

Blurring of mandates in Somalia

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Somalia is normally described by pundits as a “failed state” or “anarchic”, because the country has been without a central government since January 1991.¹ At the close of 2004, Somalia could lay claim to the title of the most protracted example of state collapse since the end of the Cold War, if not in the post-colonial period (even taking into account the new Transitional Federal Government, which at the time of writing had yet to relocate from Kenya into Somalia). The mere mention of Somalia invokes images of warlords and child soldiers pillaging this East African version of the “Wild West”. The country has allegedly been colonized by Osama bin Laden’s henchmen, who are supposedly turning vast swathes of Somalia into a new Afghanistan, complete with training camps. In humanitarian and development terms, official indicators place Somalia at the bottom of all development indices – that is, life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrolment, infant mortality, per capita income, malnutrition, and a host of others.² Although these perceptions may contain some partial truths, the reality is far more complex.

Indeed, Somalia today is a country of sharp contrasts. On the one hand, there is an extremely dynamic image few outsiders appreciate. In many parts of Somalia, electricity lights up the streets at night (a service sadly lacking in most of neighbouring Kenya), and the mobile telephone network in Somalia is the cheapest in East Africa and possibly the second cheapest in all of Africa. Somalis from the diaspora remit funds into Somalia at a lower cost and faster rate than most other money transfer services worldwide – both formal and informal. Fatuma’s US\$250 sent from

Minneapolis on Tuesday evening will arrive at the door of her mother's house in Galkaayo early morning on Wednesday, 12 hours later, and the transfer fee will be lower than that charged by Western Union or Citibank. Mogadishu has a number of schools providing elementary, secondary and even tertiary education, as well as television stations, hospitals and medical clinics. Hargeisa has car insurance, internet cafés, hotels and restaurants, and several Somali airlines operate scheduled services throughout the country. All are private, Somali-run businesses.

In some regions, such as in Somaliland in the north-west or Puntland in the north-east, local and regional administrations function with traditional and religious authorities acting as legislative and constitutional assemblies that legitimize their authority. In many respects, therefore, it could be argued that Somalia without a central government may be better off and more accountable than many so-called "intact" states, and certainly more so than a centralized, non-representative Somali government. As for terrorism, there is little evidence that Somalia has been used as a breeding ground, but it has been used by a limited number of terrorists seeking sanctuary after attacks elsewhere and for transshipment activity.³ In other words, the picture is far from straightforward.

There is also a static and more depressing Somalia, one in which large pockets of the population live in extreme poverty. The United Nations estimates that far too many Somalis suffer from grave human rights violations, chronic drought, food insecurity and sporadic violence, all of which inhibits development and prevents international aid workers from accessing many parts of the country. According to the United Nations, 750,000 Somalis are "chronically vulnerable",⁴ out of an estimated population of 7 million (or 7.5 million or 8 million or 9.6 million, depending on the source⁵). It is in fact these unreliable figures that are themselves part of the problem.

Since the state collapsed, statistics have been difficult to accrue given the insecurities on the ground and the lack of regular and reliable data collection, and because up to half of the population is nomadic. In fact, owing to this problem, Somalia has not been included in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) global Human Development Index since 1997, even though, in recent years, data collection in some sectors has improved.⁶ Thus rankings for Somalia are mostly estimates.⁷

Different organizations – both Somali and international – gather data in different ways, with no agreed methodology or reliable means for accumulating information over time. Not only do population estimates vary considerably, but so too do figures for the Somali diaspora, as well as for how much money is remitted into the country annually. Estimates of the size of remittances going into Somalia on an annual basis range from

US\$500 million to US\$1 billion. How can appropriate needs assessments be made when family coping mechanisms are so poorly understood?

Even given the lack of reliable statistical information, one assumption I make, which underpins this chapter, is that Somalia has not fallen into the abyss since the state collapsed, primarily because of the efforts of Somalis themselves – both in the diaspora and in Somalia. The tight Somali social networks, based on close ties of clan and kinship, have been critical to the survival of Somalis and Somalia. But again, this is really only an informed opinion, since the data to back this claim are also unreliable.

This is to argue not that the efforts of the international community have been wasted or well-meaning, but rather that the international community has yet to develop a consistent response to overcome the complexities caused by the protracted collapse of central authority. It may in fact be this inconsistent international behaviour that forced Somalis to rely on their own social networks, even more than they had in the past. Thus the discussion of humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia, as conducted by the international community since 1991, needs to be considered in juxtaposition to this fairly fluid, often opaque picture.

In fact, circumstances in Somalia since 1991 have forced a fundamental rethink of several basic concepts of humanitarianism – particularly the core issues of neutrality and impartiality. The lack of effective governance in Somalia has meant that *all* international actors in Somalia – whether humanitarian, development, political or even military – inevitably act as diplomats and inevitably become embroiled in politics, even when this falls outside their individual mandates. There has been a blurring of the lines in Somalia. This chapter will therefore not focus exclusively on humanitarian action; rather, it will also discuss the political process, development modalities and, during the intervention, the involvement of the military.

I consider “humanitarian diplomacy” in Somalia throughout the period of state collapse, that is, from 1991 to 2004. This time frame in turn will be divided into two distinct periods, to reflect the country’s lurch from one extreme to another. The first period covers 1991–1995, when Somalia was in the international media spotlight because of state disintegration, famine and the consequent UN peace support operations. The second period covers Somalia from mid-1995 to 2004, after the soldiers and journalists had moved on to the next crisis, when Somalia became yet another forgotten emergency. In the first period, international assistance reached nearly US\$1 billion per year at its peak, whereas in the second the average was US\$50 million per year.⁸ Yet neither the highs nor the lows were sufficient to help Somalis overcome the centripetal forces that caused the state to implode.

I analyse humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia in five sections: the first

provides a historical outline of the crisis, the second examines operational issues, the third focuses on obstacles encountered throughout, the fourth discusses the negotiations that attempted to bypass or overcome the obstacles, and the chapter concludes with an examination of the wider implications of the crisis. In each of the five sections, the issues will be considered over the two time periods noted above.

Context

The antecedents of the conflict can be traced back to 1960, when the United Kingdom and Italy departed from their colonial outposts: the United Kingdom from the north-west (the British Somaliland Protectorate) and Italy from the southern trusteeship territory. The two parts joined to form the Somali Republic. Although the new country established a multi-party democracy, this disintegrated fairly soon owing to immense political and social fragmentation and administrative and financial mismanagement. Just nine years after independence, General Mohamed Siad Barre took over the Somali Republic in a military coup.

Siad Barre was to rule this country for over 20 years through shrewd manipulation of clan politics and rivalries, military coercion and the exploitation of state resources and foreign assistance. Formally, he proclaimed that the clan structure that permeated Somalia would no longer dominate. In reality, however, for all important public posts he favoured the Darod clan-family (of six major clan-families), especially his own Marehan clan, his mother's clan (Ogaden), and the clan of his son-in-law (Dulbahante).⁹

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported Somalia and, from 1974, Ethiopia as well. The war between Somalia and Ethiopia (1977–1978) forced the Soviet Union to choose between its two allies, and it chose Ethiopia. This exchange, coupled with Somalia's defeat in that war, thereafter placed Somalia under the patronage of the United States, and the country then became dependent on Western foreign aid and remittances from Somalis in the Gulf to sustain its economy. Peace with Ethiopia was not formalized until 1988, but by then the Somali economy had all but collapsed as a result of widespread corruption, erratic economic policies, a financially draining civil war that pitted the government in Mogadishu against the majority clan (Isaq) in north-west Somalia, and the massive influx of ethnic Somali refugees from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. A nationwide civil war ensued.

In January 1991, after various rebel groups had parcelled up most of Somalia, President Siad Barre finally fled Mogadishu. Four months later, the north-west region of Somalia declared its independence from the

rump state as the “Somaliland Republic” (it has yet to be recognized by a single member of the United Nations). The civil war had caused immense devastation, with enormous numbers of refugees (at least 500,000 going to neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti), internally displaced persons (IDPs – another 500,000) and civilian deaths, most of which were famine related (estimated at 350,000). The grain-growing region between the Shebelle and Juba rivers in the south was particularly ravaged, and famine thus spread rapidly throughout the country.

By the early 1990s, foreign food aid could no longer get through to affected Somalis. Instead, warlords plundered relief supplies to feed their militias and exchange the aid for more weapons. The humanitarian relief agencies remaining in Somalia were forced to hire thug Somalis to protect them and their work (usually from the self-proclaimed protectors). Relief workers watched helplessly while most of their food aid filtered through this corrupt system, in the vain hope that some of it would trickle down. The aid only enhanced the role and strength of the militias, and the population at large continued to starve.

The UN Security Council, indecisive and hesitant in its response to the looming disaster, passed Resolution 733 on 23 January 1992, which called for a total arms embargo and the establishment of an immediate cease-fire. By February, the parties to the conflict agreed to the cease-fire, mediated through the coordinated efforts of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Yet the situation on the ground remained conflictual.

International intervention soon crystallized as the number of refugees, IDPs and deaths from hunger ballooned: approximately 23 per cent of the population were directly affected by the famine, and up to 70 per cent were reportedly in the queue. Moreover, extensive media coverage of emaciated Somalis ensured a suitable international outcry (the “Do Something” response), although some have since argued that the state of emergency was vastly exaggerated by the media.¹⁰ The media were greatly assisted in this effort by the relief agencies which, together with interested members of the US Congress, launched one of the more successful public relations campaigns with the hope of raising funds for their work and putting a stop to the famine.¹¹ This alliance left the international community with relatively few options.

For US President George Bush (Senior), still heady from his victories in the Cold War and the Gulf War and hoping to realize a “New World Order”, and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, eager to test the potential of an organization that had been in a superpower stranglehold since its inception, Somalia provided the perfect opportunity. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was thus conceived

through Security Council Resolution 751 (24 April 1992) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The overwhelming endorsement at the United Nations for the intervention was garnered because the state imploded and the formal institutions of government disappeared, leaving the population unprotected from the ravages of the civil war, the resultant man-made (or warlord-inspired) famine and the local warlords themselves, who were committing human rights violations on a massive scale.

July witnessed the arrival of the first 50 military observers, who comprised the initial security force for UNOSOM, which grew to 500 by mid-September. It quickly became apparent, however, that the provision of widespread relief needed a much larger organization than UNOSOM to secure food delivery. Hence, in December 1992, the United States initiated the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope, transporting 37,000 troops to the African continent to do just that. Because of fears of “mission creep”, UNITAF was to last only five months, with its primary aim the protection of food relief. A hand-over to a multinational, peace enforcement operation – UNOSOM II – was therefore arranged for May 1993, with the United States providing some troops and the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Security Council Resolution 814 (March 1993) also tasked UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for a comprehensive “nation-building” exercise in Somalia, setting a precedent for the United Nations.

On 5 June 1993, General Mohamed Farah Aideed’s men ambushed a contingent of Pakistani soldiers, killing 24 and wounding many more.¹² From that day forward, the operation veered off course and soon came to a crashing halt. The next day, the Security Council passed Resolution 837, which explicitly called for the detention and trial of those responsible. What started out as an impartial peacekeeping operation to feed the starving soon turned into an unsuccessful, all-out man-hunt in pursuit of Aideed, culminating on the night of 3 October when 18 US Army Rangers were killed and 77 wounded after an attack on an Aideed meeting place in Mogadishu. The Somali casualty list was even higher: an estimated 300 were killed and another 700 wounded, with up to 30 per cent of the victims women and children. This was the bloodiest confrontation of any UN operation.

Americans once again reacted strongly to media coverage on CNN. This time it was not starving children but rather a dead US soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by Aideed’s men. The “Do Something” cries were rapidly replaced by a rousing chorus of “Get Out”, because the US public could not understand why Somalis were killing their troops – troops who were sent to Somalia purely on a humani-

tarian mission. President Clinton promised to have all US soldiers out by March 1994.¹³

In early January 1994, Boutros-Ghali recommended scaling back the mission and, the following November, the UN Security Council set March 1995 as the final date of operation for UNOSOM II. The operation stumbled on until its termination, on schedule, without accomplishing political reconstruction, disarmament of the factions or a resolution of the conflict – all of which were stated aims of the intervention. The human cost was 156 peacekeepers and several thousand Somali civilians. The three UN operations – which lasted from April 1992 to March 1995 – did, however, put a stop to the famine: an estimated 100,000 lives were saved by the intervention.

Immediately after the United Nations terminated the operation, much of Somalia slipped back into the situation of sporadic lawlessness that had prevailed before foreign troops arrived, despite the enormous infusion of funds during the three operations (US\$2.3 billion spent by the US government¹⁴ and US\$1.64 billion by the United Nations¹⁵) and the invasion of untold numbers of aid workers and foreign soldiers (close to 50,000 troops at its peak). The country was no longer in an emergency “famine” situation, but rather had moved into a situation that was very fluid, marked by occasionally erratic and inconsistent acts of violence and punctuated by irregular humanitarian crises in different parts of the country. This was set against a backdrop where all public social welfare services that had been provided by the state were now gone.

Operational issues

In neither the UN intervention phase nor the post-UN period has operating in Somalia been a straightforward affair for humanitarian and development organizations. Every aspect of working in Somalia has been affected by the absence of government.

The intervention period

If international support for the Somali intervention was garnered because the state had collapsed, an equally valid point is that many of the problems encountered by the international community were owing to the inability of a traditional peacekeeping operation to function in a society with no government.

Technically, UNOSOM was a small, traditional peacekeeping operation that was intended to separate the warring parties (which had already agreed to a cease-fire). UNITAF then took over as a US-led, UN-

endorsed peace enforcement operation to secure urgent humanitarian assistance. It was not a Blue Helmet operation precisely because of the flexibility it allowed a member state – in this case, the United States – to take certain actions to maintain or promote peace and security. The bulk of the financial costs of UNITAF were borne by the United States (approximately 75 per cent instead of the normal 27 per cent of peacekeeping) in exchange for a non-UN command and control operation.

The three objectives of UNITAF were: to secure the seaports, airstrips and food distribution points; to protect relief convoys and ensure the smooth operation of relief agencies; and to assist UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing relief to the famine-stricken population. The provision of security also entailed voluntary disarmament and cantonment of weapons in exchange for money or food, and retraining Somalis for civilian employment. International military escorts were used so that Somali security guards, riding in “technicals”,¹⁶ could no longer profit.

What complicated the Somalia operation was the overt emphasis on “nation-building” in a situation of prolonged state collapse, officially tacked on after the operation began. UNITAF had managed to sidestep this issue, although the US government had been fully aware from the start that political reconstruction needed to be addressed in order to prevent a return to the *status quo ante*, i.e. internecine warfare and possibly another famine.¹⁷ Initially, political reconstruction did not appear to be a very daunting task, because the very same warlords who had instigated the civil war had, since the start of the UN operation, signed various agreements that were to lead to the formation of new political structures. Yet none of these was successful, as will be discussed below.

Post-interventions

The public failures of the UN operations in Somalia, irrespective of who was to blame, discredited the United Nations – both inside Somalia and internationally. In fact, the establishment of rudimentary local and regional authorities in some parts of the country, along with the emergence of a robust private sector, occurred in areas where UNOSOM had not interfered (especially in the north-east, or Puntland, and in Somaliland).

In December 1993, at the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, several important donors, in particular the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy and the European Commission (EC), along with representatives of some UN agencies, met on the fringe to determine how to establish a new, independent mechanism to deliver aid, one that would be distinct from UN military and political structures because of the negative image UNOSOM then had, both

in Somali eyes as well as to many others. At that time, the US government had already decided to withdraw from the UN operation in Somalia, but it remained committed to supporting the international – and particularly the humanitarian – efforts in the country. It was also not clear then if the UN peace support mission was going to be terminated; UNOSOM II still had a heavy military presence in Mogadishu.

Accordingly, in February 1994, these donors and some of the UN agencies established the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) to serve as a new coordination body for donors, UN agencies, NGOs and other international organizations. One year later, the SACB adopted a Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia. This Code provided a framework for international involvement in Somalia, and was endorsed by Somali authorities in the different regional administrations (where they existed), which acted as legitimate repositories of Somali sovereignty.

Although the Code of Conduct permitted traditional EC and UN rehabilitation and development instruments to adapt to the realities of state collapse, the degree of acceptance and enforcement of the Code varied significantly from region to region, owing to the volatile political situation. Despite the problems encountered, the establishment of working practices within the SACB paved the way for some major donors to continue operating through NGO partners in Somalia, albeit at greatly reduced levels, while others, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, were unable to adapt.¹⁸ After UNOSOM II departed, the SACB – which was located in Nairobi and not in Somalia for security reasons – became the only international forum where political, security and humanitarian questions were debated and policy adopted in a series of committees.

The SACB assumed the coordinating role normally provided by a UN agency. It was led from the start by the European Commission because it was then the largest donor in Somalia. The European Commission subsequently adopted three guiding principles for involvement in the country: (1) strict neutrality with respect to the fighting factions; (2) non-recognition of any government that is not broadly representative; and (3) no direct mediation role but rather encouragement and support for initiatives by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.¹⁹ Whereas in theory the European Commission was to take a back seat politically (as noted in the third principle) and focus on its more traditional humanitarian and development roles, in practice the European Commission would become highly political because of an astute EC Special Envoy, Sigurd Illing, and an emasculated United Nations. By early 1996, Illing had succeeded in placing the European Commission

(and, technically, the European Union) at the forefront of international involvement in the country.

In many respects, the SACB has proved to be a creative adaptation by the international community to state collapse, and it was unique in its composition because it brought together donors with NGOs and UN agencies. Yet, it also has been criticized for being overly bureaucratic and less relevant to affairs in Somalia because it is based in Nairobi. Many argue that the aid community spends far too much time in meetings in Kenya, rather than implementing agreed policies in the field.²⁰

Moreover, despite Somali involvement on the ground in the different regions of Somalia and Somali involvement in the political process, not enough Somalis have been involved in the SACB coordinating bodies. Initially it was felt that it would be impossible to select appropriate and representative Somalis, and that their inclusion would empower some at the expense of others. Only at the end of the 1990s were modalities elaborated to bring more Somalis into the decision-making process but, even then, their participation remained marginal.

At the political level, as noted, the European Commission became active. The UN political office was anyway unable to provide effective leadership because it had been rendered powerless by UN headquarters – left with only a skeleton staff, given a restrictive mandate, and its work divorced from that of the UN humanitarian and development office. The European Commission was also the largest donor in Somalia, even if its funds had been drastically reduced because Somalia no longer benefited from the Lomé Conventions,²¹ since the country had not ratified the Lomé IV before it collapsed. Funds left over from previous financial commitments to Somalia within earlier Lomé Conventions and other funds from the various autonomous EC budget lines (e.g. food aid, democratization) therefore had to be mobilized to overcome the legal and institutional constraints posed by these unique circumstances.

In 1995, the European Commission launched a conflict management and governance project, based on the conviction that the initiatives sponsored by the United Nations and Somali leaders between 1991 and 1995 had failed to reach a settlement of the Somali conflict because they hastily tried to reconstruct a central state without elaborating constitutional arrangements compatible with traditional “uncentralized” Somali culture.²² Additionally, they concentrated primarily on the warlords at the expense of members of civil society.²³ Ken Menkhaus commented, “The ability to destroy had been confused with the ability to govern. The power to govern, it turned out, had devolved to a much more localized level.”²⁴ The departure of the EC Special Envoy subsequently led to the termination of this project at the European Commission by his suc-

cessor, who had his own ideas about how to resolve the Somali conflict. The lack of consistent application of policies plagues most conflict zones, particularly when there is no overall agreement on the political process (given that the European Commission was pushing this and not the United Nations).

Internal power struggles between the United Nations and the European Commission hindered development and humanitarian programmes in Somalia for several years in the late 1990s until UN headquarters became more involved. A new RSG (David Stephen) was appointed, who had a bigger profile than previous representatives, and soon thereafter a more competent UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (Randolph Kent) joined the team in Nairobi. Both made an effort to coordinate the work of the two offices, while also regaining control over coordination mechanisms from the European Commission, which, in turn, became less political and reverted to its traditional donor role.

Obstacles and opportunities

Just as operations were confused and mandates blurred at the macro level because traditional humanitarian actors played an overt political role, so too did this occur at the micro levels, in both time periods discussed in this chapter.

The intervention period

Somalis bear the ultimate responsibility for the crisis that has undermined their society, albeit endeavours of the international community exacerbated the situation. Concerning the latter, a number of mistakes were made throughout the interventions, and even prior to them, when there was no joint planning between the military and the heads of relief organizations, even though the military was originally deployed to provide protection for these organizations.

The United Nations also played a principal role in the unfolding Somali tragedy in many ways, including – but not limited to – issues related to poor coordination (and turf wars) between New York and Mogadishu staff; over-concentration on Mogadishu at the expense of the rest of the country; frequent changes of the person acting as SRSR and of the Humanitarian Coordinators (five of each rotated through Somalia within a three-year time period); and unclear rules of engagement and rules on the use of force and for civil–military relations. An overview of these factors could subsume them under the umbrella of management problems,

which can threaten and impede any peace support operation. Moreover, each new head of agency or mission inevitably would want to put his or her stamp on the operation, particularly when there was no overall strategic framework. Such disparities in leadership and inconsistency in policy implementation only served to undermine the mission, and, in this case, did not provide Somalis with any predictable policy direction.

There were further difficulties in regaining control over security in this heavily armed, faction-ridden society.²⁵ In addition, resource allocation proved inadequate to accomplish mission mandates. The mandates did not match the means: UNITAF's mandate was limited, and its budget constraints were few; on the other hand, UNOSOM II was supposed to operate throughout the entire country on restricted funding.

In addition to poor coordination and inadequate funding, which have plagued other peace support operations, the United Nations and the US government had been considering political reconstruction of the Somali state since UNOSOM, and unrealistically assumed that impartiality could be maintained. Yet the Americans were (understandably) unclear on the means to accomplish this task, and therefore tried to foist political reconstruction onto the United Nations, while publicly committing only to undertake the temporary, stop-gap assignment of securing food delivery. UNITAF became partial and involved in politics anyway by virtue of securing food deliveries and choosing representatives in villages to assist with the distribution. External involvement in political reconstruction is by definition controversial and complex.²⁶ Arguably, the United States and the United Nations erred in pressing solutions on Somalis without properly involving them at different stages of the process or assisting them to develop their own revenue-raising capacity to sustain these institutions.²⁷

UNOSOM II gave Boutros-Ghali his first opportunity to execute his *Agenda for Peace*, with the "largest multinational force ever assembled under [his] direct control".²⁸ Yet experimentation, by definition, is a trial-and-error process. Political rehabilitation was ill coordinated and applied patchily in Somalia, without any overall sharing of information between UN agencies, the military and humanitarian and development agencies. What was expected of the United Nations, in any case, was without doubt beyond its reach owing to the lack of resources and experience in this area. The mad Aideed man-hunt also invalidated any residual pretensions of neutrality and impartiality, and instead boosted Aideed's image amongst Somalis.²⁹ Finally, as mentioned, any UN contact with the warlords inevitably conferred more legitimacy on them, which only served to wrest control from many of the elders who traditionally held more influence and potentially also the prestige to assist in reconstruction.

Post-interventions

As noted, immediately after the termination of UNOSOM II, the United Nations in general had lost credibility. Meanwhile, the rise in political influence of the European Commission (a traditional donor that normally did not play a political role), along with the European Commission's assumption of control over the mechanisms of the SACB, was perhaps unavoidable given the power vacuum that was created within the international community. The subsequent turf wars between the European Commission and the United Nations, which endured until the late 1990s, resulted in the international community becoming as fragmented as Somali society, and the situation was made even more complicated because the European Commission was one of the United Nations' major funders.

After UNOSOM, there was a dramatic reduction in funds dedicated to Somalia. The situation deteriorated even further towards the end of the 1990s. In 2002, Somalia received only US\$41 million through the UN Consolidated Appeals Process, falling short by 50 per cent of the overall appeal. One year later, the total raised for Somalia was a mere US\$37 million.

Not only were funds reduced, but budgets for humanitarian and development projects were too short term. Many projects were funded on three- to six-month cycles, owing to the difficulties donors had funding projects in Somalia at all. In general these projects carried on at the end of each cycle, but all too often it was easy to terminate them, again interfering with consistency.

Moreover, after the SACB became operational, most of the major donors lost interest in Somalia, even if they stayed nominally involved.³⁰ This meant that the personnel deployed to Somalia were not always star performers, and it also meant that a powerful personality could wield undue influence because of the lack of interest by major capitals. Country policy was thus skewed and dependent on the vagaries of a project cycle or a particular personality working for a particular NGO, donor or agency.

Somalis learned to wait out the tenure of a head of agency, and the occasional naming of that person as *persona non grata* became a powerful tool wielded by Somalis in hastening this process. In addition, new directors could easily disband projects if they felt like it, as occurred with the EC governance project mentioned above. Alternatively, the headquarters of the donor agency, multilateral organization or NGO could change policy in a similar fashion.

Small NGOs working inside Somalia also exercised undue influence, given that there were so few actors on the ground (the majority remained in Nairobi and would visit irregularly). Often an NGO would be the only

international presence, and the only employer, in a village. This meant that, even if the mandate of the NGO was strictly humanitarian, it became intricately involved in local politics. Only a handful of humanitarian and development workers had the training and experience for this type of working environment.

By the very end of the 1990s, the United Nations had finally succeeded in re-establishing its authority in the coordinating bodies. Further, the UN political office and the development and humanitarian office had managed to establish a close working relationship. Even then, there was no formal linkage between the two. This only ensured that the political office could make vague promises of aid or expanded UN activity, tied to the peace process, but such assistance was never guaranteed because of politics at UN headquarters, and development and humanitarian actors continued to be involved in politics by the very act of carrying out their programmes in Somalia.

Negotiations

Since 1991, there have been numerous, often contradictory, attempts by members of the international community – politicians, diplomats and humanitarians – to resuscitate the state, and none has been successful. “Negotiations” in this section refer mostly to the macro attempts at political reconciliation, which were considered essential for allowing development and humanitarian work to expand in-country, rather than the numerous micro-level negotiations that ensured occasional access or co-operation in aid delivery in different parts of the country. The latter were ongoing and, because neither local political actors nor international staff were in place for very long, the process had to be repeated every time a new political leader (or warlord) assumed control at the local level or a new employee of a humanitarian agency arrived in theatre.

Political negotiations: The intervention period

Before the UN operation got under way, attempts at reconciliation had been made by various groups of Somali intellectuals, by Somali warlords or “politicians”, by foreign governments and by regional states. These continued throughout the interventions and resulted in numerous peace agreements. Between 1991 and early 1995, 17 national-level and 20 local-level “reconciliation initiatives” were attempted in Somalia and in neighbouring states.³¹ In all the agreements, satisfying the stipulations *and* the parties involved proved impossible.³²

Despite the plethora of agreements on peace, national unity and the

formation of a central government, they failed because they focused almost exclusively on a rapid revival of a central state – without the prior elaboration of constitutional arrangements that could have accommodated the centrifugal realities of Somali society and built confidence amongst the various actors in the peace process. The national-level agreements also foundered because they included more warlords than traditional leaders from civil society, and these warlords could not fully control their claimed constituencies.

Local-level agreements achieved more results, especially in Somaliland, through the organization of many small meetings. These gradually transformed, over the course of a year, into a regional conference. The Boroma “national” conference, held between February and May 1993, capped this process. Here, elders agreed on a National Peace Charter for the “Somaliland Republic”, which assisted in resolving clan conflicts. Significantly, this process received very little external financial assistance.

Post-interventions

After UNOSOM, despite the elaboration of a Code of Conduct for aid delivery, on the political side there was no overall strategy for rebuilding the state. (Even today, state collapse has not yet been incorporated into the normative structure of the international system.³³) It was thus left to the creativity, or whim, of individual heads of organizations to develop and implement their own. First, the European Commission launched its governance project, based on the belief that a decentralized model would be most appropriate for Somalia. The European Commission may have also been experimenting with the emerging concept of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. After the Special Envoy departed, Brussels decided that his successor should have a lower political ranking and profile and focus more on the development and humanitarian role. His successor soon decided to abort the governance project.

The SACB subsequently supported what was alternatively called the “building block” or the “peace dividend” approach, which complied with its Code of Conduct and with a number of UN resolutions.³⁴ The idea was to support areas that made “progress on political reconciliation and security”, based on the belief that a national government could be realized only if it were built on strong, peaceful, regional foundations. Essentially, this meant that any regional authority that could maintain peace and security would receive aid, whereas the so-called “poor performers” would receive only humanitarian assistance (when security permitted), and even then such assistance was minimal owing to funding constraints.

By the late 1990s, the building block/peace dividend approach had

been endorsed by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – the East African regional organization – which was chaired at the time by Ethiopia.³⁵ Somaliland was already receiving the bulk of international assistance, and in 1998 the north-east soon established a regional charter for Puntland. Together these two regions comprise approximately half of all the territory of the former Somali Republic. Other regions in southern Somalia were at times declared to be “building blocks” by inhabitants of at least part of these regions, including Hiraanland, Jubaland, Gedo region and the Benadir Administration. Of all these regional administrations, only Somaliland and Puntland were formed in a bottom-up fashion; the rest were hastily assembled from the top down, probably from pressure exerted by the international community, and consequently have either disintegrated or been far less stable.

The hope was that these regional authorities would eventually come together and form a loose (probably federal or confederal) state, and this method of coming together would help ensure that power remained decentralized. Although in theory this approach made the most sense, and complied with what many Somalis from civil society had been advocating for years, in practice it was undermined by the relative indifference of some of the major powers, particularly the United States and UN headquarters. Their lack of interest and their reluctance to support this building block approach in a meaningful way allowed regional actors to interfere with relative ease, to the detriment of the political and security situation inside the country, while poor performers continued to deteriorate. Had the US government and UN headquarters put their full diplomatic weight behind this effort and applied greater pressure on Somali regional authorities, as well as assisted in democratization efforts, potentially this policy might have succeeded in re-establishing an effective government.

Instead, since 1997, a regional Cold War intervened in Somalia. The competition was first between Kenya and Ethiopia for control of the peace process, then between Ethiopia and Egypt owing to their long-standing dispute over the Nile, with each country supporting different, opposed warlords in both northern and southern Somalia. Ethiopia and Egypt also had mutually exclusive ambitions for the type of government they wanted established in Somalia. Remembering its past war with Somalia, Ethiopia preferred a decentralized state, which would be viewed as less of a threat to its larger neighbour. Ethiopia thus utilized its lead position at the time in IGAD to promote the building block approach, which of course also found resonance amongst Western states. Egypt, on the other hand, itself a highly centralized state, advocated a model similar to its own, and probably also because it preferred Ethiopia’s neighbour to be strong. The Egyptian view was that, if Somalia were encouraged to

break into “entities”, there would be more of a likelihood that each entity would attempt to declare independence, as had already occurred in Somaliland. If instead a central government were formed first, then it could be up to the central government to decide on the regions that would comprise the state. Egypt argued that it was committed to preserving Somalia’s integrity.

Complicating the equation was the Eritrean–Ethiopian war, which fully erupted in early 1999 and was responsible for an upsurge in arms flows into Somalia. Yemen and Libya also entered the picture and were accused of supplying arms to different actors as well. All these states additionally continued the earlier damaging policy of negotiating possible settlements only with the warlords (giving them large sums of money to attend so-called “peace talks” and sign agreements that could not be implemented). Thus, whereas at one level the international community, through the SACB, was advocating a building block approach and a focus on civil society, the regional states were pushing a contrary policy that essentially kept Somalia in a political stalemate and continued to empower the warlords.

Things only deteriorated further with yet another regional peace initiative, this time sponsored by the Djibouti government. In August 2000, at the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was officially announced. The TNG moved to the capital, Mogadishu, in October 2000. It received some support from the United Nations and financial support from several Gulf and North African states, including Saudi Arabia, which allegedly donated US\$6 million to it. The form of government agreed at Arta was nearer to the Egyptian preference and it too soon faltered.³⁶

Because the TNG never managed to control more than half of Mogadishu, further political discussions took place in Kenya in 2003 and 2004. At the time of writing, a new Transitional Federal Government, decided by clans, had been declared, although it had not yet moved from its base in Kenya into Somalia. Whether or not it will be sustainable is too difficult to predict at this stage.

At the micro level, humanitarian and development work was often impeded by security concerns or incidents such as threats, or even on occasion murder, against local or international staff. When this occurred, the SACB would declare that all work would cease in that particular area until those who committed the atrocity were brought to justice by the local authorities and it was considered safe to resume activities. This policy rarely succeeded and in many respects it seemed unfair to put so much pressure on local authorities that exerted only partial control over the territories they claimed. With no overall rule of law structure in most of

Somalia (excluding Somaliland), it was very rare that Somalis could not only locate the accused but then bring that person to justice.

Once all international staff had been evacuated, their return would have to be agreed by the SACB, then their re-entry re-negotiated, along with a new *modus vivendi*. There were often great divisions within the SACB about when it was deemed safe to return, and decisions were not always made on security grounds. Some agencies needed an on-the-ground presence for fund-raising purposes, while others were worried about the humanitarian situation deteriorating with no assistance being provided. At one meeting I attended, a representative of an NGO remarked, "If we don't return to [Somali village], we will have no presence in Somalia, and that is not acceptable to our headquarters." As the United Nations gradually took over the leadership of the SACB at the very end of the 1990s, this policy was altered so that important humanitarian and development work could continue except in extreme security situations.

Thus, throughout both the intervention and the post-intervention periods, neither the humanitarian, nor the development nor the political actors were able to implement a coherent plan to rebuild the state and hence allow for the safe and consistent delivery of international humanitarian and development aid. Too many individuals and states succumbed to hubris or self-serving political purposes, believing themselves to be the saviour of the Somali nation. There was never a direct linkage between humanitarian and development aid and the political process, but it was understood that funding and programmatic activity would increase significantly if there was a recognized government counterpart on the ground.

Wider implications

In Somalia, because international actors had been operating with no effective national counterpart for over a decade, politics became integral to the development/humanitarian offices, and certainly to a greater extent than the mandates of many agencies dictated. Indeed, in the first period analysed, politics caused the famine that was to become an international humanitarian issue in 1992; thereafter, food plundering sustained the war economy. As Clarke and Herbst explained, "Where famine is man-made, stopping the famine means rebuilding political institutions to create order".³⁷ Not only did international actors exacerbate the famine and the civil war by sending in food aid (most of which was subsequently stolen), but they then became involved in clan politics during the intervention, which contributed to further political disintegration. These were

clear examples of well-intended diplomacy gone awry and of the blurring of the lines between the humanitarian and the political. It was nearly impossible to respect ideals of neutrality and impartiality.

During the first period, Somalia was inundated with high-ranking envoys, diplomats and senior UN humanitarian representatives, although none stayed for very long and therefore policy was inconsistently applied. Funding for the mission was also generous. Throughout the second period, in contrast, international representatives were not so senior and were often inexperienced, and funding was reduced dramatically. Political fragmentation and the accompanying security problems on the ground ensured that humanitarian and development aid could be delivered only in an ad hoc fashion (except in Somaliland). At this time, the United Nations separated political efforts from humanitarian and development work, and the major donors established a new coordinating mechanism that was not directed by the United Nations, but led instead by the European Commission.

These changes have ensured an erratic and inconsistent narrative. The UN political office has had no carrot or stick to implement peace plans and has often been marginalized, whereas the development and humanitarian side has had some means and therefore often became involved in politics, sometimes to the detriment of the political process. Only from the latter half of 1999 did the United Nations regain momentum, but, even then, it was an informal decision by the two UN representatives rather than a decree from UN headquarters.

At the same time, as funds for development and humanitarian assistance decreased from the mid-1990s, so the influence of OECD donors declined accordingly. Regional states began playing a more critical – if at times obstructive – role, and Somalis from the diaspora have contributed substantially larger sums to Somalia than has the donor community, anywhere from 5 to 15 times the amount (depending on which total is endorsed). Even so, since international troops departed from Somalia, not enough Somalis have been brought into internationally led humanitarian and development activities, whether they be strategy formulation, coordination mechanisms, implementation or policy reviews. Somalis have, however, participated in political negotiations. Thus, just as UN political efforts were disconnected from the humanitarian and development work, on the Somali side there has been a similar disconnect.

Not only should Somalis be fully incorporated into SACB structures and programmes, but the diaspora too should be encouraged to work more closely with the international community. Given the huge disparity in contributions, the diaspora should be playing a far more significant role. The contributions of the diaspora – even when they take the form of collective remittances – are not factored into the UN Consolidated

Appeals for Somalia, which means that needs assessments are already distorted, despite recent attempts by some agencies to improve their understanding of remittances. The same applies to the work of Islamic NGOs in Somalia: they too should be brought into the SACB structures. Only a very small number of Islamic NGOs participate in the SACB and given that many Islamic NGOs are implementing projects in the country – building mosques, schools, hospitals – their exclusion (whether by choice or not) from the coordinating bodies does not allow for a complete picture to emerge.³⁸

Lessons learned: Harmonizing the work of the United Nations

More than any other complex emergency in the 1990s, Somalia taught humanitarian workers that it is not always possible to remain neutral and impartial, and the deaths of several aid workers demonstrated that they were not always viewed as such by beneficiaries. In Somalia, given that the famine was man-made, it was inevitable that aid workers would become embroiled in politics. After the UN military interventions, there was finger-pointing from all sides: the US government blamed the United Nations, the United Nations blamed the US military, the NGOs blamed the United Nations and the US government, when, in fact, everyone and no one was to blame, given the overall lack of experience in dealing with a collapsed state.

Because the crisis in Somalia was fundamentally political, the formal separation of the political from the humanitarian work at the United Nations never made any sense either. Although there had been a de facto reunion of the two offices at the end of the 1990s, this had not been sanctioned at UN headquarters, and therefore they were not given the institutional support that would have been necessary to underpin the peace process in a meaningful way. This is not to argue that the work of the two should have been fully integrated, given that humanitarian work is supposed to be impartial and neutral and so many times in the past in Somalia it clearly was not. Rather, an enhanced, public degree of formal coordination and cooperation was necessary, because it would have prevented the humanitarian and development office from interfering in politics and given the political office some carrot to use for the implementation of peace plans.

Humanitarian delivery

International actors too have resolved some of the thornier issues impeding their work. For example, although many humanitarian agencies admitted that, during the famine, 90 per cent of food aid was stolen, by the

end of the 1990s the World Food Programme (WFP) had developed a new *modus operandi* to overcome these delivery problems.³⁹ Other agencies involved in providing emergency assistance to children also utilize creative methods. For example, in some areas, food security agencies have stopped conducting nutritional assessments to determine whether children are malnourished. These assessments had attracted too much attention, raised expectations within communities, and also caught the eye of bandits. Instead, they use local staff to monitor the prices of certain local products and wages. If these figures “indicate a serious deterioration in food security, international staff carry out a very rapid assessment” and alter activity accordingly.⁴⁰

And continued need

Despite these adaptations, state collapse has still left the majority of Somalia’s citizens without consistent access to basic goods and services. Beyond assistance from family members abroad – for those lucky enough to have relatives in Germany or the United States or Australia – there is no social safety net in Somalia.⁴¹ The attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States have added a sense of urgency regarding “black holes”, given that years of neglect in Afghanistan enabled Osama bin Laden to consolidate his lethal terror machine. Somalia thus once again reappeared on the radar screens of the US government owing to fears that the country had become a permissive environment for criminal and terrorist activity. New tools are still required to cope with the lack of government, tools that could improve the coordination of international agencies – both inside and outside the SACB – and, at the same time, harness the considerable energy of the diaspora and the dynamic Somali business community.

Notes

1. For more information about why the term “failed” is inappropriate, see Karin von Hippel, “The Proliferation of Collapsed States in the Post-Cold War World”, in Michael Clarke, ed., *Brassey’s Defence Yearbook 1997*, London: Brassey’s, 1997.
2. See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World*, <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_complete.pdf> (accessed 15 July 2004), for more information.
3. The Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia to the Security Council described not only how Somalia harboured some of the terrorists who carried out attacks in Mombasa, but also how the territory was used to smuggle weapons into Kenya. See *Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1474 (2003)*, UN Security Council, S/2003/1035, 4 November 2003.
4. See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Consolidated Ap-

- peals Process, *Humanitarian Appeal 2004: Somalia*, <<http://www.un.org/depts/ocha/cap/somalia.html>> for more information (accessed 20 July 2004).
5. See Somalia's country profile on ReliefWeb, <<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/bkg.nsf/doc200?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=som&mode=cp>> for the range of figures.
 6. In particular, see *Socio-Economic Survey 2002: Somalia. Report No. 1, Somalia Watching Brief, 2003*, UNDP with the World Bank.
 7. According to UNDP, there is an absence of comprehensive baseline statistics. Information on population movement and displacement or seasonal migration patterns is weak. The informalization of the economy makes economic analysis particularly difficult and the extent of privatized services such as education is unknown. As data collection is dependent on the quality of access, there is a bias in the volume and quality of data collected to areas where there is better security. See UNDP, *Human Development Report: Somalia, 2001*, Nairobi: UNDP, p. 195.
 8. See <<http://www.reliefweb.int/>> for more information on international assistance to Somalia.
 9. For more details, see I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.
 10. See Michael Maren, "Feeding a Famine", *ForbesMediaCritic*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 1994.
 11. For more information, see Warren P. Strobel, "The Media and US Policies Toward Intervention: A Closer Look at the 'CNN Effect'", in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds, *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996, pp. 360–366.
 12. Aideed was one of the men responsible for the overthrow of Barre.
 13. US troops briefly returned in March 1995 to provide protection off the coast during the final force withdrawal, Operation United Shield. Although US public opinion has been cited as the reason for withdrawing from Somalia, some researchers believe that the US government misread public opinion, which was in fact supportive of escalation despite (or because of) their outrage. See Steven Kull, I. M. Destler and Clay Ramsay, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public*, College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 1997, for more information.
 14. John G. Sommer, "Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia, 1990–1994", Refugee Policy Group, November 1994, p. C-5.
 15. UN Department of Public Information, accessed 1999.
 16. A "technical" is a basic pick-up truck, mounted with a machine gun. They have been utilized by all faction leaders in Somalia, as well as by the international aid community. The term was coined by the non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations during the civil war because they were forced to hire Somali escorts to protect them, even though their constitutions did not allow them to do this. They thus justified their payments to these Somalis under the heading, "technical assistance".
 17. See, for example, "Remarks by President Bill Clinton to the Congress from the White House Office of the Press Secretary, October 13, 1993"; or US-UN Press Release 37- (93), 26 March 1993.
 18. The latter are restricted by their articles of agreement to working *only* with established governments.
 19. See, for example, the speech by Ambassador Roberto di Leo, Embassy of Italy, Representing the EU Presidency, delivered to the participants at the "First Seminar on Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia", sponsored and organized by the European Commission, Lake Naivasha, Kenya, June 1996. For more information on the European Union's involvement in the Somali crisis, see Karin von Hippel and Alexandros Yannis, "The European Response to State Collapse in Somalia", in Knud Erik Joergensen, ed., *European Approaches to Crisis Management*, The Hague: Kluwer International, 1997.

20. See Nicola Reindorp and Anna Schmidt, "Coordinating Humanitarian Action: The Changing Role of Official Donors", HPG Briefing Paper No. 7, London: Overseas Development Institute, December 2002; and Joanna Macrae et al., "Uncertain Power: The Changing Role of Official Donors in Humanitarian Action", HPG Report 12, London: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, December 2002.
21. The first Lomé Convention was signed in Lomé, Togo, in 1975. The conventions, which are reviewed regularly, are essentially aid and trade agreements made by members of the European Union and are intended to promote development in 70 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (also known as the ACP states).
22. A group of academic consultants at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) were commissioned by the European Commission to prepare "A Study of Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options" (August 1995), which outlined four models of decentralized government: three territorially based models (the confederation, federation and decentralized unitary state) and a community-based type of power-sharing known as consociation. Following publication of the study in 1996, the European Commission organized seminars in Kenya and, in 1997, several inside Somalia for members of civil society to provide the forum for these Somalis to deliberate the study in greater detail as well as contribute their expertise to the overall debate. I was the project manager for the LSE report and responsible for the seminars in Kenya and Somalia. See reports prepared by Karin von Hippel, entitled "First Seminar on Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia", Lake Naivasha, Kenya, June 1996; and "Second Seminar on Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia", Lake Nakuru, Kenya, 16–18 November 1996.
23. Security Council Resolution 814 made specific reference to support for civil society, but in practice this was not undertaken to a significant degree.
24. Ken Menkhaus, "Stateless Somalia", draft article; later published as "Somalia: The Political Order of a Stateless Society", *Current History*, Vol. 97, May 1998, pp. 220–224.
25. Boutros-Ghali sought to disarm the Somalis from the beginning of the operation, using whatever force necessary, yet he was unable to incorporate this aim until Security Council Resolution 814 was passed in March 1993. His aspiration was never realized owing to the US military, which did not want to participate in a door-to-door disarmament campaign because it was guaranteed to be bloody. Although a thorough disarmament programme could feasibly have helped lay the foundation for implementing political reforms – and Somalis today say that the failure to do so initially was a missed opportunity because most Somalis were willing to disarm at the start of the operation – US planners believed it would transform the mission of their troops from providing an impartial food security service to participating directly in the conflict. Ironically, this occurred anyhow. The little disarming that did take place was sporadic and voluntary, and eventually most of the weapons were stolen from the cantonment sites.
26. For a full analysis of political reconstruction after military intervention, see Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
27. Even the programmes that were considered more successful, such as the establishment of local and regional councils, did not prove viable, primarily because there was no overarching authority in place. See UNOSOM II documents, "Governance: District and Regional Councils, their Legitimacy, Effectiveness and Role in Reconciliation and Development", 22–24 June 1994, UN orientation seminar for newly arrived UN Volunteer specialists; "Meeting on Workshop for District Councillors in Somalia" and "UNOSOM II: District Councillors' Workshops", 10–11 August 1993.
28. Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995, p. 64.
29. It is unclear what other options were available to the United Nations. Obviously the

- United Nations could not let troops be killed without reprisals. Many suggestions have since been made, albeit none very satisfactory. For one alternative, see Ameen Jan, "Peacebuilding in Somalia", IPA Policy Briefing Series, New York: International Peace Academy, July 1996.
30. The US Embassy in Nairobi assumed the Somalia portfolio, and for several years only one staff member followed events in the country. After he left, he was replaced by one person, who not only had the Somalia portfolio but was also responsible for the Great Lakes. Eventually, one person would be dedicated to each conflict zone, which was still insufficient.
 31. Ken Menkhaus, "International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 43.
 32. The precise demarcation of the regions was an insuperable obstacle, and the issue of self-determination for Somaliland was not broached.
 33. "The situation in Somalia will continue to deteriorate until the political will exists among the parties to reach a peaceful solution to their dispute, or until the international community gives itself new instruments to address the phenomenon of a failed state" (United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia (1992-1996)*, Blue Books Series, Vol. VIII, New York: Department of Public Information of the United Nations, 1996, p. 89).
 34. As noted in UN Security Council Resolutions 886 and 897 (November 1993 and February 1994, respectively), and General Assembly Resolution 52/169 (December 1996).
 35. A joint Ethiopia/Kenya letter of 31 January 1997, which referred to IGAD guidelines, noted the following: "We feel that United Nations assistance for the rehabilitation of Somalia in a well calibrated manner with a clear goal of strengthening constituencies for peace in the country is one of the most critical areas of support that the United Nations can provide for the regional effort for peace in Somalia."
 36. As Matt Bryden explained, "The Arta conference effectively denied the existence of these [regional] authorities, and aimed instead at the formation of a government by a large group of hand-picked individuals, invited by the Djiboutian government. Since the leaders of the 'building blocks' declined to attend, the conference attracted their political rivals instead, and awarded them legitimacy and recognition under the rubric of a new 'Transitional National Government'. The consequences were dramatic: the administrations of Puntland and Bay/Bakool soon collapsed as pro- and anti-TNG groups struggled for power. Gedo region, which had been peaceful for several years, also erupted into inter-factional violence, and an alliance of pro-TNG militia from central Somalia assaulted and occupied the southern port of Kismayo." Matt Bryden, "No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam and Statelessness in Somalia", *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall 2003, p. 44.
 37. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention*, Center of International Studies, Monograph Series, No. 9, Princeton University, 1995, p. 10.
 38. There are additional worries that some of these Islamic NGOs are promoting a radical agenda through their aid. And, because Western international assistance is not significant in scale, the influence of some of the more extreme Islamist movements has increased. A recent International Crisis Group report noted that the fundamentalist movements inside Somalia "owe their rapid growth since 1990 less to genuine popularity than access to substantial external funding" (*Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, Africa Report No. 45, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 23 May 2002, p. 13).
 39. Essentially, a Somali contractor would deposit a bond with the WFP that initially was equal to the cost of the delivery. The contractor would be responsible for all losses be-

tween the port and the “extended delivery point”. This policy has dramatically reduced the theft of goods in transit (although losses after goods have been distributed are more difficult to ascertain). This process was clarified by Dr Simon Narbeth.

40. Susanne Jaspars, “Solidarity and Soup Kitchens: A Review of Principles and Practice for Food Distribution in Conflict”, a joint project by NutritionWorks and the Overseas Development Institute with Nicholas Leader, HPG Report 7, London: Overseas Development Institute, August 2000, p. 8.
41. For example, in 2002 UNICEF reported that Somalia had “one of the lowest immunization rates in the world, only 18% of children were fully immunized with DTP”. Over a decade earlier, more than double that number of children had been immunized. From *State of the World's Vaccines and Immunization*, jointly published by the World Health Organization, UNICEF and the World Bank, Geneva, October 2002, p. 3.