European Union
Baseline Activities
DISSUADE DENY DETECT DEFEND
Root Causes Establish Norms Encourage norms Enforce norms Info Materiel Equipment Access People Capabilities Plans Agents Disease Source Protection Incident Management (IM) Plans IM Capabilities/ Resources Counter- measures Remediation
                                         
Communities S/L/F Public Health                       * Public health preparedness and response is coordinated and promoted at the EU level through the program of coperation on preparedness and response to biological and chemical agents attacks (BICHAT).  BICHAT objectives include setting up mechnisms for info exchange, creating an EU capacity for detection of agents, creating a medicine stocks and health services database, and drawing up guidence to face-up attacks.
* The "Communicable Disease Network" (1999) and the "Health Security Programme" (2001) constitute an early warning system for outbreaks.  It links national health authorities and experts with the commission and provides EU capability for rapid detection, ID, and diagnosis of cases.
* EU Health and Security Committee established a 24/7 Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats (RAS-BICHAT).  This relies on member states surveillance systems.  Individual member states have to notify the Commission, who then is responsible for info exhcange.
* Inventories of labs and their diagnostic capabilities were compiled to facilitate reliable and timely detection of BT agents.
* The Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) of the Communicable Disease Network will be incorporated into the new European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDPC).
* The Commission set up a secure general rapid alert system (ARGUS) to be an entry point for member states to coordinate various specialized alert systems. (p. 18-19 for detail)		 * Public health preparedness and response is coordinated and promoted at the EU level through the program of coperation on preparedness and response to biological and chemical agents attacks (BICHAT).  BICHAT objectives include setting up mechnisms for info exchange, creating an EU capacity for detection of agents, creating a medicine stocks and health services database, and drawing up guidence to face-up attacks.
* The "Communicable Disease Network" (1999) and the "Health Security Programme" (2001) constitute an early warning system for outbreaks.  It links national health authorities and experts with the commission and provides EU capability for rapid detection, ID, and diagnosis of cases.
* EU Health and Security Committee established a 24/7 Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats (RAS-BICHAT).  This relies on member states surveillance systems.  Individual member states have to notify the Commission, who then is responsible for info exhcange.
* Inventories of labs and their diagnostic capabilities were compiled to facilitate reliable and timely detection of BT agents.
* The Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) of the Communicable Disease Network will be incorporated into the new European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDPC).
* The Commission set up a secure general rapid alert system (ARGUS) to be an entry point for member states to coordinate various specialized alert systems. (p. 18-19 for detail)
* Lab assistance in case of an outbreak is provided by high security labs established under auspices of the Health Security Commission.  This also assures diagnostic services to member states and 24/7 on-call availability.		     * Public health preparedness and response is coordinated and promoted at the EU level through the program of coperation on preparedness and response to biological and chemical agents attacks (BICHAT).  BICHAT objectives include setting up mechnisms for info exchange, creating an EU capacity for detection of agents, creating a medicine stocks and health services database, and drawing up guidence to face-up attacks.
* Under BICHAT, 10 clinical diagnosis and case management guidelines have been published covering various agents.
* Epidemiological experts are working together to develop a generic model of possible outbreaks and data for simulations, which can be later adapted to member states.
* The secure laboratory network contributes to excercies, training, and skill development.		 * Public health preparedness and response is coordinated and promoted at the EU level through the program of coperation on preparedness and response to biological and chemical agents attacks (BICHAT).  BICHAT objectives include setting up mechnisms for info exchange, creating an EU capacity for detection of agents, creating a medicine stocks and health services database, and drawing up guidence to face-up attacks.
* Under BICHAT, 10 clinical diagnosis and case management guidelines have been published covering various agents.
* Epidemiological experts are working together to develop a generic model of possible outbreaks and data for simulations, which can be later adapted to member states.
* Lab assistance in case of an outbreak is provided by high security labs established under auspices of the Health Security Commission.  This also assures diagnostic services to member states and 24/7 on-call availability.
 * Public health preparedness and response is coordinated and promoted at the EU level through the program of coperation on preparedness and response to biological and chemical agents attacks (BICHAT).  BICHAT objectives include setting up mechnisms for info exchange, creating an EU capacity for detection of agents, creating a medicine stocks and health services database, and drawing up guidence to face-up attacks.
* Inventories have been made of the availability of countermeasures in various member states.  Nearly all member states have first generation vaccines against smallpox and sufficient antibiotics for most bacteriological pathogens. 

* Public health preparedness and response is coordinated and promoted at the EU level through the program of coperation on preparedness and response to biological and chemical agents attacks (BICHAT).  BICHAT objectives include setting up mechnisms for info exchange, creating an EU capacity for detection of agents, creating a medicine stocks and health services database, and drawing up guidence to face-up attacks.
                                * The Commission deems capacity of antibiotics to be sufficient to respond to an attack, though response time remains a matter of concern. * The Commission deems capacity of antibiotics to be sufficient to respond to an attack, though response time remains a matter of concern.
* Inventories of medicinal stocks, however, were deemed incomplete and insufficient by the Commission in 2003.
* Also of concern are vaccines and products for the variety of toxins that can be produced.
* Insufficient supply of immunoglobulins for treatment of serious adverse reactions to vaccines.
* There is discussion among the Commission of stockpiling at the EU level, but members have not shown much interest in this, nor do they want to make formal arrangements to share national stockpiles.		  
Hospital/Medical                                      
                                     
Law Enforcement                      * National customs agencies play an important role in actual law enforcement.  The Customs cooperation Working Party (CCWP) is a coordinating group within the Council that is responsible for customs cooperation.  It introduced an action polan to promote detection and prevention of CBRN smuggling.
* The European Agency for the Management of Operational Coorperation at the External Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX) aims to enhance cooperation between national customs agencies.
* EU capacity to detect a potential attack can be found largely in the area of law enforcement cooperation, which has increased significantly since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
* Europol and Eurojust boosted exchange of info between national law enforcement.
* Europol is making more progress in mapping terrorist networks; however, there is a still a need for increased mutual trust between national agencies and willingness to share informaiton of current investigations.		 * National customs agencies play an important role in actual law enforcement.  The Customs cooperation Working Party (CCWP) is a coordinating group within the Council that is responsible for customs cooperation.  It introduced an action polan to promote detection and prevention of CBRN smuggling.
* The European Agency for the Management of Operational Coorperation at the External Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX) aims to enhance cooperation between national customs agencies.		              
                  * Cooperation in the field of intelligence is problematic, which inhibits comprehensive threat analysis.                  
Emergency Management/ Fire                               * DG Environment's Civil Protection Unit sought technical expertise and response team.
* Several DG's are involved in developing and implementing training programs and simulation exercises for national experts and crisis managers.		 * DG Environment's Civil Protection Unit sought technical expertise and response team.
* The Commission has developed pre-determined response scenarios and encouraged standardization of management responses.
* Progress has been made in the Civil Protection Mechanism, which facilitates the EU and member nation mobilization of civil protection assistance.  It's Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) accept requests for assistance.  The MIC then sends out the request to its network of national contact points and then informs the requesting country of the availability of assistance.
* A Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) is a web-based database of experts and facilities that are available to MIC-participating countries in an emergency.  However, member states are reluctant to submit vaccines and pharmaceuticals to the system.
* The Commission wants to set up a central Crisis Center that bring together representatives from all relevant commission services during an emergency.
* A Solidarity Fund (EUSF) has been created from which stricken members can be compensated.
    
                                     
Biotech Industry           * A compulsory regime exists for control of exports of dual-use items and technologies.  In addition to strict provisions on exports, it emphasizes responsibilities of exporters in preventing use of those technologies for WMD production. * A compulsory regime exists for control of exports of dual-use items and technologies.  In addition to strict provisions on exports, it emphasizes responsibilities of exporters in preventing use of those technologies for WMD production.                     * Cooperation in research takes place under the 6th Framework Programme, under which a whole new stream of security and countermeasures research has been set up.  The Commission continues to suggest boosts in funding.  
                                     
Science Community           * Initiatives related to securing info and material related to BW production remains a national responsibility in Europe.  EU laws, however, are in place to provide regulation on lab security, proper use of dual-use technologies and agents, and movement of harmful consumables used for BW.                     * DG Research launched research initiatives related to bioterrorism. * DG Research launched research initiatives related to bioterrorism. * DG Research launched research initiatives related to bioterrorism.
* Cooperation in research takes place under the 6th Framework Programme, under which a whole new stream of security and countermeasures research has been set up.  The Commission continues to suggest boosts in funding.		  
                                     
Military/Defense                                      
                                     
Arms Control   * The EU has few of its own instruments directed specifically at dissuasion; however it takes an active role in international nonproliferation agreements, included the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), the BTWC, and the NPT.  Works closely with third countries to accept the terms of these agreements. 
* European Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD and the European Security Strategy  is a keystone in the nonproliferation strategy.		 * The EU has few of its own instruments directed specifically at dissuasion; however it takes an active role in international nonproliferation agreements, included the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), the BTWC, and the NPT.  Works closely with third countries to accept the terms of these agreements. 
* European Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD and the European Security Strategy  is a keystone in the nonproliferation strategy.		     * A compulsory regime exists for control of exports of dual-use items and technologies.  In addition to strict provisions on exports, it emphasizes responsibilities of exporters in preventing use of those technologies for WMD production. * A compulsory regime exists for control of exports of dual-use items and technologies.  In addition to strict provisions on exports, it emphasizes responsibilities of exporters in preventing use of those technologies for WMD production.                        
  * Although EU members support the WMD Strategy, funding is problematic.  This is especially so because the Strategy focuses on nuclear terrorism as opposed to bioterrorism. * Although EU members support the WMD Strategy, funding is problematic.  This is especially so because the Strategy focuses on nuclear terrorism as opposed to bioterrorism.     * Concerns persist among EU member states about adverse impact of stringent regulations on dual-use technologies. * Concerns persist among EU member states about adverse impact of stringent regulations on dual-use technologies.                        
Federal Government * The EU's Humanitarian Aid Office coordinates donations of international aid; the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) strives to rebuild war-torn areas.  EU diplomatic efforts attempt to resolve conflicts.  Each of these activities can be viewed as insturments in the normatic effort to prevent terrorism. * The EU has few of its own instruments directed specifically at dissuasion; however it takes an active role in international nonproliferation agreements, included the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), the BTWC, and the NPT.  Works closely with third countries to accept the terms of these agreements. 
* European Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD and the European Security Strategy  is a keystone in the nonproliferation strategy.		 * The EU has few of its own instruments directed specifically at dissuasion; however it takes an active role in international nonproliferation agreements, included the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), the BTWC, and the NPT.  Works closely with third countries to accept the terms of these agreements. 
* European Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD and the European Security Strategy  is a keystone in the nonproliferation strategy.		     * Initiatives related to securing info and material related to BW production remains a national responsibility in Europe.  EU laws, however, are in place to provide regulation on lab security, propoer use of dual-use technologies and agents, and movement of harmful consumables used for BW.  EU's legal competiences over border control and import licensiving also give it a sstrong role to deny entry of dangerous substances.
* EU has a strict regulatory regime to record CBRN agents and materials.  Obligations for possession, handling, storage, and use in all workplaces (labs, research institutes, hospitals) are in place.  These also require appropriate qualifications for those involved in these operations.  Similar safeguards apply in food, plant, and animal arenas.
* A compulsory regime exists for control of exports of dual-use items and technologies.  In addition to strict provisions on exports, it emphasizes responsibilities of exporters in preventing use of those technologies for WMD production.		 * EU has a strict regulatory regime to record CBRN agents and materials.  Obligations for possession, handling, storage, and use in all workplaces (labs, research institutes, hospitals) are in place.  These also require appropriate qualifications for those involved in these operations.  Similar safeguards apply in food, plant, and animal arenas.
* A compulsory regime exists for control of exports of dual-use items and technologies.  In addition to strict provisions on exports, it emphasizes responsibilities of exporters in preventing use of those technologies for WMD production.		 * EU has a strict regulatory regime to record CBRN agents and materials.  Obligations for possession, handling, storage, and use in all workplaces (labs, research institutes, hospitals) are in place.  These also require appropriate qualifications for those involved in these operations.  Similar safeguards apply in food, plant, and animal arenas.   * New position of EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator helps coordinate work of EU in combatting terrorism and monitoring implementation of European anti-terrorism policies at the national level; however it has no formal legal power.
* EU has a well-developed capacity to map and monitor trends that could contribute to detection of biological threats.  Most DG's have developed mechanisms to detect disruptions and impending threats.  These entail gathering, registering, and disseminating of information among national authorities.		 * Detection and prevention of CBRN smuggling is organized in close cooperation w/ third countries and international orgs.  Most activities are geared to detecting bioagents and dual use technology at airports, seaports, and external borders.
* EU has a well-developed capacity to map and monitor trends that could contribute to detection of biological threats.  Most DG's have developed mechanisms to detect disruptions and impending threats.  These entail gathering, registering, and disseminating of information among national authorities.		 * Detection and prevention of CBRN smuggling is organized in close cooperation w/ third countries and international orgs.  Most activities are geared to detecting bioagents and dual use technology at airports, seaports, and external borders.       * The DG for Health and Consumer Protection implemented the BICHAT program to improve coordination and preparedness of European health officials.  Other DGs added bioterrorism response to their existing capacities. 
* DG Environment's Civil Protection Unit sought technical expertise and response team.
* DG Research launched research initiatives related to bioterrorism.
* Council's administration reviewed what elements of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) could be reoriented to bioterrorism. 
* Proposals were made for a European Solidarity Fund to help relieve financial burden of stricken states.		 * The DG for Health and Consumer Protection implemented the BICHAT program to improve coordination and preparedness of European health officials.  Other DGs added bioterrorism response to their existing capacities. 
* DG Environment's Civil Protection Unit sought technical expertise and response team.
* DG Research launched research initiatives related to bioterrorism.
* Council's administration reviewed what elements of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) could be reoriented to bioterrorism. 
* Proposals were made for a European Solidarity Fund to help relieve financial burden of stricken states.		    
  * Although EU members support the WMD Strategy, funding is problematic.  This is especially so because the Strategy focuses on nuclear terrorism as opposed to bioterrorism. * Although EU members support the WMD Strategy, funding is problematic.  This is especially so because the Strategy focuses on nuclear terrorism as opposed to bioterrorism.     * Concerns persist among EU member states about adverse impact of stringent regulations on dual-use technologies. * Concerns persist among EU member states about adverse impact of stringent regulations on dual-use technologies.     * Cooperation in the field of intelligence is problematic, which inhibits comprehensive threat analysis.                  
Federal Legislative Bodies           * Initiatives related to securing info and material related to BW production remains a national responsibility in Europe.  EU laws, however, are in place to provide regulation on lab security, propoer use of dual-use technologies and agents, and movement of harmful consumables used for BW.  EU's legal competiences over border control and import licensiving also give it a sstrong role to deny entry of dangerous substances. * Initiatives related to securing info and material related to BW production remains a national responsibility in Europe.  EU laws, however, are in place to provide regulation on lab security, propoer use of dual-use technologies and agents, and movement of harmful consumables used for BW.  EU's legal competiences over border control and import licensiving also give it a sstrong role to deny entry of dangerous substances.                        
                                     
International Public Health                                      
                                     
International Organizations                                      
                                     
KEY: SOURCES :
  BASELINE ACTIVITIES 1.  Dekker and Rhinard.  The EU's Response to the Threat of Bioterrorism.  
 
  NOTES
  1.  For the purposes of this paper, the US represents "federal government."
  GAPS
FOR DISCUSSION:
1.  In which community would Intelligence go?