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# The US Defense Budget and Changes in US Strategy

## *Pre FY2013 Budget Submission Report*

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# Introduction

**This brief analyzes the pattern of cuts in recent, ongoing, and possible future defense and national security spending that affects the US and its ability to project power and aid its friends and allies. It shows, however, that this is only part of the story:**

- The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest.
- The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely.
- The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances.
- At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of “independence,” including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts.
- US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP -- in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- versus 6-7% during the Cold War.

**The US Congress has passed budget legislation that threatens devastating cuts in national security funding if the Congress does not act to find meaningful solutions to the nation’s debt and deficit problems by the end of 2011.**

- At 24.1 percent of gross domestic product, total federal outlays in 2010 were considerably higher than the 20.7 percent they have averaged over the past 40 years. According to CBO baseline projections, federal spending in the next decade will average almost 23 percent of GDP.

- Mandatory or “entitlement” outlays will increase by 5.1 percent in 2011 and by an average of 4.4 percent annually between 2012 and 2020, compared with an average growth rate of 6.4 percent between 1999 and 2008. They will average 12.3% to 13.3% of the GDP during FY2012 to FY2020.
- Defense spending will average only 3.3% to 4.3%, dropping from a peak war year level of 4.7% in FY2010. All other discretionary federal spending will equal 4.1% to 3.1% of the GDP.
- (CBO, <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/Chapter3.shtml>.)
- The defense share of federal spending is so low a percentage of total federal spending, the GDP, and rising entitlements costs that no feasible amount of cuts in US national security spending can have a major impact on the US deficit and debt problems. Unaffordable rises in the burden medical care puts on the economy which cannot be dealt with by cutting back the level of government spending without addressing the entire mix of national government spending, demographic trends, and social needs.

**The most serious single threat the US faces to its national security does not come from foreign threats, but from the pressures on defense spending created by these domestic social and economic trends, and the rising cost US federal entitlements spending.**

- These rises in total spending are driven two critical factors that cannot be addressed simply by altering the federal budget. They are driven by the cost of mandatory retirement and medical costs that extend far beyond government spending:
  - First, an aging population that does not save or assume full responsibility for retirement.
    - In 1940, the life expectancy of a 65-year-old was almost 14 years; today it's almost 20 years. By 2036, there will be almost twice as many older Americans as today -- from 41.9 million today to 78.1 million.
    - There are currently 2.9 workers for each Social Security beneficiary. By 2036, there will be 2.1 workers for each beneficiary. At the end of 2011, roughly 50% of the present US workforce had no private pension coverage, and 31% of the workforce has no savings set aside specifically for retirement.
    - In 2011, 54% of retired married couples and 73% of unmarried persons – some 35 million Americans or 69% of those receiving benefits -- received 50% or more of their income from Social Security; and 22% of married couples About 43% of unmarried persons receiving benefits relied on Social Security for 90% or more of their income. Another 9% of Americans over 65 had no retirement savings and did not receive Social Security benefits. In addition, 8.4 million disabled Americans and 2 million of their dependents (19% of total benefits) depended on Social Security, plus 6.3 million survivors of deceased workers (12% of total benefits). (Social Security Administration)

- Second, by the rising cost of Medicare, Medicaid (and potentially national medical care under the Affordable care Act as of 2014).
  - These costs are driven massive rises in the national cost of medical care from around 6% of the GDP to well over 20% -- they rose 5.73% in 2011. Expenditures in the United States on health care surpassed \$2.3 trillion in 2008, more than three times the \$714 billion spent in 1990, and over eight times the \$253 billion spent in 1980. Without major changes in cost, they will equal some 25% of the GDP in 2025.
  - They are costs which roughly one quarter of Americans have no insurance, and many only partial insurance coverage. Even so, the average health insurance premium for family coverage has more than doubled over the past decade to \$13,770 a year.
  - Some 45.1% of the workforce from ages 18 to 64 had no coverage as of September 2011, and many retirees lacked the savings to pay for any additional payments above Medicare. These figures did not include Americans who had not worked in the last 12 months, and coverage had dropped substantially since 2008. If one includes self-financed medical insurance, some 50 million Americans or 16.% of the population had no coverage in 2010.
  - In 2010, 31% of Americans relied on the government for health insurance, up from 24.2% in 1999. a total of 9.8% of children under age 18 are uninsured despite the government programs. (US Census Bureau, Kaiser Family Foundation, CNN Money)

### **These pressures, however, are only part of the non-traditional threats to US security**

- The steady decline in the size and military capability of our traditional allies poses another critical non-traditional threat. It is clear that no amount of US exhortation will change this situation and the US must reshape its strategy accordingly.
- The rise of threats like terrorism is only one aspect of new shifts in the threats to the US that force it to work far more closely and effectively with non-traditional allies, reshape elements of its military spending and operations to help build up their capabilities, and maintain strong embassy teams and aid efforts to help bring political and economic stability.
- The US must fundamentally rethink its approach to “optional wars.” It is far from clear that it can win the Iraq War, rather than empower Iran, without a strong military and aid presence. It will decisively lose the Afghan and Pakistan conflict if it does not quickly develop plans for a military and diplomatic presence, and help to aid Afghanistan in transitioning away from dependence on foreign military and economic spending during 2012-2020. US troop cuts are not a transition plan, and focusing on withdrawal is a recipe for defeat.
- That said, the US cannot, and should not, repeat the mistake it made in intervening in Iraq and Afghanistan. It must deal with non-traditional threats with a far better and more affordable mix of global, regional, and national strategies that can deal with issues like the turmoil in the Middle East, and South and Central Asia, and terrorism and instability on a global basis. It must rely on aiding friendly states, deterrence, containment, and far more limited and less costly forms of intervention.

- The new budget act poses a potentially crippling threat to US national security. Further major defense spending cuts pose a major additional threat under these conditions. The US has already made major cuts in its defense efforts since FY2009, and plans to implement an additional \$250 billion in cuts over the next five years. It cannot absorb major additional cuts under these conditions.

**The Department of Defense does need to make a major new effort to deal with its own, self-inflicted non-traditional threats.**

- Massive rises in the cost per soldier on active duty.
- A quarter century of posturing (?), failed efforts to develop effective procurement programs and cost controls.
- A fundamental breakdown in the ability to tie strategy to feasible, affordable programs.

**It is clear that far more integrated planning is needed at some point to address the proper mix of State Department, Department of Defense, various homeland defense, and Intelligence Community efforts. It is unclear that this would produce meaningful budget savings, but it is all too clear that the present compartmented and stovepiped efforts do not produce anything approaching an integrated strategy or efficient use of resources.**

**Setting the Stage for the FY2013  
Budget Submission and 10 Years  
of Lower Defense spending:**

**The January 2012 Policy  
Guidance on “Sustaining US  
Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup>  
Century Defense”**

# Key Take-Aways

- **The Pentagon released an outline of its forward-looking defense planning in light of the roughly \$490 billion in defense spending cuts over ten years currently underway as result of prior decisions in 2009-2011.**
- **This guidance did not, however, consider the \$580-\$600 billion in additional reductions specified under the Budget Control Act, apparently assuming that Congress will intervene to prevent sequestration**
- **It featured a broad emphasis on technology, the air-land battle in Asia, maintaining a strong posture in the Middle East, relying more on partnerships with our allies, reduced but ready ground forces, and a slow-down in procurement**
- **Broad outlines, however, do not set real priorities until concrete numbers and plans for procurement, allocation, manpower, force structure, and detailed operational capabilities**
- ***The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Comptroller repeatedly stressed that these details will not become clear until the White House and Pentagon release their FY13 Budget Request in late January or early February.***
- ***For all the talk of 10 years of planned spending levels and cuts, the President and Congress can only shape the actual budget and defense program one year at a time. There is a near zero real world probability that the coming plan and budget will shape the future in spite of changes in the economy, politics, entitlements, and threats to the US.***

# The New Primary Strategic Priorities and Missions

- Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
- Deter and Defeat Aggression
- Project Power Despite A2/AD Challenges
- Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
- Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
- Defend the Homeland and Provide support to Civil Authorities
- Provide a Stabilizing Presence
- Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
- Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations
- Continue to Move toward a more Collaborative in Interoperable Joint Force

# Primary Missions and Priorities- I:

*“recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments”*

**Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare.** Acting in concert with other means of national power, U.S. military forces must continue to hold al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents under constant pressure, wherever they may be. *Achieving our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qa’ida and preventing Afghanistan from ever being a safe haven again will be central to this effort.*

As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare. We will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.

**Deter and Defeat Aggression.** U.S. forces will be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by any potential adversary. *Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor.*

- As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere.
- Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state’s aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains a land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace.
- This includes being able to *secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.* Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, *they will be capable of denying the objectives of -- or imposing unacceptable costs on -- an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.*
- U.S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces. Our ground forces will be responsive and capitalize on balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur.

# Primary Missions and Priorities- II:

**Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges.** In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged.

- In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles,
- advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus.
- States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well.
- *Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.*
- This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.

**Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space.** Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space.

- Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy assets.
- *Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.*

# Primary Missions and Priorities- III:

**Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent.** As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal.

- We will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments.
- *It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.*

**Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities.** U.S. forces will continue to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors.

- We will also come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or in case of natural disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or even catastrophic event.
- Homeland defense and support to civil authorities require strong, steady-state force readiness, to include a robust missile defense capability. Threats to the homeland may be highest when U.S. forces are engaged in conflict with an adversary abroad.

**Provide a Stabilizing Presence.** U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises.

- These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence.
- A reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity. *However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these operations.*

# Primary Missions and Priorities- IV:

**Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations.** In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations.

- U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible.
- Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- *However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.*

**Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations.** The nation has frequently called upon its Armed Forces to respond to a range of situations that threaten the safety and well-being of its citizens and those of other countries.

- U.S. forces possess rapidly deployable capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, medical evacuation and care, and communications that can be invaluable in supplementing lead relief agencies, by extending aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters, both at home and abroad.
- DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities.
- U.S. forces will also remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens overseas on an emergency basis.

# Toward the Joint Force of 2020 - I

To ensure success in these missions, several principles will guide our force and program development.

**First, given that we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of missions described above.**

- The Department will make clear distinctions both *among* the key sizing and shaping missions listed above and *between* these mission areas and all other areas of the defense program.
- Wholesale divestment of the capability to conduct any mission would be unwise, based on historical and projected uses of U.S. military forces and our inability to predict the future.
- *Likewise, DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.*

**Second, we have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres.**

- *Accordingly, the concept of “reversibility,” including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis, is a key part of our decision calculus.*

**Third, we are determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce our overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized over the past decade.**

- An ill-prepared force will be vulnerable to corrosion in its morale, recruitment, and retention. Unless we are prepared to send confident, well-trained, and properly equipped men and women into battle, the nation will risk its most important military advantage at the health and quality of the All-Volunteer Force.

# Toward the Joint Force of 2020 - II

## **Fourth, the Department must continue to reduce the “cost of doing business.”**

- *This entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before taking further risk in meeting the demands of the strategy.*
- As DoD takes steps to reduce its manpower costs, to include reductions in the growth of compensation and health care costs, we will keep faith with those who serve.
- During the past decade, the men and women who comprise the All-Volunteer Force have shown versatility, adaptability, and commitment, enduring the constant stress and strain of fighting two overlapping conflicts.
- They have also endured prolonged and repeated deployments. Some a more than 46,000 men and women have been wounded, and still others a more than 6,200 members of the Armed Forces have lost their lives. As the Department reduces the size of the force, we will do so in a way that respects these sacrifices.
- This means, among other things, taking concrete steps to facilitate the transition of those who will leave the service. These include supporting programs to help veterans translate their military skills for the civilian workforce and aid their search for jobs.

## **Fifth, it will be necessary to examine how this strategy will influence existing campaign and contingency plans so that more limited resources may be better tuned to their requirements.**

- *This will include a renewed emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare.*

## **Sixth, the Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy.**

- Over the past decade, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to national security. The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require that we continue to employ National Guard and Reserve forces. *The expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant driver in determining an appropriate AC/RC mix and level of RC readiness.*

# Toward the Joint Force of 2020 - III

**Seventh, as we transition out of Iraq and draw down in Afghanistan, we will take extra measures to retain and build on key advancements in networked warfare in which joint forces have finally become truly interdependent.**

- *This imperative will shape a number of Departmental disciplines, ranging from establishing warfighting requirements to the way our forces train together.*

**Finally, in adjusting our strategy and attendant force size, the Department will make every effort to maintain an adequate industrial base and our investment in science and technology.**

- *We will also encourage innovation in concepts of operation.* Over the past ten years, the United States and its coalition allies and partners have learned hard lessons and applied new operational approaches in the counter terrorism, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance arenas, most often operating in uncontested sea and air environments.
- Accordingly, similar work needs to be done to ensure the United States, its allies, and partners are capable of operating in A2/AD, cyber, and other contested operating environments.
- To that end, the Department will both *encourage a culture of change and be prudent with its “seed corn,”* balancing reductions necessitated by resource pressures with the imperative to sustain key streams of innovation that may provide significant long-term payoffs.

**The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power. Our global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail. The balance between available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate. Force and program decisions made by the Department of Defense will be made in accordance with the strategic approach described in this document, which is designed to ensure our Armed Forces can meet the demands of the *U.S. National Security Strategy* at acceptable risk.**

# By the Numbers

- **It's now expected that Obama will request about \$82.5 billion for Overseas Combat Operations — down from the nearly \$115 billion in OCO funds provided for the current fiscal year**
- **The base budget will likely be reduced to about \$523.8 billion, or roughly \$8.5 billion below FY2012 appropriations. After this adjustment, the budget numbers show annual real growth of about \$10 billion to \$12 billion from FY14 into out-years**

## Limits on Discretionary Budget Authority for Fiscal Year 2012

(Millions of dollars)

	Security	Nonsecurity	Total
Caps Set in the Budget Control Act	684,000	359,000	1,043,000
<b>Adjustments</b>			
Overseas contingency operations <sup>a</sup>	126,544	0	126,544
Disaster relief <sup>b</sup>	6,400	4,053	10,453
Program integrity <sup>c</sup>	0	483	483
Subtotal	132,944	4,536	137,480
Adjusted Caps for 2012	816,944	363,536	1,180,480

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

## Limits on Discretionary Budget Authority for Fiscal Years 2013 to 2021

(Millions of dollars)

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Caps Set in the Budget Control Act <sup>a</sup>									
Defense	546,000	556,000	566,000	577,000	590,000	603,000	616,000	630,000	644,000
Nondefense	501,000	510,000	520,000	530,000	541,000	553,000	566,000	578,000	590,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,047,000</b>	<b>1,066,000</b>	<b>1,086,000</b>	<b>1,107,000</b>	<b>1,131,000</b>	<b>1,156,000</b>	<b>1,182,000</b>	<b>1,208,000</b>	<b>1,234,000</b>
Effect of Automatic Enforcement Procedures <sup>b</sup>									
Defense	n.a.	-54,649	-54,649	-54,650	-54,650	-54,651	-54,651	-54,651	-54,652
Nondefense	n.a.	-37,937	-37,321	-36,568	-36,218	-35,648	-34,672	-33,301	-32,910
<b>Total</b>	<b>n.a.</b>	<b>-92,586</b>	<b>-91,970</b>	<b>-91,218</b>	<b>-90,869</b>	<b>-90,298</b>	<b>-89,323</b>	<b>-87,952</b>	<b>-87,562</b>
Revised Caps									
Defense	546,000	501,351	511,351	522,350	535,350	548,349	561,349	575,349	589,348
Nondefense	501,000	472,063	482,679	493,432	504,782	517,352	531,328	544,699	557,090
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,047,000</b>	<b>973,414</b>	<b>994,030</b>	<b>1,015,782</b>	<b>1,040,131</b>	<b>1,065,702</b>	<b>1,092,677</b>	<b>1,120,048</b>	<b>1,146,438</b>

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Numbers in the table may not add up to totals because of rounding; n.a. = not applicable.

- Section 251A of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (Public Law 112-25) specified that a different set of caps would take effect for 2013 through 2021 to cover defense (budget function 050) and nondefense budget authority if recommendations of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction that would reduce deficits by \$1.2 trillion over that period were not enacted by January 15, 2012.
- The automatic enforcement procedures delineated in the Budget Control Act would reduce the caps on discretionary budget authority for 2014 through 2021. For 2013, a sequestration of budgetary resources is scheduled to take effect, but no further reduction in the caps is specified in the law. Discretionary budget authority for 2013, CBO estimates, would be reduced by \$97,469 million through that sequestration. In addition, a sequestration of mandatory spending is scheduled each year between 2013 and 2021.

# Critical Questions

- If the funding picture for at least the near term will require the Pentagon to do less with less, how will the Military serve all of its stated primary missions? Where will scarce resources be spent and what specific capabilities need to be purchased in order to achieve our goals?
- What will happen if sequestration is not averted and the Pentagon needs to cope with an additional \$600 billion in cuts over the next 10 years?
- Given the past systemic failure of all branches to efficiently manage their procurement and acquisition, will these dollars be allocated to maximize their strategic efficacy and in ways that preserve vital development capabilities within the US defense-industrial base?
- Given that this new guidance operates outside of the QDR/QDDR process, how will interagency coordination and funding over reconstruction/transition be accounted for in Afghanistan and Iraq?
- Exactly how do we create smaller and cheaper forces that can be so flexible, ready, and deployable that they can fight and defeat any aggressor in any fight in every kind of war at once?
- How do we maintain an all-volunteer force - the willingness to stay in military careers for the years required to be fully effective - and cut spending? What are the details of the human factors necessary to make such a strategy workable?