

Engaging Youth to Build Safer Communities

A Report of the CSIS Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Project

Project Directors
Frederick Barton
Karin von Hippel

Lead Researcher and Author
Steve Seigel

Contributors
Morgan Courtney
Sinead Hunt



August 2006



Engaging Youth to Build Safer Communities

A Report of the CSIS Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Project

Project Directors

Frederick Barton
Karin von Hippel

Lead Researcher and Author

Steve Seigel

Contributors

Morgan Courtney
Sinead Hunt

August 2006



About CSIS

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmakers committed to advancing global security and prosperity. Founded in 1962 by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS is a bipartisan, non-profit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., with more than 220 employees. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.

CSIS experts, working through more than 25 programs, conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives grouped under three themes:

Defense and Security Policy. Currently devoting over a third of its resources to security issues, CSIS has chosen to focus on both the traditional drivers of national security—defense policy and organization—and some of the most important new dimensions of international security, such as post-conflict reconstruction, proliferation, and homeland security.

Global Trends. A growing and more mobile population and advances in economics and technology have exposed the inability of nationally organized governments to respond to transnational challenges. A large number of international organizations, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental entities now exert significant influence over international affairs. CSIS examines not only how traditional nation-states themselves deal with problems that cross national boundaries, but also how they relate to this new and powerful group of actors.

Regions. CSIS is the only institution of its kind with resident programs on all the world's major regions. The programs enable CSIS to anticipate developments in key countries and regions across the world, especially as they affect global security.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

Cover photo: “night commuters,” by Tim Judah.

© 2006 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

CIP information available upon request

ISBN-10: 0-89206-491-9

ISBN-13: 978-0-89206-491-5

The CSIS Press

Center for Strategic and International Studies

1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: (202) 887-0200

Fax: (202) 775-3199

E-mail: books@csis.org

Web: www.csis.org/

Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Youth Security and Safety Programs	6
3. Core Findings and Principles	15
4. Strategic Recommendations: Enhancing Current Practice	20
5. Specific Action Steps	23
Appendix A. Protecting from Outsiders and Ourselves: Youth and Security in Rwanda	24
Appendix B. Persons Consulted	35
Appendix C. Additional Programs	36
Appendix D. Additional Readings	38

Introduction¹

Summary

Post-conflict environments are inherently insecure. Although cease-fires and peace agreements formally signal the end of large-scale fighting, periodic violence usually continues, and communities suffer in the absence of reliable and effective security forces and rule of law. These environments are also home to large populations of youth; some perpetuate violence, others contribute to rebuilding, and still others are marginalized. Yet the youth group in its entirety represents an enormous untapped potential that could help in the reconstruction process, particularly with regard to improving security. Unfortunately, they are typically viewed as part of the problem and are not considered as viable actors.

The CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project posits that youth can play a constructive role in building safer communities. The process of working with both youth and their community to increase safety includes:

- Reducing one potential driver of conflict—youth—by providing opportunities for those who might otherwise engage in violence and crime; and
- Engaging youth in specific programs that can help improve the safety of communities.

From taking part in foot and bicycle patrols, neighborhood watches, and early warning systems to providing crime reduction education, prevention strategies, and escort and first-responder services, youth have the capacity to contribute to safety and security when official mechanisms for protecting local communities are absent, ineffective, or in need of extra support. While not all youth are suited to participate in safety-building initiatives, many could help consolidate peace and reduce violence.

Youth engagement in security activities has been overlooked by program developers and donors. This report recommends that these should be included in the spectrum of activities in which post-conflict youth could engage. In addition to reviewing methodologies and specific programs, the PCR Project highlights core principles that have led to long-term success with youth in helping build safer communities.

1. This project was generously supported by funding from the Compton Foundation, with additional support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Overview

Restoring and maintaining public order is a significant challenge in post-conflict environments, for both international peacekeepers and new national security forces. A number of recent innovations have successfully enabled local citizens to participate more actively in building safer communities.

Such activities may include community policing and neighborhood watch systems; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants; early-warning systems; and patrols of unsafe areas. Other strategies approach security from a wider perspective, seeing positive youth engagement, economic rehabilitation, and rights education as critical components that must be included in these short-term solutions if security is to hold. Many insecure communities can benefit from programs that have developed effective, nonviolent, holistic, and community-based techniques to improve security. Most of these programs have been locally driven and, thus, are better tailored to meet the specific needs of their communities, rather than those generated by external actors and donors.

In a few cases, youth have been considered as essential partners in this process, and this makes demographic sense. Almost 50 percent of the world's population is under the age of 25.² In Africa and South Asia in particular, children and youth together make up more than 60 percent of the total population,³ and approximately 85 percent of all youth live in developing countries.⁴ Today's youth bulge is the largest in modern times. As noted, youth are often active participants in conflict. Militias, armed groups, and gangs have mobilized youth for their own gains, evidenced by the estimated 300,000 young soldiers currently involved in armed conflict.⁵ Yet they are rarely involved in rebuilding their societies in a constructive manner, even though viable alternatives exist. Donors, implementing partners, and local citizens can help make communities safer by considering strategies to engage youth in safety practices.

This report will recommend inclusive approaches for youth in post-conflict settings with the intent of persuading programmers and policymakers to view youth as critical partners in realizing community safety. In addition, the report aims to complement recent initiatives that have effectively mobilized youth participation in post-conflict reconstruction and offer additional ideas for change and improvement.

2. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), *State of World Population 2005: The Promise of Equality* (New York: UNFPA, 2005), http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/pdf/en_swp05.pdf.

3. World Bank, "Why Invest in Children & Youth?" Washington, D.C., <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTCY/0,,contentMDK:20243901~menuPK:565261~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:396445,00.htm>.

4. UNFPA, *State of World Population 2005*.

5. This estimate has remained unchanged since 2001, as quoted by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, and may not accurately reflect the number of youth currently involved in armed conflict. See <http://www.child-soldiers.org>.

Current Approaches to Youth Programming

In many post-conflict societies, youth are viewed either as perpetrators of violence or as victims needing to be protected. Many internationally administered programs focus on protecting young people's rights and securing their well-being, increasing their economic contributions, and promoting their social and political participation. These approaches have had a significant positive impact on the lives of young people in war-torn environments.

The "child protection" rubric frames most approaches to youth in post-conflict societies. Using the international Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as a core document, many prominent international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have designed child protection programs in order to create safe spaces and offer services for children and youth who have lived through conflict.⁶ Although child protection initiatives offer tangible benefits to participants, there is room for older youth to take a more active role in helping improve safety following conflict.

Defining Youth

For the purposes of this study, *youth* refers to those individuals in the transitional phase between childhood and adulthood, who have a substantial capacity to contribute to society, but who may not be considered full adult participants by way of either local customs or international standards. This study recognizes the need to take into account local functional conceptions and sociocultural perceptions of youth, but views the target group as roughly between the ages of 15 and 20. It is this group that is typically recruited by warlords, gangs, and militias, and it is this group that communities must enable to participate in peacebuilding activities. A program director from Catholic Relief Services remarked that youth was "the population that is the most overlooked and least targeted." With the diversity of post-conflict environments, in addition to the various levels of influence accorded to youth in different cultures, this study emphasizes the need for contextual analysis before practical implementation can occur. Each culture's perception of its younger generation will influence the efficacy of programs that incorporate youth into security and safety programming.

Some youth programming is dedicated to school and vocational training, with economic incentives and educational opportunities viewed as key to turning youth away from violence. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the U.S. Congress appropriated \$100 million and \$200 million for basic education programs in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively,⁷ and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its Education Strategy in which it states that "Some USAID programs may seek to provide learners with both basic education and specific job skills. This might be the case where

6. Including: UNICEF's child protection program, the World Bank's Global Child Labor Program, the International Labor Organization's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor, and numerous others.

7. Elizabeth Stites, "Basic Education: A Review of USAID's de facto Basic Ed Strategy," RESULTS Educational Fund, Washington, D.C., December 2004.

local analysis indicates that programs be directed toward illiterate adults and out-of-school adolescents, or toward demobilized soldiers in fragile states emerging from crisis and conflict.”⁸ The UK Department for International Development (DFID) also offered programs targeting skills and job training as foundations of state stability and economic advancement. However, education and vocational training may be seen as

“The focus can’t be just on youth. The emphasis should be on the security of the population and what is in their best interest.”—USAID Program Officer

pointless unless it offers reliable job opportunities. At the same time, money and jobs are scarce, and many youth find banditry and intimidation more lucrative.

Other programs focus on civic learning and positive social and political participation. A number of organizations have developed projects that help bring youth

into civil society, from participation in media and other forms of communication to political education and youth-run organizations.⁹ These programs prioritize youth voices and include them in the cultural, political, and social debates that will influence the reconstruction of their country.

International and local communities still overlook youth capacities for action in the sphere of security and safety. In doing so, they lose an essential ally that can assist in building safer communities, and they may miss out on incentives that can keep youth from turning toward violence.

These youth—gang leaders, drug runners, drug dealers—all have incredibly sophisticated abilities relating to their area of work: leadership, experience in supply and demand, creating a market, working with suppliers, and working with labor management and economics. They’re smart. Give them something to do that relates to what they already know.”—Program Director, Search for Common Ground

Alternative Strategies

In the absence of sufficient and legitimate security providers, communities may develop ad hoc—and potentially damaging—solutions to cope with insecurity. Warlords, local justice councils, informal police forces, private security groups, and vigilante justice mechanisms can fill the security vacuum. While some of these techniques have perpetuated violence, others have proven effective in providing security.

In some instances, such as in remote communities in Liberia or hazardous

envazións in Colombia, security forces have been unwilling to intervene or unable to

8. For example: the Nigeria Youth Education and Self-Reliance (YES) project, the EQUIP-3 Youth Trust, the Liberia Transition Initiative’s Youth Education and Life Skills (YES) project, and the Afghanistan Primary Education Program. Also see USAID, *Education Strategy: Improving Lives through Learning* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, April 2005), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/education_policy05.pdf.

9. Agencies, commercial development firms, and NGOs, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Search for Common Ground, and the Women’s Commission on Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC), have played a prominent role in cultivating civic participation programs.

offer protection. When insecurity is the norm, youth are more likely to seek order and safety in the form of an armed group, regardless of its ideology or behavior.¹⁰ If youth are given the chance to offer positive contributions to safety, there may be a greater opportunity both to improve security and to limit participation in violent groups.

The CRC—and child protection—is essential for promoting child rights and defining key protocols for protecting youth from danger. In post-conflict environments, however, many of the opportunities and services mandated in the CRC may not be provided by the state due to insecurity, lack of capacity, and absence of funding. Although greater donor commitments may increase protection for youth in these environments, obligations to child protection alone cannot reduce many of the threats that continue to afflict post-conflict regions. In Logar and Uruzgan provinces in Afghanistan, for instance, young women do not attend school for fear of violent attacks and burnings. Thousands of children near Gulu town in northern Uganda walk treacherous stretches of roads between camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and larger towns, attending schools during the day, and finding shelter at night in larger towns, due to fears of attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army.

If the environment is not secure, many of the CRC's promises will remain unfulfilled. Much is still missing—youth are exposed to enormous risk by virtue of living in unprotected communities, and many perpetuate the problems. How can the current risk-filled environment be improved by youth? This report attempts to answer this question.

Methodology

The methodology was designed to take into account the views and expertise of practitioners and researchers while remaining aligned with local concerns and realities. For this study, PCR Project staff reviewed 35 programs that engaged youth in community safety practices, both internationally and in the United States. Additionally, staff compiled and reviewed 130 resources on youth and the broader issues of community safety in post-conflict environments (the bibliography is found at the end of this report).

Given the general paucity of program evaluations and lack of third-party assessments, however, the PCR Project reached out to experts and practitioners to collect more detailed analyses of programs. Interviews were conducted with approximately 30 program officers, headquarters staff, social workers, researchers, and heads of organizations focused on youth engagement and community safety.

PCR Project staff also incorporated the opinions and criticisms of youth in urban schools and at-risk youth centers. A consultant provided a portrait of youth engagement in community safety in western Rwanda. By soliciting assessments and ideas from the youth themselves, and by discussing analyses with program officers and community members, the consultant developed an initial exploratory tool to illustrate the recommendations and evaluations of this report in a specific context. The consultant's paper is included as an appendix hereto.

10. R.L. Punamaki, "Can Ideological Commitment Protect Children's Psychological Well-being in Situations of Political Violence?" *Child Development* 67 (1996).


Youth Security and Safety Programs

New Strategies for Youth

Ten innovative programs illustrate how youth can play a positive role in increasing safety. These programs can offer substantial benefits to communities, such as reducing and preventing crime, increasing police responses, transforming violent youth, creating effective crime reduction strategies, preventing violence, and educating local citizens. In some instances, the benefits may not outweigh the costs of placing youth in potentially hazardous situations. Nevertheless, they should be considered as potential options.

The following program descriptions come from diverse regions of the world, and not all are from post-conflict societies. All are instructive, however, and offer relevant lessons and innovative solutions, whether it is a creative approach to integrating technology or an unorthodox method of collaborating with police.

Spectrum of Youth Security and Safety Activities



Security and Safety Providers

Unarmed Patrols—Swakopmund, Namibia

Swakopmund Youth Against Crime (SYAC) is a youth-led and managed program to increase local safety, and includes patrols, community safety council meetings, and civic engagement activities.

CONTEXT. In the coastal town of Swakopmund, Namibia, local residents complained that police were nonresponsive to calls for help; the police in turn cited a lack of manpower and resources as reasons why they could not respond effectively.

PROGRAM. SYAC started as a grassroots, volunteer initiative to help police maintain security. A young Namibian named Paulus Shoopala first mobilized a group of local youth to perform night patrols on area beaches. Initial success with the patrols and approval from Swakopmund government officials led Shoopala to recruit a larger group of unemployed and out-of-school boys from 17 to 20 years old for organized patrols of the greater central business district. The group consisted of five patrols, comprising four to five individuals dressed in civilian clothes, maintaining a visible presence in the city center all day. In addition, individual members occasionally performed unaccompanied foot patrols of targeted locations. Volunteers were often equipped with radios, and occasionally bicycles, to speed up their ability to contact police in an emergency.

The mayor of Swakopmund noted the success of these initiatives and worked with the youth to launch the SYAC volunteer organization, which now partners with the Namibian Police, the Swakopmund town council, and the Chamber of Commerce. Together, they devised effective crime prevention and patrolling strategies and drew on local businesses to receive in-kind payments, such as bicycles and food, to help the SYAC carry out its mandate.

In 2002, the Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID), with assistance from USAID, made note of SYAC's achievements in crime prevention and civic participation. NID provided a grant to replicate Youth Against Crime (YAC) programs in other regions of Namibia¹ and supported capacity building and advocacy for local and national governments. In addition to crime prevention and patrolling, YAC activities also include voter education, volunteerism, and civic engagement.

SYAC has helped improve police accountability and effectiveness, which has had a considerable effect on how Swakopmund perceives its current state of security.²

“When there are unreliable police, lots of excuses are made. When crimes in the central business district happened, the police said they didn’t have manpower. Instead of criticizing the police, the youth figured out how to assist them.”—Program Officer, Namibia Institute for Democracy

1. Youth Against Crime organizations exist now in Otjozondjupa, Caprivi, Karas, Oshana, Omu-sati, and Kavango regions.

2. Although Swakopmund noted a decrease in crime following the inception of SYAC, Namibian crime statistics are considered largely unreliable. Therefore, we cannot attribute a reduction in crime directly to SYAC's activities.

For more information, see <http://www.nid.org.na/index.htm>.

Reporting and Monitoring—Liberia

Youth Crime Watch Liberia (YCWL) promotes youth as central actors in crime prevention and safety at local and national levels.

CONTEXT. Following the departure of President Charles Taylor in 2003, Liberia faced the challenge of establishing security in a context of numerous and violent rebel groups, armed factions, and government-supported militias. Youth played a significant role in the conflict—experts estimate that 25 to 75 percent of all combatants in the conflict were youth or children. Many internationally funded programs were set up to assist both the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia (ECOWAS-ECOMIL) in the process of DDR and in promoting peace and security throughout the country.

PROGRAM. Youth Crime Watch (YCW) originated as a crime prevention and neighborhood safety program in the United States. Since its inception, it has established programs in 12 other countries. YCW includes the following activities in their mission to improve safety: anonymous crime reporting,³ radio-assisted youth patrols, mentoring, mediation, drug and crime prevention education, conflict resolution training, and peer and cross-age teaching.⁴ The different country offices determine which aspects of the YCW curriculum best match local community safety needs. Central to any YCW program is the requirement that youth take leadership roles, from assessing problems and drafting courses of action to publicizing, promoting, and configuring the sustainability of programs.

Using 12 schools as the primary venues for organizing programs and recruiting volunteers,⁵ YCW youth participants have developed anonymous reporting systems to exchange information with the newly established Liberian National Police (LNP) and UNMIL's civilian police force. The schools proved to be effective venues for organizing youth programs as they provided adult supervisory structures and a large base for recruitment. Relying on anonymous tip boxes and preexisting emergency hotlines, YCWL participants divulged information about mob violence, drug abuse, and theft. In addition to these school-based programs, YCWL is looking to expand to rural locales where the education infrastructure is minimal, but where recruitment for armed groups and militias remains uncontrolled.⁶ YCWL also sought accreditation at the national level to provide governmental legitimacy, which in turn allowed YCWL to expand more easily throughout Liberia.⁷

3. In unofficial conversations with implementers, the practice of reporting can be seen in some local contexts as an activity carried out by “informants,” such as in Jamaica where there is considerable stigma attached to communicating with police.

4. Social Program Evaluators and Consultants (SPEC), Inc., and Partners in Evaluation and Planning, *Youth Crime Watch of America: 2001–2002 National Outcome Study* (Detroit: SPEC, 2003).

5. YCWL has 12 programs in high schools across the country.

6. YCWL, unlike its counterparts in the United States and other countries, chose not to establish a youth patrol component. Due to the recent end of civil conflict and the ongoing process of reintegration and rehabilitation of youth ex-combatants, YCWL has determined that youth patrols too closely resemble the organizational structures of armed groups and militias; youth participation in patrols, they believe, could potentially undermine or reverse advances in the DDR process.

For more information, see <http://www.ycwa.org/world/liberia/index.html>.

Conflict Intervention—South Africa

Community Peace Workers (CPW) empowers youth to manage conflicts and encourage dispute resolution techniques. By combining patrols with livelihood development, CPW promotes security and creates future opportunities for youth.

CONTEXT. South Africa today faces continued challenges of poverty and violence. Unemployment hovers between 25 and 40 percent, and violent crime is endemic. Municipal enforcement authorities, particularly in large urban areas, have been reluctant to tackle the issue of youth and high levels of criminality, and few programs have offered solutions that provide positive opportunities and mitigate violence at the same time.

PROGRAM. The CPW program, part of the Urban Conflict Management Peace and Development Project, funded by the German development agency, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ), and administered by its implementing partner, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), places youth at the center of local violence prevention. CPW recruits 100 youth each year—half men, half women—to participate in a yearlong program of patrolling, crime intervention, and victim support activities. Participants are asked to perform daily patrols in their community, resolve disputes between neighbors and among families, monitor drug trade activity, and assist in providing safety escorts to schools. They are trained in conflict mediation and asked to intervene when necessary, despite the potential risk to their own safety. They are also offered life-skills education in leadership and career counseling in exchange for their services—over 75 percent of participants secure jobs or start their own businesses after completing the program.

The program's dedication to positive outreach allows its participants to gain a high level of trust with members of the community, which leads to more effective interventions and crime prevention campaigns. The peace workers cooperate with local governments and civil society, including police, ministries, schools, community safety forums, and social work organizations. Although CPW does not publish statistics related to its impact on crime reduction, program officers claim that communities have benefited significantly.

For more information, see <http://www.gtz.de/en/praxis/11629.htm>.

Patrollers, Safety Multipliers, and Police Apprentices—Clearwater, Florida

AmeriCorps Clearwater in Florida increases community safety by pairing young volunteers with police officers. It also provides community development services and augments law enforcement staff.

CONTEXT. In the late 1990s, Pinellas County, Florida, was one of the state's three worst counties with respect to crime rates. In response to the high crime index, county

7. Including certificates of accreditation from the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Youth and Sports, in addition to a memorandum of understanding with the Liberia National Police. YCWL does not at present receive financial backing from the government.

police forces and local citizens decided that community-oriented policing practices were needed to improve local safety and bring the citizens and police together.

PROGRAM. AmeriCorps Clearwater forged a beneficial partnership between youth volunteers and local law enforcement (the Clearwater Police Department). Each group of participants —approximately 13 individuals over the age of 18—serves as a support team for police by conducting crime reporting, patrolling, and auxiliary investigations for one year. They perform daytime and evening patrols of parks, recreational sites, beaches, “sensitive sites,”⁸ and school grounds. Participants also help police investigate fires, plane crashes, and car accidents and help document and report crimes. In 2005, the group saved the police department \$181,197 by providing almost 5,000 patrol hours.

Even though Clearwater participants are not official law enforcement personnel, they act as safety multipliers and bolster police monitoring capacity. Should they wish to pursue a career in law enforcement, they benefit from on-the-job training, police academy preparation and sponsorship, and help with job placement. Participants are also given a modest stipend of \$10,200 annually, based on a 40-hour work week. On top of tasks directly related to law enforcement, they indirectly assist community safety by forging relationships between the police and the community they serve. Outreach and citizen participation are central components of the program. Participants create and direct volunteer activities that engage Clearwater residents, from bicycle safety courses and student mentoring to community revitalization projects and neighborhood watches.

For more information, see <http://www.clearwaterpolice.org/ameriCorps/index.asp>.

Beneficial Collaboration

Youth and Community-based Policing—Smiany, Slovakia

The Junior Police Venturers program in Smiany, Slovakia, brought together youth, citizens, and police officers to create a law enforcement model based on community collaboration.

CONTEXT. In Slovakia in the late 1990s, most citizens viewed the police with great skepticism. Over 80 percent of the population reported a lack of confidence in police, as law enforcement was ineffective in addressing growing crime trends and reaching out to the public. After the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1990, law enforcement was greatly decentralized, and municipal police forces took on a substantial portion of local law enforcement responsibilities, allowing for an increased ability to meet the specific needs of each community.

PROGRAM. Jan Vitko, a Slovak police officer, recognized the opportunity to make youth a core focus of municipal law enforcement and received a grant in 1998 from the Ashoka Fellows Program⁹ to implement his vision for a more community-focused

8. As determined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

9. Ashoka is a global nonprofit organization that provides international development assistance by funding innovative approaches to social entrepreneurship.

enforcement model. The goals of the project were threefold: (1) to allow young people to address and participate in improving the large crime problem in the region; (2) to provide a forum for young people to engage with law enforcement personnel; and (3) to make law enforcement more community driven. The programs began with three weeks of training; youth from the ages of 13 to 17 were brought in from villages and towns across the country. In addition to learning about the sources and nature of crime, and how to work with police to address these problems, the participants learned practical skills, such as first aid and public speaking that would help them reach out to peers and community members.

After returning home, the youth organized meetings and presentations for their peers at local schools to disseminate lessons and knowledge gained from the program. They also organized local working groups and devised crime prevention projects that required input and participation from the community, local police, and government officials. In addition, the program worked with support groups composed of adults from the community—including police officers, teachers, and parents—to underpin activities, provide a source of leverage, and lend legitimacy to the youth's efforts.

For more information, see http://www.ashoka.org/global/aw_ce_slovakia.cfm.

Private-sector Engagement—Revenge, Venezuela

Proyecto Alcatraz in Revenge, Venezuela, offers gang offenders the chance to avoid prison by participating in a program that seeks behavior change and positive contributions to society.

CONTEXT. In 2003, a security guard for the Venezuelan rum company C.A. Ron Santa Teresa was attacked and mugged by three members of a local gang. When one of the attackers was finally brought to the police, the company's president, Alberto Vollmer, requested that the youth be given the choice between going to jail and working for him for three months without being paid. The youth chose the latter and asked that other members of his gang be incorporated into the plan.

PROGRAM. From this informal beginning, Proyecto Alcatraz grew into a work, study, and rehabilitation program for area gang members. The structure has remained largely unchanged: participants complete three months of unpaid farming and fire control and take part in counseling and life-skills education. During that time they are held to strict standards, play rugby, and begin educational and vocational classes. After finishing the compulsory labor, they are able to choose paid employment and apprenticeships in coffee growing, architecture, and woodworking.

The project currently has around 130 participants and graduates and has contributed to reduced violence and lower crime rates in Revenge, in addition to fostering community solidarity. Local security forces noted a 40 percent reduction in area crime, and several gangs have been completely disarmed through participating in Proyecto Alcatraz. Furthermore, Proyecto Alcatraz is part of a municipal initiative that aims to

"If I hadn't had this opportunity, I would still be carrying my pistol and might be dead or in jail."—Cara de Leon, Proyecto Alcatraz Graduate

bring together community leaders, civil society organizations, government authorities, security forces, and private businesses to create a larger strategic plan for the region.

For more information, see <http://www.proyectoalcatraz.org>.

Alliances with Police and the Community—Guatemala

In Guatemala, two community programs have promoted youth as partners for reducing violent crime: the Youth Alliance Program (PAJ) and the U.S. embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS).

CONTEXT. After the official end of civil conflict in 1996, Guatemala's post-conflict recovery suffered setbacks from high levels of crime and violence. In particular, Guatemala experienced a surge in gang activity, which has had a significant impact on the general population while affecting youth in particular. Most gang members are under 24, and the recruits are getting younger each year.¹⁰

PROGRAM. The Youth Alliance Program (PAJ), funded by USAID and implemented by Creative Associates Inc., worked to reduce violence and gang activity by forming an alliance of local NGOs dedicated to integrating youth in the development of crime prevention and safety strategies. The PAJ offered grants for youth support centers to provide vocational skills training, job placement programs, computer skills development courses, accelerated education programs, and day care centers for children of at-risk youth. The PAJ also organized crime prevention councils that brought together local citizens, at-risk youth, and police personnel. These councils developed strategies tailored

"Most youth programs look to engage only the good youth, not the risky ones. It's a numbers game. These programs that engage the good ones are fine, but they can only do so much, and if you never take care of the other population, you'll never get away from the problems."—Community Policing Consultant

to each community, conducted outreach, and mediated between gang members and police.

In addition to the PAJ, USAID has initiated a partnership with the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the U.S. embassy in Guatemala to offer new approaches to gang violence, blending law enforcement with more community-oriented policing methods. As part of this project, a confidential hotline for the reporting of gang violence and any other criminal activity has been established, and new pilot programs are being developed to incorporate community-based policing methods into existing justice sector and law enforcement structures.

Soccer Matches to Increase Safety—Global

Soccer matches have been used all over the world as a way to foster peacebuilding, reconciliation, and civic engagement. In several instances, though, soccer matches have been used to forge advantageous partnerships between youth and security forces, which have had positive impacts on local security. By providing an open, unarmed, and non-

10. USAID and Creative Associates International, Inc., *USAID Gang Impact Assessment: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, December 2005).

confrontational activity, the organizers were able to bring together two adversarial groups. This enabled gang members and policemen to generate informal connections that helped communities combat crime, disarm gangs, and reduce conflict.¹¹

PROGRAM. One development specialist with Latin American gang experience found soccer matches to be useful in building trust and forging communication between gang members and police.

The matches began with the gang members and police personnel on opposing teams. At halftime the teams were mixed together, so that the two groups were required to cooperate with each other to win the game. The contact allowed both parties to see each other as individuals with names, faces, and lives separate from their affiliations. This, in turn, helped build trust. There have been incidents when gang members have contacted police forces in informal channels after these games to inform them of future violent activity and gang warfare.¹² In this way, the police have been able to play a more preventive role.¹³

Similarly, Right to Play, an international humanitarian NGO that operates in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, organizes sports programs for youth, many of which are designed to reduce the causes of conflict and increase civic participation as a way of making communities safer. Right to Play programs directly target at-risk and vulnerable youth affected by conflict, including refugees, internally displaced persons, ex-combatants, youth with disabilities, and especially girls. The organization provides trained coaches, sports equipment, and facilities and creates a neutral and safe environment in which youth can safely learn and play sports.

For more information, see <http://www.righttoplay.com>.

Comprehensive Youth-focused Disarmament and Development— Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Viva Rio is an NGO located in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, with a primary focus on disarmament. It has targeted all aspects of community safety and has devised innovative methods of improving security in over 350 local communities.

CONTEXT. It is estimated that 8 million Brazilians own guns. Approximately 39,000 Brazilians die from firearm wounds every year, and one out of four young Brazilians dies from gun-related injuries. In Rio de Janeiro, urban slums—called *favelas*—are home to rampant crime, high murder rates, and endemic insecurity.

11. Play for Peace, a USAID-funded and sponsored soccer match in Haiti, intended to increase trust between citizens and police forces (and help boost participation in a national disarmament campaign), ended in violence when Haitian police officers began firing into the crowd. The result was a backsliding in disarmament efforts and a significant rift between the communities and officers dispatched to the areas (Martissant and Grand Ravine). See “Disorder after Deadly Match,” *Newsday* (N.Y.), August 28, 2005.

12. The tactic of engaging with gangs directly has been reduced or eliminated in Guatemala due to safety concerns. A number of gang members who tried to leave gangs, or members who spoke with police, received death threats and were killed.

13. This role requires a great deal of voluntary self-restraint and has great potential to be abused by officers who will exploit trust and take advantage of vulnerabilities revealed in the name of conflict prevention. Several experienced practitioners have noted this possibility should the police chiefs and officials prioritize enforcement over conflict mitigation tactics.

PROGRAM. Viva Rio was established in 1993 following a series of kidnappings and the murder of eight children in one of Rio's *favelas*. In response to the rising trends of violence in the area, Viva Rio initiated a number of voluntary disarmament activities. To boost its effectiveness, further promote peace, and improve safety in Rio, the organization has expanded its scope to offer a wide array of services and opportunities for communities, targeting youth as the most important actors.

The organization's effectiveness comes from its ability to confront the issues of violence and safety from multiple perspectives—law enforcement personnel, witnesses, perpetrators, and survivors. Viva Rio recognized that reintegration and disarmament will not take hold if there are not sufficient economic and social incentives to keep youth away from engaging in violent activity, and it has developed specific services to draw youth into closer contact with their community with the end goal of reducing violence. In addition, it addressed the needs of those who are currently responsible for providing protection—police—and sought new ways of improving their relationship with local communities. In order to achieve its goals in improving community safety, Viva Rio offered community-oriented police training as a way to improve police responsiveness to community needs. In addition, it funded research focused on improving understanding and spreading awareness of children in organized armed violence (COAV).

Viva Rio's holistic approach helps to attract a diverse crowd of participants and increases its influence and credibility with the local population. Viva Rio has also leveraged its strength by partnering with hundreds of institutions in the area, including other domestic NGOs, religious institutions, labor unions, police battalions, government agencies, and private businesses. This has granted Viva Rio and its beneficiaries access to a vast array of resources, staff, and expertise.

For more information, see <http://www.vivario.org.br/english/>.

Core Findings and Principles

Youth are shaped by the environment in which they live. At the same time, they have a tremendous capability to influence the health and well-being of that community, and given the opportunity, they can provide it with a positive shape and direction. Because of this, three central elements of success emerge for programs that engage youth in building safer communities. First, programs in which youth actively contribute to the design, execution, and leadership have a higher degree of sustainability and success. Second, an understanding of local contexts and culture allows experienced program organizers to tailor approaches appropriately. Third, holistic approaches that incorporate the social, political, economic, and legal needs of youth will target immediate and long-term needs.

Youth need to feel ownership over the process of building safer communities. “Community safety” implies social inclusion; the process of creating safe communities should consist of broad participation and community buy-in, and youth must take part in pinpointing issues and devising solutions.

Additionally, community stakeholders have the best understanding of the needs, problems, culture, and language of their own community. Internationally organized programs designed to help youth may prove ineffective if program officers cannot communicate with citizens or comprehend local contexts. In one home for demobilized youth in northern Uganda, for example, the expatriate program manager could neither speak nor understand several of the regional languages spoken by the youth, thus limiting the results the program had intended to achieve.

Holistic approaches that address youth rights, economic challenges, and social and political activity will provide the most benefit. Many of the programs evaluated began with a narrow focus—often security—but recognized the value in expanding program activities to meet other needs. Viva Rio, for instance, has developed a number of additional programs to meet such needs. Swakopmund Youth Against Crime has also

“The case for targeting youth is clear. If you have a person of 17 years who was forced to be a child soldier and in charge of other child soldiers [and] who has developed leadership skills and societal skills, cognitive and evaluative skills, why not utilize skills—why not use these skills for healing and transforming the community? They have experienced a lot, they have strategies, and they have survived—so why not tap into that?”—Representative, Youth in War to Peace Transitions

focused on civic engagement and voter education, in addition to security. Though youth are capable agents in the sphere of community safety, they have many needs that cannot be addressed solely by narrowly focused programs.

The structural and educational elements of each program are therefore critical. These aspects not only show youth how they can contribute, and educate them on the existing agents that are meant to provide security, but also work with the community to ensure that youth contributions are not stymied. This happens by:

- Providing youth with a sense that they can contribute to safety/security and empowering them with that opportunity;
- Working with the community to make it more supportive of youth and their contributions; and
- Working with existing protection agents/security forces to ensure that youth's actions compliment (and do not counteract) other work that is attempting to improve security.

This benefits communities by:

- Bringing citizens in closer communication with security forces;
- Creating greater awareness of threats and the roadblocks that prevent those threats from being met by existing structures;
- Allowing youth to fill needed gaps; and
- Mobilizing youth for positive outcomes.

This benefits youth by:

- Providing them with a sense of purpose;
- Creating greater buy-in to solutions that avoid violence and crime;
- Creating community pride and a sense of ownership (both of the community and the program);
- Reducing opportunities for conflict among youth; and
- Providing alternatives to dangerous or nefarious activities.

Expected Outcomes

The following outcomes were compiled from youth safety and security programs.

Youth-focused programs:

- Built local capacity of youth and local institutions;
- Increased social interest and civic engagement;
- Diminished feelings of alienation and marginalization;

- Complemented (without replacing) educational and economic opportunities;
- Taught youth conflict mediation and alternative dispute resolution skills;
- Reduced idleness and increased empowerment; and
- Reduced mistrust and built bridges between antagonistic groups.

Youth involvement and contributions:

- Improved police responses to security threats;
- Helped police through logistical and support functions and served as additional eyes and ears;
- Positively influenced police personnel and promoted future enrollment in police forces;
- Brought communities into closer contact with law enforcement and strengthened relations between the two;
- Educated police on youth behavior; and
- Challenged authorities to find better ways of intervening in gang activity.

Programs focused on safety and security:

- Met local security needs;
- Reduced and prevented crime;
- Increased local perceptions of safety due to visibility of participants in public spaces;
- Transformed violent gang members;
- Provided two critical components of successful crime reduction and prevention strategies—local context and community buy-in;
- Prevented violence through innovative and unorthodox methods of communicating with gangs, at-risk youth, and community members;
- Encouraged the reintegration of offenders through community buy-in; and
- Supported local youth through peer-directed education on crime-prevention and reduction techniques.

Greater government and private-sector support:

- Raised national awareness for programs and provided additional buy-in;
- Facilitated and improved community relations with government bodies;
- Generated buy-in from local government and police, which gave participants greater legitimacy; and
- Provided the private sector with an opportunity to contribute to youth safety and security programs.

Lessons Learned

Below are the PCR Project’s principles for youth safety and security programs. Although these principles are derived from specific examples of youth safety programs, they are intended to address broader needs and remain adaptable to local contexts.

Critical Elements of Success

Youth can organize and govern programs with limited adult contributions. Youth exist in the precarious transition between childhood and adulthood. They are solidifying their identities and future roles in society and require space to assert their independence and autonomy. Many successful programs have encouraged youth to fill leadership and organizational roles or have been built by youth themselves. Adult support can provide legitimacy for a program and help it gain support from other adults. At the same time, youth must be given sufficient trust to direct and govern their own contributions. Among the benefits that this offers youth is empowerment, confidence, and a sense that their voice can contribute to society.

Community partnerships are key to successful youth programming. If a community can mobilize and support its youth, programs are more likely to endure. A majority of programs described in chapter 2 were founded, organized, and managed by local staff, even though most received funding from international donors. Not only do local citizens have a more complete understanding of the priorities and demands for security, development, and reconstruction, they also have an interest in seeing successful programs last—should donor funding dry up. Municipal or community-wide meetings can provide a framework for securing community buy-in, gathering support, promoting awareness, and seeking financial support from local and international businesses. Additionally, prominent and influential community leaders should be made aware of the support they can provide to these programs.

Programs need to be fully inclusive. In post-conflict settings, child soldiers, orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) are frequently singled out as specific populations requiring focused attention. Tailoring programs to particular populations can alienate and isolate other youth who have survived conflict. In many instances, youth who do not meet criteria for participation—such as being a member of an armed group or losing parents to AIDS—are excluded from receiving benefits. This, in turn, can generate jealousy and resentment.¹ Additionally, youth may find ways of meeting the criteria so that they can gain access to programming. Many organizations and implementers have learned such lessons and taken care to consider—and, when possible, include—all war-affected youth in programming.

Programs should respond to market demands. Job opportunities do not merely offer financial incentives; they offer hope for the future. Vocational training and education may be seen as pointless if there are no jobs to offer youth once they have finished learning. Job training that responds to market demands will be more valuable than vocational courses offering “useful” skills that do not match the needs of the community. Experts who have studied DDR recognize the significance of economic recovery in

1. In Zimbabwe, orphans were called “lucky orphans” by peers due to the benefits they received from programs that targeted orphans only.

preventing youth from resorting or returning to violence. Although jobs and education may not be the panacea for violence prevention, they are essential factors to be considered when designing any program.

Key Challenges

“Street credibility” and independence can make or break a program. Programs too closely affiliated with a group or institution inimical to youth—such as a security force or a disconnected international organization—will fail to attract appropriate participants. On the other hand, programs that assert independence from these institutions or organizations will gain more trust from youth partners and other members of the community. At-risk youth in particular will not work with organizations that they or their peers view as antagonistic toward youth or disengaged from youth culture. Programs that offer such street credibility will make participation viable.

Programs in which youth publicly provide security may pose risks. Individuals who directly contribute to a community’s safety and well-being have a higher chance of making their actions public. Although publicity itself may not be cause for concern, insecure environments, by definition, are less equipped to protect youth that participate in safety patrols, work with police, or intervene in conflicts, particularly if this work threatens or incites reprisals from actors that carry out crime or violence. While risk cannot be eliminated from any program in an insecure post-conflict setting, communities must decide whether program objectives will incite dangerous backlash. Youth should be provided with full knowledge of the risks to which they may be exposed in any given program and given the ability and autonomy to choose whether they wish to participate.

Youth already engaged in violence pose challenges. Local citizens and international practitioners frequently see youth involved in violent activities as past the point of help. These are the ones who have the potential to create problems in the future and need to be dealt with if peace is to hold. Moreover, leadership skills acquired in violent contexts—such as in an armed group or gang—have enormous potential if these skills can be positively redirected. One program director with Search for Common Ground described what he called the “five-percent shift principle”; child-soldiers, gang members, and participants in armed groups have acquired a tremendous amount of leadership and practical knowledge through their experiences. They need to be given the right tools and opportunities to redirect their energy and expertise so that it can exert a positive impact on the community.² At the same time, working with these youth can bring many challenges and requires a great degree of flexibility and the need to try unorthodox methods of attracting participation.

2. Interview with program director from Search for Common Ground.

Strategic Recommendations: Enhancing Current Practice

Youth programming can benefit from a wider debate, one that addresses top-down and bottom-up concerns and focuses on theoretical challenges and specific tactical needs. This section proposes five recommendations for policymakers, program officers, and others concerned with youth-oriented programs, while the final section suggests specific action steps that could be taken.

Mainstream Youth in National and International Policy

Graça Machel's widely disseminated report, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*¹—commonly referred to as the Machel Report—raised international awareness about the

"Just trying to keep youth busy is not enough—they see through that quickly. When you talk to them about how they imagine themselves in their 20s, they cannot come up with anything. If you can't see yourself in the future, does it matter if you get shot or if you become HIV positive, if your time horizon is so narrow?"—Program Director, Catholic Relief Services

impact of armed conflict on children and made a number of important recommendations. These helped lay the groundwork for other researchers and practitioners and opened the debate to new approaches, including some that have enriched the child-protection paradigm, predominantly defined by the international Convention on the Rights of the Child. This study endorses a continued expansion of these concepts through a number of means.

Recommendations:

- Mainstream youth in planning, policy, and programming at national, regional, and municipal levels.
- Encourage wider discussion and government endorsement of innovative and successful programming.

1. Graça Machel, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* (New York: United Nations/UNICEF, August 1996), <http://www.unicef.org/graca/>.

- Develop partnerships with relevant agencies, such as security forces or ministries of youth, sports, and culture.
- Forge additional partnerships with international peacekeepers, such as the UN or regional forces.

Create Community Safety Councils

Local councils dedicated to youth and community safety can provide oversight for safety initiatives. The more inclusive they are, the more likely they will be to help divided societies find common ground. Councils should serve a number of needs, such as advising security forces about conditions and needs of the community; incorporating the perceptions and views of all actors; and devising solutions to community safety problems.

Recommendations:

- Foster partnership, cooperation, and open dialogue between community members and security personnel.
- Recruit adults and youth from the community, including local leaders, business representatives, and security personnel.
- Create opportunities for youth to interact with adult members of the community.
- Encourage youth ownership and accountability for the full range of programming—design, execution, and evaluation.
- Allow youth to take leadership roles.

Develop Partnerships with the Private Sector

Local enterprises have an interest in protecting their assets and in improving security and safety where they conduct their business. Partnerships with the private sector would provide in-kind and direct funding, employment opportunities, training for youth, and a more integrated community. In areas with tourism potential, youth programs can be promoted as beneficial to local businesses and area safety.

Work with Local Schools and Religious Institutions

In some communities, schools, mosques, and churches may attract large populations of youth. Cooperation with these entities can identify youth for participation and provide additional support and legitimacy. Where religion plays a major role in communities, such institutions can help to mobilize and organize youth. Schools can be used for after-school and weekend activities, while unemployed teachers can be resources and potential leaders in youth programming.

Provide Incentives for Participation

Donors and local governments can partner to develop low-cost incentives to expand youth participation and programming. These can range from school fees, books, food,

clothing, and shelter, through to computer training, Internet access, radios, cell phones, and even salaries. Developments are under way to lower costs for numerous technologies, such as radios, cell phones, laptop computers, and Internet access. Private-sector partnerships, as noted earlier, can help developing states enter the information age, and youth in all societies are generally more adept at learning these skills.

“Tell them you can design a Web page by the end of the day; that affirms their human capacity. Gang members need this. They’re the dark other. The only thing for them is prison or exclusion. You have to affirm their dignity.”—Program Director, Homeboyz Interactive

Specific Action Steps

The following action steps offer practical recommendations for implementation and design of youth safety and security programs.

Develop Youth-managed Community Watch and Early-warning Systems

- Organize youth patrols with appropriate monitoring, clear reporting lines, and enforcement capacity.
- Develop partnerships between the youth-organized programs and security forces.
- Use bicycles and radios as incentives and to increase efficacy and coverage.
- Employ youth in appropriately sized groups to provide escort services for women collecting firewood and water and younger children going to and from school.
- Consider nationwide program options, including a national youth corps.

Create Safety Multiplier Programs

- Determine staffing gaps in existing security sectors, including administrative tasks, that youth can fill.
- Appoint a facilitator to help manage relations between youth and security forces—and include sports and other activities to forge stronger relationships.
- Establish low-risk zones where youth can patrol and monitor to free up time for security forces.
- Support the involvement of youth as the liaison between police and communities through public outreach programs.
- Implement youth first-responder systems, including training, particularly for communities with limited capacity.
- Support youth peer-to-peer education for fire safety, health risks (such as water-borne diseases), gender-based violence, human trafficking, and crime reduction.

Incorporate Youth in Security Sector Reform and Rule-of-law Programs

- Engage youth to determine gaps and critical weaknesses in developing security sectors' responses to youth.
- Involve trained youth in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs for young ex-combatants, particularly for those who will transition into the security sector. Consider youth for apprenticeships and mentoring programs.
- Promote youth-sensitivity training to mitigate the potential for adversarial relationships between youth and security forces.

Protecting from Outsiders and Ourselves: Youth and Security in Rwanda¹

Executive Summary

Rwanda is a country still in repair after the devastating genocide of 1994. Post-genocide, the government has exerted full control over the borders of the country, as well as the interior; security is tight, and Rwandans feel very safe. Despite security measures against infiltrators and rebels, Rwanda remains a deeply divided country whose genocide wounds have not yet healed. Resentment and hatred lie beneath the calm surface. The government is well aware of this situation, however, and it has implemented many programs in an effort to ease the ill feelings. Many of these programs are targeted toward youth, who compose 67 percent of the population and whose potential for violence is best symbolized by the rise of the *Interahamwe*, the murderous youth militia that emerged during the genocide. Rwandans have learned from experience that youth should be incorporated into the greater internal and external security strategy, and opportunities for youth participation are numerous and necessary. In the calm of the new, postwar order, there has been no better time to reconcile, learn lessons from the past, and work to ensure that Rwanda moves forward in its development.

Context

Rwanda is a nation emerging from a long history of violence. Historical differences between the ethnic Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority² were exacerbated by Belgian colonialism, which favored the Tutsi people. In 1959, before granting independence in 1962, the Belgian authorities transferred the government to the majority Hutu population. Hutus, having been disfavored, led a genocidal campaign against the Tutsi

1. This case study was researched and written by Morgan Courtney for the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, Washington, D.C., March 2006. It was written primarily in reference to youth and security in the northwest Rwandan province of Gisenyi. However, research from Kigali and the southwest province of Butare is also referenced.

2. There is also a minority of Twa people, original inhabitants of the land. It is believed that they account for 1 percent of the population.

population, causing a major exodus of Tutsis to neighboring countries, primarily Uganda. Ethnic tension between the two groups continued, with Tutsi rebel forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) leading attacks from Uganda.

In 1994, President Juvénal Habyarimana negotiated a power-sharing agreement with the Tutsi rebels. On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana's plane was shot down, and it is thought that the majority Hutu army and Hutu extremists (Hutu Power and *Interahamwe* militia), disagreeing with the president's concession, were responsible. In the absence of a president, the army took over the government, and that evening, the most efficient and comprehensive genocide in recorded history began. Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered at the rate of three a minute, totaling between 800,000 and 1 million dead in 100 days.

The genocide slowed and came to an end with the RPF's capture of Kigali, the Rwandan capital, on July 4, 1994. A new government was installed, one that preached ethnic balance, justice, and healing. Some Hutu extremists and others who were drawn into the killing spree (referred to in this paper as *génocidaires*) escaped into the Democratic Republic of Congo³ and continue to be a source of instability across Rwanda's northern border.

In response to security concerns, the new government established a strong army and police force, which covers every corner of the country. These security forces are well trained, well equipped, and well respected by the people. As a result, security issues are minimal. *Génocidaires* who have returned to their communities since 1994 are now being tried by *gacaca* councils, local processes which allow community members to confront their attackers in pursuit of justice and reconciliation.

Security Overview

Rwanda is a unique case study because post-genocide security, uniquely provided by the government, has been so effective that the United Nations has labeled it a Phase 0, with minimal security issues. The northwest provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri are the only exception, because of their proximity to the still-active Hutu rebel areas in neighboring Congo. As a result, they have been labeled Phase 1, defined as "precautionary movement."

It is safe to move throughout the country; primary roads are in excellent condition and are well guarded by the seemingly omnipresent police and army. They are visibly armed; in Gisenyi province, because of the potential for Hutu rebel attacks, army soldiers also carry rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

It is important to differentiate between external security issues and internal security issues. The external issues are immediate and are being handled by formal security structures. The internal issues are longer-term problems, and the government is implementing programs to handle and mitigate them.

3. From this point, all usages of the name Congo refer to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

External Security Issues

The two external security issues revolve around the security of Rwanda's neighbors; namely, Congo and Burundi. These are:

- A conflict or event that drives people into Rwanda, generating a population of impoverished refugees; and
- Hutu rebel attacks from Congo across the northern border into Rwanda.

Neighboring Conflicts

Attacks in and around Goma, Congo,⁴ across the border not five kilometers from the town of Gisenyi, have driven an estimated 30,000 Congolese refugees to towns and camps in northern Rwanda.

Even college-educated Rwandans have difficulty finding jobs, so Congolese not living in camps (i.e., those living in Kigali) have a very difficult time finding employment. As a result, there is a possibility that the desperately impoverished could resort to theft. Theft has become a bigger problem in Kigali over the past 12 years, but it is not yet at a level comparable with such notorious capitals as Nairobi and Johannesburg.

Instability in Burundi caused an influx of refugees in southern Rwanda, in the town of Butare. After presidential elections in 2005, many Burundians felt it safe to return, resulting in a mass exodus of refugees. Both cases demonstrate the fluid movement of people across borders in the Great Lakes region and the impact this can have on security in Rwanda.⁵

Hutu Rebel Attacks

Hutu rebel attacks from Congo have occurred in the past and continue to be anticipated. This is the most feared security issue and the one for which the Rwandan government has gone to great lengths to prevent. Rwanda's current president is Paul Kagame, the general who led the RPF to victory and served for many years as minister of defense in the new government. While his administration is of mixed ethnicity, Hutu rebels continue to view Kagame's presidency as the symbol of a Tutsi government.

Internal Security Issues

Major internal security issues include:

- The *gacaca* judicial councils;
- The presence of street children in Rwanda's cities; and

4. The conflict in Congo is being led by Rwandan Hutu extremists exiled after the genocide and Congolese sympathizers. These rebels are targeting Congolese speakers of Kinyarwanda, who tend to be Congolese Tutsis. Their stated goal has been to eliminate Congolese Tutsis, either by chasing them to Rwanda or by killing them.

5. It should also be noted that the volcano chain on the border of Congo and Rwanda is active; one volcano erupted in Goma, Congo, causing an influx of tens of thousands of refugees in Gisenyi, Rwanda, in 2002.

- The ongoing tension between different ethnic groups.

Gacaca Councils

The *gacaca* councils, or village judicial councils, are a traditional Rwandan mechanism of resolving conflicts. Presided over by the sages of the village, they are approached to handle cases between individuals, such as arguments over land or other property. Post-genocide, these councils, with the help of the international community and the *Inkiko Gacaca* governmental commission, have taken on a new role—to deliver justice to *génocidaires* who have returned to their communities, many of whom have been in jail since the end of the genocide. The pilot *gacaca* were launched in 12 sectors in 2002.⁶ In January 2005, the *gacaca* processes were expanded to all of the provinces, generating fear among many that they will finally be tried for their actions. The *gacaca* are currently in the information-collection stage; community members are asked to inform the council about what they witnessed, and research then ensues. Eventually, the defendant is brought before the mandatory community gathering, and the council decides the fate of the defendant.

The *gacaca* councils, while aiding the justice and reconciliation process, have also generated some insecurity within communities, as victims are afraid to speak out against the offenders, for fear that they will kill them for doing so.⁷

Street Children

The problem of street children is mainly confined to Rwanda's cities. Children in rural areas seek the stimulation and excitement of a city, so they abandon their families and take to the streets, earning little, if anything, and begging for necessities. This has obvious effects on security in cities; driven to do anything to survive, the children often resort to stealing, and left unattended, the problem could grow. The children have no incentive, nor the minimum amount of money needed, to go to school; in many cases, it simply does not interest them. In addition, there are few programs to provide skills training. Five or ten years down the road, this could easily mean that they will be adolescents with no education, no training, and thus no livelihood. They have, in effect, no family other than each other. Such an environment could foster the development of gangs and other groups dangerous to the community at large.

Ethnic Tension

The end of the war in 1994 did not signal the end of ethnic tension in Rwanda. As the government is headed by a former RPF general, Paul Kagame, some Hutus accuse the government of being Tutsi dominated. Many Tutsis confide in private that they fear another genocide, and some have taken precautions to ensure that at least one member of their family lives in another country. Populations tend to be self-segregated, as many Hutus are farmers in rural areas or laborers in the cities, and Tutsis continue to dominate the professional classes.

6. Sectors are the second-lowest administrative level. The five administrative levels are: federal, province (*intara*), district (*akarere*), sector (*umurenge*), and cell (*akagari*).

7. Once the *gacaca* councils began, many people fearful of being tried fled to Burundi. These people were forcibly brought back to Rwanda by the Rwandan government, but it is believed that they will try to escape again.

Efforts to reconcile differences are being made both by the government and by independent organizations in Rwanda. While in some ways these programs have been effective, there has also been a deceptive calm between the ethnicities, as it has become prohibited to discuss differences or differentiate between them.⁸ Tensions between the two groups remain under the surface, and resentment continues unabated.

Community Dynamics and the Role of Youth

In both urban and rural areas, the degree to which Rwandans know and recognize each other is surprising. A warm people, Rwandans have a strong sense both of community and of nationality, and these strong bonds are evident in their interactions.

Upon the arrival of a new family to the area, they must present themselves to the *nyumbakumi*, a person elected to represent every 10 houses. The *nyumbakumi* then reports to the *responsable*, the representative of the “cell,” the smallest administrative unit. The cell comprises an average of 200 to 300 people. The *nyumbakumi* and the *responsable* work with the newcomer to fill out detailed records and then introduce the new family to the community, making sure that they are well received. The country is in the process of redistricting. Upon completion, newcomers will instead present themselves to an *imudugudu*, who will represent 50 houses. The *imudugudu* will report to the *responsable* as well.

Even without introduction, community members are likely to notice a new (or returnee) family in their area. Many people have lived in their communities for their entire lives, so families are very intimate with one another, having known each other for decades.⁹

The Role of Youth

Many youth in Kigali attend school, but there are also many street children, selling everything from postcards to shoes. For the poorest families, children can provide an additional source of income by working or selling goods. Generally, in rural as well as urban areas, older children (particularly girls) are expected to care for the younger children. Nuclear families vary in size, between 3 and 10 children. Rwandans, particularly in rural areas, tend to live with their extended families, and many have adopted children of family members who did not survive the genocide.

In rural areas, the role of children is more marked. In an agricultural society such as that of Rwanda, children facilitate the upkeep of the land and can help a family to survive. They are sent to fetch water, food, sticks, and other necessities.

Both the 1994 genocide and the agricultural labor needs of Rwandan society have contributed to the unusually high percentage of children in the country. According to the UN Population Fund, 67 percent of Rwanda’s population is under 25.¹⁰

8. For example, after 1994, the government issued new identification cards that did not identify ethnicity.

9. It should be noted that while many fled their homes during the genocide in 1994, the government has enacted a law that dictates that any squatters in returnees’ homes must immediately vacate. As a result, as former community members return home, communities (and community memory) are being rebuilt.

Youth and Community Safety¹¹

There are several programs in place to promote youth involvement in the community, and in many ways, this contributes directly and indirectly to the promotion of safety and security. Among these are: youth-adult community policing; a National Youth Council network of youth; programs to encourage street children to gain education or training; and the association of Scouts, a nationwide program to teach youth to contribute positively to their communities.

Youth-Adult Community Policing

In Rwanda, youth and adult community policing has been in place since the 1980s. From 9 p.m. until 3 a.m., a five-person team of male youth (aged at least 18 years) and men circulate around the neighborhood with an army soldier or a designated armed guard, keeping watch for any unusual activities. The genesis of this government-mandated program was both an alarming rise in theft and the inability of the army to be omnipresent. In response, the rate of theft dropped dramatically. The program continued during the early 1990s for less honorable purposes; namely, the harassment of Tutsis in the neighborhood. After 1994, theft was no longer the primary concern. Infiltrators and rebels were coming across the border, wreaking havoc in communities and attempting to revitalize the genocide. These community policing teams became an important and effective way to protect neighborhoods, as there is always at least one armed member of the team. Firefights have occurred in the past (the danger of being a member of the team is the main reason why younger children and women are not allowed to serve), and should the team catch a thief, he is promptly taken to the local authorities.

Fewer teams circulate in recent years, as security has been tight. However, there is a community policing team in every community, whether rural or urban, and this program can be revived at a moment's notice. In areas where the teams continue, participation is strongly encouraged. Those who choose not to participate are asked to contribute a modest sum to the district. There is a rotation list, so teams change every night.

National Youth Council

A less tangible way in which youth are increasing security is through National Youth Council programs. The programs are conceived not to provide security from outsiders, but rather to increase understanding and heal ethnic divides that could generate future security issues.

The National Youth Council has representatives at all five administrative levels (including a minister-level representative), and all are elected.¹² Only youth ages 14 to

10. See "Securing the Future by Harnessing the Youth," *Equality Empowers*, July 11, 2005, p. 20, <http://www.unfpa.co.rw/downloads/20%20Securing%20the%20future%20by%20harnessing%20the%20youths.pdf>.

11. For the purposes of this paper, I will adhere to the Rwandan government definition of "youth" as those aged 35 and below.

12. As noted earlier, the five administrative levels are: federal, province (*intara*), district (*akarere*), sector (*umurenge*), and cell (*akagari*).

35 are allowed to vote for the representative, which is notable, as voters must normally be at least 18 years old to vote. Voting cards, therefore, are unnecessary.¹³ Candidates for this position are normally between 28 and 35 years old.

The council is a part of the Program for Unity and Reconciliation. Its aim is to provide talks, programs, and youth exchanges and build friendships across administrative divides. It grew out of the recognition that, from childhood, parents negatively influenced their children's thinking by telling them which tribes (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) were good and which were not to be trusted. This fostered hate, which culminated in the development of the *Interahamwe*, the murderous youth militia that emerged in 1994. Using the same idea of influencing children's thinking from an early age, the National Youth Council aims to foster an idea of Rwandan identity beyond tribal affiliations. These programs appear to be particularly popular in urban areas, where children do not have after-school activities and do not have to work in the fields.

Street Children

Street children (mostly boys) are rapidly becoming a concern for medium-size and large cities in Rwanda. Many are runaways from the countryside, leaving their homes for the perceived excitement of a city. Others are forced or encouraged by their families to beg or steal. In the southern town of Butare, a program has been implemented to encourage street kids to go to school. The government provides uniforms, books, and supplies, which is usually such an initial delight that children want to go. However, many street children have no particular interest in going to school, so it is much harder to keep them there. To encourage them to continue, the government and the World Food Program provide lunch. This is often their only meal of the day. If the children stay and complete the year, and/or if they excel, they receive a gift of a shirt or some other item of clothing. These clothes are often secondhand, but this appears not to matter, as this system has worked very well.

In Kigali, a former street child founded an organization that provides vocational training for street children. The program teaches hairdressing, mechanics, and other trades. Children are also taught how to make crafts, which in turn are sold to visitors. While the majority of the profits generated from the crafts are used to sustain the organization, the child artisan also receives money.

The Association of Scouts

The Boy and Girl Scouts are combined into one organization in Rwanda, with *unités* ("scout troops") across the country, both in towns and villages. There are roughly 25,000 Scouts across Rwanda. Membership is free, and in Rwanda, the association is financed by the government. Those aged 3 and older are invited to join. In Gisenyi, there is a center for Scouts, which is open from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 at night (and often later). There is one full-time employee who manages the center and directs the activities. Such classes and activities as dance, karate, volleyball, and soccer are offered; there are also meetings to teach children about HIV/AIDS, the perils of drugs and alcohol, and other issues that affect them.

13. To ensure that everyone votes only once, elections take place at one set time during the day, and youth stand behind the candidate that they support. The candidate with the most support wins.

An additional benefit of the Scouts program is the availability of mentors; older Scouts can help to guide at-risk youth away from unsavory practices and can also provide emotional support. In Rwanda, the Scouts also focus particularly on the ethnic divide and work to bridge it through informal educational programs. According to the Gisenyi regional coordinator of the Scouts, the Gisenyi *unités* are ethnically balanced. Rural villages tend not to have centers for Scouts, but they still meet, teach, and organize activities for youth. These tend to be some of the more active groups. Unlike urban *unités*, which tend to draw youth seeking sport and social interaction, rural *unités* focus primarily on *travaux communautaires*, or community work, which includes working in the fields and building houses.

In rural areas, families generally hesitate to permit children, who aid in the survival of the family, to participate in extraneous activities. Part of the success of the Scout program may be attributed to the tangible contributions youth are making to communities, which, in light of the importance of community in Rwandan society, reflects well on the children's families.

Concerns

Women do not play a direct or indirect role in community security. In terms of their own security, some women have expressed concern about rape. In this light, it may be that the best role for women is to protect themselves through self-defense training and to ensure that there is both a support system for victims and a prosecution mechanism for the aggressor. Rape cases are taken very seriously.

There are few, if any, security roles for those under age 25. Children tend to take notice of strangers or strange happenings in the neighborhood more quickly than adults, as they are often out working and playing. In addition, the vast majority of the population is under the age of 25. This demographic remains a largely untapped resource.

Programs to help street children alone could generate resentment. Rwanda remains a poor country, with many parents unable to afford the 5,000 Frw public primary school fee. If programs target only street children, many of whom chose to leave their families, other families could begin to resent the preferential treatment, insisting that all children receive free meals, books, and clothing.

Program Recommendations

In making program recommendations, it is necessary to take into account the cultural context of the target country. Programs that work well in Rwanda may not work in other countries that don't have general security, an agricultural society, or historic ethnic divides, as examples.

- *All programs should be community driven and community managed.* Rwandan society is generally distrustful of outsiders, and there is some residual resentment from government leaders and citizens toward international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and some governments as a result of their actions or inaction

during the 1994 genocide. These entities should tread lightly, allowing maximum community leadership. Ideally, the leadership should convene community meetings, foster discussions, and allow individuals to contribute ideas. This involvement will help to ensure the success of the program.

- *Develop a youth watch and adviser system.* Secondary school students, generally aged 16 to 20, are often mature enough to serve as agents of security and as advisers to peers and younger students. The local government could choose the best-performing secondary school students, providing scholarships to pay for their education (public secondary school costs 60,000 Frw, or roughly U.S.\$110, a year). In return, these students can serve as watchdogs in and out of school, serving as role models for proper behavior.

Rwandan society closely follows and respects authority, so if these students are chosen by the local government, they will be respected by other students. In addition, this program would have the added benefit of rewarding hardworking students. Such a program may be effective at the primary and middle school levels as well.

- *Work with religious institutions to provide youth programming.* After-school programming and weekend activities for youth tend to work well in urban areas, as youth are not obligated to work the fields. In rural areas, subsistence needs take precedence over such programs. Therefore, a different strategy should be implemented in rural areas.

Religious organizations have historically been very influential in Rwanda, and churches (and, increasingly, mosques) can be found even in the most remote villages. People listen to and respect religious authority, so implementing youth programming through religious institutions may be a more effective way to reach rural youth populations. Such programming can include messages of reconciliation and national unity and may also be an appropriate venue for youth to learn a new trade. Providing a meal may also encourage participation. Lessons on how to encourage rural participation may also be taken from the association of Scouts, as they have been particularly successful in attracting rural youth.

- *Encourage youth, particularly girls and underrepresented populations, to become involved in politics.* As the vast majority of the country is under age 25, elected officials should be more representative of the demographic. Representatives at all levels are generally age 25 years or older, a reflection of the society's respect for its elders. Empowering younger leaders now will ensure the presence of experienced politicians several years on.

The Parliament has been a self-selected body of men for years, as girls and women felt that serving in the government was a job best left to men. The Rwandan government has been working to change this perception through extensive information campaigns and the obligatory election of three women to Parliament from every province. It was only in 2001 that the first woman was elected to Parliament, and despite the progress that has been made since, girls still tend not to participate in political activities. Integrating girls into political activities will ensure that there will be a willing and capable group of women to draw upon in future years.

The current Rwandan government is often accused of ethnic imbalance, favoring those of Tutsi ethnicity over those of Hutu ethnicity. If left unaddressed, this could become a major source of instability in the future. Whether or not this favoritism actually occurs, it does appear that there is a lower representation of Hutu youth in political groups than Tutsi youth. This may be attributed to the fact that Tutsis have a history of political leadership, dating to the precolonial period. However, as the country continues the healing process, encouraging more Hutus to become politically involved may help to train them as future political leaders and ease the perception of imbalance in the government.

- *Provide meals and snacks.* Despite its wealth of agriculture, the food security situation in Rwanda often renders many families vulnerable. Payment for work in some cases is given in the form of food instead of money. Girls are sometimes so desperate for food that they will submit to prostitution for some potatoes or a piece of candy. Poor families in urban and rural areas tend to eat one meal a day, and street children have no assured source of meals.

As a result, children are often eager to participate in any program that will feed them, and parents are often eager to send their children to a place where they will be fed. Consequently, a staple of many successful programs for youth in Rwanda is food. This generally works as intended when meals are provided during the program.

Other alternatives have been attempted in the past but have not worked as well; the World Food Program used to give cooking oil to students at the end of the school day to help to feed their families and provide an incentive for students to go to school. However, as the oil was sold by families for extra money and not used to feed the children, this program was discontinued in Rwanda.

- *Expand opportunities for street children.* Street children have few options: beg, starve, or return home. The majority resort to begging, creating a community that, as it grows older, could become a security concern. The school lunch program in Butare has worked very well, as has the incentive system for those who stay in school. If the children live with their parents, the provision of food and clothing may be enough to prevent kids from being sent out to the streets to beg. For those who have run away from home, associations such as the street child craft center in Kigali are a compelling option. Such associations could provide meals and shelter for these youth in exchange for their training and production of goods. This would not only remove them from the streets, but it would train them in a profitable trade, which would reduce the need for begging and increase their employability.
- *Utilize youth as protectors of women and younger children.* Although rape is far less common in Rwanda than elsewhere, lessons may be learned from Tanzania, where women who would walk for miles to retrieve water would be raped along the way. Tanzanian communities implemented a system whereby many women would walk together, accompanied by a young male, between 15 and 25 years old. The simple presence of a male was enough to deter would-be rapists.

In rural areas, young children must walk long distances and often cross roads to go to school, exposing them to danger not just from passing cars, but also from strangers along the way. Older youth can accompany these children to and from school, ensuring their safety and acting as a responsible guardian, should an incident occur.

Conclusion

Rwanda has come a long way since 1994, when ethnic tensions ripped the country apart. Security issues are as much internal as they are external. While efforts to prevent instability from exiled extremist rebels have been relatively successful, efforts to alleviate ethnic differences have fallen short.

The overwhelming presence of youth in Rwanda can be viewed as both a problem and an opportunity. The views of youth are generally easier to influence; as a result, the childhood years are crucial to the development of ideas, opinions, and prejudices. Therefore, while it can be expected that such a demographic would be accompanied by increased numbers of street children and increased poverty, it can also propagate the prejudicial opinions of children's parents. Similarly, this can be seen as a unique opportunity to teach children less-divisive views. Such an effort could, over time, bridge the deep divide.

Despite the gains made over the past 12 years, more progress is needed. Poverty and perceived inequalities can feed hatred, and Rwandans are all too familiar with the havoc such hatred can wreak. Internal security can be strengthened through programs employing youth as both passive and active actors. With training and community integration, the youth of today are more likely to overcome differences. Perhaps then, Rwanda will finally be able to move forward from its troubled past.

Persons Consulted

Theresa Polk
*Manassas Park Parks and
 Recreations Department*
 November 2005

Gilberto Mendez
Christian Children's Fund
 November 2005

Ebou Camara
*United Nations High
 Commissioner for
 Refugees*
 November 2005

Grace Hollister and Brett
 Alessi
*Innovations in Civic
 Participation*
 November 2005

Kirk Felsman
Catholic Relief Services
 November 2005

Michael Shipler
Search for Common Ground
 November 2005

Alia Afshar
Creative Associates
 December 2005

Lynn Sheldon
Creative Associates
 December 2005

Rebecca Davis
AmeriCorps Clearwater
 December 2005

Marianne de Klerk
War Child Sudan
 January 2006

Bill Baker
The Emergence Group
 January 2006

Terry Modglin
Youth Crime Watch America
 January 2006

Mike McGovern
Crisis Group
 January 2006

Zuo Taylor
Youth Crime Watch Liberia
 February 2006

Ernest Vafee
Youth Crime Watch Liberia
 February 2006

Zachary Rothschild
*Office of Transition
 InitiativesUSAID*
 March 2006

Ron West
West Consulting
 March 2006

Nicole Dial
Search for Common Ground
 March 2006

Raissa Tatad
*National Democratic
 Institute, Philippines*
 March 2006

Jose Garzon
USAID, Guatemala
 March 2006

Evelyn Santiago
*Christian Children's Fund,
 Philippines*
 March 2006

Amy Willsey
*International Youth
 Foundation*
 March 2006

Monica Koep and Gary
 Newton
USAID, Namibia
 March 2006

Theunis Keulder
*Namibia Institute for
 Democracy*
 April 2006

Richard Hill
CHF International
 April 2006

Additional Programs

The following programs offer additional innovations and models for engaging communities or youth in post-conflict settings.

- Weapons in Exchange for Development, Albania, UNDP
- EQUIP 3 Youth Trust (<http://www.equip123.net>)
- Albania/The Albanian Initiative: Coordinated Action Against Human Trafficking, Creative Associates (<http://www.caaht.com>)
- Christian Children’s Fund Philippines
- AED–Liberia Community Peace Building and Development (<http://www.aed-ccsg.org>)
- Slums Information Development and Resources Centers (SIDAREC) (<http://www.sidarec.or.ke>)
- NDI–Community Policing in Muslim Mindanao (<http://www.ndi.org>)
- Youth Crime Watch America
- Apprenticeship Scheme for Young Afghans–Solidarité Afghanistan
- Taluk Task Force–Concerned for Working Children (<http://www.workingchild.org>)
- Zopadpatti Police Panchayat, Mumbai, India
- Community Based Youth Project Against Trafficking in Human Beings in Serbia and Moldova–Christian Children’s Fund Serbia
- Peer HIV/AIDS Educators–Centre for Development and Population Activities (<http://www.cedpa.org>)
- Community Based Health Intervention/First Aid–International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (<http://www.ifrc.org>)
- Rommel Roberts Community Policing and Civic Participation Pilot–Ashoka (<http://www.ashoka.org>)
- Stop Trafficking, Oppression, and Prostitution of Women and Children (STOP)–Ashoka (<http://www.ashoka.org>)
- Community Based Security Watch in Lofa County Proposal–UNHCR Liberia

- Homeboy Industries (<http://www.homeboy-industries.org>)
- Strategic Thinking Leadership Training for Youth—Center for Democracy and Development
- Community-Based Diversion Program for Children in Conflict with the Law—FREELAVA Inc. (<http://www.freelava.org>)
- Voluntary Service in Post-Conflict Situations—Kenya Voluntary Development Association (KVDA)
- Voluntary Workcamps Association of Nigeria (VWAN)
- Children’s Assistance Program, Liberia—UNICEF
- AMOSAPU—Mozambican Association for Public Health, Mozambique
- Promoting Children and Youth in Difficult Circumstances (PCY), Uganda—GTZ
- Education and Livelihood Skills Alliance (ELSA), Philippines—International Youth Foundation
- Service Volunteered for All (SERVOL), Trinidad and Tobago (<http://community.wow.net/servol/>)
- Program to Attend to Children and Youth Leaving the Armed Conflict, Columbia—Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (<http://www.icbf.gov.co/ingles/home.asp>)

Additional Readings

- Aird, Sarah. "Mozambique: The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers." Youth Advocate Program International, Washington, D.C., 2001.
- Amnesty International. "Policing to Protect Human Rights." London, July 2002.
- Arieff, Irwin. "UN Sanctions Imposed on Three in Ivory Coast." Reuters, February 6, 2006.
- Basic Education Coalition. "Iraq: Education in Post-Conflict." Fact Sheet. Washington, D.C., n.d.
- Bekoe, Dorina. "Strategies for Peace in the Niger Delta." USIPeace Briefing. United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., December 2005.
- Berger, David. "Don't Discard Youthful Offenders." *Washington Post*, November 29, 2005.
- Boothby, Neil. "Policy Implications of Education in Emergencies for USAID." PowerPoint Presentation. Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP), USAID, Washington, D.C., January 2004.
- Brandt, Pamela Robin. "The Brotherhood." *American Way Magazine*, May 2005.
- Bruderlein, Claude, and Theresa Stichick. *Children Facing Insecurity: New Strategies for Survival in a Global Era*. Toronto: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 2001.
- Burde, Dana, et al., eds. *Education in Emergencies and Post-Conflict Situations: Problems, Responses and Possibilities*. New York: Society for International Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, 2005.
- Bush, Kenneth D., and Diana Saltarelli. "The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children." UNICEF Innocenti Research Center, Florence, Italy, August, 2000.
- Canadian International Development Agency. "Support to Former Child Soldiers: Programming and Proposal Evaluation Guide." Quebec, May, 2005.
- Chrobok, Vera. "Demobilizing and Reintegrating Afghanistan's Young Soldiers." Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn, 2005.

- Cincotta, Richard. "Demographic Security Comes of Age." *Environmental Change and Security Project Report: Issue 10*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004.
- . "Youth Bulge, Underemployment Raise Risks of Civil Conflict." Global Security Brief No. 2. Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C., March, 2005.
- Cincotta, Richard, et al. *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Population Action International, 2003.
- Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS). *Child Soldiers: Global Report, 2004*. London: CSUCS, 2004.
- Cole, George. "Hoping to Find the Right Answer." *Financial Times*, January 25, 2006.
- . "Making a Connection to Boost Youth Life Skills." *Financial Times*, January 25, 2006.
- Collective for Social Science Research. "Afghans in Karachi: Migration, Settlement and Social Networks." Case Study Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, March 2005.
- Collins, Don. "The Overabundance of Rogue Males: A Major Contributing Factor in Terrorism." *Social Contract* (Fall 2001).
- Davidson, Joanna. "An Overview: What Young People Can Teach Society." *Ashoka Changemakers* (1998).
- Day, Graham, and Christopher Freeman. "Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect—the Policekeeping Approach." *Global Governance* 11 (2005).
- Dowdney, Luke. *Neither War nor Peace: International Comparisons of Children and Youth in Organised Armed Conflict*. N.p.: Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV), 2004.
- Economist*. "The Battle for Safer Streets." September 30, 2004.
- Evans, Gareth. "Building Peace—and a Belief in the Future." *Global Agenda* (2004).
- Federation of Canadian Municipalities. *Youth Violence and Youth Gangs: Responding to Community Concerns*. Ottawa: Solicitor General of Canada, 1994.
- Fusato, Massimo. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants." In *Beyond Intractability*, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Boulder: Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, July 2003.
- Gear, Sasha. "Now that the War Is Over: Ex-combatants, Transition and the Question of Violence: A Literature Review." Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, 2002.
- Ghandi, Sanjay. "Comment: Models Needed to Build a Future." *Financial Times*, January 25, 2006.
- Gleichmann, Colin, et al. *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*. Clementsport, Canada: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2004.

- Global Fund for Children. "The Danger of Neglecting Education for Boys." Washington, D.C., 2002.
- Gow, Melanie, et al. "The Right to Peace: Children and Armed Conflict." Working Paper No. 2. World Vision International, Monrovia, Calif., March 2000.
- Green, Jack R. "The Case for Community Policing." *Issues of Democracy* 2, no. 4 (November 1997).
- Hill, Jane, and Graham Wright. "Youth, Community Safety and the Paradox of Inclusion." *Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 42 (July 2003).
- Human Rights Watch. "Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in Angola." New York, April 2003.
- . "Recruitment of Ex-Child Soldiers in Cote d'Ivoire." New York, March 2005.
- . "The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture." New York, May 2002.
- . "Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors." New York, March 2005.
- Ibrahim, Mohammed. "An Empirical Survey of Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence in Nigeria: Egbesu Boys, OPC and Bakassi Boys as a Case Study." *Children in Organised Armed Violence (COAV)*, n.p., 2003.
- Iglesias, Enrique. "Comment: Why Jobs Are the Critical Issue." *Financial Times*, January 25, 2006.
- Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. *A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland* [Patton Commission Report]. N.p., September 1999.
- Innovations in Civic Participation (ICP). *Transforming Communities through Service: A Collection of 51 of the Most Innovative Americorps Programs in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: ICP, May 2005.
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). *Children in War Information Kit*. Geneva: ICRC, July 2004.
- International Crisis Group. "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States." *Crisis Group Africa Report No. 87*. Brussels, December 2004.
- International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. "Afghanistan: Helping People to Protect Themselves." *News Stories*. Geneva, September 9, 2005.
- . "Iraq: Humanitarian Crisis—Post-War Rehabilitation." *Operations Update*. Geneva, February 13, 2006.
- . "Namibia Red Cross." *Profiles of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies*. Geneva, 2003.
- . "Papua New Guinea: Young People Learn Valuable Skills." *News Stories*. Geneva, September 9, 2005.

- IRINnews.org. "Côte d'Ivoire: Security Council Bolsters Troubled Peacekeeping Force." February 6, 2006.
- . "Côte d'Ivoire: Using the Media to Orchestrate Violence." January 26, 2006.
- . "Politician's Bid to Form Rival Party Makes Waves." December 9, 2006.
- . "Sierra Leone: With No Prospects, Youths Are Turning to Crime and Violence." December 22, 2005.
- Ismail, Olawale. "Conceptualizing Youth: Towards an Integrated Approach." Conflict, Security and Development Group, International Policy Institute, Kings College, London, March 2006.
- Jackman, David. "A Summary of Lessons on Small Arms Demand and Youth." Conference report from "Small Arms Demand in the Caribbean: Special Focus on Haiti and Youth Issues," organized by the American Friends Service Committee Haiti Program and the Quaker United Nations Office, June 8–13, 2003, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
- Kemper, Yvonne. *Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches of International Organizations*. Berghof Report No. 10. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, January 2005.
- Lapper, Richard. "Tackling Unemployment at its Roots." *Financial Times*, January 25, 2006.
- Lindsay, Reed. "Disorder after Deadly Match," *Newsday (N.Y.)*, August 28, 2005.
- Machel, Graça. *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*. New York: UN, August 1996.
- Maitland, Alison. "Citizenship: Giving Teenagers the Chance to Speak Out." *Financial Times*, January 26, 2006.
- Marshall, Will, and Marc Porter Magee, eds. *The AmeriCorps Experiment and the Future of National Service*. Washington, D.C.: Progressive Policy Institute, 2003.
- Mazurana, Dyan, and Christopher Carlton. "From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone." Hunt Alternatives Fund, Cambridge, Mass., January 2004.
- McIntyre, Angela. "Children and Youth in Sierra Leone's Peace-Building Process." *African Security Review* 12, no. 2 (2003).
- Melone, Sandra D., et al. "Using the Media for Conflict Transformation: The Common Ground Experience." In *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, ed. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, March 2002.
- Montrichard, Sister Ruth, and Father Gerard Pantin. "Igniting the Fires of Hope: A Case Study of the Servol Integrated Educational Programme in Trinidad and Tobago." Paper presented at the Fifth Global Conference on Health Promotion, sponsored by the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization, Mexico City, June 5–9, 2000.
- Murray, Sarah. "Disasters: When Emergency Aid Is Just Not Cricket...." *Financial Times*, January 26, 2006.

- . “Nutrition: Hygiene Factors Create Private Sector Opportunities.” *Financial Times*, January 26, 2006.
- National Coalition for Haitian Rights and Washington Office on Latin America. “Can Haiti’s Police Reforms Be Sustained?” New York and Washington, D.C., January 1998.
- Nemec, Juraj, and Peter Bercik. “Public Administration Reform in the Slovak Republic.” Banska Bystrica, Bratislava, March 1997.
- Nicolai, Susan, and Carl Triplehorn. “The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict.” Network Paper No. 42. Humanitarian Practice Network, London, March 2003.
- Opel, Aftab. “Bound for the City: A Study of Rural to Urban Labour Migration in Afghanistan.” Working Paper Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, April 2005.
- Otunnu, Olara. “Youth Overcoming Violence: Living a Culture of Peace.” Plenary presentation, ninth annual assembly, World Council of Churches, Porto Alegre, Brazil, February 14–23, 2006.
- Peters, Krijn, et al. “What Happens to Youth during and after Wars? A Preliminary Review of Literature on Africa and an Assessment of the Debate.” RAWOO Working Paper. RAWOO, The Hague, October, 2003.
- Plimmer, Gil. “Businesses Learn Lessons as Education Ties Get Closer.” *Financial Times*, January 25, 2006.
- Polgreen, Lydia. “Youth Power in Liberia: From Bullets to Ballots.” *New York Times*, October 29, 2005.
- Refugees International. “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone.” *RI Focus* (August 9, 2002).
- Robinson, Malia, and Susan McKay. “Girl Mothers in Fighting Forces and their Post-War Reintegration in Southern and Western Africa.” Report of a conference on “Girl Mothers in Fighting Forces and their Post-War Reintegration in Southern and Western Africa,” the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center, Bellagio, Italy, April 12–18, 2005.
- Ruble, Blair, et al., eds. *Youth Explosion in Developing World Cities: Approaches to Reducing Poverty and Conflict in an Urban Age*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003.
- Schell-Faucon, Stephanie. “Conflict Transformation through Educational and Youth Programmes.” In *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, ed. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, March 2001.
- . *Developing Education and Youth-Promotion Measures with Focus on Peace-Building Conflict-Prevention*. Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2002.

- Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. New York: UN, 2004.
- Singer, P.W. *Children at War*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2005.
- Sinclair, Margaret. *Planning Education in and after Emergencies*. Paris: UNESCO, 2002.
- Sommers, Marc. "Fearing Africa's Young Men: The Case of Rwanda." Social Development Papers No. 42. World Bank, Washington, D.C., January 2006.
- . *Islands of Education: Schooling, Civil War and the Southern Sudanese (1983–2004)*. Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning, 2005.
- South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). *Philosophy and Principles of Community Based Policing*. Belgrade: SEESAC, 2003.
- Sullivan, Mercer, and Nancy Vorsanger. "Understanding Adolescent Violence: An Ethnographic Approach." Vera Institute of Justice, New York, 2001.
- Ulph, Stephen. "Internet Mujahideen Refine Electronic Warfare Tactics," *Terrorism Focus* 3, issue 5 (February 7, 2006).
- UN. *Youth and the Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Opportunities for Implementation*. New York: UN, April 2005.
- UN Security Council. *Resolution 1612 [Children Affected by Armed Conflict]*. New York, July 26, 2005.
- UNDP. "Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Programme in the Gramsh District—Albania." New York, September, 1998.
- UNESCO. *Gender and Education for All: The Leap to Equality*. Paris: UNESCO, 2003.
- UNHCR. "Progress Report on Refugee Women and UNHCR's Framework for Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action." Geneva, August 15, 1997.
- UNICEF. *Adolescent Programming in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: Case Studies*. New York: UNICEF, August 2004.
- UNICEF. "Liberia: A New Start for Children Associated with Fighting Forces." Geneva, March 2006.
- UNICEF. "State of the World's Children 2003: Statistical Tables." Geneva, 2003.
- Urdal, Henrik. *The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950–2000*. Social Development Papers No. 14. World Bank, Washington, D.C., July 2004.
- USAID. *Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: USAID, April 2006.
- USAID. *Youth and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention*. Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2004.

- Veale, Angela, and Aki Stavrou. *Violence, Reconciliation and Identity: The Reintegration of the Lord's Resistance Army Child Abductees in Northern Uganda*. ISS Monograph No. 92. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, November, 2003.
- Verhey, Beth. "Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating." Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 23. World Bank, Washington, D.C., November 2001.
- . "The Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Angola Case Study." World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2001.
- Verkaaik, Oskar. *Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Washington Examiner*. "Gang Prevention Is Key to Long-term Success." November 23, 2005.
- Wax, Emily. "A Cry for Respect in a Sudan Camp." *Washington Post*, December 27, 2005.
- White, Rob. "Police and Community Responses to Youth Gangs." *Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, no. 274 (March 2004).
- Williamson, John, et al. "A Participatory Review of the Reunification, Reintegration, and Youth Development Program of the International Rescue Committee in Rwanda." USAID, Washington, D.C., July 2001.
- Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC). *Untapped Potential: Adolescents Affected by Armed Conflict*. New York: WCRWC, January 2000.
- . *Youth Speak Out: New Voices on the Protection and Participation of Young People Affected by Armed Conflict*. New York: WCRWC, January 2005.
- World Bank. *A Resource Guide for Municipalities: Community Based Crime and Violence Prevention in Urban Latin America*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, November 2003.
- . "Children and Youth: A Framework for Action." Human Development Network Working Paper Series. Washington, D.C., January 2005.
- . "Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics." Working Papers. Washington, D.C., January 2005.
- . *The OVC Toolkit for SSA: A Toolkit on How to Support Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children (OVC) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)*, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, August 2005.
- . *World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation*. Washington, D.C. World Bank, September 2006.
- Zaff, Jonathan F., and Erik Michelsen. "Encouraging Civic Engagement: How Teens Are (or Are Not) Becoming Responsible Citizens." *Child Trends Research Brief* (October 2002).
- Zamblé, Fulgence. "Development—Côte d'Ivoire: Putting Urban Crime in the Cross Hairs." Inter Press Service News Agency, February 7, 2006.