

# Foreword

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There is no more compelling issue to the government and people of the United States today than Homeland Security. Likewise, there is no more compelling mission for the military than Homeland Defense. But centuries of relative security for a people protected by two oceans and benevolent neighbors to the north and south have left us culturally ill-prepared for a new and ominous era of transnational terrorism that has brought danger to our door. Since the terrible wake-up call of 9/11, we have tried to overcome cultural malaise with institutional renovations, which has led to the greatest reorganization of government since 1947, a reexamination of the direction and focus of our intelligence community, and a renewed concern for domestic defense that has laid near dormant since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In short order this has led to the development of the Department of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Council, the United States Northern Command, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, a new Director for National Intelligence, the National Counterterrorism Center, two committees devoted to Homeland Security oversight in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and a host of other institutional adjustments in the federal government. These changes were reflected and complemented by an equal commitment to renewal in our states, territories, and local governments, along with an essential commitment by much of the private sector to become active partners in the protection of the country's infrastructure.

A great deal has been done, but a great deal remains to be done. Issues of security must be continually pursued consistently with issues of individual liberties. The parallel commitments to law enforcement and defense must remain complementary, but distinct in a country who has never wanted its soldiers to be policemen or its police to be soldiers.

The balance of the federal application of power in a very federalist union, even in the name of support to state and local governments in times of crisis, must always remain in the forefront of our thinking, whether that support is extended from a civil entity or a uniformed contingent. Our institutions and our processes must be continually developed with these and other issues in mind. Similarly, as suggested by Secretary Chertoff in releasing his “Second Stage Review,” we must remain ready to adapt, as our enemy adapts.

In the spirit of these compelling commitments, the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership, in partnership with The George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage Foundation, and the Association of the United States Army conducted what is envisioned to be the first of an annual Homeland Defense/Homeland Security conference under the sponsorship of the Eisenhower National Security Series. The event featured three guest speakers, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, the Honorable John Lehman, and Admiral James Loy, whose direct contributions to the cause of homeland security and homeland defense hardly need referencing. In addition, the forum convened five panel discussions, focused on vital issues surrounding the security of the country’s domestic environment, and the defense of her shores. This volume is a reflection of those discussions.

The first panel, sponsored by the Army War College, brought together three experts to address the question of whether or not the Department of Defense should ever be called upon to assume the position of “lead federal agency” in responding to a catastrophic event. The Department’s role in “support of civil authorities” is well-known, and has been played out on hundreds of occasions in responding to natural disasters from forest fires to floods, tornados to earthquakes, and—certainly, almost annually—hurricanes. But the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina rose to a new tier of destruction that overwhelmed not only state and local capabilities, but likewise the federal response in the earliest days of our efforts. Viewed against that background, and beneath the specter of a manmade threat that could wreak similar or even greater destruction, the question has been raised as to whether any agency

other than DoD has the manpower, transportation, communication and logistical wherewithal to effectively respond to catastrophes of this magnitude. Our panelists offered insights as to why DoD should take charge in these most extreme circumstances, and why not.

The second panel, convened by The George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute, focused on the challenge of effectively coordinating homeland security and homeland defense efforts across the expanse of the federal government and beyond. In spite of the fact that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established to bring together the preponderance of agencies nominally charged with homeland security issues, the federal effort that genuinely addresses those ends by far exceeds the boundaries of those 22 agencies housed at DHS. That diversity, characterized in institutional cultures as dissimilar as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Centers for Disease Control, has frequently resulted in bureaucratic friction that has no place in the face of the challenges surrounding the domestic security of our country. This friction is reminiscent to some of the less-than-smooth coordination that existed in our Armed Forces prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the landmark legislation that forced a spirit of "jointness" on those forces that extended from their educational institutions, through their operational employment, on to the strategies that would sustain them and their mission. In that light, a call has gone forth for a "new Goldwater-Nichols," instilling a similar spirit of "jointness" not only in DHS, but throughout the interagency structure and in partnership with the State and local levels, to include both the private and nongovernmental sectors, and the citizenry as a whole. This panel examined the feasibility, advisability and desirability of such an effort, drawing from the DoD example, and acknowledging where that example cannot be applied.

Panel Three, sponsored by The Heritage Foundation, addressed the essential, and evolving role of the National Guard in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security. More than one official has referred to the National Guard as the military's first responders in times of domestic crisis. Theirs is a long and proud history of serving the citizenry from within the citizenry, and in recent times their soldiers have served as the first and last elements of the military's response to natural disaster.

Without question, the Guard will retain a central role in responding to disaster; but if that disaster becomes a deliberate, man-made variant, how will that role be affected? What mechanisms will be required to successfully integrate command and control of the Guard with their active component counterparts in response to a crisis in the homeland? What will be the nature of that relationship when significant numbers of a state's National Guard force become victims themselves; or when the scope of a catastrophe transcends state borders? And how will the Guard meet all of these challenges while fulfilling a role as the operational reserve to this country's current crises overseas? This panel addressed all of these issues, examining the precarious balance of an asset equally vital to the nation as a whole, and to its individual states and territories.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies sponsored the fourth panel, represented in this volume with a careful study of the intricacies surrounding domestic intelligence in a new era. No other entity in the United States government has undergone more scrutiny following 9-11, or attracted more blame, than the Intelligence Community. In the wake of that scrutiny, the community has been re-structured, resulting in the designation of a new Director of National Intelligence, the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center, the re-tooling of an Office of the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis in DHS, and numerous other changes and realignments. In spite of these changes, a significant challenge remains as the country seeks to steel itself from enemies 'without and within' while simultaneously preserving the rights and liberties of our citizens and those who reside lawfully within our shores. Insights drawn from the panel's discussions are reflected here in a paper provided by its moderator, David Heyman, Director and Senior Fellow of CSIS' Homeland Security Program.

The fifth and final panel of the forum was sponsored by the Association of the United States Army. In it the panelists devoted their attention to the growing importance of information and communication in responding to disaster. One of the most basic responsibilities a government has to its people in times of crises is to convey a sense of understanding of what has occurred, what is occurring, and what they can expect in continuing response and recovery operations. Left silent, the retention

of the public's confidence will remain an elusive, if not impossible goal, in spite of what the government has accomplished on their behalf. Balancing the public's "right to know" against security issues framed to protect that very public is a growing challenge, made more so by ubiquitous sources of information outside the government which are rightly beyond regulation, and too frequently beyond responsibility. Part of bridging the gap between the two sides of this quandary is a responsible press, brought in as partners against the disquieting void of information and the threat of disinformation. But the government itself must assume the primary responsibility for "putting out the word"—crafting and disseminating a consistent and clear message for the edification of the people. This panel focused on those challenges, our current means of meeting them, and the additional steps that may need to be taken in this critical aspect of retaining and sustaining the faith of our people in our institutions.

The conference was an ambitious endeavor, designed to draw on a cross-section of experience from the partner institutions, their supporters, and their audiences. Particular thanks go out to The George Washington University, whose staff and facilities provided an ideal environment for an inaugural event. The response to that event was enough to convince the coalition that the partnership should be preserved, and brought together annually for future examinations of vital issues surrounding the security of our country, within our country. Accordingly, in November of 2008, the partnership will convene again, this time on the campus of the United States Army War College.

