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Russia and China: The Ambivalent Embrace

ANDREW KUCHINS

Russia's perspective on China is shaped by a complex amalgamation of geopolitical, economic, historical, and cultural factors that add up to a profound ambivalence. Despite this ambivalence, Russian policy toward China over the past 15 years under Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin has been driven mainly by pragmatic considerations, resulting in a gradual rapprochement and thickening of the relationship. The “strategic partnership” established in 1996 by Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, though it appeared long on rhetoric and short on substance when Putin assumed power in 2000, has taken on considerable weight as economic and political cooperation has deepened.

Moscow has no desire to establish an alliance with Beijing, but growing irritations in US-Russia and Europe-Russia relations have redounded to the benefit of the China-Russia relationship. One still hears Russians express concerns about ending up as China's “junior partner,” or as nothing more than a natural-resource appendage (*pridatka*). These worries surface less frequently, however, as Russian confidence continues to increase, thanks to the virtual macroeconomic revolution that has taken place in that country in recent years. Russian leaders and foreign policy experts recognize, as does China's political elite, that their countries' unbalanced alliance in the 1950s, followed by the total breakdown of relations in the 1960s and 1970s, constituted a tremendous strategic mistake.

Moscow's attitude toward China in some ways reflects Russia's sense of identity and its view of

its own place in the world as a uniquely Eurasian power. Occupying the massive geographical space between Europe and Asia, Russia has often in its history experienced a split identity—between, on one hand, the Asiatic legacy of the Mongol period that began in the thirteenth century; and, on the other, Westernizing reforms, attempted intermittently by Russian leaders from Peter the Great to Catherine the Great to Alexander II to Mikhail Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Historically, Asia has occupied a special place in Russians' imagination and in their version of Manifest Destiny: It has been viewed as a vast region critical for Russia's development and global role. Fyodor Dostoevsky famously expressed this view in 1881 after Russian forces defeated the Turkmens in their quest to conquer Central Asia:

What is the need of the future seizure of Asia? What is our business there? This is necessary because Russia is not only in Europe, but also in Asia; because the Russian is not only a European, but also an Asiatic. Not only that: In our coming destiny, perhaps it is precisely Asia that represents our way out. . . . In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas to Asia we shall go as masters. In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans. Our civilizing mission in Asia will bribe our spirit and drive us thither. It is only necessary that the movement should start. Build two railroads: Begin with the one to Siberia, and then to Central Asia, and at once you will see the consequences.

Of course for much of its history, especially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when interaction between China and Russia grew significantly during a first wave of globalization,

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Russia viewed itself as the superior country. During the brief period of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s, the Soviets described themselves as the “elder brother.” Today Russia finds itself the weaker partner with China, a situation unprecedented since the Russians first began to settle Siberia in the seventeenth century.

TILTING FOR LEVERAGE

China currently represents the dominant counterpoint to Russia’s political, economic, and cultural orientation toward the United States and Europe. Shortly after becoming president in 2000, in his first tour of Asia, which included a visit to China, Putin elegantly summarized the importance of balance in his country’s foreign policy. “Russia,” he said, “is both a European and an Asiatic state. It is like a bird and can only fly well if it uses both wings.”

More broadly speaking, Russian perspectives on China and international relations tend toward traditional realpolitik considerations of the dynamics between rising and falling great powers. In this realist framework, Russian views of China often depend on the status of US-Russian relations and Moscow’s ties with the West. In the 1990s—when Russia was unhappy about US support for NATO expansion, the war in Kosovo, and the development of national missile defense—the Yeltsin administration gravitated closer to Beijing. In recent years, the United States’ support for democracy promotion, as well as its increased influence in the post-Soviet states, has also driven the Putin administration to seek closer ties with China.

Yeltsin nicely captured China’s position as a leverage point with the West when he said in 1995:

China is a very important state for us. It is a neighbor, with which we share the longest border in the world and with which we are destined to live and work side by side forever. Russia’s future depends on the success of cooperation with China. Relations with China are extremely impor-

tant to us from the global politics perspective as well. We can rest on the Chinese shoulder in our relations with the West. In that case the West will treat Russia more respectfully.

Like Yeltsin before him, Putin has repeatedly invoked an improvement in ties with China as an alternative to a more pro-Western foreign policy if Washington does not pay greater attention to Moscow’s interests.

For the most part, the United States and its allies through the 1990s remained fairly relaxed about



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the gradual rapprochement between Russia and China. Those skeptical that Moscow and Beijing would engage in a real alliance against the United States pointed to their long and complicated history, which has involved intense competition and occasional conflict along their extensive border. They also cited current-day competitive instincts in Central Asia and elsewhere. NATO Secretary General George Robertson expressed this view in a lecture in Uzbekistan in 2000. “The relationship between Russia and China,” he said, “is a matter for Russia and China, but [such an alliance] has been tried before and has not always worked.” In US policy circles, more suspicious views of the Sino-Russian relationship have tended to come

from the right wing of the political spectrum.

Predictably, the impulse in both Moscow and Beijing to use each other for balance increased in response to exercises of US power such as the Kosovo war in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It also has increased in response to policies or developments that appear to augment US power, such as NATO expansion, missile defense, and support of the “color” revolutions in Eurasia. This balancing impulse has been constrained both by the absence of a sufficiently compelling threat to either Russia or China, and by the reality that, at least militarily, a Sino-Russian alliance would not be capable of balancing US power in the near term or medium term.

However, Russian arms sales to China have raised increasing concern among some in the US military. They worry about the capacity of Moscow to increase China's ability to hurt the US Seventh Fleet in a showdown over Taiwan. China has been Russia's number one weapons customer for the past 15 years. In the 1990s, arms sales to Beijing averaged \$1 billion to \$2 billion per year. In the past seven years they have run about \$2 billion to \$3 billion annually—representing about 30 percent to 40 percent of Russian arms sales overall.

SICK MAN NO MORE

Concern in US policy circles over closer relations between Russia and China grew considerably in 2005 in response to Chinese and Russian support for Uzbek President Islam Karimov's brutal suppression of rioting in Andijan in May; the subsequent eviction of US forces from the base at Karshi-Khanabad; and, in November 2005, the signing of a Russian-Uzbek security agreement. Many Russian analysts viewed these

developments in Central Asia as a real turning point for Moscow's influence in the region, as well as for the role of the emerging Sino-Russian axis. One Kremlin-connected analyst told me: "There is an impression that US foreign policy expansion has reached its limits and now there begins an epoch of the gradual decline of American empire."

With Russia's resurgence after the modern-day *Smutnoe Vremya* ("Time of Troubles") that it experienced during the traumatic 1990s, the country's confidence grew tremendously in 2005 and 2006. Indeed, the magnitude and the rapidity of Russia's revival have been as unexpected as they have been impressive. The numbers are staggering. According to the Moscow-based investment bank Troika Dialog, between 1999 and 2006 Russia's nominal GDP grew nearly fivefold—from less than \$200 billion to more than \$900 billion—and it is poised to exceed the \$1 trillion mark in 2007. Russia's foreign exchange reserves over this period have grown 20 times, from about \$20 billion when Putin became president to more than \$400 billion today. The Russian stock market has consistently been one of the fastest growing in the world for the past seven years, increasing in value about 1,000 percent. Meanwhile, average wages have increased fourfold. With economic numbers

like this, it is not a big surprise that Putin continues to enjoy popularity ratings above 70 percent.

In 1999–2000, my standard public talk on Russia was entitled "Russia: The Sick Man of Eurasia." That is no longer the case. On whatever issue we look at in 2007—Iran, the Middle East peace process, gas and oil supplies to Europe and Asia, foreign investment in the energy sector—Russia is asserting its interests far more confidently than ten years ago, five years ago, even one year ago. It is Russia's changing fortunes, along with US foreign policy, that have had the most significant influence on Russia's perception of and policy toward China.

THE BRIEF HONEYMOON

After the terrorist attacks against America on September 11, 2001, Putin decided to align Russia with the US-led war in Afghanistan, agreeing to allow US military bases in Central Asia. He also seemed to accept quietly both a second round of NATO expansion and the United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic

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Missile (ABM) Treaty. This approach caused a great deal of concern in Chinese foreign policy and security policy circles in 2001 and 2002, with many worrying that Putin was fundamentally altering Russia's balanced foreign policy in order to embrace Washington instead.

In May 2002, this second honeymoon of US-Russia relations reached its apex when President George W. Bush traveled to Moscow, where he signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty that places limits on operationally deployed nuclear warheads. The United States also awarded Russia "market-economy" status, improving bilateral trade relations and bringing Moscow a step closer to membership in the World Trade Organization.

However, like the first US-Russian honeymoon in 1992, the post-9-11 embrace would prove short-lived. Putin had made a bold decision to support the United States unequivocally in Afghanistan, going against the recommendations of the majority of the Russian foreign policy elite. But he and his colleagues in the Kremlin quickly came to believe that his decision went underappreciated and virtually unrewarded by the Bush administration. Moscow's public protests over the US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty, as well as to support further NATO expansion, may have been muted at

the time. But Washington's actions in the fall of 2001, coming so soon after Putin had extended support to his "friend George," left the Russians disappointed and feeling that they were receiving very little in return for their support.

As 2002 wore on, it became increasingly evident that the Bush administration would take military action against Iraq in defiance of Putin and much of the international community, including China. Although Putin disagreed with the US administration's decision to invade Iraq, both Washington and Moscow sought to prevent a major falling-out in the US-Russian relationship. A series of other events and trends, however, threw the relationship into a tailspin from which it has yet to escape.

Indeed, the past four years of deterioration in US-Russian ties contrast sharply with the continued improvement of Sino-Russian economic, security, and political relations.

While Putin has said on several occasions in recent years that Sino-Russian ties have never been better, US-Russian relations are chillier today than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Alarm in the West about rising authoritarianism in Russia, and about Russia's growing influence on its periphery, increased with Ukraine's Orange Revolution at the end of 2004. The causes of the Orange Revolution—following the Rose Revolution in Georgia, which brought pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili to power; and preceding the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, which toppled the Askar Akayev regime—were seen differently in Moscow and Washington. The Russian explanation for the "color" revolutions tended to emphasize the role of nongovernment organizations and politicians supported by the United States and other Western countries. The United States and its European allies argued that the upheavals came about primarily because of falsified elections and the public's dissatisfaction with corrupt governments and officials.

The positions of Washington and Moscow on these events became increasingly polarized as officials and opinion leaders in Washington argued that Putin's authoritarian inclinations led him to support dictatorship over democracy in countries on Russia's periphery. The quasi-official Russian view held that the United States was interfering in countries that Moscow considered part of its sphere of influence. The US position was seen as hypocriti-

cal because Washington, in Moscow's view, only cared about regime changes that would bring in pro-US governments like those of Saakashvili in Georgia and Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine—not about real democracy.

A BEIJING-MOSCOW CONSENSUS?

The Chinese for the most part remained on the sidelines during this growing dispute between Washington and Moscow—until the specter of color revolutions arrived in Central Asia, first in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and then with civil unrest in Uzbekistan and the brutal crackdown in the city of Andijan in May of that year. Chinese sensitivities about the potential for unrest in Central Asia to spill over to its Muslim groups across the border in Xinjiang province moved Beijing to clearly back Karimov in Uzbekistan, and to defend

the principles of order and sovereignty over the right of any outside power to interfere in a country's domestic affairs. After the events in Andijan, the first places to which Kari-

mov traveled, and where he received full support for his actions, were Beijing and then Moscow. The dividing lines were sharpening between the West's support for democracy and human rights and, in Eurasia, the interests of an emerging "authoritarian internationale" led by Moscow and Beijing.

It is unclear at this point how far Moscow and Beijing are prepared to go together to contest the interests of the United States in Eurasia, but what appeared as mainly rhetorical support for a "multipolar world" in the 1990s is now assuming greater substance. One example is Russia and China's cooperation in the United Nations Security Council on an increasing number of issues. The Chinese have followed Russia's lead on sanctions on Iran, and are likely to follow Russia on the status of Kosovo. In January 2007, Russia and China for the first time jointly vetoed a UN resolution, this one having to do with sanctions on Burma.

Another example of Sino-Russian coordination was the decision in 2005 by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—the intergovernmental group consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—to request clarification from the United States about its plans for withdrawing from military bases established in Central Asia after 9-11. The gathering of the SCO's

The United States' support for democracy promotion has driven the Putin administration to seek closer ties with China.

foreign ministers in Moscow in 2005 also included representatives of states that had recently acquired observer status—India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan. In his opening remarks, Putin crowed about the fact that 3 billion people, virtually half the planet, were represented at the gathering. Putin noted that the “SCO has gone far beyond the framework of the tasks initially set for it.”

Russian attitudes toward the SCO reflect the broader ambivalence with which Moscow views Beijing. This is natural, since the China-Russia relationship is at the heart of the SCO. The mainstream Russian view is that the SCO is essentially a Chinese project, as the name of the organization makes clear. Russians would prefer that a group like the Collective Security Treaty Organization, in which Russia is the clear hegemonic leader and from which China is excluded, act as the main multilateral organization with security responsibilities in Central Asia. Even so, the Russian leadership is pragmatic and realist. It understands that Chinese influence in Central Asia, in the realms of both economics and security, is a natural outgrowth of geography and expanding Chinese power. With this the case, Moscow figures it benefits if Chinese regional engagement is undertaken through an organizational format that includes Russia, and the SCO serves this purpose.

THE SHIFTING GLOBAL BALANCE

There are striking similarities between the maturing ideological foundations that underpin Russia's and China's respective outlooks on the world and on their global roles. The Putin administration promotes an emerging ideology often described by Russians as “sovereign democracy.” The starting point for understanding sovereign democracy is Russia's perception of the 1990s as a contemporary equivalent to the Time of Troubles—the years of turmoil that preceded the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613, when the country was in chaos and foreign powers and organizations exerted considerable authority. According to this narrative, Putin has restored stability and set Russia on the road to recovery, and he has done so not by abandoning democratic values and institutions, but by adapting them to Russian values and traditions.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the foreign policy analogue to sovereign democracy in a January 2007 speech:

The fundamental principles of Russia's foreign policy—pragmatism, multiple vectors, and con-

sistent but nonconfrontational protection of national interests—have gained broad international recognition. . . . Many countries have come to realize that a new, safer, fair, and democratic world order, whose foundations we are laying together, can only be multipolar, based on international law, and regulated by the UN's unique legitimacy and central role.

To be sure, this kind of rhetoric is hardly new. One can easily imagine a variant of it coming from the mouth of Evgeny Primakov when he was foreign minister in the 1990s or Andrei Gromyko when he held the same position for more than a quarter-century under the Soviet government. But Lavrov's rhetoric also has much in common with Chinese ideological formulations.

The rhetorical and operational foundations for Chinese foreign policy have been described, tellingly, as the Beijing Consensus. As described by Joshua Cooper Ramo, the Beijing Consensus is principally a socioeconomic development model that the Chinese have successfully implemented, a model that differs considerably from the so-called Washington Consensus as promoted by the US government and multilateral organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. The Beijing Consensus has significant implications for foreign policy and international relations that resonate with the Kremlin's sovereign democracy.

First, there is not just one correct path to development. A country must experiment to find the path best suited to its culture and traditions, and no other country or organization should seek to impose external models. Most Russians today view the advice of Western advisers and multilateral organizations as having failed and exacerbated Russia's socioeconomic problems. The typical Chinese interpretation of Russian development over the past 15 years suggests that Moscow took the wrong path in the 1990s, but that the Putin administration has learned from the Chinese reform experience and has begun to correct mistakes that devolved too much power away from the state.

The other commonality between Moscow's view of the world and Beijing's concerns the ongoing shift in the global power balance from the unipolar moment of the 1990s to a genuinely multipolar world. Rhetoric supporting such a change is not new, but today there is evidence to support the conclusion that the global balance of power is indeed shifting—and the Russians consider themselves among the emerging powers. For sev-

eral years now the financial and investment community has used the term BRICs to describe four large emerging economic world powers: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Putin himself alluded to the emergence of the BRICs as a powerful stimulus toward the reordering of the world in a speech in Munich in February of this year:

The combined GDP, measured in purchasing power parity, of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. Similarly calculated, the GDP of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap will only increase in the future. There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centers of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.

Political circles in Washington have been slow to come around to an appreciation of Russia's recovery and increased international confidence. The dominant view today is to see it as a malign phenomenon, with a more authoritarian Russia increasingly brandishing its energy "weapon," as Vice President Dick Cheney referred to it last year in Vilnius, Lithuania. But erosion of America's worldwide influence is also part of the equation. On the basis of many discussions in 2006 with Chinese and Russian scholars and analysts, my sense is that there is a reasonably broad consensus in Russian and Chinese policy circles that the United States made a grave mistake by overextending itself in Iraq, and that it has overplayed its hand in Central Asia and elsewhere in efforts to promote democracy.

PUSHED TOGETHER

Despite the perceptions of a shifting balance of power and the evident cooling in US-Russian ties, Russian elites remain at best ambivalent about the emerging Chinese superpower. The official line from Putin and members of his administration tends to accentuate the positive—and it is probably true that China-Russia relations today are better than ever. But the history of China-Russia relations does not set the highest of bars, so to speak.

In the 1990s, Russia engaged in lively debates about China, centering on whether it was a potential friend or foe, and the advisability of selling Beijing arms and technology. These kinds of debates, whether undertaken from ideological or regional perspectives, have largely disappeared. But this does not tell us much, since public debate about even the most important domestic and foreign policy issues has been muted during the Putin years. Moreover, much of the community of China experts established during the Brezhnev years and still active in the 1990s has now retired, died, or gone into business—and there is no sizeable generation of younger experts and scholars in international relations or area studies to replace them.

Russian public opinion about China tends to be quite positive, but this is probably for the most part a reflection of the fact that most Russians get their information from national television. Essentially controlled by the Kremlin, it promotes the sunny outlook on China touted by Putin and company.

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Research conducted by the VTSIOM public opinion research center in July 2005 noted that, although 56 percent of Russians view China as either a strategic partner or ally, 62 percent believe the increasing Chinese economic presence in Russia is negative, and 66 percent see the involvement of Chinese companies and workers in the development of mineral resources in Siberia and the Russian Far East as dangerous for Russia. These results at first appear to signify cognitive dissonance. In reality, they probably reflect Russia's strategic view of China as a partner with whom to contain the United States, combined with a sense of economic and demographic vulnerability experienced in the Russian regions bordering China.

Despite deep-seated wariness toward China on the part of the Russian leadership and people, ties with Beijing have significantly advanced under the leadership of both Yeltsin and Putin. The economic relationship, which has led to trade volume increasing nearly fivefold since Putin became president—to just under \$35 billion in 2006—is likely to continue to grow rapidly as major oil and gas sales finally get on track in the next few years. It is possible the two countries could reach their announced targets for annual trade volume of \$60 billion by 2010 and \$100 billion by 2020.

What will happen in the strategic relationship, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to cooperation in the UN to arms sales, is harder to predict. Such developments will be contingent to a considerable extent on the actions of the United States. If, for example, the United States were to undertake military action against Iran that was not sanctioned by the United Nations, this would undoubtedly push Russia and China closer together strategically. A US-China military conflict over Taiwan would place Russia in an awkward position, but I think Moscow would choose not to take sides. If the Europeans or the Americans removed their boycott on arms sales to China, this would over time undercut Russian companies' dominant position as a supplier. A more aggressive US posture in the name of democracy promotion and human rights, if it confronted Russian interests in the post-Soviet space, would also likely push Russia and China closer together.

Another important driver in the Russian-Chinese strategic relationship will be the development of the Russian oil and gas sector. China, the fastest-growing petroleum consumer in the world, has viewed Russia as an important alternative source of oil—and to a lesser extent gas—for the past decade or so. To date, the Chinese have been mostly frus-

trated by the slow development of the Sino-Russian energy relationship, and they are competitors for Central Asian resources (notably in Turkmenistan, but also Kazakhstan). Yet, aside from money, which Moscow is not short of now, Chinese companies have little to offer the Russians in the development of Russian greenfields. This development will entail some of the largest capital expenditures and greatest technical challenges ever undertaken. Western companies have useful management experience and technical expertise. Therefore, to the extent foreign companies are allowed to participate in the development of the Russian hydrocarbon sector, Western businesses likely will have a significant advantage over Chinese firms. Of course, if Russia's political relations with the West deteriorate further, or the legal and business environment becomes more corrupt, this equation could change.

For historical, cultural, geographic, and economic reasons, Russia's preferred option is to lean West—while also improving ties with China, for intrinsic reasons and to gain leverage with the United States and Europe. Only events of quite a significant magnitude could alter Russia's trajectory, which has been fairly consistent for nearly 15 years after the brief lurch to the West that followed the Soviet Union's collapse. ■

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