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# Military Intelligence and Counterterrorism

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
## There is *No* Role for Isolated “Military Intelligence” Efforts in Counterterrorism

- The need is for “fusion,” not a compartmented military effort.
- Integrated efforts cutting across all lines of effort are the key to success.
- Counter Terrorism Centers, integrated collection and analysis efforts, and tearing down bureaucratic and artificial security barriers, are critical.
- At every level, the challenge is to mix dedicated counterterrorism expertise with a “whole of government” approach.


## **No Two Intelligence Challenges Will Be Alike**

- **Most low level threats are police or paramilitary.**
- **Higher level threats involve a nascent or active insurgency.**
- **The level of enclave or foreign sanctuary is critical.**
- **So is the level of international involvement: Allied and threat.**
- **Ethnic and religious issues challenge the use of the term “terrorist.”**
- **The level of popular support for the terrorists is critical, as is their level of influence over the population.**
- **Only small, tightly hierarchical groups -- with limited popular support -- can easily be dealt with by military means.**

# Looking At Levels of Terrorist Violence



Comparison of High-Fatality Sunni Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan versus Rest of World from 2004 to 2008



National Counterterrorism Center, *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2008*, <http://www.nctc.gov/> pp. 24 and 17.

## Getting the Priorities Right

- **The best use military intelligence support will be to act before the use of military force is necessary.**
- **The second best use will limit the use of force to a minimum, and support integrated civil-military efforts.**
- **Once serious force is needed, the threat is no longer “terrorism” per se. It is driven by serious internal division and is at least edging towards insurgency and/or irregular warfare.**

## **For Police and Paramilitary, Military Intelligence Support must be tied to Limited Use of Force and Rule of Law**

- **Dispersed, low level-terrorism is best handled by police, paramilitary, and security agencies.**
- **Military intelligence collection and analysis must be supportive -- provide rapid response to other users.**
- **Sensitive military and civilian collection methods and analysis do need to be compartmented.**
- ***But*, hoarding information provides aid and comfort to the enemy.**

## **For the Military, Counter-Terrorism Intelligence is Only Part of Full Spectrum or Hybrid Warfare**

- **There is no clear dividing line between terrorism, insurgency and irregular warfare.**
- **Military intelligence collection and analysis must be ready to perform all of these tasks.**
- **Assets must be flexible enough to be tailored to specific conditions, and react quickly enough to dominate the threat's decision making cycle.**
- **Intelligence and operations must be integrated, and intelligence should drive plans and operations.**
- **“Meaningful change will not occur until commanders at all levels take responsibility for intelligence.”**
- **Hoarding information provides aid and comfort to the enemy.**

# In Serious Cases, Military Intelligence Cannot Be Threat-Driven

- Winning the population is as important as defeating the terrorist.
- Short of brute force, integrated civil-military operations and political compromise will be necessary.
- Intelligence and targeting must attack networks from the top down --including key cadres -- where ever possible.
- Military intelligence must consider civilian casualties, collateral damage, and strategic communications as key priorities. *Coopt, not alienate*
- Allied, foreign, and media reactions must be taken into account: Counterterrorism is a battle of perceptions.
- The military side of intelligence must include net assessment of the impact of military and civil action.
- Need a joint civil-military campaign plan: “Shape, clear, hold, and build” -- “not clash and leave.”

## Defining “Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer”

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- ***Shape***: Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.
  - ***Clear***: Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;
  - ***Hold***: Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space;
  - ***Build***: Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the population to its government and build and sustain the nation; and
  - ***Transfer***: Shift responsibility and activity to civil government, police, and civil order.
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# Full Spectrum Intelligence Requires Adaptation of Military Intelligence Assets

- **Need to test capabilities of each collection asset, as well as flow of allied data.**
- **Adapt imagery, ELINT (electronic intelligence) and SIGINT (signals intelligence).**
- **HUMINT (human intelligence) requires special training of intelligence and Special forces assets.**
- **Fusion (integrated efforts) must be exercised with police, paramilitary, justice systems.**
- **Military must focus on polls and open source material -- feedback and dissemination work in all directions.**
- **Intelligence effort must support recovery as well as defense and offense.**
- **Critical infrastructure may pose special needs. (CBRN, cyberwarfare).**

## “Targeting” Intelligence

- **Target the leadership, skilled cadres, propagandists, and shadow governments.**
- **Precision, restraint, and focus on popular perceptions of the actions on each side.**
- **Patience and “dwell time” are needed to ensure the right decision.**
- **Create cells to assess civilian casualties and collateral damage: Put a “Red Card” group in the decision-making loop.**
- **Intelligence must shape “battle damage assessment”, and feed strategic communications, accordingly.**
- **Experience shows that local human intelligence is critical wherever possible.**
- **Intelligence must support rapid reaction in terms of competing claims, compensation, and supporting civic action.**
- **Local support, and friendly ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and extended family is critical.**

## Presence versus Toys

- **Forward human presence critical wherever possible.**
- **Limits of intelligence, targeting, and battle damage assessment play critical role in shaping rule of engagement.**
- **New assets like satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) have great value but:**
  - **Dangerous without HUMINT (human intelligence);**
  - **Costly and asset density and analytic support must match threat;**
  - **Limited coverage -- looking through a tunnel .**

## **Event Response, Battle Damage Assessment, and Strategic Communications**

- **Need immediate battle damage assessment and response to reports of civilian casualties and collateral damage.**
- **Strategic communications critical intelligence task the moment military assets are used.**
- **Allied countries present serious challenge.**
- **Need immediate (24 hours or real time) response in terms of build and hold.**
- **Only military intelligence may be able to support civil-military operations in high risk areas.**

## Detention, Interrogation, and Torture

- **Cost of extralegal procedures usually greatly exceeds benefits:**
  - **Lenin's brother**
- **If unfair, or perceived as unfair, creates or train more terrorists, and better terrorists.**
- **World has developed very long memories for disappearances and abuses.**
- **Need intelligence inside camps and detention facilities, monitor outside reactions.**

## Using A “Net Assessment” Approach

- **Winning the population is as important as defeating the terrorist.**
- **Short of brute force, integrated civil-military operations and political compromise will be necessary.**
- **Intelligence and targeting must attack networks from the top down --including key cadres -- where ever possible.**
- **Military intelligence must consider civilian casualties, collateral damage, and strategic communications as key priorities.**
- **Allied, foreign, and media reactions must be taken into account: Counterterrorism is a battle of perceptions.**
- **The military side of intelligence must include net assessment of the impact of military and civil action.**
- **“Shape, clear, hold, and build” -- “not clash and leave.”**

## Conclusions

- **Fusion is everything.**
- **Support police and paramilitary where possible.**
- **Tasks include response, not just offense and defense.**
- **Need for quick reaction civil-military programs.**
- **Kill or capture not enough; must defeat in popular terms.**
- **Supporting attacks on low level terrorists and tactical operations much less important than focus on key cadres.**
- **Win war of perceptions and popular support, or military victories may be meaningless.**