded by START I in 1991.

- 1981 Inhumane Weapons Convention

Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Signed by 35 states, it includes three protocols. Signed on April 10, 1981, entered into force on December 2, 1983.

- 1986 Stockholm Document

Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures [CSBMs] and Disarmament in Europe. Contains a set of six concrete and mutually complementary CSBMS, including mandatory ground or aerial inspection of military activities that improve upon those contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Adopted on September 19, 1986; entered into force on January 1, 1987.

- 1987 INF Treaty

Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Eliminates and bans all (U.S. and Soviet) ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range capability of between 300 and 3,400 miles (500 and 5,500 kms). Signed on December 8, 1987; entered into force on June 1, 1988. Fully implemented on June 1, 1991.

- 1990 Vienna Document

Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Incorporates Stockholm Document of 1986, adding measures related to transparency on military forces and activities, improved communications and contacts, and verification. Adopted on November 17, 1990; entered into force on January 1, 1991.

- 1990 CFE Treaty

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Sets ceilings from the Atlantic to the Urals on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive operations. Signed by the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact states on November 19, 1990; applied provisionally on July 17, 1992. Entered into force on November 9, 1992. On November 16, 1995, the treaty's reduction period came to an end, with the verified elimination of over 50,000 pieces of

equipment. Following a 120-day residual-level validation period, a review conference was underway in May 1996 to assess the operation of the treaty.

Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Oslo Final Document). Enables implementation of the CFE Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Notes the May 15, 1992, agreement in Tashkent among the successor states of the USSR territory within the area of application of the CFE Treaty, apportioning among them the obligations and rights of the USSR, making them parties to the treaty. Signed and entered into force on June 5, 1992.

- 1991 START I

Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Establishes significantly reduced limits for intercontinental ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and warheads; submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and warheads; and heavy bombers and their armaments including long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles. Signed on July 31, 1991; entered into force on December 5, 1994.

Protocol to the Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Lisbon START Protocol of 28 May 1992). Enables implementation of the START I Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The protocol constitutes an amendment to and is an integral part of the START Treaty and provides for Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to succeed to the Soviet Union's obligations under the treaty. Also, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine commit themselves to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nonnuclear weapons states in the shortest possible time. In accompanying letters they commit themselves to eliminate all nuclear weapons from their territory within seven years. Belarus acceded to the NPT in July 1993, Kazakhstan in February 1994, and Ukraine in December 1994.

- 1991 UN Register of Conventional Arms Transfers

Introduces greater openness and simplifies monitoring of excessive arms buildup in any one country. Created by a resolution of the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1991, the register requests all participating states to record their imports and exports of certain major weapons systems and to submit this information by April 30 of the following year. More than 90 countries are presently providing information to the registry.

- 1992 Vienna Document

Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document on the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Incorporates the Vienna Document 1990, adding further measures related to transparency regarding military forces and activities and constraints on military activities. Expands the zone of application for CSBMs to include the territory of USSR successor states, which were beyond the traditional zone in Europe (i.e., all

of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Adopted on March 4, 1992; entered into force on May 1, 1992.

- 1992 Treaty on Open Skies

Commits member nations in Eurasia and North America to open their airspace, on a reciprocal basis, permitting the overflight of their territory by unarmed observation aircraft in order to strengthen confidence and transparency with respect to their military activities. Signed and applied provisionally March 24, 1992; will enter into force after 20 states have deposited instruments of ratification.

- 1992 CFE 1A

Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. CFE states-parties declare national limits on the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in the Atlantic to the Urals area. Signed July 10, 1992; entered into force July 17, 1992. Implemented concurrently with the CFE.

- 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. An agreement drafted by the 39 nations of the Conference on Disarmament to ban chemical weapons worldwide. Opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993, to date, it has been signed by more than 150 nations. It will enter into force 180 days after deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification.

- 1993 START II

Treaty between the USA and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Further reduces U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms by eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs (including all "heavy" ICBMs) and reducing the overall total of warheads for each side to between 3,000 and 3,500. Signed on January 3, 1993, and will enter into force following ratification by the United States and Russia. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on January 26, 1996. Ratification of the treaty in the Russian Duma, pending since 1996, was finally completed on April 14, 2000.

- 1994 Trilateral Nuclear Agreement

Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the USA, Russia, and Ukraine. Details the procedures to transfer Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia and associated compensation and security assurances. Sets out simultaneous actions to transfer SS-19 and SS-24 warheads from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling and to provide compensation to Ukraine in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations, as well as security assurances to Ukraine, once START I enters into force and Ukraine becomes a nonnuclear weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Signed in Moscow on January 14, 1994.

- 1994 Vienna Document

Incorporates Vienna Document 1992, adding information on defense planning, improved military cooperation, and other enhancements. Adopted on November 28, 1994; entered into force on January 1, 1995.

- 1994 Budapest Document

This CSCE/OSCE document includes the adoption of measures covering a global exchange of information, principles governing conventional arms transfers and stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations, negotiated in the Forum for Security Cooperation between September 1992 and December 1994.

- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III)

Negotiation of the details of START III was pending for a long time on the ratification by the Russian Duma of START II, which occurred on April 14, 2000. Russia remained committed to the goal of reducing the number of strategic nuclear warheads held by each side to 1,500, while the U.S. position was that 2,000 to 2,500 warheads were needed for effective nuclear deterrence.

- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START IV)

A future START IV agreement would involve all declared nuclear nations. The goal of such a multilateral effort would be to substantially reduce global warhead inventories to the point where the declared powers would have some level of parity. Negotiation of the details of START IV are pending on negotiation and ratification of START III.

Table 5.1. Comparison of START Central Limits

	START	START II Phase I	START II Phase II	START II
Total Strategic Warheads	6,000 accountable	3,800–4,250 actual	3,000–3,500 actual	2,000–2,500 actual (Russian prop: 1,500)
Ballistic Missile Warheads	4,900	No specific limit	No specific limit	No specific limit
MIRVed ICBM Warheads	N/A	1,200	0	0
SLBM Warheads	N/A	2,160	1,700–1,750	TBD
Heavy ICBM Warheads	1,540	650	0	0
Mobile ICBM Warheads	1,100	START applies	START applies	START applies
Total Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles	1,600	START applies	START applies	TBD

Source: Federation of American Scientists, "Arms Control Agreements: START Provisions—Comparisons," <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start-comp.htm>>.

At the Washington summit in April 1999, NATO's 19 leaders launched a five-part initiative addressing the risk of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The elements of NATO's WMD initiative were as follows:

- *Information-sharing:* Allies committed to increase their sharing of WMD information and intelligence in order to develop a more comprehensive, shared assessment of the current and evolving threat;
- *Defense Planning:* NATO military authorities planned to intensify and broaden the development of Allied capabilities to function safely in environments that may include a WMD threat;
- *Non-proliferation:* Allies committed to intensifying consultations on national non-proliferation assistance to other nations, such as the U.S. Cooperative Thrust Reduction program. This Clearinghouse function assists Allies in identifying areas of greatest need and will supplement rather than duplicate the work of existing nonproliferation regimes;
- *Civilian protection:* NATO decided to accelerate coordination of possible responses in the event of WMD use against allied populations. This includes maintenance of a database on the immediate availability of medical stockpiles and expert personnel. Allies also would consider ways that their national military forces might be made available to assist in the event of a WMD emergency;
- *WMD Center:* To ensure effective coordination of NATO efforts on WMD, Allies agreed to establish a WMD Center at NATO Headquarters. This Center will be responsible for integrating and overseeing all aspects of NATO's efforts on WMD.²⁸

Nuclear Weapons Policy and Missile Defense

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has radically reduced its nuclear posture to the minimum level of nuclear forces in Europe required to preserve peace and stability and to deter coercion and war in the new security environment. NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991, determines deterrence and defense as the fundamental security tasks of the alliance.

As part of its adaptation to the new security situation, NATO has since 1991 reduced the types and numbers of its substrategic nuclear forces in Europe by over 85 percent (almost 95 percent since the height of the Cold War). All nuclear artillery and ground-launched missiles have been completely eliminated. The peacetime readiness criteria for the allies' nuclear forces in Europe have been relaxed significantly, and these forces are no longer targeted at any country. Today, the only land-based nuclear weapons committed to NATO are nuclear

²⁸ NATO, "Fact Sheet: NATO on Weapons of Mass Destruction," released by NATO at the Washington summit, April 24, 1999, <<http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042409.htm>>.

bombs capable of being delivered by dual-capable aircraft. Moreover, the United Kingdom discontinued the nuclear role for the Royal Air Force in 1998.²⁹

Although NATO's nuclear forces remain a credible and effective element of the allies' strategy of preventing war, the alliance is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation. NATO itself is not a party to nuclear arms control agreements, which are handled on an individual or bilateral basis. However, the alliance has a keen interest in their successful implementation. There are only three nuclear states as members of NATO—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—but the collective security provided by the nuclear forces of the alliance is shared among all members of NATO.

The implementation of the July 1991 START I Agreement, providing for cuts of approximately 30 percent in the strategic forces of the United States and the former Soviet Union, and the entry into force of the January 1993 START II Agreement, are key elements of nuclear arms control. The START II Treaty, once implemented, will eliminate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads, and reduce by two-thirds the current levels of strategic nuclear weapons.

The U.S. withdrew its ground-launched and maritime tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) from Europe by July 1992. Other significant elements include the withdrawal of former Soviet TNW to the territory of Russia, for ultimate dismantlement, which was completed by May 1992. The Lisbon Protocol of May 1992, between the United States and the four states of the former Soviet Union that had nuclear weapons on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine), committed them to joint implementation of the START I Treaty.³⁰

The START II Treaty was signed on January 3, 1993, by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin. The treaty codifies the joint understanding signed by the two presidents at the Washington summit on June 17, 1992.

START III will be established by December 31, 2007, with a ceiling of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons for each of the parties, representing a 30 to 45 percent reduction in the number of total deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II. START III will include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. The Russian Federation has proposed a reduction of the overall threshold of up to 1,500 warheads, a more substantial reduction of nuclear arms than had been foreseen at Helsinki in March 1997.

A future START IV agreement would involve all declared nuclear nations. The goal of such a multilateral effort would be to substantially reduce global warhead inventories to the point where the declared powers would have some level of parity. Negotiation of the details of START IV are pending on negotiation and ratification of START III.

²⁹ NATO, "NATO's Nuclear Stance," NATO On-line Library, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-nusta.htm>>.

³⁰ Ibid.

Nuclear Weapons Convention³¹

A Nuclear Weapons Convention would prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use, and threat of use of nuclear weapons. States possessing nuclear weapons would be required to destroy their arsenals according to a series of phases over 15 years. The treaty would also prohibit the production of weapons-usable fissile material and require delivery vehicles to be destroyed or converted to make them nonnuclear capable. In the initial phases the United States and Russia are required to make the deepest cuts in their nuclear arsenals. In 1997, the UN General Assembly called for negotiations leading to the conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The resolution, which was introduced by Malaysia, was adopted with 115 votes in favor, 22 against, and 32 abstentions.

Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism Convention³²

A new convention to consider nuclear threats by terrorists would help to fill the gaps in efforts to combat international terrorism. A draft of this convention has been proposed by the Russian Federation and considered by the Legal Committee of the UN General Assembly. The work is centered in an ad hoc committee that was established in December 1996 by a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly.

The draft Convention on Nuclear Terrorism applies to the use or threat to use nuclear material, nuclear fuel, radioactive products or waste, or any other radioactive substances with toxic, explosive, or other dangerous properties. It covers the use or threat to use any nuclear installations, nuclear explosives, or radiation devices in order to kill or injure persons, damage property or the environment, or to compel persons, states, or international organizations to do or to refrain from doing any act. In this category of crimes are the unauthorized receipts through fraud, theft, or forcible seizure of any nuclear material, radioactive substances, nuclear installations, or nuclear explosive devices belonging to a state party.

Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons³³

The draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. At its fiftieth session, the UN General Assembly adopted, on December 12, 1995, resolution 50/71 E, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons," requested the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, and requested the Conference on Disarmament to report to the assembly on the results of those negotiations. The assembly stressed that an international convention banning the use of nuclear weapons was an important step in a phased

31 "Nuclear Weapons Convention," at <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/nwc/index.html>>.

32 "Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism Convention," at <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/nt/index.html>>.

33 "Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons," at <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/punw/index.html>>.

program towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, within a specified time framework. The Conference on Disarmament has been unable to undertake negotiations on this subject as called for by this and subsequent UN General Assembly resolutions.

Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions³⁴

President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin signed on May 24, 2002, the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under the treaty, the United States and Russia will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012, a target nearly two-thirds below current levels. This new, legally binding treaty codifies the deep reductions announced by President Bush during the November 2001 Washington/Crawford summit and by President Putin at that summit and a month later. It is part of the new strategic framework that the United States and Russia have established.

³⁴ "Fact Sheet: Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions," May 24, 2002, at <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/sort/fs-sort.html>>.

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