

The Kenya General Election: December 27, 2002

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The Kenya African National Union (KANU), which has ruled Kenya since independence in December 1963, suffered a disastrous defeat in the country's general election on December 27, 2002, winning less than one-third of the seats in the new National Assembly. The National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which brought together the former ethnically based opposition parties with dissidents from KANU only in October, emerged with a secure overall majority, winning no fewer than 126 seats, while the former ruling party won only 63. Mwai Kibaki, leader of the Democratic Party (DP) and of the NARC opposition coalition, was sworn in as Kenya's third president on December 30.

KANU's time had run out. In 1992, massive spending and divisions in the opposition had resulted in a narrow KANU victory; in 1997, the recruitment of popular opposition figures and even greater disarray in the opposition parties had produced an even narrower victory. In 2002, KANU leaders appeared to realize that the party stood little chance of victory against a united opposition, and most of them decided that they could live with a Kibaki presidency. As a result, the party failed to launch its anticipated campaign of bribery, rigging, and intimidation. KANU did bribe, it did rig, it did intimidate voters, but in a spasmodic, half-hearted manner, which merely ensured its defeat.

Kenya and the United States

What does this historic change mean for Kenya and for the United States' relations with the country? The new government enjoys widespread national support; there is a palpable sense of relief at the end of 24 years of authoritarian rule and a feeling of national renewal.

Although the new government may appear to lack the administrative experience of its predecessor, its general level of education and competence is higher than KANU's. Kibaki himself is singularly experienced, having served in a series of

senior ministerial positions from 1963 to 1991; new Minister of Education George Saitoti and Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka are also experienced hands; and the new administration includes several able technocrats who have held "shadow ministerial positions." The new government will be more self-confident and less suspicious of the United States than was the Moi regime. Several members know the United States well, and most of them recognize the crucial role that it has played in sustaining both opposition political parties and Kenyan civil society over the last decade.

The new Kibaki government will be as reliable an ally of the United States in the war against terrorism as President Moi's, and a more active and constructive partner in NEPAD and bilateral economic discussions. It will continue the former government's valuable mediating role in the Sudanese peace talks and will bring a much-needed new perspective to the Somali discussions in Eldoret. Although there are strains in the new government—particularly between the former opposition parties and its ex-KANU members—the new administration provides Kenya with a real opportunity to address its economic and social problems, to tackle corruption and the mismanagement of public funds, to rebuild its infrastructure, schools, and health services, and to restore ordinary Kenyans' confidence in their government and their future. Provided its two key figures—President Kibaki and Raila Odinga—continue to work closely together and to trust one another, the new government's secure majority in the National Assembly, bolstered by Kibaki's overwhelming popular majority in the presidential election, should ensure that it will have little trouble in passing legislation and expediting reforms.

NARC Victory or KANU Surrender?

The scale of Kibaki and NARC's victory was surprising. It exceeded the predictions of many commentators—including the author of this note—for a number of reasons. KANU leaders from President Moi on down seemed to accept that the national mood had finally turned against the regime. The attempt to revitalize the ruling party under the young Uhuru Kenyatta's leadership never really gathered momentum. Once Raila Odinga had shepherded former vice president Saitoti and cabinet ministers Joseph Kamotho, William ole Ntimama, and

Kalonzo Musyoka first into the Rainbow Coalition and then out of KANU into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in early October, “Project Uhuru” was in deep trouble.¹ Unlike in 1992, however, President Moi and other senior KANU figures were willing to let Kenyatta go down to defeat. Although some money was diverted from state coffers to the campaign, much less money was spent than in 1992 or 1997, and a considerable proportion of what was disbursed came from the coffers of the Kenyatta family rather than from the state or the personal accounts of President Moi and other KANU “big men.”

Unconfirmed reports suggest that KANU probably spent 10 billion shillings—less than one-third of 1992 spending—and probably half of this was provided by the Kenyatta family. Consequently, although individual KANU candidates spent large sums of money, the anticipated avalanche of funds from KANU headquarters never materialized. Kenyatta was not quite abandoned, but President Moi and his inner circle did not go out of their way financially to support his campaign.

Although he campaigned hard for Kenyatta and KANU, President Moi on several occasions during the last three weeks of the campaign signaled that he would accept a victory by Kibaki and NARC. His visit to Kibaki in hospital in London, on his way back from meeting President Bush, was unprecedented and was seen by the Kenya media as heralding Moi’s personal acknowledgment that Kibaki would be his successor. Moi’s remarks a few days later in his Jamhuri Day speech also seemed to indicate that he no longer believed that Kenyatta would win. NARC leaders sensed victory, while KANU activists became increasingly demoralized as they waited for the disbursement of funds that never came or, at least, never came in the anticipated quantities.

Secondly, and equally importantly, Kenyatta and KANU’s parliamentary candidates performed much less well than anticipated in three crucial regions—the southern parts of Western Province, Ukambani District in Eastern Province, and Coast Province—which include about one-fifth of the seats in parliament. In the Vihiga and Busia Districts of Western Province, KANU was virtually annihilated, winning only one constituency, despite Kenyatta’s selection of Musalia Mudavadi as his vice presidential running mate. NARC also swept to victory in the four Kamba districts. Five years ago, in the immediate aftermath of violent clashes in Likoni constituency near Mombasa, KANU had faced a serious revolt in parts of rural Coast Province. With less than three months to go to the 1997 election, the party had moved swiftly and ruthlessly to discard discredited politicians, enlisting new standard-bearers recruited from the opposition. The strategy

¹ For background on preelection maneuverings, see “Preview of Kenya’s December 27 National Elections,” *CSIS Africa Notes*, No. 12, December 2002.

worked, and KANU held on to virtually all of its rural Coast Province seats. There were few indications to suggest that the result would be different this time. Indeed, if anything, KANU appeared better placed in Kwale and Kilifi Districts than it had in the run-up to the 1997 election. KANU’s tried and trusted strategy, however, failed this time as NARC won not only all four Mombasa constituencies, but seven seats in the rural hinterland.

The Presidential Results

Kibaki defeated KANU’s Uhuru Kenyatta by 61.3 percent to 31.6 percent of the popular vote, while FORD-People’s Simeon Nyachae won 6.5 percent of the presidential vote, and James Orenge of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and Waweru Ng’ethe of Chama cha Umma, secured only 0.4 and 0.2 percent. Kibaki’s victory was overwhelming. He met the constitutional requirement of winning 25 percent of the vote in five provinces by reaching the 25 percent target in all eight provinces. His worst performance was in the Somali-populated Northeastern Province, where NARC won only one of the 11 parliamentary seats, and Kibaki himself secured 37.1 percent. As the DP’s presidential candidate in 1997, he had reached the target only in Central (88.6 percent), Nairobi (43.7 percent), and Eastern (28.2 percent). Kibaki’s biggest gains were in Western and Coast Provinces where his share of the presidential vote jumped from 1.4 percent to 74.9 percent and from 12.7 to 64.0 percent. In Rift Valley Province, his share increased from 20.9 percent to 43.0 percent; in Nyanza from 15.1 percent (mainly in the three Gusii Districts) to 58.9 percent (almost entirely in Luo-Nyanza); and in Northeastern from 21.1 percent to 37.1 percent.

Uhuru Kenyatta’s performance differed significantly from President Moi’s in 1992 and 1997. KANU’s presidential vote increased considerably in Central Province, rising from 5.6 percent to 30.0 percent, and holding steady in Nairobi where Moi had won 20.6 percent and Kenyatta took 20.7 percent. Outside the areas with large Kikuyu populations, however, KANU’s share of the vote fell. The collapse was greatest in Coast Province, where the revolt that KANU had managed to contain in 1997 now became fully evident with its share of the vote falling from 63.1 percent to 32.0 percent. The fall in Western Province was almost as great—and, indeed, cost the former ruling party 13 of its 15 parliamentary seats—declining from 46.0 percent to 21.6 percent. KANU’s decline was less precipitous in Eastern Province, where Moi had received 35.3 percent compared to Kenyatta’s 25.0 percent; in its ethnic heartland in the Rift Valley, where its share of the presidential vote fell from 69.4 percent to 53.0 percent; and in the isolated, pastoralist Northeastern Province, where it declined from 72.9 to 61.8 percent. As noted above, Kenyatta’s worst performance was in Nyanza, where he won only 7.8 percent of the vote compared to President Moi’s 23.5 percent in 1997, losing most

of KANU's Gusii supporters to Simeon Nyachae. Overall, Kenyatta reached 25 percent in five provinces, the same number as Moi in 1992 and 1997. (Tables I and II provide a breakdown of the presidential results.)

An Analysis of the Parliamentary Election Results

NARC's victory in the parliamentary election was, if anything, an even greater achievement. The differing sizes of Kenya's parliamentary constituencies favors the party that is strongest in the country's isolated, semiarid, pastoralist fringes (i.e., KANU) over the party(ies) that draw most of their support from the densely populated peasant farming regions and the main cities and towns (i.e., NARC). KANU, in fact, had a 20 percent advantage in the parliamentary contest, meaning that Kibaki had to defeat Uhuru Kenyatta by at least 20 percent of the popular vote to ensure that NARC won more seats in the National Assembly than KANU. In fact, NARC defeated KANU by more than 30 percent in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, ensuring that the new Kibaki government would have a secure parliamentary majority of 125 seats (132 with the additional nominated MPs) to the combined opposition's 85 (90 with the nominated MPs). For a brief province-by-province analysis, see annex.) Table III provides a breakdown of the new National Assembly by party and province.

Voter Turnout

Despite the enthusiasm that surrounded NARC campaign, turnout in the election was surprisingly low, much lower than in December 1997, as can be seen from table IV. There are several possible explanations for the fall in turnout. First, the decline in participation may, in fact, be less than it appears. Kenya's new rolling electoral register is seriously flawed. The Electoral Commission's district election coordinators attempted to update the registers and to remove voters who had moved or whom computerization revealed to be double registered. But in most rural areas, the recording of deaths is haphazard. The Institute for Education in Democracy calculated that perhaps 1 million people on the register were, in fact, dead. Roughly 2 percent of Kenyans die each year so over a five-year period approximately 10 percent of those on the 1997 electoral register will have died. In rural constituencies, however, fewer than 0.4 percent of the names on the register were removed because of death. If these deficiencies in the register were corrected, turnout would not be far below the 1997 level. Alternatively, the 1992 and 1997 official turnout figures—especially in the Rift Valley—may reflect rigging by KANU in its ethnic heartland, inflating the overall figure. Third, participation may have fallen because election day fell immediately after Christmas, and before the post-Christmas weekend, when many Kenyans return to their urban homes

from the countryside after the holiday—unlike in 1992 and 1997.

The Formation of the New Government

Although the new government does not entirely balance the diverse forces within NARC, President Kibaki valiantly attempted to balance factional and ethnic factors with the need to have an administratively experienced and loyal team. The new government, excluding President Kibaki, contains 14 National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) supporters (10 DP, 3 FORD-Kenya, and 1 National Party of Kenya), 11 LDP members (although some argue that Peter Anyang'-Nyong'o, who was an SDP-nominated MP in the previous parliament, belongs to NAK rather than the LDP), and 1 civil servant (Attorney General Amos Wako, who held the same post in the Moi governments since 1992). In terms of ethnicity, it has 5 Kikuyu members (6 if Minister of Education George Saitoti is counted as a Kikuyu rather than a Maasai), 5 Abaluhya (including Attorney General Amos Wako), 4 Luos, 2 Kalenjin, 2 Kamba, 2 Meru, 2 Mijikenda from Coast Province, 2 Maasai (if Saitoti is counted), and 1 Embu and 1 Somali.² This is a reasonably representative spread of the main ethnic communities.

In provincial terms, the Cabinet is even more balanced, including 5 members from Central Province, 5 from Eastern Province, 5 from the Rift Valley, 3 from Nyanza, 3 from Western Province, 2 from Coast Province, and 1 from Nairobi (Raila Odinga) and Northeastern Province. The representation from Nyanza and Western Provinces, of course, does not include the Luo and Abaluhya political leaders Raila Odinga and Vice President Wamalwa who, in fact, represent their community's diaspora in Nairobi and Trans Nzoia in the Rift Valley.

Five of its members (including President Kibaki and Attorney General Wako) have held ministerial positions before, and three have been assistant ministers. President Kibaki, Attorney General Wako, Minister of Education Saitoti, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Musyoka are NARC's most experienced members, although Najib Balala was a highly successful KANU mayor of Mombasa, and Minister of Transport and Communications John Michuki and Minister of Finance David Mwiraria are former permanent secretaries. Michuki also served in the late 1970s as chairman of the Kenya Commercial Bank, the country's largest joint-stock bank.

For the first time in Kenya's history, the new Cabinet includes three women members: Martha Karua (formerly DP) as minister for water development, Charity Ngilu (formerly DP,

² The Somali cabinet minister of labour and manpower, Ahmad Khalif, died in an airplane crash Friday, January 24.

SDP, and NPK) as minister of health, and newcomer Linah Kilimo (LDP) as minister of state in the Office of the Vice President. A former banker, Kilimo achieved a dual revolution in Marakwet East, an isolated Kalenjin area, by not only defeating KANU but also overcoming traditional prejudices against women. For the last five years, she has led the local World Vision campaign against female genital mutilation and has become a well-respected grassroots activist. In the previous 40 years, Kenya has had only one woman Cabinet member. The full composition of the Cabinet can be found in table V.

Strains are already beginning to emerge, however, within the victorious coalition. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), consisting of former KANU members and Luo supporters of Raila Odinga, to which 54 of the new NARC MPs claim allegiance, insists that it is a national party and should be treated as an equal partner of the NAK, rather than its 14 constituent parties—the DP, FORD-Kenya, the National Party of Kenya and others. Already, 26 LDP members of parliament, left out of the government, have accused President Kibaki of breaking the memorandum of understanding between the LDP and the NAK, which they claim promised equal representation in the new government. Kibaki's defenders insist that the agreement promised "equity not equality." NAK members gained 15 Cabinet positions and 15 assistant ministries, while LDP supporters hold only 8 Cabinet seats and 8 assistant ministries. This revolt by backbench members of the LDP parliamentary group is already tarnishing the new government's position, suggesting that the old patronage culture is alive and well. Raila Odinga, the LDP chief, and new minister of housing, roads, and public works has supported President Kibaki. He will have to work hard to assert control over his faction's dissident backbenchers, one of whose leaders is his elder brother Dr. Oburu Odinga.

President Kibaki and his colleagues will have to work hard to ensure that the nation's expectations are met. Kenya has won an opportunity to rebuild its infrastructure and social services, to counter corruption, and economically to surge ahead. Kenyans are confident that President Kibaki and NARC will deliver. Let us hope that they will not be disillusioned.

Annex: Province-by-Province Analysis

Coast Province

The biggest political changes occurred in Coast Province, formerly a KANU bastion, where the opposition coalition not only won all 4 Mombasa seats but made impressive gains in the rural hinterland, capturing all the seats in Kilifi, Malindi, and Kwale Districts. KANU held on only in the more isolated Tana River and Lamu Districts, and rather surprisingly, in Taita-Taveta. Long-serving Cabinet Minister Noah Katana Ngala, and Mombasa KANU boss Shariff Nassir were among the casualties. As a result, the political complexion of Coast

Province was transformed. KANU was reduced from 18 to a mere 7 of the 21 seats, while the constituent parties of NARC jumped from 2 to 11 MPs.

Nyanza Province

Elsewhere, the opposition coalition's victories were more predictable. KANU was routed in Nyanza, winning no seats. Ethnic voting was clearly evident with NARC and Mwai Kibaki winning all 21 Luo seats, plus Kuria (a surprise gain from KANU), while Simeon Nyachae and FORD-People won all 10 Gusii constituencies. Raila Odinga's domination of Luo politics was demonstrated yet again as his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faction of NARC humiliated SDP presidential candidate James Orengo and his supporters. Orengo lost his own Ugenya constituency to his brother-in-law Stephen Ondiek, the archbishop and head of the *Legio Maria*, a Luo-based breakaway from the Roman Catholic Church. The SDP's other candidates in Luo-Nyanza fared even less well despite the fact that some were well known, highly regarded figures. Ethnic unity overcame dissatisfaction with the imposition of approved candidates, and none of the defectors to the SDP secured more than 6,000 votes. Uhuru Kenyatta and KANU's parliamentary candidates performed abysmally, winning less than 1,000 votes in 13 of the 21 Luo seats.

KANU's defeat was even greater in the 3 Gusii Districts, although here the winner was Simeon Nyachae and FORD-People, which took all 10 constituencies in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. In 1997, despite being a KANU cabinet minister, Nyachae had thrown his support behind Kibaki's presidential bid with the result that the DP leader outpolled President Moi in the Gusii area by nearly two to one. This time, Nyachae's ex-KANU faction captured all 10 seats, humiliating Cabinet Minister Professor Sam Ongeru, who won only 30 percent of the vote in his own Nyaribari-Masaba constituency. Nyanza Province provided Uhuru Kenyatta's worst performance. The KANU presidential candidate won only 65,993 votes (7.8 percent), compared to Kibaki's 495,684 (58.9 percent), and Simeon Nyachae's 269,843 votes (32.0 percent).

Western Province

KANU's humiliation was, in some respects, even greater in Western Province, where it held on in only 2 constituencies—Nambale and Mount Elgon. Musalia Mudavadi's decision to stick with KANU rather than decamp to NARC (belatedly rewarded with the KANU vice presidential nomination), was repudiated by the voters in Vihiga and Busia Districts, KANU's former redoubt among the southern Abaluhya regions of Western Province. Vice presidential nominee Mudavadi even lost his own Sabatia constituency. In contrast to December 1997, when FORD-Kenya leader Michael Kijana Wamalwa's support was limited to his own Bukusu subgroup in Bungoma District, NARC won all but 1 of the 25 Abaluhya-

populated constituencies. The solitary exception was Nambale, where KANU Minister Chris Okemo held on—in a much-disputed result—by 924 votes. Local opposition leaders claim that the result was rigged and that the results declared at polling stations showed Patrick Olas, the NARC candidate, to have won. Reports to K-DOP (the Kenya-Domestic Observation Project) say that the presiding officer ordered all party agents to hand over their signed polling station returns and to leave the collation center, whereupon new ballot boxes, stuffed with votes for KANU, and new polling station result forms were introduced in a classic attempt to rig the result. Local NARC activists refused to accept Okemo's victory, and launched a series of protests in which five people were shot dead by the police on December 30.

Eastern Province

NARC also swept to victory in Eastern Province, where the three largest communities—the Kamba, Meru, and Embu—all voted decisively for Kibaki and NARC parliamentary candidates. KANU, however, held on in the northern parts of the province, among the seminomadic Boran, Galla, and Somali electorates. Minister of Agriculture (and former foreign minister) Bonaya Godana, one of KANU's few intellectuals, held North Horr comfortably in one of the last results to be declared. NARC and Kibaki, however, swept to victory in Meru, taking 7 seats to 1 each for KANU and Safina. Embu was more hotly contested: NARC won 2 seats by large margins, narrowly won Gachoka (where former KANU cabinet minister Jospeh Nyagah held on), and narrowly lost Siakago.

Ukambani also went solidly for Kibaki and NARC. The opposition coalition, led locally by former KANU presidential contender Kalonzo Musyoka, and the National Party of Kenya's Charity Ngilu—popularly known as “Mama Rainbow”—won 13 of 17 constituencies in the 4 Kamba Districts, while KANU carried only 1—Kaiti. The 3 other seats were won for FORD-People (Mutito), FORD-Asili (Kitui South), and Sisi kwa Sisi (Kangundo), by disgruntled losers in the NARC primaries who decamped to other political parties in order to contest the general election.

Central Province

NARC won an overwhelming victory in the northern Kikuyu districts of Central Province, the stronghold of Kibaki's DP in both 1992 and 1997. Unlike Wamalwa and Odinga, who imposed a number of candidates in their ethnic bailiwicks thereby circumventing the primary process, Kibaki maintained a strict neutrality. As a result, several of his long-time associates were repudiated by the voters in Nyeri District, and new candidates adopted to contest for NARC. In fact, Kibaki in Othaya and 1998 Kieni by-election winner Chris Murungaru (now minister of state in the Office of the President with responsibility for provincial administration and national security) were the only survivors among the incumbent MPs.

Despite these changes, Kibaki won an overwhelming majority of the presidential votes—over 90 percent—and NARC won resounding majorities in 4 of the 6 seats and held on against Safina in the others. Environmentalist Professor Wangari Mathai, became the new member of parliament for Tetu.

“Project Uhuru” made little headway in Murang'a and Maragua, Kenneth Matiba's former bastion. Despite widespread rumors that the former FORD-Asili leader would declare his support for Uhuru Kenyatta, given credence by the fact that his hand-picked successor as MP for Kiharu, Ngenye Kariuki, defected in mid-year from Safina to KANU (rewarded with a seat in Cabinet), the endorsement of KANU was one step too much for the ailing Matiba. Matiba's daily newspaper, *The People*, which is a serious drain on his depleted financial resources, consistently favored NARC and Kibaki, although with no great enthusiasm. Despite his waning political influence, Matiba's silence probably cost KANU five constituencies—Kiharu, Kigumo, Maragua, Kandara, and Gatanga—all of which were comfortably won by Kibaki and NARC parliamentary candidates.

On polling day, the Kenyatta family's influence was restricted to Thika and Kiambu Districts in southern Kikuyuland. Kenyatta easily won his own Gatundu South constituency—in marked contrast to 1997 when he secured only 31 percent of the vote—taking 94 percent. Arthur Magugu, MP for Githunguri from 1969–1992, and a Cabinet minister throughout the 1980s, easily reclaimed his seat, pushing the NARC incumbent Njehu Gatabaki, the publisher of *Finance*, into third place behind FORD-People. KANU also won Kiambaa where the DP incumbent Njenga Karume, one of Kenya's wealthiest businessmen, defected to KANU; Gatundu North where the SDP incumbent defected to KANU; Limuru and Lari, where KANU's old standard-bearers Kuria Kanyingi and Viscount James Kimathi, who were trounced in 1992 and 1997, won on Uhuru Kenyatta's coattails. Overall, KANU won 2 of the 4 seats in Thika District and 4 of the 5 constituencies in Kiambu, where the only opposition winner was Safina's Paul Muite, who held on narrowly in Kabete, despite allegations of receiving money from pro-KANU businessman Kamlesh Pattni, and misappropriating funds from a farmers' cooperative.

The results in southern Kikuyuland were a marked contrast with those at the last two elections. In December 1992, the whole region, with the exception of Kabete, was won by FORD-Asili candidates as part of the Matiba landslide. FORD-Asili also won overwhelming majorities on the county and town councils. In 1997, the region returned MPs from a diverse array of parties—4 SDP, 2 Safina, 1 DP, and 1 NDP, but no KANU—while Kibaki won landslide victories in all 8 constituencies in the presidential election. Matiba's 1992 victory, in particular, had seemed pathbreaking as little known

FORD-Asili candidates won overwhelming victories against a host of prominent DP candidates, closely associated with the Kenyatta family. Now, in complete contrast to the rest of the nation, Uhuru Kenyatta and KANU swept to victory in Kiambu and Thika, transforming southern Kikuyuland from one of the opposition's strongest redoubts into a KANU zone. Here, unlike in northern Kikuyuland, Kenyatta's personal following, strengthened by patronage, overcame identification with the opposition, providing KANU with its most conspicuous gains with 6 seats in the new National Assembly.

Rift Valley Province

Not surprisingly, KANU's last redoubt was in the central Rift Valley, although the former KAMATUSA alliance between the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu did not survive. Both the Maasai and the Turkana voted in favor of Kibaki and NARC, with the opposition coalition winning 4 of the 6 Maasai seats (the exceptions were Narok South and Kajiado Central), and 2 of the 3 Turkana constituencies. KANU survived narrowly in Turkana South, but even there Kibaki won the presidential vote. Samburu, by contrast, remained faithful to the former ruling party. The real battle in the Rift Valley, however, was for the Kalenjin vote—retiring President Daniel arap Moi's own community. Historically, the Kalenjin were the first community to witness the autocratic side of the Moi regime as the president moved swiftly in 1979, little more than a year after taking office, to assert complete control over his home area. Local opponents, especially radical MPs from the Nandi community, were rigged out of office. The clampdown continued in 1983 and reached a peak in 1988, during the “queueing” elections of that year when voters in the KANU primary were required to line up publicly behind photographs of their preferred candidate, and anyone who secured 70 percent of the primary vote was declared automatically elected to parliament and did not have to participate in the secret ballot election.

Faced by serious opposition, particularly in the Nandi and Kipsigi-populated districts, with the advent of multiparty politics KANU was compelled to permit relatively free and fair primaries to select its candidates for the 1992 and 1997 general elections. KANU won overwhelming majorities throughout the region in both the presidential and parliamentary elections in both 1992 and 1997, with several parliamentary seats returning KANU MPs unopposed, and President Moi gained over 90 percent of the vote in the majority of constituencies.

The collapse of Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) and the National Cereals and Produce Board during the last decade, however, have had a serious impact on the entire region. Living standards have fallen as household incomes have declined with the collapse of milk marketing. Uhuru Kenyatta's company, *Brookside*, which is now the main purchaser of milk in the Uasin Gishu and Keiyo, for example,

pays only 8 shillings a liter compared to 15 shillings by the old KCC. The mid-1990s were a particularly difficult period for the local economy. Estimates of absolute poverty in Uasin Gishu District, a former European farming area, which has been largely settled by landless Nandi and Keiyo, increased from 33.5 percent in 1994 to 42.2 percent in 1997. The situation in Marakwet, Nandi, and Bomet Districts was even more serious with absolute poverty indicators rising respectively from 27.2 percent to 47.8 percent, 41.7 percent to 64.2 percent, and 46.5 to 61.8 percent, over the same three years.

KANU, consequently, faced a serious revolt within its own ethnic heartland. Led by Kipruto arap Kirwa, the dissident KANU MP for Cherangany in Trans Nzoia, discontented Kalenjin politicians in Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, and Nandi Districts, organized focus groups to discuss the community's problems. Establishing contact with village elders and local women's groups, they began to prepare to launch a rival political party—the United Democratic Movement—in order to mobilize the Kalenjin community to support the opposition. The UDM was committed to working with Kenya's other ethnically based political parties as part of a broadly based opposition alliance. In the event, the fledgling UDM was swamped by the disintegration of KANU in July-October 2002, following President Moi's imposition of Local Government Minister Kenyatta as his favored successor. Few of the UDM activists had the financial resources to win the NARC primaries against much wealthier ex-KANU luminaries, such as Reuben Cheshire in Eldoret North or Mark Too in Eldoret South. In the end, only two survived the primaries: Kipruto arap Kirwa in Cherangany, and Stephen Tarus in Emgwen in north Nandi. Their grassroots work over the two years before the election, however, paid off as both were elected to the new National Assembly, providing NARC with 2 of its 3 seats in the Kalenjin heartlands.

David Throup, senior associate of the CSIS Africa Program, was coordinator of the international observers during Kenya's 1997 elections and a member of the EU team in 2002.

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Table I. Votes Cast in the Presidential Election

	Kibaki	Kenyatta	Nyachae	Orengo	Ng'ethe
Nairobi	281,535	76,007	8,751	863	297
Central	690,478	299,213	4,170	1,580	1,949
Eastern	733,776	249,906	9,392	3,913	2,170
Northeastern	29,798	49,641	737	70	36
Coast	223,979	111,795	11,934	1,406	649
Rift Valley	616,336	759,075	52,077	3,345	1,751
Western	507,386	146,582	17,826	3,437	1,865
Nyanza	495,684	65,993	269,843	9,361	1,064
TOTAL	3,637,318	1,839,575	380,097	24,547	10,344

Table II. Percentage Votes Cast in the Presidential Election*

	Kibaki	Kenyatta	Nyachae	Orengo	Ng'ethe
Nairobi	76.6%	20.7%	2.4%	0.2%	0.1%
Central	69.2%	30.0%	0.4%	0.2%	0.2%
Eastern	73.4%	25.0%	0.9%	0.4%	0.2%
Northeastern	37.1%	61.8%	0.9%	0.1%	0.0%
Coast	64.0%	32.0%	3.4%	0.4%	0.2%
Rift Valley	43.0%	53.0%	3.6%	0.2%	0.1%
Western	74.9%	21.6%	2.6%	0.5%	0.3%
Nyanza	58.9%	7.8%	32.0%	1.1%	0.1%
TOTAL	62.3%	30.6%	6.5%	0.4%	0.2%

* Based on incomplete figures calculated with 99 percent of the results in.

Table III. National Assembly by Party and Province

	NARC	KANU	FORD- People	Safina	Sisi kwa Sisi	FORD- Asili	Shiri- kisho	SDP
Nairobi	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Central	21	6	0	1	1	0	0	0
Eastern	22	9	1	1	1	2	0	0
Northeastern	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coast	11	7	2	0	0	0	1	0
Rift Valley	18	30	1	0	0	0	0	0
Western	22	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nyanza	22	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	125	64	14	2	2	2	1	0

Table IV. Percentage Voter Participation in the 1997 and 2002 General Elections

	Nairobi	Central	Eastern	North- eastern	Coast	Rift Valley	Western	Nyanza	National Turnout
1997	50.5	74.8	71.8	56.3	51.1	76.2	66.8	68.2	68.4
2002	42	67	61	60	45	62	56	55	58
Change	-8.5	-7.8	-10.8	+3.7	-6.1	-10.2	-10.8	-13.2	-10.4

Table V. The Kibaki Cabinet

Position	Name	Ethnicity	Province	Former Ministry	Party 1992	Party 1997	Party 2000
President	Mwai Kibaki	Kikuyu	Central	Finance (1969-82), Culture (1982-83), Home Affairs (1983-88), Health (1988-91)	DP	DP	NAK/ DP
Minister of State (Provincial Administration & National Security)	Chris Murungaru	Kikuyu	Central	-----	-----	DP (through by-election 1998)	NAK/DP
Minister of State (Public Service)	Geoffrey Parpai	Maasai	Rift Valley	-----	DP	DP	NAK/DP
Vice President & Leader of Gov't Business in National Assembly	Michael Kijana Wamalwa	Luhya	Rift Valley	-----	FORD-K	FORD-K	NAK/ FORD-K
Minister of State in VP office	Linah Kilimo	Kalenjin/ Marakwet	Rift Valley	-----	-----	SDP (KANU)	LDP
Minister of Finance	David Mwiraria	Meru	Eastern	-----	-----	DP	NAK/DP
Foreign Affairs	Kalonzo Musyoka	Kamba	Eastern	Foreign Affairs (1993-98), Education & Human Resources (1998-2001), Information & Tourism (2001-02)	KANU	KANU	LDP
Works & Housing	Raila Odinga	Luo	Nairobi	Energy (2001-02)	FORD-K	NDP	LDP
Education	George Kinuthia Saitoti	Maasai/ Kikuyu	Rift Valley	Vice President (1989-98; 1999-2002), Finance (1983-93), National Development & Planning (1993-99); Home Affairs (2001-02)	KANU	KANU	LDP
Home Affairs	Moody Awori	Luhya	Western	Assistant Minister (1993-2002)	KANU	KANU	LDP
Planning & National Development	Peter Anyang Nyongo	Luo	Nyanza	-----	FORD-K	SDP	LDP
Agriculture	Kipruto arap Kirwa	Kalenjin/Nandi	Rift Valley	Assistant Minister (1996-97)	KANU	KANU	LDP
Health	Charity Ngilu	Kamba	Eastern	-----	DP	SDP	NAK/NAPK
Justice & Constitutional Affairs	Kiraitu Murungi	Meru	Eastern	-----	FORD-K	DP	NAK/DP
Transport & Communication	John Michuki	Kikuyu	Central	Assist. Min. (1983-87)	FORD-Asili	FORD-People	NAK/DP

Table V. The Kibaki Cabinet (cont'd.)

Local Gov't	Karisa Maitha	Mijikenda	Coast	-----	KANU	DP	NAK/DP
Water Resources	Martha Karua	Kikuyu	Central	-----	DP	DP	NAK/DP
Energy	Ochillo Ayacko	Luo	Nyanza	-----	-----	NDP	LDP
Trade & Industry	Mukhisa Kituyi	Luhya	Western	-----	FORD-K	FORD-K	NAK/FORD-K
Land & Settlement	Amos Kimunya	Kikuyu	Central	-----	-----	-----	NAK/DP
Environment, Natural Resources & Wildlife	Newton Kalundu	Luhya	Western	-----	-----	FORD-K	NAK/FORD-K
Labour & Manpower	Ahmad Khalif	Somali	Northeastern	-----	-----	KANU	LDP
Cooperative Development	Peter Njeru Ndwiga	Embu	Eastern	-----	-----	DP	NAK/DP
Gender, Sports & Culture	Najib Balala	Arab/Mijikenda	Coast	Mayor of Mombasa	-----	KANU (local)	LDP
Tourism & Information	Raphael Tunju	Luo	Nyanza	-----	-----	-----	LDP