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# Iran, the Gulf, and Strategic Competition: The Conventional Balance

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*Revised August 10,  
2010*


## Weak Capability for “Conventional War”

- Outdated armor and artillery. Weak conscript base.
- Land forces far better suited to defense in depth, popular warfare, and war of attrition than war of maneuver.
- Main surface Navy is vulnerable and obsolete in spite of upgrades..
- No truly modern combat aircraft; even best Soviet fighters are dated. Servicability and sustainability of fixed and rotary wing aircraft poor.
- Surface-to-air missile force obsolete except for small numbers short range TOR-M.
- C4I/IS&R/battle management systems and technology date and weak in spite of upgrades.
- Is developing significant military-industrial based, but years away from competitive level of production and technology.
- Some very tactical missiles and subsystems.
- Need massive transfers of advanced combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and ATBM/ATCM to make major shift in balance.

## “Swarming” vs. “Attrition”


- Iran practices “swarming” targets in the Gulf with large numbers of small craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles, missile armed aircraft, and increasing support from UAVs/UCAVs.
- Tactics strongly favor surprise and/or sudden escalation to be successful.
- Also studies patterns of slow, episodic low-level attacks that intimidate, alter shipping patterns and insurance, threaten/attack offshore and coastal targets at levels sufficient to put on military pressure without provoking major conflict or retaliation.
- Exercises are a form of intimidation, as are shifts in deployments, weapons and technology tests and announcements.
- No fixed boundaries between “conventional” and asymmetric” warfare, or threats, low level military acts, and conflict.
- Can reinforce conventional threats/deterrence by use of proxies in other areas.

# Comparative Military Spending: 1997-2009




	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004*	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
—▲— Bahrain	387	427	472	342	355	352	350	191	559	498	550	552	697
—★— Kuwait	3,827	3,614	3,401	3,933	3,614	3,720	3,720	1,275	4,539	3,640	4,002	6,810	6,650
—■— Oman	2,126	1,913	1,701	2,232	2,551	2,445	2,657	2,764	3,210	3,410	3,298	4,657	4,060
—◆— Qatar	1,382	1,382	1,488	1,275	1,807	2,020	2,020	2,232	2,327	2,430	1,090	1,750	1,750
—+— UAE	3,614	3,933	4,039	3,189	2,976	2,976	2,976	1,701	2,817	9,888	10,292	13,730	15,470
—●— Saudi Arabia	22,323	23,386	19,878	23,386	26,256	23,599	23,599	20,515	27,000	30,810	34,020	38,200	41,200
—✱— GCC Total	33,659	34,655	30,979	34,357	37,559	35,112	35,322	28,678	40,452	50,676	52,142	65,699	69,827
—▲— Yemen	437	421	456	529	570	547	596	940	1,001	858	927	1,490	1,550
—◆— Iraq	1,982	1,382	1,488	1,488	1,488	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
—●— Iran	4,996	6,165	6,060	7,972	2,232	3,189	3,189	3,720	6,590	6,759	7,310	9,590	10,000
—◆— Gulf Total	41,074	42,623	38,983	44,346	41,849	38,848	39,107	33,338	48,043	58,290	60,379	76,779	81,377

# Comparative Military Spending: 1997-2008



# New Arms Orders by Supplier: 2005-2008



	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Iraq	Yemen
■ Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
■ All Others	0	400	0	0	0	100	100	200	100	0
■ All Other European	0	900	0	0	0	0	800	100	600	200
■ Major West European	200	19,800	0	0	1,500	500	15,600	2,200	200	0
■ China	100	400	0	0	0	0	400	0	100	0
■ Russia	4,300	500	0	0	0	0	200	300	100	200
■ US	0	23,300	400	1,500	200	0	11,200	10,000	3,500	0

0 = Data less than \$50 million or nil. All data rounded to the nearest \$100 million.

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

# Russian Comments on China as Supplier - I

Russia: Iran Seeks Chinese Arms After Russian Refusal To Sell S-300  
CEP20100714677003 St. Petersburg Vlasti.net in Russian 12 Jul 10

...Iran now intends to immediately reorient itself towards China in purchasing the surface-to-air missile systems [ZRK] it needs. In addition, Iran itself is hastily developing its own counterpart to the ZRK.

...By all appearances, the inglorious history of Russia's refusal to supply Iran with S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, which has lasted for three years now, is far from over, although officially it was terminated in the course of the recent visit of RF President Dmitry Medvedev to the United States, when he promised Barack Obama that he would not send five battalions of S-300PMU-1 ZRK that had already been assembled at enterprises of NPO [Science and Production Association] Concern Almaz Antey, and paid for by Iran. According to various data, the contract, signed by Moscow and Teheran in 2007, was valued from \$800 million to \$1 billion, news.km reports.

As was learned from SMI reports, Iran now intends to immediately reorient itself towards China in purchasing the surface-to-air missile systems that it needs. In addition, Iran itself is also hastily developing its own counterpart ZRK, similar to the S-300, as was announced in Teheran in 2010 by Heshmatollah Kasiri, a member of the Iranian military command. According to his statements, the new system, developed by specialists of the Iranian VPK [military-industrial complex] will enter the armament of the national army very soon.

...Iran has already warned that in the event Russia fails to fulfill the S-300 contract in full, it will demand through the Court of Arbitration the return of the entire amount of the contract and the payment of penalty fines. According to various estimates, the total sum of Russia's losses on the S-300 contract may amount to roughly \$1.2 billion. If you recall that last year the entire export of Russian arms came to just \$8.5 billion, the upshot is that in its desire to do a service to the United States, Russia has thrown roughly 14% of its annual revenues from arms exports down the drain.

Iran also has begun to demonstrate to Russia that the latter may also suffer in other areas if, out of political considerations, it does not fulfill its foreign economic contract for the S-300. This spring Teheran announced that it was sending back to Russia all of our flight crews who for some time now have been flying Russian Tu-154 aircraft on internal Iranian routes. In addition, because of the recent delays in the delivery of the surface-to-air missiles, Iran also has halted talks on the purchase of a batch of 30 Tu-204 passenger planes, which have been conducted since 2007.

## Russian Comments on China as Supplier - II

In the opinion of military experts, Chinese "pirates," having assimilated our technologies, will now produce the J11 for subsequent sale to Third World countries. Generally, Russian experts expected this, knowing the "oriental subtleties" of the Chinese mentality, but estimated that the PRC would require at least ten years to develop the new production process, especially for the engine.

...But the Chinese moved faster than that. As quickly as the early 2000's, they had a modified J11 consisting of 70% local components. It was equipped with an improved Chinese radar, could carry Chinese-made missiles, and had also acquired the capability of attacking ground targets. Later they replaced nearly all of the analog instruments of the Russian Su-27 with their own onboard computer with several displays. And as early as 2007, China was showing the first prototypes of the J11B model--nearly a complete copy of the improved Su-27SMK.

The Chinese Army also has other models of arms that look like Russian ones. While collaborating with the Russian Fazotron-NIIR Corporation, the PRC purchased one or two fighter radars "for testing," and a few years later their Chinese clone appeared. A project 054A missile frigate under construction in Shanghai had a search radar installed similar to our Fregat-M2YeM radar, which Russia had previously delivered to China. The Chinese PLZ05 155mm self-propelled howitzer was copied from the Russian 2S19M1. The "Smerch" multiple rocket launcher system is produced in China without any license agreement under the name A-100.

...The PRC's aircraft builders have also managed to create a clone of the Russian Su-33 carrier-based fighter, calling it the J-15. An experimental model of the plane, the T10K, of Soviet vintage, was used as the basis for this. It somehow was left behind in the Ukraine after the breakup of the USSR and was sold by Kiev to China. These two aircraft allowed the Chinese engineers to resolve the problem of the folding wings for their own carrier-based fighters.

Typically, prior to this China had wanted to buy 50 Su-33 carrier-based fighters from Russia, but then decided to first buy two copies "to try them out." Clearly, this was done in order for them to study the design and the technical performance characteristics of the model in more detail. Russia declined to sell these two planes, fearing a technology leak and recalling the situation with the J-11. After this, the PRC bought the T10K in Kiev, and began to make its own aircraft, the Su-33 clone.

But the Su-33 is not just a plane, it is one of a few fourth-generation carrier fighters in the world, and has been in the armament of the RF Navy since 1991. It is intended for defense of ships from air attack, and has an aerial refueling system. Apart from its cannon, the Su-33 has the renowned Moskit antiship missile, which can crack open ships the size of an aircraft carrier on impact, and air-to-air missiles. The Su-33 is essentially a cluster of advanced technical concepts; it carries a sight that makes it possible to attack and

## Russian Comments on China as Supplier - III

destroy an enemy plane even in a mode of complete radio silence. Information for the pilot is displayed in a heads-up display, while the pilot himself has a helmet-mounted target-designation system. It locks onto targets with the missile homing heads when the pilot directs his helmet sight at them. It is said that the Su-33 greatly surpasses the P-14 and P-18 [sic], the chief carrier fighters of the United States.

And this miracle aircraft is now in the hands of Russia's Asian competitors. Apart from this, today the PRC has organized series production of J-10, J-11, and FC-1 fighters, which are clones of our Su-30, Su-27, and MiG-29 aircraft. There is information that the PRC intends to build and sell abroad at least 1,200 of these fighters at prices that are half or even one third of the Russian originals.

And the low costs of the Chinese planes will be explained not only by the low wages of the workers at Chinese aircraft plants, but also by the fact that the Chinese did not have to invest enormous sums and years of labor in R&D to develop them, to devise the technologies, test new aircraft, and put them in production. At the same time, China sells virtually to everyone, although for now it is focused basically on the countries that are less well off. These are primarily interested not in the quality of their combat equipment and its technological superiority, but in the prices. And China is virtually unconcerned about its image as a responsible supplier of combat equipment and arms. It sells weapons even to conflict zones in Africa and Asia.

## Russian Comments on China as Supplier - IV

...Who benefits from our surface-to-air missiles not going to Iran, where they would prevent foreign planes from bombing the country with impunity? Russia? No, for instead of making money, it will lose an amount comparable to what the Russian Ministry of Defense would spend to purchase new arms for the Army and Navy for a whole year. This money would also come in handy to the designers of weapons, especially surface-to-air missile weapons, since even VVS [Air Force] generals acknowledge that Russian anti-aircraft defense systems are stagnating, and that, in terms of the time of introduction of new technologies, lag behind a "virtual adversary" by 20-30 years. And Russian PVO [Air Defense] systems are incapable of repelling all threats from countries such as North Korea and Iran.

Nor is the rescinding of the S-300 contract advantageous to Iran. In this case its air space remains unprotected.

In fact, this is advantageous only to three countries--the United States, Israel, and China. The United States and Israel will gain the capability of inflicting strikes on Iran's nuclear plants with impunity, if the latter does not have time to quickly find an adequate substitute for our ZRK, and to protect its enterprises buried deep underground. A task force of several tens of US warships, headed by an aircraft carrier, has already been sent to the Persian Gulf. In the event of a conflict, it can be used against Iran in combination with Israeli aviation.

...China is most interested in Russia's loss of image as a reliable supplier in arms markets. In contrast to the United States, Russia, and Great Britain, the troika of world arms sellers, the PRC is not interested in the nuances of politics of the purchasing countries; it is ready to sell everything it has to anyone, for what the buyer is prepared to pay.

At the same time, the Chinese are already "breathing down the necks" of our VPK in the world arms market. In recent decades they have been purchasing in Russia, under the guise of "test batches," one or two samples of recent models of planes, tanks, artillery pieces, and missiles, have disassembled them down to their screws at their military plants, and then copied them with all possible care. As a result, they have almost everything, and can offer them in the market. Of course, sometimes they don't copy all that well: "results vary," as the saying goes.

For instance, in 1992, Russia began sending Su-27SK fighters to China, shipped them 76 of them, and in 1995, actually sold them the license to produce another 200 of the aircraft at Chinese aircraft plants. Since 1996 they have been assembled under the name J11 in Shenyang using Russian components. By 2003 Russia had delivered 95 sets for the future J11 fighters, but then China refused to sign the contract for the batch of the next 105 items, evidently believing that it had acquired all the technologies it needed. However, officially the Chinese explained the unilateral withdrawal from the agreement by citing the limited combat capabilities of the plane.

## Iran's Uncertain Military Industrial Base - I

- Major investment in military industry, largely under Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
- Cost not reflected in military budget.
- Major investment in nuclear technology and long range Shahab 1/2/3, Ghadr, Sajjil ballistic missiles.
- Declared chemical weapons state in CWC, biological capability suspected
- Can produce wide range of small arms, explosives conventional munitions, and copies of light guided weapons; has developed advanced components for IED explosives and triggering.
- Most claims to build advanced guided weapons and military electronics grossly exaggerated, but real progress over last half decade.
- Major land weapons efforts include:
  - 100+ Zulfiqar main battle tanks.
  - Towsan light tanks.
  - 140-170 Boragh armored personnel carriers
  - Towed and some Carnation and Thunder self-propelled tube artillery.
  - Large family of rocket launchers, some with cluster munitions.
  - Saega and Toophan antitank guided missiles; Knout RPG.
  - Misaq MANPAT and Pantsyr mobile light SAM.
  - Mohajer and other UAVs, UCAV variant.

# Iran's Uncertain Military Industrial Base - II


## •Major naval weapons efforts include:

- Mines, torpedoes, and variety of land, sea, and air-based anti-ship missiles.
- Launch Jamaran (Mowaj) destroyer; building a second.
- Yono and Nahang midget submarines and semi-submersibles.
- Peykaap-I coastal patrol boats, Peykaap-I missile patrol boats and small craft
- Saccade (CSS-N-8) and Kowar (C-701) SSM.
- Ship refits, upgrades to combat suites and weapons.
- UAVs and UCAVs.
- Air to ship missiles; upgrades to P-3s and naval ELINT aircraft

## •Major air weapons efforts include:


- Azarakhsh and Saegheh fighters.
- Shahbaviz helicopters.
- Hawk missile clone and AAM variant.
- Clones of Russian/PRC AAMs and ASMs
- Cluster bombs and warheads
- UAVs and UCAVs
- Cruise missile development
- Avionics upgrades, electronic warfare.
- Aircraft parts and upgrades.

# Comparative Military Manpower Trends




Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

# Comparative Military Manpower Trends




Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

# Comparative Military Manpower: 2010



Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2010

# Comparative Paramilitary Manpower: 2010



	Iran	Iraq	Saudi	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Yemen
Basij	0								
Other	50,000								
Guard				2000	6,600	6,400			
Police				9,000					
Special Security			500						
Border Guard			10,500						
Coastguard			4,500	260	500	400		800	1,200
Tribal Levies						4,000			20,000
MOI Forces									50,000
Navy	18,000	1,100	15,500	700	2,000	4,200	1,800	2,500	1,700
Air Def	15,000	0	16,000	0	0	0	0	0	2,000
Air	52,000	1,200	20,000	1,500	2,500	5,000	1,500	4,500	3,000
Guard	125,000	0	100,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
Army	350,000	163,500	75,000	6,000	11,000	25,000	8,500	44,000	60,000

## Land Force Threats

- **Iranian Threat to Kuwait and Iraq**
- **Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation.**
- **Iranian dominance of Iraq; Invited In to Replace US?**
- **Spillover of Iraqi Sunni-Shi'ite power struggles.**
- **Yemeni incursion into Saudi Arabia or Oman**

### *But:*

- *Low near-term probability.*
- *High risk of US and allied intervention.*
- *Limited threat power projection and sustainability.*
- *Unclear strategic goal.*

## Iranian Land Forces

- **500,000-525,000** in its military forces, including Revolutionary Guards. Most are poorly trained conscripts.
- **350,000** poorly trained reserves, and some **40,000** men in iparamilitary forces. In theory, it can mobilize up to **1,000,000** more young men (**3,500** battalions) in its Basij Resistance Force In practice only a fraction of that force receives meaningful training, although has created a substantial local mobilization capability.
- Land forces include some **350,000** men in army and **100,000** in the land elements of the IRGC.
- No equivalent to best modern main battle tanks and armored infantry fighting vehicles
- Core of its **1,600+** tank force consists of the Zulfiqars and some **480** aging exports models of the T-72.
- **3,200** major artillery weapons, but **2,010+** of tube artillery weapons are towed systems Most of its roughly **900** multiple rocket launchers are area fire weapons with limited operational effectiveness.
- Many of its Army aircraft, attack helicopters and other helicopters not operational or cannot be sustained for more than limited periods.
- Considerable capability to provide defense in depth of Iranian territory, and trains Army, land elements of the IRGC, and local Basij for this mission. Not organized or trained for power projection or sustained maneuver and combat outside Iran.
- Have the basing and capability to operate in the border areas of Iraq if Iraq does not have the support of the US.

## Iranian Army Updates

- **June 21, 2010**
  - **Commander of the Iranian Army Ground Force Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan stated “After years of continued sanctions, we are now in possession of good capabilities in the field of military industries and we are now equipped with the most advanced modern arms of the world through independence, self-sufficiency and reliance on the expertise of local experts”**
- **July 14, 2010**
  - **According to Iranian reporting, Ahmadinejad stated that the “country’s Army and IRGC enjoy high capabilities and power and can repel any possible aggression against Iran”**
  - **Pourdastan said that his units “have assessed [armed field tactics] in different wargames and have gained good experiences in this regard**
  - **These exercises are said to take place from October 23 – November 21**
  - **He further stated that sensors, remote controlled systems that are highly resistant to electronic jamming systems will be used**
  - **The ground forces also reportedly exercised highly advanced and modern tactics and successfully deployed troops in specified positions and strongholds to deter enemy advancement and counterattacks**

## Iranian Army Updates - II


- **August 3, 2010**

- **Iranian media reporting has stated that the Iranian Army has started to use “home-made” Cobra Simulators**
- **Iranian Army Airborne Commander General Kiomarth Ahadi stated that “these Iran-made simulators...will lower devaluation, human and financial losses and training costs while increasing pilots' experience.”**
- **He further stated that, “All airborne bases have been equipped with flight training simulator systems”.**
- **Further media reporting states that General Vahidi has announced the readiness of Iran’s “counter-strike plan” to repel any possible military attacks on Iran.**
- **According to the General, “Tehran has already defined the necessary strategies and drawn defensive plans to confront enemy invasions”**

- **August 7, 2010**

- **According to Iranian media reporting, Commander of the Iranian Army Ground Force Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan announced on Saturday that the country plans to display a number of its most advanced military equipment systems on September 22.**


## Comparative Armored Vehicle Strength in 2010



■ APCs	640	352	2,240	325	321	190	226	892	728
■ AIFV/Recce/Lt. Tanks	725		1,080	71	450	174	108	645	345
■ Main Battle Tanks	1,613	77	910	180	368	117	30	471	790


Source: Estimated by Anthony H. Cordesman using data from various editions of the IISS *The Military Balance* and Jane's *Sentinel*.

# Comparative Main Battle Tank Inventory, Regardless of Age or Quality



Derived from IISS, Military Balance, various editions and Jane's


# Comparative Modern Tank Strength, 2010



	Iran	Iraq	Saudi	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Yemen
Zulfiqar	100								
OF-40								36	
T-72	480	77							60
M-84					159				
Leclerc								390	
Challenger 2						38			
M-60A3			450	180		73			
M-60A1						6			50
M-1A2			315		218				

Source: Estimated by Anthony H. Cordesman using data from the IISS, The Military Balance, various editions.


# Comparative Other Armored Vehicles Strength in 2010



	Iran	Iraq	Saudi	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Yemen
■ Light Tank	80					37		76	
■ Recce	35	53	750	46		137	68	129	145
■ AIFV/AFV	610	434	1,897	25	450		40	430	200
■ APC	640	1,479	4,460	325	321	206	226	892	728

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, and Jane's

# Comparative Artillery Strength in 2010



	Iran	Iraq	Saudi	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Yemen
■ Self-Propelled Tube	310		170	13	113	24	28	221	25
■ Towed Tube	2,010		225	26	0	108	12	93	310
■ Assault and Coastal	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	36
■ Multiple Rocket Launcher	876		60	9	27		4	72	294
■ Mortar	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, and Jane's


# Keeping a Decisive US Qualitative Edge in US Forces and Arms Transfers to the Gulf (\$10.5B in FY087 & FY09)

Joint Ground Capabilities	Joint Maritime Capabilities	Joint Air Capabilities	Space-based Capabilities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Future Combat Systems:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ground and air systems</li> </ul> </li> <li>- 119 Stryker Vehicles</li> <li>- 5,249 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles</li> <li>- 1,061 Heavy Tactical Vehicles</li> <li>- 3,187 Medium Tactical Vehicles</li> <li>- 29 M1A1 Abrams Tank Upgrades</li> <li>- Chemical Weapons Demilitarization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CVN 21 Carrier Replacement</li> <li>- 1 Virginia Class Submarine</li> <li>- 1 DDG-1000 Destroyer</li> <li>- 2 Littoral Combat Ships</li> <li>- 2 T-AKE Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships</li> <li>- CVN Refueling Complex Overhaul</li> <li>- 2 Joint High Speed Vessels</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 16 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters</li> <li>- 20 F-22A Raptors</li> <li>- 36 V-22 Ospreys</li> <li>- 23 F/A-18 Hornets</li> <li>- 22 E/A-18G Growlers</li> <li>- 16 CH-47 Chinooks</li> <li>- VH-71 Helicopter</li> <li>- KC-X Aerial Refueling Tanker</li> <li>- 59 Predators, Reapers and Warriors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2 Space Based Infrared Systems</li> <li>- 4 Expendable Launch Vehicles</li> <li>- GPS Satellite</li> <li>- 1 Mobile User Objective System</li> <li>- Transformational Satellite</li> <li>- Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite</li> <li>- Wideband Global SATCOM</li> <li>- Ballistic Missile Defense</li> </ul>
<p><b>Basic Research +\$0.3B in FY 2009 (+\$1.4B FY09-FY13)</b></p>			

# Increase Ground Capabilities

**+\$8.7B**  
FY08 - FY09

<b>Army</b> Active	<b>42</b>	Brigade Combat Teams (482.4K Soldiers)	➔	<b>48</b>	Brigade Combat Teams (547.4K Soldiers)
	<b>12/12</b>	Months Home Station / Months Deployed		<b>24/12</b>	Months Home Station / Months Deployed
<b>Marine Corps</b> Active	<b>2.5</b>	Marine Expeditionary Forces (175K Marines)	➔	<b>3</b>	Marine Expeditionary Forces (202K Marines)
	<b>7/7</b>	Months Home Station / Months Deployed		<b>14/7</b>	Months Home Station / Months Deployed



Source: FY 2009 DoD Budget Request; FY 2008 Budget; FY 2007 Supplemental

Numbers may not add due to rounding

## Air/Missile Threats

- **Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack.**
- **Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills.**
- **Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”**
- **Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.**
- **Strikes again tankers or naval targets.**
- **Attacks on US-allied facilities**
- **Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional munitions)**

### ***But:***

- ***Low near-term probability.***
- ***High risk of US and allied intervention.***
- ***Limited threat power projection and sustainability.***
- ***Unclear strategic goal.***

## Iranian Air Forces

- **Manpower strength of some 25,000-35,000.**
- **Inventory strength of some 312 combat aircraft**
- **40-60% of these aircraft have limited or no mission capability , and many so old or poorly supported that they cannot sustain a high sortie rate.**
- **Dependent on a large number of aircraft purchased during the time of the Shah – 44 F-14s, 20 F-5Bs, 64 F-4Ds and F-4Es, and 60+ F-5E/Fs – which total some 60% of its total inventory and have had only limited, local modernization over more than three decades.**
- **Other major combat aircraft include 30 Su-24MK, 35 MiG-29, 13 Su-25K Russian fighters, 10 F-1E French Mirages and 24 Chinese F-7Ms. Include Iraqi fighters flown to Iran during the Gulf War.Su-24s and MiG-29s are early export versions with less capable avionics.**
- **Modified and updated some aircraft, acquired relatively modern Russian air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, has Chinese anti-ship missiles, and tried to equip its F-14s with modified I-Hawk missiles for long range air-to-air combat to make up for inability to operate the Phoenix.**
- **Producing its own unmanned aerial vehicles, is seeking to produce its own light Saegheh and Azarakhsh fighters,**
- **Report after report that Iran was buying large numbers of modern Russian and/or Chinese fighters none of which have ever been confirmed. Purchases now sharply restricted by UN sanctions.**


## Iranian Air Force Updates

- **July 4, 2010**
  - **Iranian Air Force seeks to deploy UAVs along its border**
  - **According to Iranian reporting, Deputy Lieutenant Commander of Army's Air Force for Operations General Majid Pirhadi stated “We are seeking to equip all the country's central (air) bases with long-range UAVs but for now equipping bases along borders sets a priority”**
  - **Pirhadi added, “that all border bases in western and southern Iran will be equipped with UAVs by the end of summer (September 2010)...These drones are currently tasked with intelligence and information gathering and reconnaissance missions and that the Iranian Army plans to use different types of drones for combat, reconnaissance, disruption and communication missions”**
  - **Further reports claim Iran has inaugurated the production line of two home-made Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with bombing and reconnaissance capabilities.**
    - The two hi-tech drones named 'Ra'd' (Thunder) and 'Nazir' (Harbinger) are capable of conducting long-range reconnaissance, patrolling, assault and bombing missions with high precision.
    - Ra'd which is a UAV of choice for assault and bombing missions has the capability to destroy the specified targets with high pinpoint precision
  - **FNA states, “Iran successfully tested a home-made radar-evading UAV with bombing capabilities last June. Also in 2008, the country's Defense Industries launched production lines of two well-known home-made fighter jets, namely Saeqeh (Thunderbolt) and Azarakhsh (Lightening).”**

## Iranian Air Force Updates - II


- **August 2, 2010**
  - **General Amir Hossein Chitforoush announced that Iran plans to mount new radar systems on multiple fighter jets throughout its air force bases.**
  - **According to the General, all fighter jets have been equipped with this state of the art system which will help with night activities.**
  - **Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base Brigadier General Ahmad Miqani said “We have the honor to announce that we have reached full self-sufficiency in the production of different types of the needed radars with different ranges and frequency bands”**
  - **Additionally, Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi stated that the country's radar systems are capable of detecting every target in the air.**
  - **"Today, we own sea-based and ground-based radars as well as radars which are capable of identifying multiple air targets in various frequencies and at different altitudes.”**
- **August 5, 2010**
  - **Iranian media reporting states that the Iranian Fighter Jets practiced loading and staging their air weapons systems during a week long military exercise/show.**
  - **The fighter jets included the F-4, F-5, F-7 and the Sukhoi SU-24**
  - **Iran says it is carrying out the four-stage military maneuvers in order to test state-of-the-art weaponry, the latest aerial combat tactics and different engagement techniques**

# Comparative Combat Air Strength in 2010



Derived from IISS, Military Balance, and Jane's


# Comparative High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft in 2010



	Iran	Iraq	Saudi	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Yemen
■ Typhoon-2			4						
■ Tornado ADV			15						
■ Tornado IDS			85						
■ Mirage 2000							12	62	
■ MiG-29	35								18
■ MiG-25									
■ Su-25	13								
■ Su-24	30								
■ Su-20/22									30
■ F-18					39				
■ F-16				21		12		85	
■ F-15S			70						
■ F-15C/D			84						
■ F-14	44								
■ F-4D/E	65								
■ Saegheh	3								


# Comparative Gulf AC&W, ELINT, and Reconnaissance Aircraft, 2010

P-F3 Orion



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions.

# Comparative Gulf Armed Helicopters: 2010



	Iran	Iraq	Saudi	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Yemen
AH-64/AH-64D			12		12			30	
AS-565			15					7	
AS-550C3								1	
AS-532 Exocet			12						
SA-342 HOT					13		11	10	
AH-1J	50								
AH-1E				24					
SH-3D	10								
Commando Exocet							8		
AS-332 Exocet			6					7	
Mi-35 Hind									8
RH-53D	3								

## Iranian UAV Projects / Assets 2009

Prime Manufacturer	Designation	Development / Production	Operation	Payload Wt.	Endurance (hr)	Range	Ceiling (ft)	Mission
Unknown	Stealth	Underway / Underway	Deployed			700 km		R/S*
HESA	Ababil (Swallow)	Complete / Underway	Deployed	45 kg	1.5+	150 km	14,000	Multiple variants for R/S* - attack - ISR**
Shahbal Group, Sharif Univ.	Shahbal	Underway		5.5 kg		12 km	4,500	R/S*
Asr-e Talai Factories	Mini-UAV	Underway						Surveillance
FARC	Sobakbal	Underway / Underway	Deployed	0.35 kg	2	2.7 - 13.5 mi	19,686	Surveillance
Qods Aeronautics Industries	Mohajer II/III (Dorna); Mohajer IV (Hodhod); Saeqeh I/II; Tallash I/Endeavor; Tallash II Hadaf 3000	Complete / Underway	Deployed					Multirole aka Lightning Bolt Target drone - aka Target 3000

Source: Adapted by Adam C. Seitz from AIAA Aerospace 2009 Worldwide UAV Roundup; available at: [http://www.aiaa.org/Aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/UAVs\\_APR2009.pdf](http://www.aiaa.org/Aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/UAVs_APR2009.pdf).

\*R/S: Reconnaissance / Surveillance; \*\*ISR: Intelligence / Surveillance / Reconnaissance

# Gulf Air Balance

## Air Bases and Air Force Order of Battle (2009)



### Three Main Iranian Nuclear Facilities

- Natanz: Uranium Enrichment Facility
- Arak: Heavy Water Nuclear Reactor and Possible Future Plutonium Production Reactor
- Esfahan: Nuclear Research Center. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)

	Combat A/C	Attack Helo's
Iran	319	95
Iraq	-	37
Kuwait	50	45
Bahrain	33	16
Qatar	18	25
UAE	184	67
Oman	64	41
Saudi Arabia	278	67
Yemen	179	18

### Iran Airbases

Tabriz	F-5E/F, MiG-29
Hamadan	F-4E/D Su-24
Dezful	F-5E/F
Bushehr	F-4E/D F-14
Bandar Abbas	2 Helicopter Wings
Shiraz	Su-25 Su-24
Esfahan	F-5E Su-24
Tehran	MiG-29 Su-24
Zahedan	F-7M
Kermanshah	F-5E/F

Air Bases Source: Global Security.org  
Order of Battle Source: Anthony Cordesman CSIS

# Range of Iran's Air Power



## Mission Profile: Hi-Lo-Hi

F-4E (Bushehr):  
(4) MK83 1000lb Bombs  
(1) 600 Gallon Fuel Tank  
10 Minutes loiter time  
Range = 400 nmi

SU-24 (Shiraz):  
(4) 500 kg/1000 lb Bombs  
(1) 400 gallon tank  
10 minutes loiter time  
Range = 590 nmi

SU-25 (Shiraz):  
(4) 500kg/1000lb Bombs  
(1) 400 gallon tank  
(2) 10 minutes loiter time  
Range = 600 nmi

## Iranian Surface-to-Air Forces

- **Only modern systems are short-range manportable systems and some 30 short-range Russian TOR-Ms suitable for point defense.**
- **Other SHORAD systems consist of 30 short-range range Rapier fire units and 15 Tigercats of uncertain operational status.**
- **Longer -range SAMs include 150+ US IHawks, 45 Russian SA-2s 10 SA-5s, and some CSA-1 Chinese versions of the SA-2. All are obsolete.**
- **Limited modernization of electronics and command and control and radar system, but vulnerable to electronic countermeasures, anti-radiation missiles.**
- **Only possible option to modernize major SAM systems, and acquire some ATBM capability is Russia S-300 (S400), and associated C3 and radar systems.**
- **Russia publicly rejected such sales after passing of new UN Sanctions in July 2010.**

# Iranian Surface-to-Air Missile/Air Defense Updates

- **April 21, 2010**
  - **Minister of Defense, General Ahmad Vahidi reports that “Mersad” (Ambush), Iran’s first advanced medium-range air defense missile system, is capable of flying up to 20km in height with a range of 40 km.**
  - **[Mersad] “can hit any modern aircraft flying at low or medium altitudes”**
  - **“More advanced than the US-made ‘Hawk’ missiles and is equipped with advanced radar surveillance as well as complicated software and hardware systems”**
  - **According to the minister, Mersad’s mass production has already started within Iran’s defense ministries, and will be delivered to Iran’s armed forces during the current Iranian year (started March 21)**
- **May 2, 2010**
  - **General Vahidi reports the production of an updated version of an anti-cruise missile system**
  - **According to Iranian reporting, “Iranian experts have successfully built a short-range air-defense system which can fire 4,000 rounds per minute.”**
  - **Vahidi also reports that, “the ministry is now working on different short-range, mid-range, and long-range air-defense systems”**

## Iranian Surface-to-Air Missile/Air Defense Updates - II

- **July 25, 2010**

- **IRGC Lieutenant Commander General Hossein Salami stated "We have reached a never-ending point in (increasing) the quantity of ballistic missiles."**
- **According to Iranian media reporting, "The Iranian Defense Ministry's Aerospace Organization has made great achievements in designing and producing missiles, including the surface-to-surface solid-fuel Sejil missiles, the long-range Shahab-3 ballistic missile which has a range of up to 2,000 km, and Zelzal and Fateh missiles."**
- **Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi stated "Mesbah (Lantern) 1 air-defense system has been designed and built to counter air attacks, different kinds of airplanes, cruise missiles, choppers and other air threats in low altitudes."**
- **He further stated that "the Mesbah 1 missile shield is also capable of tracing and intercepting Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)".**

- **August 2, 2010**

- **Israeli media reporting has shown concern towards a the expected launch of an Iranian spy satellite capable of looking at Israeli territories from space.**
- **The Iranian government stated two weeks ago that it intended to launch a new satellite known as the "Rasad"(Lookout).**
- **Tal Inbar, the director of the Space and UAV Research Center at the Fisher Institute, said "a close eye must be kept on the launcher that will carry the satellite to space, since no distinction should be made between the satellite launcher and Iran's ballistic capabilities".**
- **He further stated, "if the launch is carried out by the new launcher that was presented by the Iranians last February, then this launcher has four engines, which also shows the ability to launch missiles with intercontinental range".**

## Iranian Surface-to-Air Missile/Air Defense Updates - III

### – August 4, 2010

- Iranian media reporting has stated that Iran has received 4 S-300s missile batteries: 2 from Belarus and 2 from another unnamed source
- Russia signed a contract in 2007 stating the sale of these missiles, however has since not delivered due to the most recent round of UN sanctions and general “technical complications”
- The most advanced versions of the S-300 are capable of shooting down aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missile warheads at ranges of over 90 miles (144 kilometers) and at altitudes of about 90,000 feet (27,432 meters).
- No confirmation of deliveries or operational status. No indication of exact configuration and capability of the systems.

## Russian Claims of Lost Arms Sales

CEP20100803950154 Moscow RIA-Novosti in Russian 0950 GMT 03 Aug 10

Russian expert details losses from cancelled military contracts with Iran

Russia's losses as a result of abandoning military-technical cooperation with Iran may amount to 11-13bn dollars, the director of a world trade arms analysis centre (TsAMTO), Igor Korotchenko, has told RIA Novosti. [Passage omitted] ...One of the most promising segments of military-industrial cooperation between Russia and Iran is air defence, Korotchenko said.

In late 2007 a contract was signed to supply to Tehran five battalions of the S-300PMU-1 anti-aircraft missile systems worth about 800m dollars. If this contract is cancelled, Moscow will have to pay Iran a penalty for breaking its obligations which may reach up to 10 per cent of the contract amount. Thus, Russia's overall losses caused by the cancellation of the contract for the supply of S-300 missile systems can be assessed at 900m dollars [as received].

In addition, Iran was considered as a potential customer for Buk-M2E medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems to create an echeloned system of the country's air defence. Experts put the prospective number of Buk systems that could be purchased as part of this deal at 18 to 36. Profits lost on this deal are estimated at 250-500m dollars.

In January 2007 Russia completed the supply to Iran of 29 Tor-M1 short-range anti-aircraft missile systems worth 700m dollars. These Tors have now been deployed to cover Iran's most important state and military facilities against a possible attack from air. If Russia refuses to supply spare parts and missiles for these Tor-M1 systems, its losses can be approximately estimated at 50-80m dollars. ...Earlier Tehran voiced its intention to purchase up to 1,000 Russian Igla man-portable air defence systems. The amount of the potential contract could be up to 500m dollars. The Iranian side has also showed interest in purchasing Gamma-DE and Kasta-2E2 radars. In this case Russia's losses could be assessed at 100-200m dollars.

Thus, having stopped military-industrial cooperation with Iran, in the air defence segment alone Russia will lose from 1.8bn to 2.2bn dollars, Korotchenko said. In TsAMTO's estimates, in 2010-2025 similar losses caused by freezing military-industrial cooperation with Iran in the naval equipment segment will amount to 2.2bn-3.2bn dollars; in the aircraft segment (warplanes), 3.4bn-3.7bn dollars; in terms of Ground Troops equipment, 2.1bn-2.5bn dollars, in terms of helicopters, about 1.1bn dollars. Losses caused by winding up space cooperation are estimated at 200m dollars, while losses caused by the cancellation of supplies to Iran of spare parts for previously purchased armaments and hardware, at 200-250m dollars.

# Gulf Land-Based Air Defenses In 2010

Country	MajorSAM	Light SAM	AA Guns
Bahrain	8 I Hawk MIM-23B	60 R BS-70 18 FIM-92A Stinger 7 Cro tale	27 guns 15 Oerlikon 35mm 12 L/70 40 mm
Iran	16/150 I Hawk 3/10 SA-5 45 SA-2 Guideline	SA-7/14/16, HQ-7 29 SA-15 Some QW-1 Misaq 29 TOR-M1 Some HN-5 5/30 Rapier 10 Pantsyr (SA-22) Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale) 15 Tigercat Some FIM-92A Stinger	1,700 Guns ZSU-23-4 23mm ZPU-2/4 23mm ZU-23 23mm M-1939 37mm S-60 57mm ZSU-57-2
Iraq			
Kuwait	5/24 I Hawk Phase II 5/40 Patriot PAC-2	12 Aspide 12 Starburst Aspide Stinger	12 Oerlikon 35mm
Oman	None	Blowpipe 8 Mistral 2 S P 12 Pantsyr S1E  34 SA-7 6 Blindfire S7 13 Martello 20 Javelin 40 Rapier	26 guns 4 ZU-23-2 23 mm 10 G DF-005 Skyguard 35  12 L-6040 mm
Qatar	None	10 Blow pipe 12 FIM-92A Stinger 9 Roland II 24 Mistral 20 SA-7	?
Saudi Arabia	16/128 I Hawk 4-6/16-24 Patriot 2 17/73 Shahine Mobile	40 Crotale 500 Stinger (AR MY) 500 Mistral (AD F)	1,220 guns 92 M-163 Vulcan 20mm 30 M-167 Vulcan 20mm
(NG)	16/96 PAC-2 launchers 17 ANA/FPS-117 radar 73/68 Crotale/Shahine	500 FIM-43 Redeye 500 Redeye (AD F) 73-141 Shahine static	850 AMX-30SA 30mm 128 G DF Oerlikon 35mm 150 L-70 40mm (in store) 130 M-2 90mm (NG)
UAE	2/6/36 I Hawk	20+ Blowpipe 20 Mistral Some Rapier Some Crotale Some RB-70 Some Javelin Some SA-18	62 guns 42 M-3VDA 20mm SP 20 G CF-BM2 30mm
Yemen	Some SA-2, 3 Some SA-6 SP	Some 800 SA-7 Some SA-9 SP Some SA-13 SP Some SA-14	530 guns 20 M-163 Vulcan SP 20mm 50 ZSU-23-4 SP 23mm 100 ZSU-23-2 23mm 150 M-1939 37mm 50 M-167 20mm 120 S-60 57mm 40 M-1939 KS-12 85mm

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, [The Military Balance](#), [Periscope](#), JCSS, [Middle East Military Balance](#), [Jane's Sentinel](#) and [Jane's Defense Weekly](#). Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.

## Naval Threats

- Iranian effort to “close the Gulf.”
- Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation.
- Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”
- Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
- “Deep strike” with air or submarines in Gulf of Oman or Indian Ocean.
- Attacks on US facilities

### *But:*

- *Low near-term probability.*
- *High risk of US and allied intervention.*
- *Limited threat power projection and sustainability.*
- *Unclear strategic goal.*

## Iranian Naval Forces

- Iran has an 18,000 man Navy and 12,000-15,000 man Naval Guards The Navy is in charge of operations in the Caspian and the Gulf of Oman. The Naval branch is in charge of operations in the Gulf, which is the focus of Iran's naval and amphibious capabilities for irregular warfare.
- Both lack modern surface vessel combat capability and are dependent on four obsolete frigates and three obsolete corvettes from the time of the Shah with limited modernization and uncertain combat readiness.
- Iran seems to be building its own prototype Mowaj-class corvette/destroyer, but it is not yet operational.
- The IN has three Russian Kilo-class submarines – which some reports indicate can lay smart mines and fire long-range, homing torpedoes – and the IRGC has at least 7 North Korean/Iranian-made Yono and Nahand-class midget submarines and semi-submersible small craft,
- The IN has a naval aviation branch with 3 aging P-3F maritime patrol and airborne command and control aircraft, three Falcon aircraft modified for electronic warfare and intelligence, and anti-submarine and mine warfare helicopters.
- There are some 3,000-5,000 Marines.

*(IRGC-N described in Asymmetric Warfare Analysis)*

# Iranian Navy Updates - I

- **November, 23, 2009**
  - According to the Commander of the Iranian Navy, Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, “The Navy will never allow aliens in the Caspian Sea”
  - He further stated that the “defense capabilities have doubled compared to those at the time of the Iraq-imposed war”
  - Upon commenting on Iran’s naval resource capabilities, he said, “the Navy has achieved self-sufficiency in production of Naval equipment...All the hardware and software being produced by the Iranian Navy is indigenous”
- **February 20, 2010**
  - Rear Admiral Amir Rastegari stated that “the production of destroyers will continue and in the next 2 years, the second vessel will be delivered to Iran’s Navy”
  - He further stated that by launching the “Jamaran Destroyer”, Iran joined 14 countries which manufacture destroyers and cruisers in the world.
  - He added that industrial and academic centers cooperated in this effort, and this cooperation would lead to further advancements in the defense industry.
- **April 10, 2010**
  - Sayyari has stated that presence of the Jamaran destroyer in the Gulf of Adan indicates Iran’s might in the Gulf.
  - The Jamaran Destroyer is 100 meters long and seven floors, meant to carry choppers, and equipped with the most sensitive and sophisticated equipment according to Iranian media reporting.

## Iranian Navy Updates - II


- **June 22, 2010**
  - According to the Commander of the IRGC Naval Forces, Ali Fadavi, “The trend of equipment, modernization, and change in the IRGC will continue at a higher speed until the specified goals are attained”
- **June 24, 2010**
  - Fadavi stated, in response to the US’ presence in the Persian Gulf, “This force is mighty and capable of reacting very especially and very appropriately to inspection against Iranian ships”
  - Regarding the current strength of IRGC’s Naval Forces, “...right now we are equipped with hundreds of missile launcher ships among our thousands of warships, and the Americans are quite unfamiliar with the capabilities of the IRGC Naval Forces” -- Fadavi
- **July 19, 2010**
  - General Vahidi stated that “new domestically made submarines would be delivered to Iran’s Navy by July 27, 2010”
  - He further stated that these submarines would be highly equipped with modern equipments, and would improve the Navy’s maneuvering capabilities
- **July 25, 2010**
  - According to Iranian reporting, a senior Iranian military figure stated that “each hostile US warship located in the Persian Gulf will be swarmed by over 100 Iranian military vessels”
  - Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari stated that the US warships located in the Persian Gulf are “easy targets” and Iran is “able to inflict heavy losses on these ships”
  - The IRGC has stated that its missiles can hit any target across the Persian Gulf and all gunboats are within its range.

## Iranian Navy Updates - III

- **August 8, 2010**

- **According to Iranian reporting, Iran has developed the capabilities and launched “four home-built advanced submarines to protect shipping vessels in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman**
- **Iranian Military officials state that the “Ghadir” class submarines are “light” and enjoy “exceptionally advanced capabilities and have been outfitted with highly advanced torpedoes”**
- **They seem to be copies of North Korean small submarines. If four more are actually deployed, this would raise the total to eight.**
- **Iranian Military officials further state that these “submarines can easily evade detection as [they are] equipped with sonar evading technology and can fire missiles and torpedoes simultaneously.”**
- **The IN and IRGC also seem to have semi-submersible vessels that could attack a ship on contact and possibly fire torpedoes.**
- **The commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), Brig. Gen. Yadollah Javani, said Saturday Iran’s enemies have never dared to attack because of the vulnerability of the waterway...If anything happens in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz is closed, the possibility of using this route will be lost for decades, and this will be a great tragedy for the global economy.”**


# Comparative Naval Combat Ships in 2010



<b>Submarines</b>	3								
<b>Midget Submarines</b>	3								
<b>Major Missile Combat</b>	3		11	3		2		4	
<b>Major Other Combat</b>	2								
<b>Missile Patrol</b>	31		9	4	10	4	7	8	4
<b>Other Patrol</b>	56	8	17	4		7	3	6	16
<b>Armed Boats</b>	117	30	39				11		
<b>Mine</b>	5		7					2	6
<b>Landing Craft</b>	8		8	5		4		28	5
<b>Amphibious Ships</b>	13				2	1	1		1

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from ISS, *The Military Balance*, various editions.

# Major Combat Warships in 2010



■ Submarines	3							
■ Major Missile Combat	3		11	3		2		4
■ Major Other Combat	2							
■ Missile Patrol	31		9	4	10	4	7	8

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions and material provided by US and Saudi experts.

## **The GCC Threat to the GCC**

- **Vast lead in military spending and arms imports**
- **Support from US, Britain, France**

***But,***

- **Poor Mission Focus with Limited Coordination**
- **Lack of Integration, Standardization**
- **Problems in Large-Scale Exercises and Training; Military Realism**
- **Problems in Jointness – including security services, police, and intelligence – and combined arms.**
- **Lack of Balanced Force Development: Manpower Quality and Sustainability**

# Regional Cooperation on Iran?

- **Limited current regional cooperation among the Gulf nations with regards to Iran.**
- **Region-wide drive to bolster naval forces to countering the perceived growing threat from Iran.**
- **Oman, like Syria and Qatar, sees in Iran an important political and economic ally that is too powerful and too potentially dangerous to ignore, let alone antagonize; while defying Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations in their efforts to curb Iranian influence and Nuclear ambitions.**
- **United Arab Emirates, which is battling with Iranian leaders over the title to three Persian Gulf islands, has done little to stop billions of dollars in annual trade with Iran.**
- **Sunni-led Arab countries are concerned over Tehran's influence with the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq.**
- **Qatar says it is mediating between Iran and Arab powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where the ruling family feels threatened by Iranian power.**
- **Continued developments in Saudi and Egyptian outreach to Arab nations to unite against Iranian influence and Nuclear Ambitions as well as outreach efforts to Syria in efforts to break Iranian-Syrian ties.**
- **Continued U.S. engagement and “security umbrella” seems to be key to any resemblance of Regional Cooperation in regards to Iran.**