

1800 K Street, NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Phone: 1.202.775.3270

Fax: 1.202.775.3199

Web:

www.csis.org/burke/reports



Iran, the Gulf, and Strategic Competition: Asymmetric Warfare

Anthony H. Cordesman

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
assisted by Vivek Kocharlakota and
Adam Seitz

*Revised August 10,
2010*

CSIS

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Burke Chair
in Strategy

*The Challenge of Asymmetric
Warfare:*

*Intimidation, Deterrence, and
Warfighting*

Most Likely Foreign Threats Are Not Formal Conflicts

- **Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian efforts at proliferation)**
- **Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks.**
- **Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, regional tensions.**
- **Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert elements like Quds force.**
- **Harassment and attrition through low level attacks, clashes, incidents.**
- **Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk, intimidation.**
- **Strike at critical node or infrastructure.**

Iran: Threat or “Competitor”

Non-Military Competition

- *Ideology, religion, and political systems*
- *“Terrorism” and violent extremism vs. “counterterrorism”*
- *Energy, sanctions, and global economic impacts*
- *Arms control, arms exports, and arms imports*
- *International diplomacy*

Military Competition

- *Weapons of mass destruction*
- *Conventional forces*
- *Asymmetric and irregular warfare*
- *Proxy use of state and non-state actors*
- *Threat and intimidation*

Nations and Sub-Regions of Competition

- *Gulf Cooperation Council countries*
- *Yemen*
- *Iraq*
- *Jordan*
- *Syria*
- *Lebanon*
- *Israel*
- *Gaza and West Bank*
- *Morocco*
- *Pakistan*
- *Turkey*
- *Afghanistan*
- *Central Asia*
- *Europe*
- *Russia*
- *China*
- *Japan and Asia*
- *Venezuela, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina*

Iran's Strategic Position: DNI Assessment - February 2010 - I

Iran: Growing Authoritarianism and Efforts to Expand its Regional Influence

The Iranian Government faced a major political challenge last summer when a widespread perception of fraud during the June presidential election provoked large-scale popular demonstrations and infighting among regime elites. Conservative hardliners reacted by cracking down on protestors and regime opponents, and hardliners now are using the crisis and its aftermath to further consolidate their power. Despite Iran's internal turmoil, we judge that Tehran's foreign policy will remain relatively constantly driven by a consistent set of goals, and that its efforts to expand its regional influence and ongoing support for terrorist and militant groups will continue to present a threat to many countries in the Middle East and to US interests.

Iran's political crisis has widened splits in the country's political elite and undercut the regime's legitimacy. Although Iranian politics remain in flux, Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Ahmadi-Nejad, and their hardline conservative allies are likely to focus over the next year on consolidating their power. Strengthened conservative control will limit opportunities for reformers to participate in politics or organize opposition. The regime will work to marginalize opposition elites, disrupt or intimidate efforts to organize dissent, and use force to put down unrest. Iran's economic performance has been hurt by softening oil prices and longstanding Iranian policies that discourage the private sector and foreign investment, but the economy is not in crisis. Iran's economy is heavily dependent on oil and hydrocarbons provide 80 percent of its foreign exchange revenue, making Tehran vulnerable to downturns in oil prices. Nonetheless, Iran maintains foreign currency reserves to hedge against a moderate fall in oil prices. International sanctions and pressure have aggravated Iran's economic woes by disrupting and increasing the cost of international business, slowing some projects and programs, and contributing to Iran's economic slowdown.

Iran has made contingency plans for dealing with future additional international sanctions by identifying potential alternative suppliers of gasoline, including China and Venezuela. Tehran also has resorted to doing business with small, non-Western banks and dealing in non-US currency for many financial transactions. Iranian opposition press has reported the involvement of the Revolutionary Guard and Iranian intelligence in the smuggling of crude oil as a way of both skirting and profiting from sanctions. Despite these activities and Iran's gasoline subsidy cuts, which could in part serve to mitigate some effects of the embargo, we nonetheless judge that sanctions will have a negative impact on Iran's recovery from its current economic slowdown.

Iran's Strategic Position: DNI Assessment - February 2010 - II

Iran's overall approach to international affairs probably will remain relatively constant and will continue to be driven by longstanding priorities of preserving the Islamic regime, safeguarding Iran's sovereignty, defending its nuclear ambitions, and expanding its influence in the region and the Islamic world. We judge Iran's influence and ability to intervene in the region will remain significant and that it will continue to support terrorist and militant groups to further its influence and undermine the interests of Western and moderate regional states.

In Iraq, we expect Iran will focus on building long-term influence by trying to ensure the continued political dominance of its Shia allies, expand Iran's political and economic ties to Iraq, and limit Washington's influence. We assess Tehran continues to train, equip, and fund select Iraqi Shia militant groups.

In Afghanistan, Iran is providing political and economic support to the Karzai government, developing relationships with leaders across the political spectrum, and providing lethal aid to elements of the Taliban to block Western--especially US--entrenchment in the country. Tehran likely will continue to provide reconstruction, humanitarian, and economic initiatives intended to bolster Afghan stability. Iran also will seek to expand its influence at the expense of the United States and other competitors, and to work with Kabul on border security and counternarcotics initiatives.

In the Levant, Tehran is focused on building influence in Syria and Lebanon and expanding the capability of key allies. Tehran continues to support groups such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which it views as integral to its efforts to challenge Israeli and Western influence in the Middle East. Hizballah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training, and weaponry, and Iran's senior leadership has cited Hizballah as a model for other militant groups. Iran also provides training, weapons, and money to HAMAS to bolster the group's ability and resolve to maintain its armed resistance to Israel and opposition to Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

The Broader Patterns in Iranian Activity

| Iranian Actors | Related States/ Non-State Actors | Key Target/Operating Country |
|--|---|---|
| Revolutionary Guards | Iran | Iraq |
| Al Quds force | Syria | Israel |
| Vevak/other intelligence | Hezbollah | Gaza/West Bank |
| Arms transfers | Hamas | Egypt |
| Military and security advisors | Mahdi Army | Kuwait |
| Clerics, pilgrims, shrines | Yemeni Shi'ites | Bahrain |
| Commercial training | Bahraini Shi'ites | Yemen |
| Finance/investment | Saudi Shi'ites | Lebanon |
| Investment/training companies | | Afghanistan |
| Education: scholarships, teachers | | Venezuela |
| Cultural exchanges | | Morocco |
| Athletic visits | | |

Odierno on Iran's Role in Iraq

The U.S. military is beefing up security around its bases in Iraq in anticipation of Iranian-backed militants looking to score propaganda points by attacking American Soldiers leaving the country, the U.S. commander said Tuesday.

Gen. Ray Odierno said the Iranian threat to U.S. forces has increased as Tehran looks to boost its political and economic influence in Iraq in the face of a decreasing U.S. military presence.

"There's a very consistent threat from Iranian surrogates operating in Iraq," and security has been stepped up at some U.S. bases, Odierno told reporters in Baghdad. He added that joint operations with Iraqi forces against suspected Iranian-sponsored insurgents have also been increased, while the scheduled withdrawal proceeds apace.

Though no attacks have yet occurred, said Odierno, there was credible intelligence some Iranian-backed groups were planning strikes on U.S. forces. Odierno said militants were hoping to make propaganda out of attacks on withdrawing U.S. troops to make it seem as though they were being driven out. "For years, these groups have been talking about attacking U.S. forces to force them to leave," Odierno said.

While connections between certain groups of Shiite militants in Iraq and the government in Tehran were "always very convoluted," Odierno said that at least some have ties to the powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, a heavily armed paramilitary force tasked with protecting the clerical regime.

"Whether they are connected to the Iranian government, we can argue about that," Odierno said. "But they are clearly connected to the IRGC."

Iranian Asymmetric Doctrine

- **Iran sends signals about its use of asymmetric warfare through its military parades and exercises.**
- **The IRGC often claims to conduct very large exercises, sometimes with 100,000 men or more. The exact size of such exercises is unclear, but they are often a fraction of IRGC claims.**
- **By displaying both its real and virtual military (e.g. naval) fighting capabilities through electronic, printed and network media, and through official statements, Iran seek to achieve the following politico-diplomatic and propaganda ends (4Ds):**
 - **Defiance (to maintain a course of resistance, targeting primarily the Western political will and system).**
 - **Deception (on the real state of Iranian warfighting capabilities, targeting the Western military establishments).**
 - **Deterrence (with the IRI military “might”, targeting Western public opinion, delivered through the media).**
 - **Demonstration (of the outreach of its own power, targeting the Iranian people and the Moslem world).**

“Going Nuclear:” Intimidation as a Form of Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare

- **Even the search for nuclear power is enough to have a major effect.**
- **Development of long range missiles add to credibility, and pressure.**
- **Crossing the nuclear threshold in terms of the bomb in the basement option.**
- **Threats to Israel legitimize the capability to tacitly threaten Arab states. Support of Hamas and Hezbollah increase legitimacy in Arab eyes -- at least Arab publics.**
- **Many future options: stockpile low enriched material and disperse centrifuges, plutonium reactor, underground test, actual production, arm missiles, breakout arming of missiles.**
- **Declared forces, undeclared forces, lever Israeli/US/Arab fears.**

“Going Asymmetric:” Substituting Asymmetric Forces for Weak Conventional Forces

- **Combined nuclear and asymmetric efforts sharply reduce need for modern conventional forces -- which have less practical value**
- **Linkages to Syria, Lebanon, other states, and anti-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah add to ability to deter and intimidate/lever.**
- **Can exploit fragility of Gulf, world dependence on oil exports, GCC dependence on income and imports.**
- **Threats to Israel again legitimize the capability to tacitly threaten Arab states.**

“Swarming” vs. “Attrition”

- Iran practices “swarming” targets in the Gulf with large numbers of small craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles, missile armed aircraft, and increasing support from UAVs/UCAVs.
- Tactics strongly favor surprise and/or sudden escalation to be successful.
- Also studies patterns of slow, episodic low-level attacks that intimidate, alter shipping patterns and insurance, threaten/attack offshore and coastal targets at levels sufficient to put on military pressure without provoking major conflict or retaliation.
- Exercises are a form of intimidation, as are shifts in deployments, weapons and technology tests and announcements.
- No fixed boundaries between “conventional” and asymmetric” warfare, or threats, low level military acts, and conflict.
- Can reinforce conventional threats/deterrence by use of proxies in other areas.

Some Tangible Examples

- **Iranian tanker war with Iraq**
 - **Oil spills and floating mines in Gulf.**
 - **Libyan “stealth” mining of Red Sea.**
 - **Use of Quds force in Iraq. Iranian use of UAVs. Border and coastal “incidents.”**
 - **Arms transfers, in cooperation with Syria, to Hezbollah.**
 - **“Incidents” in pilgrimage in Makkah.**
 - **Support of Shi’ite groups in Bahrain.**
 - **Missile and space tests; expanding range of missile programs (future nuclear test?).**
 - **Naval guards seizure of British boat, confrontation with US Navy, exercises in Gulf.**
 - **Development of limited “close the Gulf” capability.**
 - **Flow of illegal's and smuggling across Yemeni border.**
 - **Hamas/PIJ arms transfer and their rocket attacks on Eilat, Aqaba.**
- In August 2010**

The Expanding Roles and Mission of the IRGC

- **Iran's Deputy Army Commander Brigadier General Abdolrahim Moussavi has announced that Iran is committed to expanding its strategic reach, arguing that, "In the past, our military had to brace itself for countering regional enemies. This is while today we are faced with extra-regional threats."**
- **Iran upgraded a naval base at Assalouyeh in Iran's southern Bushehr province.**
 - **This base is the fourth in a string of IRGC bases along the waterway that will extend from Bandar Abbas to Pasa Bandar near the Pakistan border.**
 - **Part of, what IRGC's Navy Commander Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari describes as a new mission to establish an impenetrable line of defense at the entrance to the Sea of Oman.**

Expanding IRGC Capabilities

- Forces can carry out extensive raids against Gulf shipping, carry out regular amphibious exercises with the land branch of the IRGC against objectives like the islands in the Gulf, and could conduct raids against countries on the southern Gulf coast.
- Iran could launch a coordinated attack involving explosives-laden remote-controlled boats, swarming speedboats, semi-submersible torpedo boats, FACs, kamikaze UAVs, midget and attack submarines, and shore-based anti-ship missile and artillery fire.
- Could “swarm” a U.S.-escorted convoy or surface action group transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and barrages of rockets with cluster warheads could be used to suppress enemy defensive fire and carrier air operations.
- Naval Guards work closely with Iranian intelligence and appear to be represented unofficially in some embassies, Iranian businesses and purchasing offices, and other foreign fronts.
- Iran has launched a domestic weapons procurement campaign aimed at improving its defense capabilities and has announced the development of 109 types of advanced military equipment over the past two years.
 - In December 2008 Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari confirmed the delivery of two new domestically-built missile boats, Kalat (Fortress) and Derafsh (Flag), as well as a Ghadir-class light submarine to the Iranian navy.
 - The deputy commander of the IRGC's navy, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, told the Fars News Agency on 11 November 2008 that both unmanned speedboats and UAVs are now mass-produced in the country.
 - On December 6, 2008 the Iranian Navy test-fired a new surface-to-surface missile from a warship as part of exercises along a strategic shipping route. "The Nasr-2 was fired from a warship and hit its target at a distance of 30 km (19 miles) and destroyed it," Iranian state run radio reported.

IRGC Commander and Asymmetric Strategy - I

- **On September 1, 2007, Khamenei promoted Mohammad Ali Jafari, then coordinator of the IRGC Research and Command Center, to the rank of major general and the post of commander in chief of the IRGC.**
- **Throughout his military career Jafari has emphasized asymmetrical warfare and developing Iran's ballistic missile capabilities throughout his military career**
- **In 1992, he was appointed commander of the ground forces. One of the tasks he carried out in this capacity was "to study and assess the strengths and weaknesses of America [as reflected] in its attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq."**
- **Jafari has outlined the strategy he means to promote as IRGC commander, reiterating his commitment to developing Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and the asymmetrical warfare capacities of the IRGC:**
 - **Asymmetrical warfare... is [our] strategy for dealing with the considerable capabilities of the enemy. A prominent example of this kind of warfare was [the tactics employed by Hizbullah during] the Lebanon war in 2006... Since the enemy has considerable technological abilities, and since we are still at a disadvantage in comparison, despite the progress we have made in the area of equipment, [our only] way to confront [the enemy] successfully is to adopt the strategy [of asymmetric warfare] and to employ various methods of this kind."**

IRGC Commander and Asymmetric Strategy - II

- **IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari statements on asymmetric strategy continued:**
 - **Jafari has said in the past that, in the case of a confrontation with the West, Iran will be willing to employ the organizations under its influence. In a January 2005 speech to intelligence commanders from the Basij and IRGC, Jafari - then commander of the ground forces - stated: "In addition to its own capabilities, Iran also has excellent deterrence capabilities outside its [own borders], and if necessary it will utilize them."**
 - **"the Revolutionary Guards [Corps] will invest efforts in strengthening its asymmetrical warfare capabilities, with the aim of successfully confronting the enemies."**
 - **"After September 11, [2001], all [IRGC] forces changed their [mode of] operation, placing emphasis on attaining combat readiness. The first step [towards achieving] this goal was to develop [a strategy] of asymmetrical warfare and to hold maneuvers [in order to practice it]."**

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

- **125,000+, drawing on 1,000,000 Basij.**
- **Key is 20,000 Naval Guards, including 5,000 marines.**
 - **Armed with HY-3 CSS-C-3 Seersucker (6-12 launchers, 100 missiles, 95-100 km), and 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802s (120 km), and 40+ Boghammers with ATGMs, recoilless rifles, machine guns.**
 - **Large-scale mine warfare capability using small craft and commercial boats.**
 - **Based at Bandar e-Abbas, Khorramshar, Larak, Abu Musa, Al Farsiyyah, Halul, Sirri.**
- **IRGC air branch reported to fly UAVs and UCAVs, and control Iran's strategic missile force.**
 - **1 Shahab SRBM Bde (300-500-700 km) with 12-18 launchers, 1 Shahab 3 IRBM Btn (1,200-1,280 km) with 6 launchers and 4 missiles each.**

IRGC Key Assets and Capabilities

- **The IRGC has a wide variety of assets at its disposal to threaten shipping lanes in the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Caspian Sea.**
- **3 Kilo (Type 877) and unknown number of midget (Qadr-SS-3) submarines; smart torpedoes, (anti-ship missiles?) and smart mine capability.**
- **Use of 5 minelayers, amphibious ships, small craft, commercial boats.**
- **Attacks on tankers, shipping, offshore facilities by naval guards.**
- **Raids with 8 P-3MP/P-3F Orion MPA and combat aircraft with anti-ship missiles(C-801K (8-42 km), CSS-N-4, and others).**
- **Free-floating mines, smart and dumb mines, oil spills.**
- **Land-based, long-range anti-ship missiles based on land, islands (Seersucker HY-2, CSS-C-3), and ships (CSS-N-4, and others. Sunburn?).**
- **Forces whose exercises demonstrate the capability to raid or attack key export and infrastructure facilities.**

IRGC Naval Branch

- **The IRGC has a naval branch consists of approximately 20,000 men, including marine units of around 5,000 men.**
- **The IRGC is now reported to operate all mobile land-based anti-ship missile batteries and has an array of missile boats; torpedo boats; catamaran patrol boats with rocket launchers; motor boats with heavy machine guns; mines as well as Yono (Qadir)-class midget submarines; and a number of swimmer delivery vehicles.**
- **The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles.**
- **The IRGC controls Iran's coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2 Seersucker land-based anti-ship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast.**
- **The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.**
- **IRGC put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008 and is operational in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and could potentially operate elsewhere if given suitable sealift or facilities.**
- **Can deliver conventional weapons, bombs, mines, and CBRN weapons into ports and oil and desalination facilities.**
- **Force consists of six elements: surface vessels, midget and unconventional submarines, missiles and rockets, naval mines, aviation, and military industries.**

IRGC Naval Branch Modernization

- **Large numbers of anti-ship missiles on various types of launch platforms.**
- **Small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with rockets or anti-ship missiles.**
- **More fast mine-laying platforms.**
- **Enhanced subsurface warfare capability with various types of submarines and sensors.**
- **More small, mobile, hard-to-detect platforms, such as semi-submersibles and unmanned aerial vehicles.**
- **More specialized training.**
- **More customized or purpose-built high-tech equipment.**
- **Better communications and coordination between fighting units.**
- **More timely intelligence and effective counterintelligence/deception.**
- **Enhanced ability to disrupt the enemies command, control, communications, and intelligence capability.**
- **The importance of initiative, and the avoidance of frontal engagements with large U.S. naval surface warfare elements.**
- **Means to mitigate the vulnerability of even small naval units to air and missile attack.**

IRGC Naval Branch Updates

- **June 22, 2010**
 - According to the Commander of the IRGC Naval Forces, Ali Fadavi, “The trend of equipment, modernization, and change in the IRGC will continue at a higher speed until the specified goals are attained”
- **June 24, 2010**
 - Fadavi stated, in response to the US’ presence in the Persian Gulf, “This force is mighty and capable of reacting very especially and very appropriately to inspection against Iranian ships”
 - Regarding the current strength of IRGC’s Naval Forces, “...right now we are equipped with hundreds of missile launcher ships among our thousands of warships, and the Americans are quite unfamiliar with the capabilities of the IRGC Naval Forces” -- Fadavi
- **July 19, 2010**
 - General Vahidi stated that “new domestically made submarines would be delivered to Iran’s Navy by July 27, 2010”
 - He further stated that these submarines would be highly equipped with modern equipments, and would improve the Navy’s maneuvering capabilities
- **July 25, 2010**
 - According to Iranian reporting, a senior Iranian military figure stated that “each hostile US warship located in the Persian Gulf will be swarmed by over 100 Iranian military vessels”
 - Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari stated that the US warships located in the Persian Gulf are “easy targets” and Iran is “able to inflict heavy losses on these ships”
 - The IRGC has stated that its missiles can hit any target across the Persian Gulf and all gunboats are within its range.

IRGC Naval Branch Updates

- **August 10, 2010:**
 - **Bandar-e Abbas Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hormozgan Provincial TV says Iran has Added Four Domestically-Made Ghadir Submarines to Naval Fleet.**
 - **Correspondent Ezdeha'i, identified by onscreen caption as Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reporter] says, "With the launch of these four submarines, alongside the manufacturing of varieties of missile-launching vessels which has previously been accomplished, the chain of our country's defensive naval production has been completed today."**
 - **Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi says. " These submarines, which were completely domestically made by experts in the defense industry and with the cooperation, understanding, and consultation of our dear ones in the Naval Force of the Islamic Republic Army, possess special features. Their ability to be agile and move and maneuver quickly, with long-range underwater navigation and the power to identify and track targets under water and at the surface, in addition to their possessing of proper equipment, precise sonar, precise torpedo systems, and automatic navigation systems, give [these submarines] very good capabilities."**
 - **Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, says, "We believe that by using the submarines that exist in this country, and by employing the appropriate tactics, we are now able to have an underwater presence wherever it is necessary.**
 - **Correspondent, speaking over video of the submarines, says, The Ghadir 948 submarine possesses the most advanced navigation and weapons systems. The subsurface vessels are made in small, medium, and large, and Iran has rendered the mass production of small and medium submarines completely domestically. Out of the nearly 3,000 kilometers of maritime borders, about 2,200 kilometers are in the south of the country. The joining of these subsurface vessels with the Army's fleet plays an important role in the protection of our maritime borders. ...They have been designed for various waters. The small submarines were made for shallow waters, and the medium and large submarines for deep waters.**

IRGC Naval Branch Facilities

- **The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.**
- **The naval branch has bases and contingency facilities in the Gulf, many near key shipping channels and some near the Strait of Hormuz.**
 - **These include facilities at Al-Farsiya, Halul (an oil platform), Sirri, Abu Musa, Bandaer-e Abbas, Khorramshahr, and Larak.**
- **Iran recently started constructing new naval bases along the coasts of the Gulf and the Sea of Oman for an “impenetrable line of defense.”**
- **On October 27, 2008, Iran opened a new naval base at Jask, located at the southern mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint for Persian Gulf oil.**


Iranian Asymmetric Naval Warfare Forces -I

- Iran has an 18,000 man Navy and 12,000-15,000 man Naval Guards The Navy is in charge of operations in the Caspian and the Gulf of Oman. The Naval branch is in charge of operations in the Gulf, which is the focus of Iran's naval and amphibious capabilities for irregular warfare.
- Both lack modern surface vessel combat capability and are dependent on four obsolete frigates and three obsolete corvettes from the time of the Shah with limited modernization and uncertain combat readiness.
- Iran seems to be building its own prototype Mowaj-class corvette/destroyer, but it is not yet operational.
- The IN has three Russian Kilo-class submarines – which some reports indicate can lay smart mines and fire long-range, homing torpedoes – and the IRGC has at least 7 North Korean/Iranian-made Yono and Nahand-class midget submarines and semi-submersible small craft,
- The IN has a naval aviation branch with 3 aging P-3F maritime patrol and airborne command and control aircraft, three Falcon aircraft modified for electronic warfare and intelligence, and anti-submarine and mine warfare helicopters.
- There are some 3,000-5,000 Marines.

Iranian Asymmetric Naval Warfare Forces -II

- The IRGCN has a wide range of mine warfare and smaller, more modern missile patrol boats armed with Chinese and Iranian-made anti-ship missiles.
- Its anti-ship missile vessels include 13 Kaman-class and 38-meter Thondor (Hudong)-class vessels with C-802 anti-ship missiles, and 9 C-14 and 10 Mk-13 smaller patrol boats with short range Chinese anti-ship missiles. Iran has made and deployed at least 25 Peykapp II-class missile boats and 15 of its own Peykaap I-class coastal patrol craft.
- The IRGCN has some 100 other, smaller patrol boats, many of which are smaller enough to be difficult to detect reliably by radar. A number of Iran's patrol boats are armed with torpedoes and short range or manportable anti-air missiles
- The IRGCN has land-based anti-ship missile batteries, including HY-2s with ranges approximately 100 kilometers and that can be direct to a target by an aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicle. (China has anti-ship missiles with 200-280 kilometer ranges, but it is not believed these have been sold to Iran.) US experts note that Iran can attack targeted ships with C-701, C-801, C-802 and Iranian-made anti-ship cruise missiles from its own shores, islands, and oil platforms using relatively small mobile launchers.
- The IN and IRGN have extensive mine warfare capabilities described later in this analysis.
- IRGC naval forces can operate from bases along the entire Iranian coast of the Gulf, from Islands and bases near the shipping channels through the Strait of Hormuz, and in the Gulf of Oman. The Navy and IRGC cannot "close the Gulf" for an extended period, but could present a peak threat that severely restricted shipping through the Gulf for some 5-10 to 10 days.

Gulf Forces: Key Ships for Asymmetric Warfare




| | Iran | Iraq | Saudi | Bahrain | Kuwait | Oman | Qatar | UAE | Yemen |
|----------------------|------|------|-------|---------|--------|------|-------|-----|-------|
| Submarines | 3 | | | | | | | | |
| Midget Submarines | 3 | | | | | | | | |
| Major Missile Combat | 3 | | 11 | 3 | | 2 | | 4 | |
| Major Other Combat | 2 | | | | | | | | |
| Missile Patrol | 31 | | 9 | 4 | 10 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 4 |
| Other Patrol | 56 | 8 | 17 | 4 | | 7 | 3 | 6 | 16 |
| Armed Boats | 117 | 30 | 39 | | | | 11 | | |
| Mine | 5 | | 7 | | | | | 2 | 6 |
| Landing Craft | 8 | | 8 | 5 | | 4 | | 28 | 5 |
| Amphibious Ships | 13 | | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| Support | 26 | | 5 | 1 | 1 | 6 | | 3 | |

Iranian Mine Warfare Capability


- **The Iranian Navy and IRGC regularly exercise minelaying. The Navy can use its submarines and has 5 aging mine warfare ships, but all IRGC patrol vessels can lay mines and Iran could use most commercial vessels.**
- **US Navy intelligence experts estimates that Iran has the Chinese EM52, a rocket-propelled anti-ship mine, and that the Iranian purchase of three Russian KILO-class submarines probably included modern magnetic, acoustic, and pressure-sensitive mines.**
- **Iran also produces its own mines, although these may still be limited to less advanced designs. US experts estimate that Iran had at least 2,000 mines by 2004. Now may be in excess of 4,000.**
- **This is a key threat. The US normally deploys only very limited mine warfare capabilities in, and Gulf naval capabilities consists of a total of only 5 Saudi mine layers and some helicopters with uncertain readiness and training .**

Gulf: Dedicated and Potential Mine Warfare Forces



| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|----|----|---|---|---|----|----|----|
| ■ Submarines | 3 | | | | | | | | |
| ■ Other Patrol | 56 | 8 | 17 | 4 | | 7 | 3 | 6 | 16 |
| ■ Armed Boats | 117 | 30 | 39 | | | | 11 | | |
| ■ Mine | 5 | | 7 | | | | | 2 | 6 |
| ■ Landing Craft | 8 | | 8 | 5 | | 4 | | 28 | 5 |
| ■ Amphibious Ships | 13 | | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | 1 |
| ■ RH-53D Helicopters | 3 | | | | | | | | |

Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, *The Military Balance*, various editions, Jane's Sentinel series, and material provided by US and Saudi experts. Estimates differ on Saudi landing craft, because of different ways to count operational status. Some experts put the figure at 6 LCMs and 2 LCUs.

Iranian Military Exercises: 2006-2010 - I

January 27, 2006: Iran completes major military exercise that tests Teheran's ability to attack Gulf shipping and Arab oil facilities. Sources said the exercise was designed to test capabilities to strike U.S. and Arab targets throughout the area of the Gulf. According to a diplomatic source, the exercise was meant to show the West that Iran could stop all oil shipments in the Gulf and destroy numerous oil facilities in Gulf Arab countries," and included a range of fighter-jets and helicopters from the Iranian Air Force, with the Iranian navy contributed surface vessels and submarines.

August 19, 2006: Iran launches a series of large-scale military exercises aimed at introducing the country's new defensive doctrine, state-run television reported. The television report said the military exercise would occur in 14 of the country's 30 provinces and could last as long as five weeks. The first stage of the maneuvers began with air strikes in the southeastern province of Sistan va Baluchistan,. The military exercise, is said to involve 12 infantry regiments, and is called "The Blow of Zolfaghar," in reference to a sword that belonged to Imam Ali, one of the most revered figures for Shi'ite Muslims.

November 3, 2006: Iran's Revolutionary Guards began another series exercises on days after a United States-led naval exercise began in the Gulf. Iran began the 10 days of maneuvers in the Gulf by test firing dozens of missiles, including the long-range Shahab-3 (estimated range: 2000 km or 1,240 miles), and the Shahab-2, which Iran says can carry a cluster warhead that can deliver 1,400 bomblets at once. Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, leader of the Revolutionary Guards, says on television that Iran's military exercises were not meant to threaten neighboring countries. "We want to show our deterrent and defensive power to trans-regional enemies, and we hope they will understand the message of the maneuvers," he said. "The first and main goal is to demonstrate the power and national determination to defend the country against possible threat." General Safavi said the exercises would last 10 days and would take place in the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and several Iranian provinces.

Iranian Military Exercises: 2006-2010- II

March 23-30 2007: Iran's regular Navy launches week-long war-games on its southern shores. The military exercises are being carried out in the Gulf by Iran's regular Navy, the report said, adding that they would continue until March 30.

January 7, 2008: US ships harassed by Iran. Iranian boats approach three U.S. Navy ships in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, threatening to explode the American vessels. U.S. forces are reported to be on the verge of firing on the Iranian boats, when the boats - believed to be from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's navy - turn and move away. A Pentagon official say. "It is the most serious provocation of this sort that we've seen yet," He says the incident occurs at about 5 a.m. local time Sunday as Navy cruiser USS Port Royal, destroyer USS Hopper and frigate USS Ingraham were on their way into the Gulf and passing through the strait - a major oil shipping route. to take evasive maneuvers. There were no injuries but the official said there could have been, because the Iranian boats turned away "literally at the very moment that U.S. forces were preparing to open fire" in self defense.

July 7, 2008: Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps launch large-scale, five-day war-games, dubbed "Exercise Stake Net", was carried out in the Straits of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman, where an assortment of new weapons were brought into play. The Iranian military maneuvers take place on the same day the United States announces it too will holding naval exercises in the Gulf.

Iranian state media say that the military maneuvers by the IRGC's Navy and Air Force missiles unit are aimed at improving the force's military abilities. Separately, Brigadier General Mahmoud Chaharbaghi, commander of the IRGC Ground Forces artillery and missiles unit, announces that 50 of his unit's brigades are being armed with smart weapons and cluster bombs. Iran later test-fires nine missiles including what is claims is an upgraded version of Shahab-3 ballistic missile with a one-ton warhead capable of destroying targets within a 2,000-kilometer (1,245-mile) range.

Iranian Military Exercises: 2006-2010 - III

September 7, 2008: Iran's armed forces test the country's new weapons systems and defense plans in a three-day military maneuver. Iran's naval forces claim to have made a breakthrough in building various types of "radar evading" submarines to guard its territorial waters. The IRGC says it successfully test-fired advanced shore-to-sea, surface-to-surface and sea-to-air missiles. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corp (IRGC) and the Army take part in drills involving anti-aircraft defense systems. The main purpose of the maneuvers is to maintain and promote the combat readiness of relevant units and to test new weapons and defense plans. Iran's Chief Navy Commander, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, said Iran is upgrading its naval fleet with a new generation of domestically-built submarines.

September 15, 2008: The Islamic Republic Air Force tests Iran's domestic-made warfare in a joint military exercise with the IRGC, the Defense Ministry says. The joint aerial maneuver is aimed at boosting Iran's defensive capabilities and operational tactics, Iran's Defense Minister Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar said. The military exercise, which involves The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), comes in the wake of escalating US and Israeli threats to strike the country's nuclear facilities.

October 10, 2008: Islamist militiamen affiliated to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) stage military exercises in the suburbs of Tehran on Friday to defend the Iranian capital against "natural disasters" and "enemy assaults". Members of the paramilitary Basij take part in military drills under the command of the Tharallah Garrison in Tehran. Similar war games are held in Karaj, Islamshahr, Shahre Rey, Rabat Karim, and Varamin, said the acting deputy commandant of the IRGC, Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, who also commands the Tharallah Garrison. The maneuvers last for 48 hours. Meanwhile another senior Basij leader announces that the paramilitary force is giving specialized training" to its units across Iran. "These units are receiving specialized air, sea and ground training to be prepared for defending the country, the ruling establishment, and the revolution", said Brigadier General Ahmad Zolqadr on the sidelines of a military parade in Zanjan, north-west Iran. Zolqadr is the operational commander of the Basij.

Iranian Military Exercises: 2006-2010 - IV

November 12, 2008: Iran launches a “new” type of long-range ballistic missile dubbed "Sajjil," but its general layout was indistinguishable from the description of the "Ashura," which was flight-tested about one year ago.

December 2-7, 2008: Iran announces recent upgrades to the Naval Base in Asalouyeh and the now online base facilities in the port of Jask. Iranian officers state that long range tactical missile silos and shore based anti-ship missiles have long been key aspects of planning of potential military operations in the event of an open conflict. Top Iranian Army commander Major General Ayatollah Saleh is quoted in *Presstv Nov 30* as saying "the heavy weight of the enemy warships provides the Iranian side with an ideal opportunity for launching successful counter-attacks" Iran announces that it is in the final stages of planning an extensive naval and military exercise 'Unity 87' due to commence in December 2008. Iran says it will seek to accomplish objectives that include defense against a Israeli and US threat, closing the Strait of Hormuz to local and international shipping, and the testing new and improved military equipment and tactics.

Admiral Qasem Rostamabadi tells states radio that "The aim of this maneuver is to increase the level of readiness of Iran's naval forces and also to test and to use domestically-made naval weaponry." He says the naval maneuvers cover an area of 50,000 square miles, including the Sea of Oman off Iran's southern coast. "In this six-day long maneuver there will be more than 60 combat vessel units," Kayhan quotes Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, commander of the navy as saying it will include destroyers, missile-equipped battleships, submarines, special-operations teams, helicopters, and fighter planes. Iran has previously claimed it could close the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, through which about 40 percent of the world's globally traded oil passes. The United States has pledged to protect shipping routes. An Iranian naval commander says a week earlier that the country's navy could strike an enemy well beyond its shores and as far away as Bab al-Mandab, the southern entrance to the Red Sea that leads to the Suez Canal. Iran test-fires a new surface-to-surface missile from a warship in a strategic shipping route, as part of the war games in the Sea of Oman and the Gulf region: State radio reports, "The surface-to-surface Nasr-2 missile was tested in the (Sea of) Oman operational region,". IRNA reports that, "The Nasr-2 was fired from a warship and hit its target at a distance of 30 km (19 miles) and destroyed it," adding it was the first test of the new, medium-range missile.

Iranian Military Exercises: 2006-2010 - V

Mach 8, 2009: Iranian officials reported "successfully" testing a new air-to-sea missile with a range of 110 kilometers (68 miles), the Fars news agency reported. It did not say when the test was conducted. "Iranian defense specialists are able to successfully install missiles with a range of 110 kilometers on fighter planes and launch them," the report said, adding that the high-precision weapon weighs about 500 kilos. The report said the latest test showed the Islamic republic's "ability to automatically direct the missile and carry warheads to destroy large targets at sea."

May 20, 2009: Iran test-fired a solid-fuel missile capable of reaching Israel or US bases in the Middle East. Iranian officials claim that the two-stage, solid-fuel Sajjil-2 surface-to-surface missile has a range of approximately 2,000km (1,240 miles). Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, claimed that in addition to the increase in range, the Sajjil-2 differs from the Sajjil missile launched in Novmeber 2008, because it "is equipped with a new navigation system as well as precise and sophisticated sensors," according to Iran's official news agency, and added that the missile landed "precisely on the target."

Reports also indicate that the Sajjil-2's reaction times may be about 50-20 minutes faster than the Shahab series that came before it. Its solid fuel booster may also be is also reliable, particularly in a mobile basing; and haves less need for maintenance. Its mobility launcher might also be harder to detect since the TEL requires fewer support vehicles -- although the Shahab does use storable liquid fuels and the difference is might not be a serious as some sources indicate.

May 26, 2009: Iran sent six warships into international waters including the Gulf of Aden, a local newspaper reported, just days after it test-fired its Sajjil -2 missile. "We have dispatched six warships to international waters and the Gulf of Aden," naval commander Habibollah Sayari was quoted as saying in the Jomhuri Eslami. "This mission shows our increased capability in dealing with any foreign threat," he said. Iranian officials said on May 14 that the Islamic republic had dispatched two warships to the Gulf of Aden but it was unclear whether they were among the six announced by Sayari.

Iranian Military Exercises: 2006-2010 - VI

June 1, 2009: The Iranian air force has launched a large military exercise dubbed "Thunder 88" over its regional waters, official media indicated. Iranian TV said the Air Force carried out maneuvers using various types of combat aircraft, a move that coincided with the Defense Ministry's launching of three new Ghadir-class submarines for its naval fleet (bringing the total number of the sonar-evading vessels to seven) and 18 speedboats at the port of Bandar Abbas near the Straits of Hormuz, the Kuwait news agency KUNA reported. Officials said the exercises are meant to enhance the Iranian Air Force's capabilities and to train them to safeguard navy ships. Iran's Mehr news agency said the Bandar Abbas ceremony was attended by Army Commander Ataollah Salehi and Defense Minister Mostafa-Mohammad Najjar, KUNA reported.

The Ghadir class is a smaller vessel with a displacement of around 120 tons. The semiofficial Fars News Agency in 2007 said the Ghadir class was equipped with stealth technology. The news comes amid a flurry of Iranian defense activity. Iran in May inaugurated a production line for a military hovercraft, dubbed the Younes 6. Meanwhile, Iran announced the military production of some 20 other military devices, including laser systems and electronic warfare devices. Production also began on a 40mm anti-cruise cannon dubbed Fath, which is capable of reaching targets as far as 7 miles away with a firing rate of 300 rounds per minute. The Sejjil-2 surface-to-surface solid-fuel missile, meanwhile, was launched in May with a range capable of reaching Israel.

June 6, 2009: Iran has started production of a new ground-to-air missile system, Iranian media, amid persistent speculation that Israel might attack the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities. "The range of this defense system (missile) is more than 40 km and it is able to pursue and hit the enemy's airplanes and helicopters on a smart basis and at supersonic speed," Defence Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar said, without specifying how the missile compared to previous such weapons.

June 22, 2009: Iran began three days of air force exercises on in the Gulf and the Sea of Oman to raise operational and support capability, Iranian media said. "Long-distance flights of around 3,600 km (2,237 miles) along with aerial refueling from tanker to fighter jet and from fighter jet to fighter jet will be part of this exercise," state broadcaster IRIB's website reported. "Low altitude flights over the waters of the ... Gulf and the Sea of Oman by Iranian fighter jets over distances of 700 km will also be tested.," it said. IRIB reported that the exercises were also aimed at raising the force's ability to use intelligence aircraft "to send signals and analyze threats".

Iranian Military Exercises: 2009-2010 - VII

September 28, 2009: Iran launched a long range missile claiming that it was capable of hitting Israel along with firing multiple short range missiles during its wargame code named ‘Fatemeh Zahra (SA). Iranian media reported that “all the fired missiles hit the pre-determined objectives... Tens of ground-to-ground missiles were also fired during the military exercise which was conducted in line with the carrying out of preventive programs of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Forces” IRGC General Hossein Salami had reported that among the various kinds of missiles launched were the medium range Shahab-1 and -2 missiles as well as the long range Shahab-3 missile. Other short range missiles such as the Fateh, Tondar and Zelzal were successfully test fired as reported by the Iranian media. Further media reporting states, “Tens of ground-to-ground missiles were also fired during the military exercise which was conducted in line with the carrying out of preventive programs of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Forces”

November 22, 2009: Iranian media reporting shows, air forces of the IRGC launched the first phase of a nationwide aerial wargame code named “Defenders of Velayat 2”. Brigadier General Ahmad Mighani stated that “the aim of the war game is to [increase] coordination and enhance combat readiness of the Iranian Air Force, IRGC and the Basij (volunteer) forces.” It was conducted throughout Iran in cities such as Bushehr, Fars, Yazd, Isfahan, Markazi and Gazvin provinces as well as in the northern and western parts of the country. The general also stated, “The maneuver has three phases including preparation of military units, reconnaissance flights and dog fights... will be held in an area about 600,000 square kilometers during which some of the most sophisticated defense systems will be examined.”

April 22nd, 2010: Iranian reporting stated that the IRGC engaged in a 4 day war game named “Holy Prophet 5” in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. During the exercise, the IRGC demonstrated successful tests of 5 advanced cruise shore-to-shore missiles and sea-to-sea missiles. The missiles specifically tested were :Nasr (victory), Saeqeh (lightning), and Noor (light). In addition, according to further Iranian reporting, the IRGC tested “laser smart weapons” and “hit their targets with 100% accuracy”. The IRGC claimed this “Drill carried message of peace and security... and also served as a warning to the US and Zionist Regime.”

Iranian Military Exercises: 2009-2010 - VIII

May 7- 12, 2010: The IRGC conducted a 5 day war game entitled “Velayat 89” in the Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, and the Northern Indian Ocean – covering an area of 250,000 square km. According to Iranian reporting, “an Iranian spokesperson said that the Velayat 89 wargame has been conducted mainly to showcase Islamic Iran’s strength in controlling general passing ways hundreds of kilometers far away Hormuz Strait and facilitate connection of ships coming from Hormuz Strait to Persian Gulf.” Rear Admiral Qassem Rostambadi told the IRNA that “the chemical invasion of the hypothetical enemy was successfully countered with the use of domestically-made warfare during this military exercise. The war games use combat, support, logistic, radar and electronic units as well as surface-to-surface, under water and air missiles using the fighter aircraft of the air force.” Further Iranian media reporting stated that the “IRA’s Navy successfully launched electronic and anti-electronic warfares, using distracters and alarm signalers, information collectors operating through radar system, and audio and non-audio instruments in the Oman Sea onshore and offshores.” Iran’s newly deployed warship ‘Jamaran’ has also reportedly been used in the naval exercise. The sea vessel has a displacement of around 1,400 tons and is equipped with modern radars and electronic warfare, as per the media report.

Operations Deputy for Iranian Army’s Ground Forces, Brigadier General Ali Arasteh told reporters on Sunday that in the fifth day of the war games, numerous sectors of the ground forces including infantry, armoured, artillery and telecommunications units started their tactical operations in southern parts of the province which is located in southeast of the country. The IRNA reported various types of surface-to-surface, air-to-surface and surface-to-sea missiles were fired at the fourth phase. While in the fifth phase Iranian waters were characterized by firing solid propellant Farg-5 cruise missiles towards the hypothetical targets . The mid-range intelligent missile is designed to trace and completely destroy its targets according to Iranian media. Further reporting shows that it was fired from shore to open seas in the northern Indian Ocean, flying up to a 50 to 60-km distance, the radar-evading missile is more advanced than its foreign counterparts, and can be installed on vessels such as warships and hovercraft.

IRGC Commander on Mass Graves

The deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Gen. Hossein Kan'ani Moghadam, said graves for any attacking U.S. troops have been dug in Iran's southwestern Khuzestan province, where Iran buried Iraqi soldiers killed during the ruinous 1980-88 war between the Islamic republic and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's regime.

General Moghadam stated, "The mass graves that used to be for burying Saddam's soldiers have now been prepared again for U.S. soldiers, and this is the reason for digging this big number of graves."

Moghadam further stated, "I assume that the enemy will be hit in its own military bases out of our borders and will not have any chance to have its forces land in Iran".

"If the U.S. decides to take a pre-emptive action and attack Iran, Iran will have no choice but to strike the American bases in the region," he said. "The heavy costs of such a war will not be just on the Islamic Republic of Iran. America and other countries should accept that this would be the start of an extensive war in the region."

The Al Quds Force - I

- **Comprised of 5,000 - 15,000 members of the IRGC (Increased size of force in 2007)**
- **Equivalent of one Special Forces division, plus additional smaller units**
- **Special priority in terms of training and equipment**
- **Plays a major role in giving Iran the ability to conduct unconventional warfare overseas using various foreign movements as proxies**
- **Specialize in unconventional warfare mission**
- **Control many of Iran's training camps for unconventional warfare, extremists, and terrorists**
- **Has offices or "sections" in many Iranian embassies throughout the world**
- **Through its Quds Force, Iran provides aid to Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq-based militants, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.**
- **Despite its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, Iranian authorities continued to provide lethal support, including weapons, training, funding, and guidance through its Quds Force.**
- **General David H. Petraeus has stressed the growing role of the Quds force and IRGC in statements and testimony to Congress.**

The Al Quds Force - II

- **Quds Force continue to provide Iraqi and Afghani militants with:**
 - **specialized training,**
 - **funding,**
 - **Iranian-produced advanced rockets,**
 - **sniper rifles,**
 - **automatic weapons,**
 - **mortars,**
 - **Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**
 - **and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) that have a higher lethality rate than other types of IEDs**
- **Since 2006, Iran has arranged a number of shipments of small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives, possibly including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), to the Taliban.**
- **Israeli defense experts continue to state that they believe the IRGC and Quds force not only played a major role in training and equipping Hezbollah, but may have assisted it during the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006, and played a major role in the Hezbollah anti-ship missile attack on an Israeli Navy Sa'ar-class missile patrol boat.**

Iran and Hezbollah - I

- Hezbollah was originally formed in 1982 by Iranian seminarians.
- Iran's aid packages (arms and money) to Hezbollah are said to exceed \$100 million per year.
- Iran has gone from supplying small arms, short-range missiles and training to providing more sophisticated long-range missiles and other higher-end weaponry
 - Iran exported thousands of 122-mm rockets and Fajr-4 and Fajr-5 long-range rockets to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Arash with a range of 21–29 kilometers.
 - Between 1992 and 2005, Hezbollah received approximately 11,500 missiles and rockets; 400 short- and medium-range pieces of artillery; and Aresh, Nuri, and Hadid rockets and transporters/launchers from Iran.
 - In 2005, Iran sent Hezbollah a shipment of large Uqab missiles with 333-millimeter warheads and an enormous supply of SA-7 and C-802 missiles, two of which were used in an attack on an Israeli ship.
- Iran also supplied Hezbollah with an unknown number of UAV's, the *Mirsad*, that Hezbollah briefly flew over the Israel-Lebanon border on November 7, 2004, and April 11, 2005; at least three were shot down by Israel during the summer 2006 war.
- Iran supplied Hezbollah advanced surface-to-air missiles, including Strela-2/2M, Strela-3, Igla-1E, and the Mithaq-1. The same missiles were reported to have been used to target Israeli helicopters.

Iran and Hezbollah - II

- **During Hezbollah's summer 2006 war with Israel, Iran resupplied the group's depleted weapons stocks.**
- **Hezbollah has recovered from its 2006 confrontation with Israel and has been able to rearm and regroup, and Iran has been an important part of that recovery.**
 - **Various Types of Rockets, reportedly increasing its stockpile to 27,000 rockets, more than double what Hezbollah had at the start of the 2006 war. (some say 40,000)**
 - **Among the deliveries were 500 Iranian-made "Zelzal" (Earthquake) missiles with a range of 186 miles, enough to reach Tel Aviv from south Lebanon.**
 - **Reports of Scud transfer unconfirmed.**
 - **Much better C4I/BM and sheltered positions now in middle of country.**
- **Fighting in Lebanon in 2006 seems to have increased Hezbollah's dependence on Iran and Syria. Both Hezbollah's loss of weapons and fighters in the conflict with Israel and the resulting damage to its reputation and position within Lebanon made it more reliant upon outside supply.**
- **Iran seems to directly control some small Hezbollah cells outside Lebanon.**
- **Elements of Hezbollah planned attacks in Egyptian Sinai; operate in Iraq.**

Source Multiple news outlets and Congressional reports and Intelligence assessments including: "Israel's Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah." Reuters, February 4, 2002; Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL32048, April 14, 2009, available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf>; Robin Hughes, "Iran Answers Hizbollah Call for SAM Systems," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 7, 2006, available at: www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw060807_1_n.shtml; Rotella, Sebastian. "In Lebanon, Hezbollah Arms Stockpile Bigger, Deadlier." Los Angeles Times, May 4, 2008; Shadid, Anthony. "Armed With Iran's Millions, Fighters Turn to Rebuilding." Washington Post, August 16, 2006; MEMRI, "Iran and the Recent Escalation on Israel's Borders Reaction in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria," Special Dispatch Series no. 1207, July 17, 2006, available at: www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP120706; Ali Nouri Zadeh, "130 Officers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds Force Aid Hezbollah: 11,500 Missiles and Rocket-Propelled Grenades Sent from Tehran to Hezbollah," Asharq Al-Awsat, July 16, 2006, available at: www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issue=10092&article=373305&search=C802&state=true; "New Iranian capability is troublesome," The Washington Times, 19 February 2009; The Israel Project, "Hezbollah, Hamas Rearm as Israel Works to Resume Peace Process," press release, February 22, 2007, available at: www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=hsJPK0PIJpH&b=689705&ct=3601455., etc.

Iran and Hamas/Islamic Jihad

- **Iran openly supported Hamas and spoke out against the lack of support for Hamas by Arab regimes throughout the Middle East during engagements between the IAF and Hamas in late 2008 and early 2009 in Gaza.**
- **Iran provided training, arms and logistical support to Hamas during the fighting in Gaza between Israeli forces and Hamas militants in late December 2008 and early January 2009.**
- **Continued to fund Islamic Jihad, over which it has more direct influence and control,**
- **Israeli intelligence sources continued to report Iranian efforts to rearm Hamas after a ceasefire agreement was reached in January 2009.**
- **Has equipped Hamas and Islamic Jihad with long range rockets that can be broken down in to four units for transfer through tunnels. They now have a larger and more modern inventory than in “Gaza War.”**
- **Islamic Jihad fired rockets into Eilat and Aqaba in August 2000.**
- **Arms transfers come through Sudan and Sinai. Tunnels are key route.**
- **Level of Iranian financial support uncertain.**

Source Multiple news outlets and Congressional reports and Intelligence assessments including: Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL32048, April 14, 2009, available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf>; Alon Ben-David, “Iranian influence looms as fragile Gaza ceasefire holds,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 January 2009; Mike Shuster, “Iranian Support For Hamas Running High Post-Gaza,” NPR, available at: 4 February 2009, available at: <http://www.npr.org/templates/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=3>; The Israel Project, “Hezbollah, Hamas Rearm as Israel Works to Resume Peace Process,” press release, February 22, 2007, available at: www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=hsJPK0PIJpH&b=689705&ct=3601455; etc.

Planning for Defense Against Asymmetric Warfare: Converting the GCC from a Facade to a Force

- **Deterrence, passive defense, and conflict prevention areas critical as active defense.**
- **Need integrated GCC force planning and war planning efforts.**
- **Must show GCC will act together. Threats cannot divide or exploit weakest link.**
- **Exercise realistic “red-blue” war games to determine common options and requirements.**
- **Follow-up with realistic CPXs and FTXs.**
- **Emphasize joint warfare approaches that tie in paramilitary and security forces.**
- **Demonstrate have exercised a retaliatory capability.**
- **Interoperability with other Gulf states and with US, UK, France.**
- **Defend against strikes at critical nodes and infrastructure.**