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# Iraq After US “Withdrawal:” Meeting the Challenges of 2010 and Beyond

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# **Key Challenges: Democracy and Governance Overtake Insurgency**

# Key Challenges in 2010

- **Paralysis by democracy : lack of national unity government**
- **Lack of government effectiveness and capacity at every level**
- **Remnants of insurgency and possible revival**
- **Sectarian and ethnic challenges**
- **Budget crisis, crippled economy, loss of foreign aid**
- **Halt in progress in developing Iraqi security forces**
- **Coming US withdrawal**
- **Uncertain neighbors**

## Key Rivals in the Election: Six Month and Counting



## Election Results

- **Strong nationalist, anti-incumbent vote, but still strong sectarian and ethnic character.**
- **Maliki's State of Law Party (89 seats and 27.4% of the vote),**
- **Allawi's Iraqiya (91 seats and 28% of the vote) and**
- **Hakim-Jafaari-Sadr coalition in the Iraqi National Alliance (70 seats and 21.5% of the vote).**
  - **Sadrists get nearly 60% of the seats within the INA – approximately 39 seats versus 9 for Badr, 8 for ISCI, 1 for Jaafari, 6 for Fadhilla, and 5 for other candidates.**
- **Kurdish vote shows considerable unity of PUK and DPK (43 seats and 13.2 % of vote ).**
- **Iraq's Unity Alliance (Bulani) is major loser.**
- **Both MoD and MoI lose, as does head of Accountability Commission**

# Paralysis by Democracy : Wasting Half a Year

## TIME LINE OF THE GOVERNANCE GAP


EVENT	TIME PERIOD	CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
Preliminary election results	4 days after election	
Uncertified official results	15 days after election	All election inquiries resolved by Iraq's Higher Judicial Council (HJC)
Certified official results	Pending recount	HJC certifies the election
CoR convenes	15 days after certification of the election	Article 54: Eldest member shall chair the first session to elect the speaker and two deputies
CoR Speaker elected	During first session of the CoR	Article 55: Elected by absolute majority of secret balloting
President elected	No set deadline	Article 70: Elected by 2/3 majority. If no candidate receives required majority, two candidates with highest number of votes compete; majority vote wins.
Presidential charge to form government	Within 15 days of President's election	Article 76: President asks the largest CoR bloc to nominate a candidate for Prime Minister
Prime Minister-designate names Council of Ministers	Within 30 days of designation	Article 76: If Prime Minister-designate fails to name CoM within this time period, the President shall charge a new nominee for Prime Minister
Prime Minister-designate puts forth Council of Ministers and ministerial program for approval	No set deadline	Article 26: If they do not receive a vote of confidence, the President must ask a new nominee to form the CoM within 15 days.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, "Process of Government Formation," 3/11/2010; UNAMI, "Iraqi Constitution," [www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi\\_constitution.pdf](http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf), accessed 4/16/2010.

<b>Action</b>	<b>Time Frame (Phase)</b>	<b>in Days) Cumulative</b>
<b>Special needs voting and Election Day</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Tally of results and preliminary results</b>	<b>4-7</b>	<b>7-10</b>
<b>Complaints and adjudications: Provisional Results</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Appeals and Certification of Results</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>First Session of Council of Republic ; negotiations for selection of Speaker (maximum of 30 days after certification)</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>Speaker elected</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>128</b>
<b>Council of the Republic elects President and other members of the Presidential Council</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>158</b>
<b>Prime Minister nominated (maximum of 15 days)</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>173</b>
<b>Prime Minister picks Council of Ministers. (maximum of 30 days)</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>203</b>
<b>Prime Minister and Council of Ministers sworn in. (Presidential Council must designate new Prime Minister in</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>238</b>

## Status of the Government of Iraq

FIGURE 1.4  
FINAL, CERTIFIED RESULTS OF MARCH 2010 ELECTIONS



Source: GOI, IHEC, "Iraqi CoR Election Results," 3/28/2010, [ihec-iq.com/en/results.html](http://ihec-iq.com/en/results.html), accessed 7/21/2010.

Source:  
SIGIR Report,  
July 30, 2010.  
p. 6.

- On May 5, 2010, representatives from SoL and the Iraqi National Alliance announced the formation of an alliance between the two groups, but they have been unable to agree on a single candidate for prime minister.
- The dominant faction within the INA—the Sadrist Trend—refuses to accede to SoL’s insistence that Prime Minister al-Maliki be given a second term.
- On July 20, Prime Minister al-Maliki again met with Ayad Allawi, but the two were unable to break the impasse, leaving Iraq still without a new government.
- Dispute over Article 76 and the “largest bloc.”
  - March 25, the Chief Justice issued a ruling stating that the “largest bloc” means the majority alliance formed after the election with the most seats.

# Iraqi Governance: The Problem of Creating an Effective Cabinet and National Leadership

Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members

Pres.	Jalal TALABANI
Vice Pres.	Adil ABD AL-MAHDI
Vice Pres.	Tariq al-HASHIMI
Prime Min.	Nuri al-MALIKI
Dep. Prime Min.	Rafi al-ISSAWI
Dep. Prime Min.	Rowsch Nuri SHAWAYS
Min. of Agriculture	
Min. of Communications	Faruq ABD AL-QADIR Abd al-Rahman
Min. of Culture	Mahar Dilli al-HADITHI
Min. of Defense	Abd al-Qadir Muhammad al-MUFRJI
Min. of Displacement & Migration	Abd al-Samad SULTAN
Min. of Education	Khudayr al-KHUZAI
Min. of Electricity	Karim Wahid al-HASAN
Min. of Environment	Nermin OTHMAN
Min. of Finance	Bayan Baqir JABR Sulagh al-Zubaydi
Min. of Foreign Affairs	Hoshiyar Mahmud ZEBARI
Min. of Health	Salih Mahdi Mutlab al-HASNAWI
Min. of Higher Education	Abid Dhiyab al-UJAYLI
Min. of Housing & Construction	Bayan DIZAYEE
Min. of Human Rights	Wijdan Mikhail SALIM
Min. of Industry & Minerals	Fawzi al-HARIRI
Min. of Interior	Jawad Karim al-BULANI
Min. of Justice	Dara NUR AL-DIN
Min. of Labor & Social Affairs	Mahmud Muhammad Jawad al-RADI
Min. of Municipalities & Public Works	Riyadh GHARIB
Min. of Oil	Husayn al-SHAHRISTANI
Min. of Planning	Ali BABAN
Min. of Science & Technology	Raid Fahmi JAHID
Min. of Trade	
Min. of Transportation	Amir Abd al-Jabar ISMAIL
Min. of Water Resources	Latif RASHID
Min. of Youth & Sports	Jasim Muhammad JAFAR
Min. of State for Civil Society Affairs	Thamir Jafar al-ZUBAYDI
Min. of State for Council of Representatives Affairs	Safa al-Din al-SAFI
Min. of State for Foreign Affairs	Muhammad Munajjid al-DULAYMI
Min. of State for National Dialogue	Akram al-HAKIM
Min. of State for National Security	Shirwan al-WAILI
Min. of State for Provinces	Khulud Sami Izara al-MAJUN
Min. of State for Tourism & Antiquities	Qahtan Abbas al-JABBURI
Min. of State for Women's Affairs (Acting)	Khulud Sami Izara al-MAJUN
Min. of State Without Portfolio	Ali Muhammad AHMAD
Min. of State Without Portfolio	Hasan Radhi Kazim al-SARI
Min. of State Without Portfolio	Muhammad Abbas al-URAYBI
Governor, Central Bank of Iraq	Sinan Muhammad Ridha al-SHABIBI

Source: CIA

## Once a Government Exists


### Iraq: Key Challenges in 2010-2011

- **Revitalize effort to develop effective the Iraqi security forces.**
- **Resolve the problems left over from the fact that the 2009 budget expired without funding a wide range of projects, deal with the deficit problems in the 2010 budget, and put the 2011 budget on a more stable path.**
- **Move towards an effective rule of civil law that adapts Iraq's "confession-based" legal system; and find an effective balance between the judiciary and police**
- **Perform triage between the mix of Iraqi government projects and the results of US and other foreign aid efforts to ensure the best aid projects are effectively transferred and sustained..**
- **Find some compromise between Arab and Kurd that at least buys time for a broad, negotiated political settlement,.**
- **Find ways to ease the tensions between Arab Sunni and Arab Shi'ite that were exacerbated by the election campaign and new de-Ba'athification efforts.**
- **Deal with the past failure to create effective programs to deal with internally displaced Iraqis and Iraqi refugees outside Iraq.**
- **Move forward to ensure that the petroleum contracts signed in 2009 are fully supported by the new government.**
- **Make similar reforms to provide incentives for private and foreign investment that are competitive with those offered by other Gulf states.**
- **Define the practical relations Iraq will have with the United States as part of the Strategic Framework Agreement for both civil and military aid and relations before US forces fully withdraw, and in time to set clear goals for US aid funding to Iraq in the FY2012 budget.**

# Iraq: Key Challenges in 2012 and Beyond

- **C**omplete the constitutional and legal basis for Arab and Kurdish political accommodation; move towards truly “national” treatment of Sunni and Shi’ite.
- **S**t able planning and funding of economic and infrastructure development.
- **F**ully shift away from outside aid; create stable planning, spending, and control of budget without major deficits.
- **C**reation of jobs for steadily growing population. Rise in per capita income from 160<sup>th</sup> to Gulf standards, better distribution of income.
- **S**tructural reform of agriculture
- **L**ong-term solutions to water problems.
- **C**onversion-modernization-privatization of state industries.
- **F**ull legislation and liberalization to attract foreign and domestic investment.
- **R**econstruction and modernization of upstream and downstream petroleum sector; pipelines and Gulf facilities; stable Iraqi-foreign company partnership.
- **M**ake Ministries effective; revitalize health and education sectors.
- **D**eal with foreign refugees and internally displaced persons.
- **S**hift and downsizing of Iraqi military from counterinsurgency to deterrence and defence against foreign threats.
- **S**hift of police and security forces from counterinsurgency to rule of law; checks on corruption and organization crime.

# **Iraq: Underlying Challenges to Security and Stability**



## Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges -- Pre Census “Guesstimates”

### ◆ *Sectarian Challenges*

• *Iraq: 60-65% Shi'a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other*

### ◆ *Ethnic Challenges*

• *Iraq: Arab 75-82%, Kurdish 13-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%*


### ◆ *Tribal Challenges*

• *Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.*


# Iraqi Ethnic Divisions



# Iraq: National Unity




# Iraq-Kurd Disputed Territory




Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09

# Iraq: "The Kurdish Issue"



# Iraq: The Overall Displaced Persons Challenge




Note: Excludes refugee statistics for Europe and Australia.

Sources: UNHCR, "Country Operations Profile," [www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html](http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html), accessed 10/8/2009; USCIS, "Iraqi Refugee Processing Fact Sheet," [http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/iraqi\\_refugee\\_fs\\_11feb09.pdf](http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/iraqi_refugee_fs_11feb09.pdf), accessed 10/8/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009. Pp 80-81.

# The Internal Displaced Persons Problem

**IRAQI INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, BY DISTRICT**  
January 2010




Source: Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "IDPs in Iraq by District January 2010," [www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/A1F617996D005FF7C12576A900385588/\\$file/iraq\\_unhcr\\_idps-by-district\\_jan10.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/A1F617996D005FF7C12576A900385588/$file/iraq_unhcr_idps-by-district_jan10.pdf), accessed 3/5/2010.


SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 2010. p. 84

**FACTORS AFFECTING IDP DECISIONS TO STAY PUT OR RELOCATE**

**Reasons IDPs Said They Could Not Access Their Property**



**Reasons IDPs Said They Chose To Return**



Note: Survey respondents were allowed to select more than one reason; therefore, percentages do not add to 100%.

Sources: International Rescue Committee, "A Tough Road Home: Uprooted Iraqis in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq," 2/2010, p. 7; Norwegian Refugee Council, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Patterns of Return and Resettlement," 3/1/2010, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/718916EEB6743EEF802570A7004CB9B97OpenDocument&expand=11&link=23.11&count=10000#23.11](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/718916EEB6743EEF802570A7004CB9B97OpenDocument&expand=11&link=23.11&count=10000#23.11), accessed 3/5/2010.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 2010. p. 86

# Other Key Iraq Updates

- **Security**
  - Reduction in size of Army bases from 500 to 126 – aim is to be at 94 by September 1, 2010
  - Currently 88,000 troops on the ground – aim is to be at 50,000 by September 1, 2010
  - Moved 18,000 vehicles out of Iraq, and more than 600,000 containers
  - US has picked up or Killed 34 of the 42 top AQ in Iraq officials. – AQ in Iraq has lost contact with AQSL (Al-Q'aida Senior Leadership) in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
  - All of this is a result of the mixed efforts of the US troops along with Iraqi military and law enforcement efforts.
  - Iraq continues to face frequent bomb attacks – suicide or remote detonated. Two car bombs exploded in the holy Shiite city of Karbala. The explosion killed 22 people and wounded 54 others. Another car bomb exploded outside the offices of Al Arabiya in Bagdad killing four people and wounding ten others. (Source: <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/07/2010726172923823721.html>, July 26, 2010)
- **Economy**
  - Iraq's Real Gross GDP estimated at 4.3% due to falling oil prices and global economic downturn
  - Iraq's Presidency Council ratified a \$73.26 billion budget for 2010. – 23.5% increase from 2009
  - Extended Natural Gas negotiations with Royal Dutch Shell for an additional 6 months
  - Electricity production rises 14% since 2009
- **Funding**
  - The US, GOI, and International community have committed \$162.83 billion towards Iraq's Reconstruction efforts.
  - The US has appropriated \$53.31 billion towards these efforts through four major funds – ISFF, IRRF, ESF, CERP
  - Congress has also allocated \$6.10 billion towards smaller reconstruction initiatives
  - The International Community has appropriated \$18.10 billion
    - Administration has requested an additional \$4.45 billion
  - The Government of Iraq (GOI) has committed \$91.43 billion
  - The U.S. Defense Department is unable to account for 95% of the Iraqi oil money tapped by the U.S. for rebuilding Iraq. (Source: <http://goshennews.com/breakingnews/x2105968819/U-S-cant-account-for-8-9-billion-sent-to-Iraq>, July 27, 2010)