

**CENTER FOR  
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**“ZIMBABWE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS”**

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J. STEPHEN MORRISON: We're going to move into the second part of our program here. I'm going to do quick introductions of our four speakers. We're going to try and do this in a more interactive, roundtable style. We've asked our speakers to try to sort of hit on a few – provide the highlights on a few key topics, and then we can have them interact among themselves, as well as soliciting input from yourselves.

Our first speaker is Otto Saki. He's currently studying at Columbia University as a human rights fellow pursuing a degree there. He's a Zimbabwean lawyer and manages a program at the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. He is a recipient of the 2006 Reebok Human Rights Award; a former student leader at the University of Zimbabwe, sits on a number of youth groups boards that have become very important in recent years. Otto, welcome.

He'll be followed by our second youth activist, Sidney Chisi, founder of the Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe, an organization working to capacitate youth activists and build community democracy. He's been very active in a number of other human rights and democracy organizations in Zimbabwe, including the Zimbabwe National Student Union, the Crisis Coalition and the National Constitution Assembly. Prolific in strategic analysts, he is among the bright lights that have emerged in coming to view in this most recent period.

John Makumbe is our third speaker, familiar to many of you. He's a renowned professor of political science and courageous veteran civic activist and outspoken critic of the Mugabe regime. He's founding member of the National Constitutional Assembly and the Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe. He's authored many works and provided commentary through the years. John, thank you so much for being with us.

Our fourth speaker is from the Democracy and Human Rights Bureau at the Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jeff Krilla. Jeff came into that position in 2002, correct? Am I correct? Yes, in –

JEFFREY KRILLA: Six.

MR. MORRISON: – in 2006. And he, for several years, was directing the Africa work at the International Republican Institute. He has lived and taught in South Africa, has worked in several different congressional offices, brings quite a broad span of experience. He holds a degree from Georgetown School of Foreign Service and a law degree from the Georgetown University Law Center.

So welcome to all of you. We're going to start with Otto and move our way in this direction.

OTTO SAKI: Thanks so much, Steve. It's a pleasure to be here and seeing a couple of familiar faces, even those from our embassy, I think are here. On a more serious note, I think the situation in Zimbabwe is quite saddening, it's quite worrisome. For someone who's been practicing as a human rights lawyer, I think the implications are very obvious, and the hazards of the occupation is – (unintelligible) – but it even becomes much more distressful for the ordinary activists, as we have heard from the assistant secretary talking – recalling some of the acts of violence, of brutality, that have been continuously meted on defenseless citizens who are just yearning for a space to air their views and to be appreciated as Zimbabweans.

So it's very of concern to us that, inasmuch as this mediation is being undertaken, there hasn't been a fundamental shift in the policies, in the practices, of the government led by Robert Mugabe – (unintelligible). We've also seen the continued systematic torture, abductions, happening on the ground with the participation of state institutions, which are supposed to be the sanctuaries, or entities that are supposed to provide protection. So to some of us, for individuals who are operating as intelligence operatives or state security agents, being named to be on the sanctions list, I think to them, it's an issue of bringing about individual accountability because institutions at – (unintelligible) – have not been able to provide that. So I think that's very commendable.

We're also concerned on the fact that the law has been continuously used as a tool of persecution rather than prosecution, so we have to continuously distinguish between the two. If you are being arrested, you have been denied or deprived of your rights on the basis of having violated the law, a law which is reminiscent of the colonial era – if you read through the statute books, most of these laws smack of the Rhodesian era. Ian Smith's soul rest in peace, but that's what we have inherited from him; that's the legacy that we have.

So it's very saddening to note that we have tried to distinguish ourselves as being a new government or a new country, as it were, but yet, we've perpetuated the practices that were known to be of the colonial regime, the torture, as it were, the torture chambers. The CIO itself is a creation of these past regimes. So I think we have to take that into context.

Then also the issue of politicization of food, it has continued through and through. And we have now seen with the failed harvest, if we harvest anything at all, in the coming season, chances are we're not going to be able to provide enough, and at least three million people are likely to be in need of food aid. And with the coming elections, we are going to see a scenario where such is going to be politicized, and there are already indicators on the ground that this is happening.

We have recently noticed that the judiciary has been on strike. For some of you who might have been following, magistrates and prosecutors have been on strike. It's almost a month now, and there hasn't been any attempt to resolve that within the government. They've indicated that they don't have money to provide or to top up their

salaries, but yet, to have individuals who are languishing in custody. These are some of the people who have been completely forgotten about.

We have the effects of the forced evictions. Recently, when I was back home in October visiting one of the – called the Hopely Farm, where people resettled, they are still living in squalid conditions, despite the recommendations that were made by the fact-finding mission of Tibaijuka.

So there are so many things that you could start bringing about, which are already a creation of our government. The forced evictions did not have anything to do with the West. If my understanding of what has happened is correct, it was a clear act of brutality by the state going out to destroy people's houses.

Then you can see as well, as you are preparing for the elections, why there's this escalation of violence. In 2000, we had the first election with the participation of the opposition. I think ZANU-PF suffered the greatest dent that they ever had politically, with over 56 seats going to the opposition. They didn't expect that. In 2002, we had the winner then declaring himself the winner with a margin of about 400,000, if my statistics is correct, which was quite marginal in terms of the people who had been turned away, in the terms of the people that had not been able to access the polls, in terms of the people that didn't even attempt the polls because of intimidation and violence. In 2005, we had a similar scenario.

Now, we are preparing for 2008; the conditions have not changed in any way. The human rights violations are continuing, so to then have the confidence in the electoral system as an avenue of providing relief to the so much beaten and battered Zimbabweans, I think it becomes very difficult. These are some of, I think, the cross-cutting things that we are seeing, and I think the human rights concerns, the violations, do continue unabated.

There's no willing whatsoever, or indicator whatsoever, on the ground that they're likely to reform, despite the negotiations or the mediations with some of our – as an individual, I don't have faith in that because if you look at the track record of South Africa for instance, their voting patterns before the UN on human rights issues, has been appalling, to say the least. So to then have confidence in a process which seems to be very much devoid of the fundamentals, you'll be, I think, forgiven for being skeptical. I think – let me end, so at least I can give room to others. Then we can have the discussion. Thanks.

MR. MORRISON: Thanks very much, Otto.

Sidney?

SIDNEY CHISI: Thank you very much, Steve. And thank you to everyone. And maybe to start off with, it would be a good question to say, okay, with all this that has been said, what then becomes the political solution to everything that has been said? Are

Zimbabweans ready to go into an election and vote for the party that they want? And does that party exist at all, given the events that have been happening on the political field within Zimbabwe? Is the MDC or – and there are two formations – the ultimate solution to the political crisis in Zimbabwe, vis-à-vis what Zimbabweans are going through?

But maybe before I even start talking about that, I should also then say, just last week on Friday there was what is called One Million Men March, right. And to take note of that, these were forced marchers who had been forced to embark into our area, but also to forget Zimbabwe is made out of about 12 million people, so where the 11 million? What were they doing? What were they eating? Who was not busing them? What were they thinking?

So in actual effect, you guys, I'd like you to see that within issues of legitimacy, within issues of popularity, ZANU-PF, if it doesn't force people, it has got less than one million supporters. But how then do they make sure that at the end of the day, the figures of election results would amount to almost two million?

So it gives us a point to a question: what then are we supposed to be taking home when you go into elections? And when we say to this, we actually say that the crisis in Zimbabwe is a crisis of government performance which is centered around a varying degree of continuity, rather than change, on the part of the current regime. It is not willing to change.

And any hopes that the ZANU-PF as a political front would reform, so that it becomes people-centered, it's very unfortunate and you will be living in a fantasy land. What they have done over the past 10 years is that they have become what I would call conflict entrepreneurs, people who have benefited out of the current crisis. And most of them are not willing to let go because they know that their track records are in the dark and they have got skeletons which are willing to move the moment that they leave office.

So within that kind of a perspective, we need to start thinking around how then do we make sure that we have got a democratic force and we have got a democratic culture that is enshrined into Zimbabweans, into which Zimbabweans are willing to buy into? And rather, people would start to look at other questions and say, but no, look, Sidney, in 2000, MDC fell; in 2002, MDC fell and in 2005, MDC fell. So the people have spoken in terms of where the MDC stands.

But you have to look around the democratic space into which those political forces are operating to which the civic society is also operating. You have to start thinking about the draconian laws to which Otto has talked about. You also have to think that ZANU-PF is actually a vampire state – a vampire institute. It sucks on the blood of its young ones, and that alone would mean that even the oppositions are also at risk. So you would not expect any other level of success within that kind of an environment, especially if you are dealing with a monster in the form of the current regime.

The other thing that also people have to be looking at is that the opposition in Zimbabwe has managed – if the current opposition has managed to stand the test of time, unlike the previous opposition parties that have been created by ZANU-PF, so as to make sure there is something that is called multi-party democracy. For ZANU-PF, the definition of democracy is holding elections after every five years. Whoever attempts to participate in those elections, that is not the issue.

So we need to make sure that we start burdening the issue of trying to say, how do we start looking at the current opposition forces as people we have managed, at least to pose a certain level of success? This has been instituted by the fact that the opposition politics in Zimbabwe did not start in 1999. It had been an investment that it goes back to 10 years prior to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change, looking at the resistance against economic structure adjustment program, looking at the after-effects of the payoffs to the war veterans of 1997, looking at the food riots that started breaking in as the economic crisis in Zimbabwe started to (ship ?) in. And the people had no solution but to go for something that is opposite to what the current regime believed in.

And that alone, you'd see that it has not been a smooth transition; it has not been a smooth road. It had casualties. People disappeared, people were killed. There was a police car gimmick in the form of a land reform program, which was highly misplaced and disorganized in the form of trying to bring back the soil to the people. And what the people have done with the soil is that they've just looked at the soil and nothing has come out of those fields and the rest of Zimbabwe is starving.

And that kind of a scenario has also made sure that within that kind of changes, what ZANU-PF have also not done was to make sure that – it needs to make sure that whatever transformation that has to take place, there are institutions like what Otto has highlighted, which would never, and which had never been partisan, but post-2000, we have seen that CIO have become partisans, the police have become partisan, the army has become part of the missionary in the persecution of the people of Zimbabwe.

The universities, they have been turned out into small centers of militia into which students have been brutalized, and as we speak right now, the students from the University of Zimbabwe have been removed from the halls of residence so that so they cannot organize themselves. Young women are resorting to living with certain boyfriends and risking their lives in the advent of HIV and AIDS because they don't have anywhere to stay.

So all these things are systematic ways into which people have to start thinking around whether Zimbabwe today, and with the current opposition that is there, and what people might actually term, it has been the failure of the opposition, whether it is really a practical failure or it is actually a systematic way into which ZANU-PF has made it very impossible for anyone who might want to come up with a voice of discourse, so that they will never succeed.

ZANU-PF has managed to make sure that it has put structures and frameworks that goes down to the minute grassroots level, which would be sources of intimidation in forms of traditional leaders, in terms of militia and militia institutes of training, in terms of universities, in terms of women's league and in terms of militarization of the economy with all the parasite of being headed by ex-brigadier something or retired brigadier something or active brigadier something. And that kind of a situation would mean then that at the end of the day, there is no option that we might actually have then. The call is to say, how then do we start building a link to what will be said? How do we make sure that we build a link to which the CSOs, which are the safe haven, will be given the platform into which all the participants and participation becomes possible?

So the ultimate solution to this would make sure that the civic society be given support to which then all the activists would have a platform, an alternative platform. ZANU-PF has gone around and banned newspapers; it jams private radio stations so that people do not have access to any form of information. The statement media has become so partisan, and anything that it chants out will be state propaganda. So there's no alternative in terms of information, and that information has to trickle down, and – (unintelligible) – certain processes like voter education, like whom to vote for.

Zimbabweans, at this particular time, what they demand is change, and what we have seen is that at any other election, people are not voting for individuals. People are voting for the change in form of a political party. They will only later know who they would have voted for after the results, but apparently, they would have voted for anything at least that will give them change. And this is the hope that we come up with; this is the hope that we stay with in Zimbabwe; this is the scenario that every other child who is not yet born has already been mortgaged with ZANU-PF borrowing into the future of those young people.

So for us to underline this, we'll do – (unintelligible) – have to say, Zimbabwe today needs the current democratic forces to be the vehicle to which people will see change. The current leadership today within the opposition forces has not, by any means, been affected by what other people would want to magnify as the split. We are not concerned about that. What we are concerned about is change, and whether that change comes in a split movement for democratic change or in effect, it has not really taken away the spirit for making us see the change that we'd desire. Thank you very much.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. Thank you very much, Sidney.

Professor Makumbe?

JOHN MAKUMBE: Thank you, Steve. Thank you everybody for giving us an audience. I will speak very briefly on the SADC mediation process, which has been going on for some months now, but which has not translated into reality on the ground, at least as far as we know. And we live in Zimbabwe and we live with the dictator and the dictator is loving this mediation process a lot because, as the colleague from South Africa

has said, Thabo Mbeki is also fighting for survival within his own system, and he is not going to make it.

I always say Zimbabwe is very unfortunate to have this crisis (fighting ?) well after Nelson Mandela had left office. If he had been in office, I think we would have achieved something, but Thabo Mbeki is just not – he doesn't have the stuff to resolve this problem.

The mediation process is probably one of Africa's biggest hoaxes; it's a hoax; it's not going to work. There is a lot of skepticism about it. There are people who – the majority of the people in Zimbabwe are not really happy with the process. It's shrouded in secrecy. There are things that are alleged to have been agreed upon between ZANU-PF and MDC.

Most Zimbabweans do not trust ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF will give with the right hand what it will take with the left hand. The things that may have been agreed, they have not materialized on the ground. The repression continues, the human rights violations, as Otto has said, intensify. The media is still very restricted; there is still uncertainty with regards to whether there will be a new constitution before or after the elections.

There is even uncertainty about whether the elections are in March or in June, 2008. We know for certain – and Otto may have to correct me here – that Amendment number 18 to the constitution of Zimbabwe effectively extended Robert Mugabe's tenure by something like two years. In fact, after the passing of Amendment number 18, Robert Mugabe doesn't actually have to call elections in 2008. He can call them in 2010 and that will be legal, that will be within the law, because of Amendment number 18. But he is a proud man. He has always called elections when they are scheduled and he might actually call the elections. He will only call elections when he knows he is going to win.

The mediation process has sought to address elements of what may have been identified as causes of an uneven political playing field and tried to smoothen them, to create an even political playing field. As I said, nothing is translated onto the ground. We see ZANU-PF proceeding with arrangements in accordance with previously existing legislation, such as allowing the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to hire staff and maintaining the commissioners who were in place since 2005, as well as carrying out the limitation of constituencies without really consulting the various political formations within Zimbabwe, as it should be required under a new constitution.

There are rumors of a constitution that may have been agreed upon, which is a hybrid of the NCA draft, the rejected draft of 2000, as well as elements from the constitution that was drawn up by Patrick Chinamasa of ZANU-PF and Welshman Ncube of the previously combined MDC. We haven't seen the hybrid constitution yet, so we can only speculate on what is in it and what is not in it, but the crucial element is, will it come in before or after?

The bottom line is that it is still not a people-driven constitution and there is also apparently an agreement that it will not be subjected to a referendum. And I think after what Mr. Chavez suffered in Venezuela yesterday, Robert Mugabe, the last thing he wants to see is a referendum – (laughter) – and we can understand that very well.

The EU Summit, we didn't agree also with the invitation, but we also needed to look at it from another perspective. We have had eight years, almost nine years, of disengagement between Western democracies and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. The results have been limited, to say the most, but we therefore, think it's time to engage the dictator.

It is really unwise to continue to have a standoff with an enemy. I think there is a time for a standoff, there is a time to reengage. There is a time for a tactical retreat and there is a time for rapprochement, and we believe this time, it is necessary to have Mugabe tackled at every national front, at every level.

The problem we have at the moment is, what is the EU Summit, EU Africa Summit stance on the Zimbabwe problem? Does the United States government have the position, which it has sold to the EU, and asked the EU to place that on the agenda? Is Zimbabwe on the agenda at all?

Sidney and I are going to Portugal from here tomorrow and you need to pray for us. (Laughter.) But we intend to participate in civic action in Portugal by way of seminars, meetings and so forth. The important thing for us is that Robert Mugabe should not be allowed to bully the international community. He should be tackled, and to tackle him and to embarrass him.

With the SADC, there have actually been very serious discussions of the Zimbabwe situation behind closed doors and without the media's presence. And Robert Mugabe has been told by SADC leaders, literally in the past few weeks, you fail on the mediation process, you are on your own. He knows. But we also know that he actually calls their bluff and he says, you cannot instruct me on how to run the country.

So the position at the moment with the EU Summit is that they are very likely to treat the Zimbabwe case very circumspectly. They are going to avoid it. We doubt that Zimbabwe will be discussed at all. I don't think it's on the agenda of that meeting. I don't think the U.S. has made their position and submitted it to the EU, and insisted that they bring it up in their discussions. I doubt that very much. And so we are going to do the civic action and lobbying from the sidelines of the summit.

And finally, on the U.S. position, we feel that the U.S. government is probably making a mistake. We believe – what we seem to see is that the U.S. government is now beginning to see, with all these splits in the MDC, with the level of performance of the MDC since 2000, since its formation, the MDC may not have delivered. It hasn't delivered. It's probably a weak party, it's probably a weak leadership, and the best way to bring back good governance into Zimbabwe is a reformed ZANU-PF.

I believe years ago, that used to be the position of one of my good friends, Johnny Carson, but he has recently repented and he now realizes that ZANU-PF is bad news wherever it is. We would like to urge the U.S. government to forget about a reformed ZANU-PF. It will not exist. I would like to submit that there are no moderates in the ZANU-PF. There is the ZANU-PF way of doing things and that is exactly what Robert Mugabe is following.

And you replace Robert Mugabe with Joyce Mujuru or Emerson Munangagwa, or Simba Makoni, for that matter, they will do it the same way. There will be no meaningful policy changes, and we believe that, given the way Robert Mugabe has ruined Zimbabwe, any idiot in ZANU-PF can only do better, but that's not necessarily good governance.

Therefore, we would rather have somebody who, in fact, is committed to the democratic path to actually come in and run the country. And I want to always end on a positive note. The people in Zimbabwe have come to the full realization that they have the responsibility to set themselves free. Their dictator's policies have done very well to campaign against him, and people are hungry today because of Robert Mugabe's policies and the people now know that. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. MORRISON: Thank you very much, John. I don't know if you saw the New York Times yesterday. There was a very interesting piece on the role of sardonic aphorisms and absurd cultures and political culture, and the art of the sardonic aphorisms over the ages. There's actually a society of aphoristic sardonic individuals that meets regularly and we should introduce you. (Laughter.) You've had some rather well crafted aphorisms there.

Jeff?

MR. KRILLA: I wish I had more college professors like John Makumbe. (Laughter.) I probably would have gone to more classes. I'm pleased to be here today to help draw attention to this important issue in the ongoing human rights situation in Zimbabwe. In my past life as an NGO staffer, I've worked with a lot of people in this room here and I'm glad to see so many familiar and friendly faces here for such an important event. Thank you, Steve, for CSIS sponsoring this.

One of the great things about this forum is that the opportunity it brings for all of us who care about Zimbabwe, whether we be NGO leaders, government officials or the media, for us to come together and hear firsthand from courageous human rights activists about the reality on the ground. Certainly Otto, Sidney and John can give us a perspective that is very refreshing here in Washington.

It's very much a real-life tale of what's going on the ground and very helpful to policy makers here, as we look to try and make decisions to try and improve the human rights situation on the ground, to try and help restore civil and political rights to their

fellow citizens in Zimbabwe, and I'm very honored to be on the panel with these gentlemen today.

As Assistant Secretary Frazer said, the United States government remains seriously concerned about the daily tragedy in Zimbabwe, and certainly, the Zimbabweans who live amongst the political and economic turmoil of the Mugabe regime – we're very concerned about that in the U.S. government. We're also very concerned about the impact in the region and on the continent at large.

At the bureau of the State Department that – as the bureau of the State Department responsible for covering human rights, democracy issues, we're very closely monitoring events on the ground, and we're continuing to do what we can to both support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle and to push the international community to remain focused on the issue until there is a solution.

Against the backdrop of economic and humanitarian crises, including food shortages, endemic HIV/AIDS infection rates, vast unemployment and a life expectancy that's now fallen to 35 years, the government of Zimbabwe has intensified its crackdown on democracy and human rights. As we all know, the events of March 11<sup>th</sup> set off a maelstrom of international and domestic protests, but those events, though egregious and high profile, were neither the beginning nor the end of the story of the Mugabe regime's actions against its own people.

The Mugabe government's campaign of harassment against its democratic opponents has intensified, even as the Southern Africa Development Community works to try to resolve Zimbabwe's political and economic problems, and this is simply unacceptable.

My bureau publishes the department's annual human rights reports, so we're constantly working along with our regional bureaus and our embassies to track events and trends. Our work is based in part on reporting by international and local NGOs, whose brave and crucial efforts to document abuses and assist victims, continue regardless of any danger.

And so we can say with considerable confidence, as Assistant Secretary Frazer already noted, but which certainly bears repeating, 2007 has indeed been the worst year yet for defenders of human rights and ordinary citizens alike in Zimbabwe.

The State Department has put together both a fact sheet on the increase in political violence in Zimbabwe this year, as well as a snapshot of this year's events right up through November. These documents have been released today and are available, I think, in the back of the room, and I would urge all of you to take a copy of those documents.

We think the facts speak for themselves. Things are not getting better. They are getting worse. Zimbabweans from all walks of life have become targets for the Mugabe regime security forces and youth militias. They've been attacked throughout the country

in rural and urban areas, in public places like shopping center and university campuses, even in private homes. Fear tactics include arbitrary arrest, detention, abduction and assault.

I want to reiterate here just how staggering the numbers are. Independent organizations operating in Zimbabwe report a substantial increase in state-sponsored violence and intimidation. They're reported over 6,000 violations of human rights in 2007, with over 500 occurrences each month. Fourteen hundred attacks have been carried out against students. There are 90 reports of politically-motivated disappearances and more than 1,200 cases of arrest and detention. Government interferences with humanitarian activities, partisan distribution of food and refusal of medical treatment to victims of politically-motivated violence continues, as do broad restrictions on freedoms of speech, peaceful assembly and association.

So amid all this tragedy, is there a solution? We hope so. The United States continues to strongly support South African president's Mbeki's facilitation effort under the SADC initiative to establish conditions for free, fair and peaceful elections with, we hope, international monitors present. We certainly welcome such an agreement and are keen to see one when it materializes.

We also believe it will be critical that any agreement be fully implemented on the ground. This means, in part, that all parties must take immediate steps to respect internationally recognized human rights standards, such as those put forth in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, to which Zimbabwe is a signatory, in order to create the opportunity for political participation for all Zimbabweans.

The United States continues to support the efforts of Zimbabwe's democratic activists and civil society organizations to restore democracy and restore respect for human rights in Zimbabwe.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

MR. MORRISON: Thank you very much. I think we'll go about this last half hour here much as we did before. We'll bundle together several succinct comments and questions. One question I wanted to put forward – it follows on Michelle's (sp) opening question – which has to do with preparing for recovery, sort of a post-Mugabe recovery. And particularly from the Zimbabwean presenters, how do they see that process today? What is necessary, both among Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe, but there's also a very important contingent of talent outside of Zimbabwe, an enormous store of talent, who have every intention and hope of returning, and much to contribute in thinking and planning with respect to the future recovery?

There's many different sectors that can be analyzed and their contribution in leading the way, it seems to me, will be very integral as we look forward. Now, I'd like to – if you could hold for that for a moment and if we can solicit – yes, Scott, and then this gentleman right here.

Q: Thank you very much for the presentations. They were very interesting, but disturbing. Scott Taylor from Georgetown University. Professor Makumbe talked about the necessity for change, rather than simply reform, and Otto mentioned the penetration by the military of the parastatal organizations. I was wondering if we can elaborate on both of those themes in terms of the role of the military, which really didn't get much mention in the presentations, and the implications for change of the military's penetration, not merely of the economic realm, but of politics and state institutions as well, and what that means for change going forward.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. There's a microphone right behind you, sir.

Q: Thank you.

MR. MORRISON: Please, identify yourself.

Q: This is Bahati Jacques with Africa Faith and Justice Network. My question is, do you fear any war coming into your country, given the fact that many African nations now are at war? Thank you.

MR. MORRISON: Okay, let's take one more comment, right here.

Q: Hi, Carla Winston, U.S. Institute of Peace. Sidney, you mentioned conflict entrepreneurs that benefit from the current situation and really, really don't want to give up power. These are also the people that control the means of violence and the means to interfere with free and fair elections. How do we – what carrots and sticks are there available to safely sideline these people, get them out of the process, to have free and fair elections? And how does that impact our options for accountability in the future?

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. So we've got a question around how to plan for the future and draw from Zimbabwean contributions and talent on this, the military that Scott talked about. Are we headed to war? And the final question with regard to conflict entrepreneurs. Otto, you want to kick it off?

MR. SAKI: Well, I think indeed, we have so much talent in the Diaspora. One of the things that I even noticed was that we have the highest numbers of journalists in exile, over 90, and that's so much potential. That's so much talent that we're putting to waste, but though they're doing so much critique from abroad, but we'd really benefit from having them at home.

Then, on another slightly different note, is the fact that the current establishment has not fully realized the potential of the Diaspora community. They've used them and so far, they've made incentives for what they call Homelink, where they encourage them to send the money that they earn back to Zimbabwe through the Reserve Bank.

But they've not been willing to give them the vote. The constitutional amendment recently passed and with the agreement of the opposition, and there was no discussions about that. Yet, this is a critical mass, there's a critical sector. So already, there are no incentives for them to be deemed to be part and parcel of the remaking of the new Zimbabwe.

So for me, I think, inasmuch as we'd want to incorporate them in the future, but there should have been – practical, critical steps should have already been taken way back, so at least the few part and parcel of the processes of reforming the Zimbabwe, of making the Zimbabwe that we all want. So it's – I think it's an area that has not really been looked at.

Within Zimbabwe itself, there are many individuals who are very capable, who are looking forward to reforming of the institutions. Myself, I'm here up until May and I'm going back. I'm not staying here. I'm going back to Zimbabwe because I feel that I really have a role to play. The little that – (unintelligible) – gained from expertise here will really contribute to the reforming possibly participation in the judiciary, and even in the attorney general's office, because I'm looking at prosecuting one or two individuals but – (laughter) – honestly, it's an issue of accountability. We have inherited institutions that have this legacy of impunity, and that has to come to an end. And that's how some of us look forward to contributing to that.

Militarization of state institutions, Sidney will tackle that. War in Zimbabwe, who will be fighting whom, I really don't know. I think we've so much – the work that we're doing right now is to actually avoid such a scenario. And most of the times that I get such an opportunity, I always tell that I'm doing ZANU-PF a favor because people of my generation, of our age group, most of the time, they tell us that we're wasting our time by engaging in these discussions because they have not brought anything. So in the reverse, I see myself actually doing ZANU-PF a favor by saying, the young people should advocate for peaceful transition mechanisms than resorting to the barrel of a gun because it has not given any meaningful results anyway.

So it's very important for us, I think, on the aspect of accountability that, right now, what you're doing, the documentation, the numbers, the statistics, the individuals who are participating in all the state violations, we should be able to trace them one of these days and bring them to account, which is also saddening from my perspective is the discussions are going.

We've already had signals of amnesty from the political parties. Maybe it's a political gimmick that they would want to use to incise exit of the current establishment, but for some of us, we want complete accountability. We want to start only clean, fresh pledge for the Zimbabwe that we want.

MR. CHISI (?): On the issue of the militarization of the parastatals, apparently, it's a political strategy because, one, we are looking at a failed state, but we are also looking at a shrinking economy, to which the government do not – does not have solution

around. Of course, they can rig elections by their effort to rig the economy. And with that alone, it means then that the only way of making sure that there is not despondence within or among the people is to make sure that they put violent figures behind such kind of institutions because you are always reminded of the past.

So when the ZANU-PF regime fails, it's – either it becomes historical or it becomes hysterical. They tell you about what they have done in the past or they're shouted to as puppets of the West.

So those two options are the only ones that they have and they have managed to make sure they control the parastatals using the historical option of saying, "We went to war, so as to be able to control these resources and institutions." And one of them is that these people who are ex-brigadiers – (unintelligible) – they have got very minimum education, and they don't have the time to think and become very objective.

So it's either you're fired or you're meant to disappear, whatever it could be. They are pillars of support which infuse fear and intimidation into people who are supposed to operating very – (unintelligible) – and become very rational. All the decisions which are made in Zimbabwe today are not made at a level of being impartial or objective. They are made from a political standpoint. Is it going to benefit ZANU-PF or it's not going to benefit ZANU-PF? So that is the reason why we have got that kind of systematic militarization of the parastatals.

Then on the issue of conflict entrepreneurs, since 1980, when the ZANU-PF regime got into power, that was the point to which these people started really amassing a lot of – at the expense of the people. With the British giving the government some money for rehabilitation of the war veterans, that money went to very few people until the bigger chunk of the war veterans started demanding for their own share, to which then the economy of Zimbabwe collapsed around.

But also you find in that, most of the people who are in ZANU-PF today are not there because they have got very good political credentials, but is because they have got money. And ZANU-PF would need some form of oxygen tanks in forms of their cash, so as to sustain itself. And because it doesn't mind how they make that money clandestinely – (unintelligible) – what they need is to find something that will always sustain its own operations. And hence, these people can go out of their own way in terms of doing anything that is criminal so as to get that money.

However, they gain the political power, but they also gained the political power. And as that process goes on, you find that ZANU-PF becomes an elitist regime. It becomes a Swiss bank socialist movement, that kind of reform. And you cannot really address yourself out of that kind of scenario.

But what is needed is that the issue of accountability only comes into a place into which we have got a weak accord, which is a weaker executive and a clear separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislator. If we have a weak accord

to which everything is not centered around in individual, then it would mean then that there is a level of accountability at every other stage. And that has not happened in Zimbabwe.

In Zimbabwe, everything is centered around Robert Mugabe and he makes decisions; he appoints commissioners; he appoints the judiciary. Whatever he would need is the core, right, of all these, and that is the reason, at the end of the day, he might have to leave other people in there because they make sure that they sustain the regime. They can actually sustain the violence.

But at the end of the day, those people have to be paid. They get the diamond mines. They get the tender to go to China, mine in DRC Congo, come up with certain measures with South Africans, and all these would make sure that ZANU-PF, as an institution, is supported by the people who are on behalf – who are actually brutalizing the same citizenship which is suffering today.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. John?

MR. MAKUMBE: Very quickly, a controversial statement. One of the problems with Zimbabwe is that the Zimbabweans in the Diaspora are sustaining the regime. (Laughs.) They'll kill me. (Laughter.) I'm going to Portugal tonight. (Laughter.) But seriously, if the people in the Diaspora would not send money back to Zimbabwe for six weeks, the Mugabe regime would collapse.

But how do you stop them sending money, Western Union and DHL, FedEx, actual greenback, the U.S. dollar? The regime made a mistake one time and they said, you cannot send money to Zimbabwe and give it out in foreign currency. It is to be given out in Zimbabwe dollars. And people literally just started sending money through the back door. And so the regime was starved of foreign currency.

So they said, "Oh, no, Western Union and all these other MTAs, monetary transfer agencies, can give out money in actual foreign currency, natural cash," because when that happened, they also go on the black market and buy the money. And so they do that today.

So you have the problem of people in the Diaspora, who have relatives and family back in Zimbabwe. How do you convince them not to send money for six weeks? The – a study which has been done recently indicates that more than 50 percent of the households in Zimbabwe are actually alive today because of people in the Diaspora sustaining them, supporting them, and so forth.

And so the post-Mugabe strategy must actually say what resources, human, skills, and so forth are outside the country? How do we harness them for a post-Mugabe development strategy? Studies also show that 60 percent of the people who leave the country because of conflict do not come back even after the conflict, except as tourists. That is very serious because the number of people who have left Zimbabwe, who are in

the Southern African region and in Europe and North America, is very huge. We estimate around five million.

And to lose skilled people to the tune of five million is a very serious matter. And unfortunately, neither the MDC, nor ZANU-PF, nor civil society, are actually planning on that. What do we do? How do we turn around the economy very quickly, very effectively, in the shortest possible time after Mugabe's departure?

The role of the military is not going to be a serious problem because the military actually have very limited skills, and after the change of – after regime change, as I prefer to say – after regime change, the military will be placed in their respective positions and they will be happy to abide, particularly if they have farms and businesses.

One of the things Mugabe has done a good job on is the reduction of prices because this – that policy has been pervasive. It has hit both the stores and the businesses of Mugabe's enemies and his friends as well. And so a lot of his friends are very unhappy with him. And so in the post-Mugabe era, it will not be difficult to have even someone in the military saying, good riddance to Mugabe.

And finally, civil war in Zimbabwe, very unlikely. One of the things Mugabe has done effectively is to demonstrate that he is a violent man, and anybody advocating violence is walking into Mugabe's threat, and opposition parties know that. Civil society know that and I think the regime knows that. Zimbabwe is the only country in Southern Africa which has sustained an eight-year military campaign in another country, Mozambique, and another four-year military campaign in the DRC. Even South Africa has not done that. And so the violent way is the losing way, and so there will not be a civil war in Zimbabwe.

We always love – as Zimbabweans, we say they are so afraid of Robert Mugabe because of his violence; they would rather face crocodiles in the Limpopo, running away from Robert Mugabe. Thank you.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. Jeff, do you want to offer some thoughts or should we go back, or would you prefer that we go back? Why don't we start over on this side, Mark and Lauren? Then we'll move this direction.

Q: Mark Bellamy, CSIS. I wanted to ask our Zimbabwean guests how you, as activists and as democrats, experience – well, I don't want to say the abandonment by your neighbors and by other Africans, the relative paucity of support that you have received from within Africa?

And a related question to that, should we, in the United States, rather than stressing common approaches with South Africa – and I'm not sure there is that much communality in our approaches to Zimbabwe – should we be pressing South Africa to become more a part of the solution and less part of the problem in Zimbabwe?

Q: Lauren Pluck (ph) with the Congressional Research Service. Dr. Makumbe, you mentioned that you were concerned that the United States was turning its back on the MDC and looking towards more moderate elements in ZANU-PF. I was wondering if you or your colleagues could give us your analysis of the two factions of the MDC right now, and what way forward you see for them, if you see them having any hopes of reconciling? And in the possibly very unlikely chance of a free and fair election in March, if you see them being able to come together for that election to challenge ZANU-PF together?

Q: (Off mike.) Thanks. My question is, I wondered whether any of you would comment on the prospect – possibility of a junior officers' coup.

Q: I've read on one of – it's Regina from University of Maryland – I've read in one of the papers – yes, I am – (laughs) – I've read in one of the online papers that there's going to be some talks on a third way in Zimbabwe because ZANU-PF has failed, MDC has failed and there's going to be a third way. And I'm thinking we're already in December and we have elections in March. Do you think that's going to be possible?

Q: (Off mike.) Thank you. This is for Dr. Makumbe. Bob Wells, I was a former advisor for Vice President Cheney on Africa affairs, and we care very much about Zimbabwe from the last three years. But I don't much remember the 1970s, sir, and you mentioned that the people have realized that the policies of Robert Mugabe have reached a certain point.

And I'd like to know if there are any particular artists in American or British – song artists – that have a particular relationship with the youth of Zimbabwe, recalling Stevie Wonder's "Hotter Than July," which mentioned Zimbabwe for American youth, as well as recalling the concern for Bangladesh with George Harrison, and also Sting with the situation with human rights with Argentina. And I just – it seems like it's time again, recalling the 1970s. Thank you.

MR. MAKUMBE: Yes, the paucity of support from Africa is almost like a surprise to Zimbabweans. Zimbabweans cannot understand why do the other African countries not support them, except that there's a very clear understanding that a liberation leader in Africa is a sacred cow, and you don't want to mess with them. It took a long time for Zambia to get rid of Kenneth Kaunda, and so forth.

And there is a sort of league among the original leaders in Africa to stay on and to support each other, but at the moment, if you really – I have just come from Mali and I was in Mali. I was in Bamako and I even drove out of Bamako for a while. And I looked at Mali. It is actually built as one of Africa's shining examples of democracy, and I saw what I can only call abject poverty. And I look at the situation in Zimbabwe and I said, "We Zimbabweans are spoiled brats." There is absolutely nothing wrong with Mugabe. He is okay compared to what I had seen in Mali.

In other words, Zimbabweans are really saying the governance is bad, but Zimbabwe is still miles ahead of many African countries. Why I say that is in order to say there are still comfort zones, which Zimbabweans are still treasuring. She looks at me like I am crazy. (Laughter.) There are no eggs, no beef, and so forth, but there are comfort zones which there are little pockets which Zimbabweans hold dearly, which they know they will lose if they go the violent way, or if they insist on the big push from other African countries.

And so I think there's an understanding that really, other African countries are not going to shed tears about Zimbabwe because even now, Zimbabwe is far much more comfortable than themselves. That is really the general feeling. In my view as a political scientist, I think Africans have a real – African leaders have a real agreement, a gentlemen's agreement, "Don't push me because I may be the dictator today. Tomorrow it may be you."

Should U.S. pressure South Africa on them? Yes, all the time, every time, but as said– (unintelligible) – has his own problem. I think U.S. should start working with Zuma now and – (laughs) – get him ready to – Zuma will do the job of Mugabe within hours. (Laughter.) And then he'll take a shower. (Laughter.) Were they to help or not is not important – (laughter).

The factions within MDC and (NDA ?) is my very frank talk. I am not a member of MDC. I'm not – I don't hold a brief for any of the two factions, but in politics, you must always say who has the people. And at the moment, Morgan Tsvangirai has the people. Arthur Mutambara does not have the people. That's the bottom line.

One, secondly, it is very unlikely that the two will reunite before the elections, but it is very likely that they will agree on one presidential candidate. And that is the important thing, because in doing that, they will therefore, reduce the splitting of the vote, at least on the issue of the president.

In terms of the other constituencies, I think they will say, may the best woman, may the best man, win. And in that process, I think the Arthur Mutambara faction will be wiped out. I'm sorry, but that is what we seem to see. I think if there is not very serious change to the electoral law – (unintelligible) – will lose again to ZANU-PF in 2008. And the situation, the problems for Zimbabwe, will only intensify.

Junior officers coup, no, not likely. You must not – you must always understand the army in Zimbabwe is depleted, very severely depleted. A lot of the middle level have recently been promoted and so now, they qualify for the Toyota (Prado ?), the other handouts and so forth, and so they will not really talk. The ones who have gone into parastatals are not expected to perform. They are supposed to demonstrate a point: if you're a good boy, you will get a job after your uniform. And that is what is happening. A junior officers' coup not likely because a lot of the junior officers are deserting the army. They are going into South Africa. South Africa is working very hard, preparing for 2010 and the fastest growing industry in South Africa is called security services.

Third way, in Zimbabwe, very likely, but it is also very likely to be smashed. There are elements from within ZANU-PF working with elements within the MDC. It's largely elitist; the third way is largely elitist. In the nature of politics in Zimbabwe, they will just be like a third party to ZANU-PF and MDC. And the space, the political space, does not allow for a third horse in Zimbabwe at the moment.

And finally, I will let him comment on the artists, but we do have fantastic artists whose music has been banned. We have fantastic artists who have written plays and the police are attending theater more than they are on the streets arresting, because they are writing notes on these plays and stopping them right in mid-performance right now. And there's a lot of energy being directed into artistic works, in song, in plays, in drama, in the theater. And a lot of that, I'm hoping, will stay alive as the turnaround comes through eventually, and we will put them on film. There are lots of videos on Zimbabwe. Some of them are secretly made within our offices, within our houses, and there is a lot of talent. Thank you.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. We're getting towards the end here. What I'd like to do is ask Sidney, Otto, and Jeff to offer some closing comments on the questions that are on the table. Sidney?

MR. CHISI: What I would want to say is that if there is any way that there is going to be a third force regime before you go out, it's not going to be effective before the 2008 elections, not at all, right? What could actually bring out the third force would be in a position to which people would be disgruntled of the outcome of the elections, and there could be any – they cannot take another tenure of Robert Mugabe.

There could be an uprising into which a new leadership would be born out of the current democratic forces, and that leadership could also maybe include some disgruntled members of the ZANU-PF who might not be happy with what is going to come out from the ZANU-PF congress of the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 15<sup>th</sup> of December 2007, but not for the next year election. There is no space. There's no time at all for that kind of a process.

On the issues of the MDC formations, I know in 2005, there was one which was called pro-senate and anti-senate, but after Amendment number 18, I'm no longer sure of the where they are now, going into senate elections, all of them. (Laughter.) So there are points of convergence within the two formations, maybe as a result of the mediation process, but like he has said, there's not room for unit.

But what could also be – what is likely going to happen is that the Welshman – I don't want to call it the Muthambara faction, because he doesn't have any say in this – but the Welshman faction, right, and ZANU-PF have found a common enemy in the Morgan Tsvangirai faction.

And to a certain extent, ZANU-PF is willing to rig on behalf of the Welshman faction, so as to bring in a few MPs that can be coerced into forming a government of

national unity and do away with sanctions, because then if today, they are targeting sanctions against ZANU-PF members who are in the government, tomorrow, the U.S. government cannot start saying, whoever is in the Zimbabwean government is going to go on a targeted sanction.

So they might be forced to remove the sanctions against everyone, and then the ZANU-PF crocodiles will start to show their heads again. So there is an issue into which ZANU-PF is willing at least to accept one or two people from the Welshman movement faction and really take that standard stage to make sure that Morgan Tsvangirai's political history ends in 2008 after those elections.

I really think that the solution to the Zimbabwean crisis can never be brought out at a platform to which everyone comes, like Saudi heads of states, like maybe even the EU Africa summit. The moment that those heads of states come together, they protect each other. So I think there has to be like an out door, like a one-on-one kind of intervention and advocacy, targeting certain leaders and talking to them one-on-one and influencing in that direction.

The moment that those guys come together, there is this pseudo-Pan-Africanism brotherhood, or big brother Africa kind of a scenario, to which they would not want to set a wrong precedent like what Dr. – Professor Makumbe has just said. So I think on that front, there can be pressure put onto Africa, but it can never be done at an open platform. And we still have got hope as Zimbabweans as we go back.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you, Otto, last words.

MR. SAKI: Well, briefly, I still have a little bit of hope in the way that civil society has been doing around African Union, the SADC initiative, because inasmuch as I'm also a bit skeptical, this is the first time that we have had the SADC block, I think, taking a firm stand on Zimbabwe. This is the first time that we even had the – (unintelligible) – of the African Union – (unintelligible) – and Kufuor from Ghana, speaking all clearly on what is happening in Zimbabwe.

And the fact that you have 18 men from SADC sitting – calling an agent meeting on Zimbabwe to say, look – (unintelligible) – what's happening in Zimbabwe is not okay. I think it's an indicator of the progress that has been made, inasmuch as we are very skeptical of the outcomes. So we shouldn't, I think, entirely lose focus in the – traction that we have gained, even on the best of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. They had not been willing to hear a communication or a case on Zimbabwe.

Right now, there are 18 cases on Zimbabwe before the commission, and they are being forced to really have a say in what is happening. Then inasmuch as I don't even have a brief for the MDC – I don't think I would want to have their brief anyway. It's a bit unfair, in my view, to judge them as having failed as a political party because they have not been given the opportunity to really show what they have.

So the formation of the third way is fair and fine. We're trying to emulate a democracy where you appreciate divergent views, but inasmuch as we have not been able to kind of give this current crop of leadership within the opposition the opportunity to display what they have, and to provide solutions, it might be, I think, a bit premature to support an idea of a third way. That's my views.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you. Jeff, you have the very last word, and then we're going to adjourn.

MR. KRILLA: Okay, just very briefly, Steve, I think just two main points. One, the sanctions Jendayi announced today are a very important mechanism. I think we put a lot of hope into them going after the guys that are causing this crisis. But there are other pressure points and certainly, if we don't see progress, if we don't see these SADC-brokered negotiations moving in the right direction, leveling the playing field, being acceptable to all Zimbabweans, creating democratic opportunities, there are other pressure points that we will use.

And then secondly, this culture of fear that's been created over the last eight years has got to end. We're very serious about that. There simply – you cannot have free and fair elections if people are afraid that by backing the opposition, they're going to get their heads bashed in. You just – it just simply does not work.

In 2007, while there's been SADC negotiations, violence has escalated. That's a problem. We've documented it. I think it's important for people to recognize that. This is one reason why we are linking whatever possible political agreement through these negotiations to the human rights conditions on the ground. So thanks again, Steve, and thank you to our Zimbabwean friends.

MR. MORRISON: Great. On behalf of everyone here, I want to thank our speakers. (Applause.)

(END)