

**CENTER FOR  
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
(CSIS)**

**SMART POWER SPEAKER SERIES**

**WELCOME AND MODERATOR:  
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SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,  
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STEPHEN FLANAGAN: Good morning. I'm Stephen Flanagan, senior vice president here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And it's a pleasure to welcome you to this ongoing series of lectures as part of our Smart Power Commission.

And we're delighted to welcome back a favorite son of CSIS, Dr. Robert C. Orr, who, as you know, is currently serving as assistant secretary general for policy coordination and strategic planning in the executive office of the secretary general at the United Nations. His detailed bio is in your program, but I'll just touch on some of the highlights. And as I look around the room, I wonder whether I really need to introduce him to this group. In fact, I was beginning to wonder whether we were staging for a post-conflict operation when I looked – or some other humanitarian mission – when I look around the room and see all of the veterans of those many missions that many of you have served together on.

But Bob Orr came to the U.N. from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard, where he served as executive director. And some of you will note that that is a position we have in common in our past histories. But he previously had served in a number of positions in government, particularly at the United Nations as a deputy ambassador, director of the Washington office for the United Nations, and also as a director for multilateral affairs in the National Security Council. As I mentioned, his earlier service here was in 2001 to 2003 where he co-directed the very highly regarded bipartisan commission report on post-conflict reconstruction that was a joint effort of both CSIS and the Association of the U.S. Army.

Dr. Orr, as many of you know, has published widely on post-conflict reconstruction, on the United Nations, on peacekeeping and democracy promotion. He received his Ph.D. and MPA from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, and his undergraduate work at UCLA.

Ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure to welcome him back, as I said, to CSIS, to this stage. I would ask you to please turn off your cell phones and pagers, so we don't get any further feedback on these mikes. Dr. Orr will speak for about 20 to 30 minutes, and then we'll both sit down and have hopefully a very rich conversation on some of the challenges that he sees for the United Nations system.

So welcome back, Bob Orr. (Applause.)

ROBERT ORR: Thank you. Thank you very much, Stephen, and to John Hamre for the invitation. Seeing a lot of the faces in the room, I was doing the same thing you were, thinking, okay, my subject is not peacekeeping; it's not post-conflict reconstruction today. Being in this room where we had all too many discussions on those issues – and I

think still some very, very useful ones here – I'm pleased to be back and pleased to be talking about the subject, which is related to all of those, but I think which has broader implications.

I think CSIS has done something extremely important in trying to organize a number of thinkers and doers around the concept of smart power. We know that the nature of the world today is such that the United States has to draw on dimensions of its power if it is to meaningfully protect its own security and that of the rest of the world as well. I think the commission that has been started, headed by Joe Nye and Rich Armitage, is extremely important, and it draws together both thinkers and doers in this area. And I for one am very much looking forward to seeing the commission's report when it comes out, I understand, as early as next week.

The subject today is smart power. And I want to relate that directly to the United Nations. While I think the United Nations figures in a lot of discussions in Washington, it's very much in a segmented manner. The fact is, if you're to take a smart power approach to U.S. foreign policy, you need to integrate your U.N. policy with your smart power policy. And that's what I want to try to address today.

It's only natural that the U.S.-U.N. relationship is a major part of this discussion, because the U.N. is both a forum for exercising smart power, and it's also an actor or a tool for using smart power. As a forum, the U.N. offers limitless opportunity for the United States to constructively engage on the broad range of U.S. foreign policy challenges. As a tool, the U.N. is also a tremendously useful and – I would hope – valued partner in a broad range of operational areas. This may not have traditionally been the case, as the U.N. when it was first created 60 years ago was very much a forum, and much less having its own operational capacity. Today, the U.N. is very much both the world's quintessential forum for acting through foreign policy interests, but also very much an operational partner.

Today, we have more than 100,000 peacekeepers deployed in 18 missions worldwide. We have another 13 field missions in preventing conflict and in mediation support. The organization also leverages billions of dollars to combat poverty and disease. War crimes are being prosecuted in Rwanda, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and as many of you know, currently engaged in the setup of establishing a tribunal for Lebanon, which is really at the epicenter of many issues in international security today.

We have over 400 human rights officers posted around the globe in the field. And that number will continue to rise as the doubling of the High Commissioner for Human Rights budget takes full effect. In Iraq and around the world, the U.N. is the primary provider of assistance to the more than 10 million refugees and 2 million IDPs affected by manmade and natural (sic) disasters. Excuse me.

As many of you know, in the coming months, as joint U.N.-AU hybrid force is being constructed for Darfur. This would consist of over 20,000 military personnel and

over 6,000 police. In the last few days, the political negotiations sponsored by the U.N. and the AU have commenced. A difficult beginning, as I think all expected; this will not be an easy process. But we know that if it is to have a chance of success, this will be through an active and successful partnership between the U.N. and the AU.

This is only one example of the many, many ways in which the United States and other governments around the world are turning to the U.N. increasingly on a range of issues. In fact, today, the demand for U.N. services is higher than it has ever been in its 60-year history, and the trend line is going straight up. This provides some huge opportunities for us, but also some real challenges in terms of being able to operationalize the broad range of demands that the world is coming to the U.N. to address.

The U.N. is, in fact, coping with the surge in demand. And more than coping, I think we are succeeding, to the extent possible, in pulling the world together collectively through this universal instrument in areas across the board – peacekeeping, humanitarian affairs, human rights, and development. But today, I don't want to address any of those core competencies. And this says something about today's U.N. that I really want to talk about the U.S. and the use of smart power in relation to the U.N. – not in any of our core competencies, those for which we are historically known.

In fact, this morning, I want to address three issues, which you may not associate with the U.N. as much: first, on the question of counterterrorism; second, on global public health; and third, on climate change. In each of these areas, the U.N. is playing an increasing role, which provides the United States an opportunity to wield smart power through the U.N.

First, in the area of terrorism, we all know terrorism is a threat that reaches into all nations and has shown a capacity for making victims of innocent people in every region of the world. Terrorism is a global problem; not just a national one. And only coordinated action – global action – can produce sustainable results. The U.N. as an institution is uniquely suited above and beyond any single member state of the U.N. to deal with the full range of threats posed by global terrorism.

As a result, in recent years, a surprisingly robust global counterterrorism political foundation and architecture has emerged at the U.N. This is something that I think many in Washington have missed. Over recent years, the U.N. has become a real player in counterterrorism in a way that many of you that might have worked with the U.N. on counterterrorism issues years ago would not recognize.

Against all odds – and I say against all odds – the General Assembly of the U.N. last year, in 2006, passed a global counterterrorism strategy, coincidentally, on exactly the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. This historic event, the passing of the strategy, marked the first time that all 192 member states of the U.N. agreed on a common, strategic, and operational measure to combat terrorism.

The particular genius of the strategy is that it weaves the existing Security Council resolutions as well as 13 existing international counterterrorism conventions into a single instrument that wields the international legitimacy of all nations acting collectively. This has never happened before in modern history. So it provides a tremendous foundation for global counterterrorism work that did not exist even two years ago.

In addition to its normative and political value, the U.N. brings valuable counterterrorism operational capacities to the table. It offers states counterterrorism technical assistance and guidance through the facilitation of U.N. entities and organizations. It has set up a number of counterterrorism-related bodies to monitor and coordinate the work, and I am privileged to chair the counterterrorism implementation task force, which brings together 24 different entities in the U.S. system that deal with aspects of counterterrorism. Not all of those are counterterrorism bodies. In fact, that is the beauty of the instrument that only a minority of those bodies are directly counterterrorism bodies, but we have meshed together a broad range of U.N. instruments to face the counterterrorism challenge. This in fact is an embodiment at the U.N. of using smart power.

We're working on a number of the counterterrorism challenges that demonstrate the U.N.'s added value. I just want to name a few of them to give you a sense of what we're working on. These include radicalization and extremism that lead to terrorism, improving measures aimed at stemming the financing of terrorism, helping governments build their counterterrorism capacity, strengthening the protection of vulnerable targets, like civilian populations, and highlighting the human face of terrorism, dealing with victims, something that many governments, if not most or all governments tend to deal with very, very poorly. And if we are to win the fight against terrorism, we must humanize this problem, and we must pay attention to the victims of terrorism. The U.N. provides a very good platform to do that.

No single country, not even the United States, has the expertise and experience to address all of these issues on its own. Instead, like many aspects of the fight against terrorism, it requires sharing experiences, best practices, pooling of resources, and broad and systematic international cooperation.

Furthermore, by working within the U.N. system, the U.S. can promote counterterrorism initiatives such as those that focus on radicalization without the negative attention that a "Made in America" stamp would elicit in some, if not many quarters. Avoiding the "Made in America" stamp will be one of the hallmarks of a successful counterterrorism policy. You have nowhere else to turn but the U.N. for that part of the counterterrorism challenge.

U.S. counterterrorism efforts are enhanced by a U.N. framework that provides credibility, universality, and unique capacities in key areas. This is exactly the type of smart power advantage the U.S. derives from working with U.N. system on these issues.

I want to turn now to the question of global health, an area that may be even less than counterterrorism is associated with the U.N. This area also requires a smart power approach. Global health is perhaps one of the greatest challenges of our time for which we have the broadest scope for solutions. This is a huge challenge, but it maybe has the – a corresponding volume of potential to address the problems.

As history has shown repeatedly, disease and global insecurity are inextricably linked. When health systems are inadequate, pandemics spread, weakening the ties that bind in society after society, and more broadly, internationally. This compromises everyone's security. The U.N. system recognizes these connections, and between the urgent health needs or developmental purposes, and the urgent health needs for security purposes. We are trying to address these in a coordinated and coherent manner, but the clock is ticking on these issues.

We are at the midpoint of our timeline to achieve the Millennium Development goals, three of the key goals. Numbers four, five, and six for the cognizant in the crowd, are aimed at reducing child mortality, maternal healthcare, improving maternal healthcare, and combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. These three core goals of the U.N., I think it can be said, are central if we are to achieve a broader thrust of the Millennium Development goals, whether it's reducing poverty or all of the other vital challenges enumerated in the goals.

The surge of international attention on global public health in terms of financing, political attention, research in public, private, philanthropic and non-profit organizations is truly impressive in the last few years. However, there must be a coordinated and consistent stewardship of these various resources in order to translate these donor investments into improved public health on the ground, otherwise we will not only waste resources; we will waste millions of lives.

Unfortunately, the health world is becoming less coherent, not more coherent. New streams of money are pouring into disease-specific channels without building the fundamental health systems needed to sustain health interventions across the full spectrum of health needs. We must move in silos, to systems, and we need to do it now.

As a forum in which inclusive and multilateral discussions can occur, the U.N. can facilitate a comprehensive framework among various stakeholders to achieve lasting progress on global public health. Just last year, the secretary general convened a meeting at U.N. headquarters with senior U.N. officials from throughout the system, foundation leaders, health experts from around the world to begin to flesh out priorities in this global public health space, and to start to talk about the coherence challenge.

Getting all of the major players together was itself a huge challenge, but in a very striking or – we convened meetings on a whole range of topics. I think virtually every player that came into room was a top player in their field – changed their own schedule to come to New York for this meeting – across-the-board recognition that there is a need for

coherence at the global level in this area and that it does not exist currently, and looking to the U.N. to help sort that out.

I want to turn now to climate change, and I'm handling these each separately. Obviously there are linkages between these subjects, but I'd really rather leave that for the Q&A and focus on each of these three challenges and the U.N. role before moving to that.

On climate change, 60 years ago when the U.N. was designed, no one was aware of – or very few were aware of – and no one was discussing climate change, and what later became known as the threat of climate change. That said, climate change is the exact kind of threat for which the U.N. was created. It affects everyone. It is a global threat affecting all humanity. It respects no borders whatsoever. Science must lead the way, and only when the U.N. coordinated a global scientific assessment through the IPCC has the world's leadership unanimously recognize the scientific facts. And the U.N. provides the only recognized negotiating forum to sort out the differences based on very real and different national interests when it comes to addressing the threat of climate change.

In September, the secretary general convened a major meeting in New York on climate change before the opening of the general assembly. This was the first time in history that the issue has been taken up at such a high level, with over 80 head of state and government attending and speaking and over 140 governments at the ministerial level.

September's event demonstrated the utility of the U.N. to mobilize action on a challenge that no one country can tackle alone. The U.N. provided a forum where all of the various concerns of all of the major emitters, as well as the most vulnerable countries were heard. And although differences exist among these groups, there was a good bit of common ground.

The science on climate change is unequivocal; the time for political action is now. Just in the last few days, we have heard very good signs out of Bogor and the ministerial meeting that was held there of major players on climate change. And they have confirmed what we saw in September of New York, that all of the major players are ready to go to Bali in December to launch the climate negotiation. Six months ago, no one thought that this negotiation would start in Bali in December.

So we are on the path, and the U.N. was the body that was able to catalyze this action. Now it's time to get down to business in shaping those negotiations in Bali and proceeding over the next couple of years to finalize them.

As a major emitter, the U.S. will need to work with other industrialized countries on both the mitigation and adaptation challenges. Technology provides some of the answers, but not all. The U.S. and its wealthier counterparts will also have to assist those that will be most severely affected by climate change, especially the poor and most

vulnerable since they bear the least responsibility for the problem but they bear the brunt of the cost.

Taking a smart-power approach on climate means using the forum provided by the U.N. to negotiate a solution that will involve all of the major actors, developed and developing, governmental and private, major emitters and most vulnerable. It also means continuing to harness the world's scientific community through the effective U.N. coordination mechanism of the IPCC. While the Nobel Prize is certainly welcome for the IPCC, everyone who saw the work of the IPCC before the Nobel Prize was awarded knew how important it was, and it was a wonderful recognition that the Nobel Committee also recognized the importance of that body. This has been absolutely catalytic in getting the world's leaders to focus on science, something which is hard to do in a day-to-day basis.

It also means that we will have to tap the U.N. and its many specialized agencies for implementation work once the negotiations are complete. This is not Kyoto; this will go well beyond Kyoto. This round of negotiations will create demands on all of the governments of the world and on all of the private entities in the world which will require broad-based cooperation and coordination, but also a high level of specialized expertise. The U.N. also stands ready to support in that.

Smart power is not only about using all the dimensions of U.S. power as Joe Nye has laid out I think for everyone, but also about knowing when and how to use each dimension of power, and in what combination. The U.N. is the ideal forum for many issues – maybe not all, but for many issues – to figure out that combination, the sum total of which is effectively smart power. But having a solid U.S.-U.N. relationship is a prerequisite to having all the options on the table. When the U.S.-U.N. relationship is not working, the U.S. has dramatically reduced options on the table for exercising smart power. When the U.S.-U.N. relationship is solid, the U.S. has a much broadened basket of options to choose from.

So I want to conclude by talking about the U.S.-U.N. relationship more basically, more fundamentally. Throughout history and in today's world, partnership with the United States is the indispensable ingredient to U.N. success. This partnership needs to be strong, deep, and broad. U.S. influence is enhanced when it comes to the table in a position of leadership. Leadership - political, financial, and operational – is the key to promoting our shared goals. The U.S., after all, is not only a principal founder of the U.N. and its largest financial contributor, but also a guiding light on the key pieces of normative architecture in the international system, such as the universal declaration of human rights, and it continues to be the host nation of the U.N., something the U.S. often seems to overlook the importance of that fact.

Even with questions abounding internationally about U.S. credibility, the world still looks to the U.S. to lead. Having served at the U.N. for the United States, and now serving the U.N. as a U.N. employee, I've seen both sides of this equation. I must say that today, while U.S. leadership is challenged in many places, the U.S. still has major

opportunities for exercising leadership at the U.N. The world is hungry for American leadership. It may not look like American leadership of the past, but American leadership is sought.

Even with the number of questions abounding about the U.S. foreign policy and directions currently being pursued, many initiatives that the U.S. has started in recent years have succeeded. And I think this shows that even during a difficult time, the U.N. can produce things that are good for the United States.

Everything from the Democracy Fund, various management reforms along the lines of improving our ethics and establishing an ethics office, creating a financial disclosure program that anyone who has worked for the U.S. government would recognize – but it's actually harder than the U.S. government program – seeing the broad basket of U.N. reforms through is a crucial priority; not only for the secretary general, but for the U.S. – and finally, the Security Council's endorsement of an increased role for the U.N. in Iraq, as well as the broad range of issues coming to the Security Council on a daily basis. If you just look at these issues that the U.S. has been able to move through the U.N. in recent years during what has been a difficult patch, think what we can do when the U.S.-U.N. relationship is on solid footing.

Few issues that lack U.S. support have the stamina to move forward politically at the U.N. Whether on peacekeeping, human rights, the Human Rights Council, peace building commission, management and reform, terrorism, or climate change, sustained U.S. high-level attention can make all the difference. When the U.S. becomes disinterested or indifferent, progress gives way to paralysis, and the U.S.-U.N. relationship slips into crisis all too easily.

Nowhere is this more evident than with the U.S. arrears to the organization. Over the years, the U.S.-U.N. relationship has fallen into a dysfunctional cycle over the issue of the payment of dues. It is simply bad global politics when the U.S. refuses to honor its commitments and fails to pay for peacekeeping missions it has authorized in the Security Council. That breach of faith weakens the United States' reputation in New York and places enormous strain on the U.S.-U.N. relationship.

One of America's most talented and dedicated public servants, Ambassador Khalilzad is doing a great job in New York. The skills he brings to the table, the ability to build coalitions, forcefully argue positions, and negotiate compromise demonstrate that American diplomacy still matters. Good diplomacy is the essence of smart power.

Exercising smart power at the United Nations also means approaching challenges in New York strategically, with an eye to the U.S. relationship with Beijing, Moscow, Paris, London, Berlin, New Delhi, Tokyo, Seoul, Brasilia, Mexico City, Pretoria, Abuja, and well beyond these major capitals. Issues of critical importance at U.N. headquarters often don't get effectively raised in missions abroad. As a result, I would argue, there is an inadvertent leakage of smart power, where diplomatic goodwill and effort is not being converted into important progress on strategic goals.

Smart power also means doing a better job at producing and encouraging the best and the brightest Americans to serve in international organizations. For the first time in recent memory, Americans are underrepresented at the U.N. – I repeat, underrepresented. From the founding of the organization, Americans were dramatically overrepresented because of the post-war realities 60 years ago. Today, Americans are underrepresented. That doesn't bode well for the U.N. or for the United States.

The world has much to gain from the values, skills, and networks that Americans can bring to the job. I believe that we need more Americans that understand the complexities, strengths, and perhaps most importantly the limitations of both the United States acting alone and of international organizations, including the U.N. Over time, this will help to dispel some of the harmful myths perpetuated about the United Nations.

I think of this especially in the context of a U.S. presidential election. It's a regular sport to take shots at the U.N. I'm very pleased to see that that has been relatively minimal so far. I really hope that that will continue through this electoral cycle. The U.S. needs the U.N. way too much to take cheap political shots during a political season. It happens in every country. The U.S. is not alone. But it is extremely important that great reserve in this regard be shown during this political cycle.

Let me close with a tangible, real-world example of U.S. smart power. The benefits of smart power don't manifest themselves overnight. Take the case of an American investment over four decades ago. A young boy whose family and village were liberated during a war by U.S. troops operating under U.S. auspices came to the United States as a participant in an American Red Cross program. Today, Ban Ki-Moon is secretary general of the United Nations. And he understands the importance of strong U.S. leadership at the United Nations and in the world.

As he stated in this very conference room during his first trip to Washington as secretary general in January, with the U.S. actively and constructively engaged, the potential of the U.N. is unlimited. And with the U.N.'s potential fulfilled, the U.S. can better advance its aspirations for a peaceful, healthy, and prosperous world. This is smart power.

Thank you; and I look forward to a vibrant exchange. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. FLANAGAN: Thank you very much, Dr. Orr. We have a good 45 minutes for discussion. I would just ask, if you would please, Dr. Orr, as you can tell – (inaudible) – fighting a cold and the effects of an early morning shuttle flight down here, so his ears, he said, are a little bit still full. So, if you could please be sure to use the microphone and identify yourself, and we'll look forward to a dialogue.

Let me just say one thing as you are beginning to form your questions, when Dr. Orr mentioned the issue of the human dimension of combating terrorism and dealing with the victims, those of you who are interested in that, I would just draw your attention to the reporting and the papers prepared at a conference last week that the CSIS post-conflict reconstruction project sponsored over at the Reagan building. And a number of these issues, it was a fascinating interaction between the human rights community and the counterterrorism communities, and both learning to understand a bit more about each other's concerns as we deal with that very problem. So I was very interested to hear Dr. Orr's comments on that. And hopefully we can come back to that issue. But let me – I think Joanna Mendelson Forman had a question, if you could –

Q: Thanks, Bob. A former colleague here, and as your former co-director, I always learn when I hear from you about nuances and how to address the U.N. But let me go back to a point that you raised about your work on counterterrorism, especially in light of the meeting that we held last week. You said that the purpose of the work you're doing is to try and lift the made in America branding from the terminology. But I wish you could spell out a little bit more clearly specific actions to do that, among the different organisms that are involved in the complexity; and also, how this would be financed, given that while there is consensus that the U.N. is the best tool for counterterrorism, the paucity of funding remains the challenge. So perhaps you could define a little bit more clearly your remarks? Thanks.

MR. ORR: Yeah. I think on the made in America – I think this is important for me to say to a Washington audience. It's just common sense, if you will. The purpose of U.N. counterterrorism efforts is not to lift the made in America. But if we are to succeed, that is one of the things that has to happen. There is no question that the fight against terrorism has polarized populations, governments around the world. To get sustained action on counterterrorism, there has to be a common sense of commitment to this. You can't be asking governments to do things just to appease the United States government. We can twist and we can twist and we can twist arms as the United States. But that will never be as effective as getting real cooperation defined by those governments and parts of civil society on the ground where we most need to see progress.

We get evidence of this every day at the U.N. The number of governments that will come to the U.N. and ask for help under a U.N. rubric where they have explicitly declined U.S. help – and these are in a lot of the places where the fight against terrorism is very real, very persistent, and quite frankly, where we have shown some of the least results. So I think thinking about the U.N. as an umbrella under which to promote the various types of operational activities – here I'm not thinking so much of the hard edge of counterterrorism. I think that will almost always have to be pursued on a bilateral basis. But I think the broad range of the counterterrorism challenges are not in that basket.

If you poll member states in the most affected zones of the world, and the governments in those places, they talk about so-called root causes of terrorism left, right, and center. We, in the strategy, tried to re-shift that away from root causes, because I

don't think – the data doesn't sustain the notion of root causes and a direct linkage between certain kinds of conditions on the ground.

But we talk about conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. There is no doubt there are multiple conditions conducive. What was fascinating in the strategy is that I think seven or eight of them were actually enumerated in the strategy – 192 governments recognized that certain conditions promote terrorism. And that – think of the full gambit of countries – it's hard to get 192 member states to agree what day of the week it is. To agree on some conditions conducive to terrorism is quite significant.

But our challenge now is to then drill down on that. What do you do when you say that radicalization and extremism are a condition conducive to terrorism? One specific area that we have seen huge amounts of agreement on is that countries around the world are facing radicalization that may have different local causes. But the process of radicalization itself is something that everyone needs to look at in much more depth.

I think it's almost a cliché now that it doesn't cost a lot to undertake a terrorist action. It does cost a lot to build a committed cadre of terrorists. It happens over years and it costs a lot of money. There are many linkages in that chain of creating a cadre of terrorists that can be broken. But it can only be broken if there is agreement from the people on the ground on what those causes are and how you can address those concerns. That will never come out of Washington. That has to come from the places most affected.

But the United States has to be a partner in addressing that radicalization challenge. The United States in actions it takes can fuel the fires of radicalization. I think we've seen this in many places. So a first do no harm approach is wise.

But then, getting down to the, what can the U.S. do, U.N. programs are just beginning in this area. I will tell you what is exciting is the number of governments and civil society actors – and I mean key civil society actors, religious actors – from around the globe that are ready to sit down in a multilateral forum and talk about how to address their radicalization problem, this is new; this is important. And the United States needs to be a part of that dialogue, I think preferably not at the front of the parade; but somewhere solidly in the middle of the parade would be nice for the U.S. to position itself in this kind of nexus of issues.

MR. FLANAGAN: Could I just ask, following on that question in terms of how the strategy is being operationalized, you mentioned that some of the U.N.-specific programs in this area on radicalization and countering terrorism are just developing, but what about some of the other elements of U.N. capabilities, say, as you look at this question of conditions that favor terrorism? Has that led to any kind of adjustments in, say, UNDP priorities or UNICEF priorities or other programs on governance that the U.N. might be sponsoring? And are those programs already in train that are then being adjusted as a result of this recognition that these are also priorities because they are conditions that support –

MR. ORR: I mentioned that our taskforce has 24 different entities in it, a small fraction of which are actually counterterrorism entities. The first invitation that we sent out, I got everyone into the room. And about half the entities in the room said, I think I'm in the wrong meeting. I thought you said this is counterterrorism. I came because the secretary general asked for it. But why am I here? That was from the development side; that was from the human rights side; that was from the information side. A whole range of parts of the house that said we don't do counterterrorism; that's those guys over there.

I will tell you, the process of the last two years on which the taskforce has been operating, no one doubts that they belong in the room now. The U.N. system is operating in a more integrated fashion on counterterrorism than any other entity I've seen actually, any individual government. That's hard to do. The U.N. is notoriously decentralized and difficult to coordinate at the center. But on counterterrorism, I think everyone has recognized they have something to address – this specific nexus of issues around conditions conducive.

You asked specifically about UNICEF, UNDP. We have to tread carefully, because UNICEF and UNDP and other entities such as those have their own mandates. They are not counterterrorism entities. They are going to pursue the welfare of children and the welfare of development, of constituencies for their own purposes. But, if, in the course of pursuing those, we can link that and those types of activities to what we are seeing on the ground in terms of the development of conditions conducive to terrorism, then we can make some real progress.

There was a real debate about this in the General Assembly. There was a piece in the secretary general's report that was the basis on which this agreement was negotiated that talked about a role at the country level for UNDP. And a broad range of countries rose – it was maybe the only piece in the secretary general's report that got stripped out in the negotiations. Many countries worried that the developmental functions of the U.N. be undermined if counterterrorism were specifically given a role through the UNDP at the country level. So there are sensitivities there that we recognize, and we have to tread cautiously.

But I think when we look at the way we are functioning as a system at the country level, what we do as a U.N. system does have a huge impact. And in some areas, if you look at what's happening in the occupied territories, the fact that UNRA, a U.N. entity, is providing 80 percent of the public services in Gaza. If you're trying to link development challenges and potential for development of new generations of terrorists, you've got to look at places like this. And UNRA may be some of the only remaining glue in Gaza. And I read this morning's paper on the shuttle on the way down, we are going into whole new terrain here in terms of pressure on the society in a place like the Gaza strip.

So when we do that – and the U.N. is the only operational actor really left – we need to link what we're doing to provide humanitarian and developmental and social

services to affected populations to this broader geo-strategic reality. That's something that we have to do at the U.N. and all of our entities combined. But we also need our member governments to help us with that. Our board of directors has to be sensitive to those issues as well.

MR. FLANAGAN: Thank you. There's a question over here and then I'll come back. Yes, ma'am.

Q: Hi, I'm Diane La Voy, House Intelligence Committee. I have two questions, one relating to the counterterrorism topic, and the other to global climate change. And they're both related to the bill passed three years ago, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, IRTPRA as we call it. One really is, one provision of that bill is to establish and has established a counterterrorism center – national counterterrorism center for the United States. Another provision is to really provide and push for the use of open source reporting and the interaction of our intelligence community with the rest of the world around intelligence.

And so my question to you, on both of those fronts, looking at global climate change and looking at counterterrorism is how are we doing? Has the bill made a difference? What are you seeing? Thank you.

MR. ORR: It won't surprise you that I can't comment on any specific piece of legislation of the U.S. or any other country. But I think in terms of the substantive thrust of your question, the notion of organizing and how we organize to fight terrorism in the first instance – before I get to the climate change piece – really matters, both at the national level and at the international level. We see similar challenges in governments across the world. Governments are still trying to figure out how to organize themselves to fight terrorism. Stove piping is not unique to Washington.

If there is one thing we've found through our increased coherence as a U.N. system, we engage the full range of actors in a government now. And what we find is, when you mention the open source issue, information flows from very different parts of governments and outside of governments. While we are not an intelligence organization – we have no intelligence function – using open information to inform policymakers' decisions is something we do on a daily basis. And I'll say, it's all out there. You don't need to go to much of anything classified to see what's happening in most parts of the globe. And I think one of our challenges is to gain the level of trust between the counterterrorism side of the equation and all of these other entities that operate in the most sensitive spaces on whether it's humanitarian development. We can't undermine those instruments as humanitarian development instruments, human rights instruments. We must kind of protect those spaces, at the same time integrating the information so that policymakers internationally and nationally can take good decisions.

One area that is very sensitive in all governments: human rights and counterterrorism. It's not just in this country this is an explosive issue; it's all over the place. But we have had some very good conversations in U.N. fora on this in part

because it's a common challenge for governments. They are struggling with this. The U.N. technical assistance providers have helped governments to write many laws around the world on counterterrorism. This is one of the areas where governments want guidance more than any other area. How do we protect human rights and further our counterterrorism agenda simultaneously?

This is really tough stuff, but I think it's through a forum like the U.N. that you're going to find that balance. Bilateral assistance in these areas is probably not going to be asked for or welcomed if offered, except in a handful of circumstances. So it's one of those areas – intelligence, that is most sensitive, in an area the U.N. traditionally is really outside the main thrust but where the flow of information we see certainly we can facilitate and it makes a difference.

On climate change, this is a fundamentally decentralized discussion traditionally. I think the negotiation that is about to begin, we hope, in Bali, will bear this out, but the fact is that while governments protect their sovereign privileges very closely, the recognition at the political level that there has to be a level of integration to deal with climate change, that we can have good national plans in every country in the world and it will not add up to a global strategy or a global solution. The targets needed just won't be met.

So it's how to integrate those internationally – those national strategies to get every country doing what they can, but then how to integrate them in an international strategy that will make the difference. That doesn't mean necessarily creating a global center or a tightly – an architectural answer, creating a big center on climate change, but what it does mean is coordinating the various policies in a way that achieve agreed goals and standards, and of course the negotiations.

So I think the challenge on the climate change side is quite different in terms of architectural solutions from the counterterrorism, but the one thing it has in common is that governments are turning, literally, day by day, hour by hour, more and more to the U.N. We have to take advantage of that. We have to step carefully because sovereignty is still very much alive and well in the world, and we see it more than any other place in the world, the U.N. where people are coming together in many ways to pool their sovereignty to solve problems. That is when they are also most acutely aware of protecting that sovereignty. So we're at the line between the pooling and the protecting of sovereignty, and that is the essence of how you deal with terrorism, climate change, and global health. These are all sensitive areas, but they are also areas where governments are increasingly ready to pool their sovereignty to deal with some of the threats.

MR. FLANAGAN: Dr. Shearer (sp).

Q: Thank you very much. Fascinating explication of case studies. But you almost by absence, you're poking a hole in a long-standing U.S. perception that the institution rises and falls on the quality of the diplomacy of the Security Council as an

institution. Most of your presentation was kind of bottom up with some very different stakeholders, which is quite interesting. But could you comment briefly on the council, where it is looking in particular at some key actors: China and Russia, who are at very different stages in their own trajectory, and how we are, we the United States, but also the U.N. broadly trying to grapple with some of the big issues on the council agenda, and what we should be looking for in the next six months to a year. Thank you.

MR. ORR: As always, I would expect Jim to ask a very good pertinent question. It wasn't an accident that I didn't focus on the Security Council issues. If you will, the three issues I addressed are definitely of the 192 variety, not the 15 or the five variety. It's because I think in the coming decades, if you take a multi-decade approach to what kind of big issues threaten humanity in various forms, we need to maximize the power of the 192-member instrument. We get into a habit, I think – and in this sense, I'm not a U.N. official; I'm saying we, the United States – I don't have the luxury of crossing that line, but I'd say we in the United States often look to the U.N. as the Security Council, and we've gotten a little bit lazy, if you will, in thinking about the U.N. as the Security Council. So I really want to kind of unblinder us a little bit and focus on the 192-member equation.

That said, there is a lot of interesting stuff happening in the council, in the council and with the council. You mentioned two of the dimensions, just the relationship between the great powers, the way that China and Russia in particular are engaging the world and through – and the world through the Security Council – it is evolving. This is very important to recognize. Old patterns don't hold as one might expect in Security Council deliberations the way they once did when I sat on the U.S. side.

But it's also about a much bigger equation. I talked about the surge in demands on the U.N. The most obvious and acute surge in demands is for peacekeeping. And when you and I worked on these issues, we were talking about 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers in the field. And of you guys across the river, that was too many. (Laughter.) But I think that the fact now that we are at 100,000, we're looking to move towards 126,000 for deployment in Darfur, and we're easily on a trajectory going up beyond that. It could be 140, 150,000 without too many imaginative leaps in the coming year. That puts us in a whole new realm in terms of global security.

People don't realize the U.N. is, after the United States, the number-two security provider right now globally in terms of number of personnel deployed around the globe outside your borders. No one even comes close. And it – you don't have to be too imaginative to imagine draw downs of the U.S. of Iraq and elsewhere, which in a few short-year's time, the U.N. can be the number one deployer of security personnel around the globe.

Now, I'm not asking for that – (chuckles) – but I'm looking at trend lines. And that means the U.N. is in a totally different basket from the way that American policymakers think about it. We think about it as an add on. Here is the real security challenge, and, oh, yeah, U.N. peacekeeping will be helpful in these little cases over here.

Don't think of it that way – I know you don't – but don't collectively in Washington think of it that way. We are in a whole new space here where the U.N. is playing in all of the most difficult places, and the U.N. needs – the U.S. needs the U.N. to play that role.

So what happens in the Security Council really matters because our operational role is so much bigger than it used to be. Our U.N. role is so much bigger than it used to be. And this is where the Security Council as an institution comes in. The credibility of the Security Council is at an all-time low. It's at a low partly because of the brass-knuckles debate over Iraq and the outcomes. It is under immense pressure right now with respect to Kosovo. We'll see what comes out in December or doesn't come out in December. That could add additional challenges to the Security Council. But if you take this in the aggregate, the need for the Security Council to be respected, its decisions respected, is at an absolute high, and the credibility of the Security Council is not where it needs to be.

This is where that whole debate over Security Council expansion comes in. There are a lot of capitals, those who want to be on, where this is the only subject – you talk about the U.N.; you're a U.N. official, and you go to certain capitals in the world. Security Council expansion is the only topic that you're asked to talk about. That seems pretty far away if you're sitting in Washington, but in fact it underscores a basic reality right now. The demand for U.N. services means people in uniform from many capitals that don't currently give people in uniform to the U.N.

We need to have a credibility for the decisions to be undertaken, and we need that capacity to be contributed to the U.N. from all of the different places to be able to perform the missions we're being asked to perform. And that is where the – whether Security Council expansion is the answer or not, that the debate is the right one. How do you get enough credibility and enough stake of all of the big players internationally that they are ready to contribute through the U.N.?

And if you look at our current efforts to build the force in Sudan, it puts the stuff you and I worked on in the U.S. government to shame in terms of the challenges. It is absolutely fundamentally to get high-quality troops in large numbers out to Sudan. That is very hard if a number of the players don't feel adequately represented in the U.N. So there is a governance issue that needs to be sorted. Neither I nor the secretary general will take any position on how it needs to be sorted, but that it needs to be sorted is very much a part of becoming reality so that this instrument that is being so heavily used right now will be up to the challenge.

MR. FLANAGAN: Just on that point, if we could for just a minute. On this issue of building capacity in the peacekeeping area, is the U.N. playing a role in orchestrating various national efforts or integrating them, you know, the ECOTA program, other things that are going on? How is that effort being – or is the U.N. playing a role in orchestrating that overall effort?

MR. ORR: I think the biggest role that the U.N. plays right now is in this unique and extraordinarily important partnership with the AU in Sudan. While the situation on the ground itself is enough reason to really invest ourselves heavily in Sudan, the important corollary is that we are constructing a partnership and a transfer of skills from the U.N. to a regional organization in the most difficult environment possible in Sudan. This is going to play out over years, I have no doubt.

The AU has a tremendous potential as a regional security player, but it is just starting down this path. The U.N., in working in a hybrid fashion already, even before the hybrid force has been fully deployed, we have been planning together, we have been training together, we have been working together for many months and will continue to do so. That transfer of skills to a broad set of actors in Africa could do more to enhance the security outlook for Africa than just about anything else that I can imagine.

All of the individual bilateral programs are crucial. Those are the building blocks we're going to need, but then the actual coordination of it will come through the multilateral infrastructure of the U.N. and the AU, and in particular the partnership of the U.N. and the AU. So we're crafting something very new. I am very pleased that the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress recognize the importance of this and allowed – and passed in its mission for Sudan U.N. funding for a hybrid force. This used to be a U.S. red line. You just can't fund through the Security Council a regional organization; that is just a taboo. You can bless it, you can do a lot of other things bilaterally, but if we're to make a regional security architecture that works in Africa, this may be the only way.

So I say that is the big one. We don't have a kind of a grand coordination cell for all bilateral programs that are building peacekeeping capacity. But I think de facto in our missions, not just in Sudan, but in Lebanon if you look at what is happening in Lebanon and the UNIFIL mission, that is another area where this is happening on the ground.

MR. FLANAGAN: Great. Adam Segal – (inaudible) – right here in the third row. Sorry.

Q: Adam Segal. I'll take the hat of being a board member of energy consensus. You talked a lot about – I was very interested about the coordination on terrorism and the bringing together. Who, if anyone, let's say, on energy is doing the same thing in the U.N. of bringing together all of the disparate elements of the U.N., everything from energy audits of offices, energy office audits of U.N. peacekeeping operations to development programs to try to change the U.N. and energy, and therefore its implications – the U.N.'s footprint itself in terms of global warming?

MR. ORR: This is great, Adam. I don't know you, and we have never met, and this wasn't prefabricated, but as of two days ago, the secretary general and all of the other chief executives of the U.N. system met in their annual chief executive board meeting, and one of the issues that they met on and agreed on was a U.N. approach to move towards a climate-neutral U.N., what it's going to take all U.N. operations move towards

a much smaller carbon footprint, which gets to issues like energy audits and everything else. We recognize the need to kind of walk the walk.

It's very hard when you're a member-state funded and driven organization from a management perspective to move down this path, but we are because of the importance as we move into the climate negotiations, the U.N. has to walk the walk.

In terms of the overall policy coordination on energy issues, the U.N. has been a marginal player historically. It can't continue to be a marginal player. We're too present in too many of the issues that affect the energy – (inaudible) – security nexus to remain a marginal player. That said, don't expect the U.N. to be coordinating anyone's energy policy anytime soon, but I think as we get into the climate change negotiations and the discussions of implementation of anything that comes out of those negotiations, the U.N. will I think be a major partner in implementing any of those agreements. And I think anything from alternative fuel – there is a lot of work going on in the U.N. system. I think that has to be kind of integrated more broadly.

Certainly the U.N. recognized this need. A couple of years back we created a – what is called U.N. energy. It is a standing task force of the various parts of the U.N. system that deal with energy in some way, shape, or form. So I would encourage you to maybe get in touch from the folks from U.N. energy and it's been capably led by the World Bank, which lest you not forget is a part of the U.N. system over the last couple of years. And that has just – the leadership of that has just transferred to a much smaller U.N. entity in UNIDO in partnership with the U.N. environment program. But there is a vibrant core of organizing going around energy issues, but I think we're talking baby steps right now, and we're going to have to get to adult-sized steps pretty soon.

MR. FLANAGAN: Thank you. Yes, there is a question – there is two questions. I'm sorry. Why don't we get both of those and then maybe – because we're running to about 15 minutes. So maybe we'll take two questions and see if – also, I'll be interested, does anyone have any questions on health. We haven't touched on point yet on global health.

Q: Thanks. Lawrence Wocher, U.S. Institute of Peace. Thinking about your remarks in the context of the broader U.N. reforms, and particularly the negotiations that led to the 2005 World Summit, and at least as I recall, the analysis of the successes and failures – I don't think the three issues you focused on would have been high on anyone's list of the areas where those negotiations led to the greatest progress. So I wonder if there is an implicit message about the best way to actually move towards political progress at the U.N. in comprehensive negotiations versus sort of more issue-specific.

MR. FLANAGAN: Okay, if we can take the other issue too, and –

Q: Yes, I'm Chip Locher (sp) from the U.S. Agency for International Development. I guess my question – I want to go back to this – to your three examples. And what struck me about the discussion about both health and your – particularly your

remarks about the IPCC, was the sort of the – the level of scientific and other kinds of – the U.N.’s role in sort of creating a scientific consensus around what the issues were and what the response is. And yet, when I look at the issue of counterterrorism, as a political document in terms of identifying what these contributing factors are to terrorism, but I’m just wondering, in terms of the information foundation, whether there is in fact an effort on the part of the U.N. to establish a little bit more of a scientific foundation about the sources of these – of counterterrorism or whether or not the U.N. is in fact satisfied that we understand exactly what is driving the problem.

MR. ORR: Right, two very good questions. Let me start with Chi’s. I think the question of the U.N.’s ability to mobilize scientific consensus was absolutely instrumental in kind of getting a real global shift on counterterrorism. I think the award to IPCC and Al Gore – the Nobel Committee doesn’t always get it, quote, “right,” but in this case recognizing an individual that kind of popularized the science for the globe, and then the large body of over 2,000 global scientists that did it from the bottom up is about how the world works. Sometimes it takes one person from a big platform for it to bottom up.

I think the building scientific consensus in various areas is key, and I’m glad you asked this question relating to both climate change and global health. We do need something comparable in global health. The data is out there and it’s flowing in from many places, but in order to have a joint kind of strategic approach to global health, you have to kind of agree on how to aggregate all of this data and what to do with it. So I think the scientific consensus part is a key first step in a number of the areas that we’ll be dealing with in the decades, and these two most certainly.

On CT, very good question to see what the linkages here – we did delve into – in the drafting of the secretary general’s report, just about every possible study out there about the, quote, “root causes” of terrorism. And that is why I say I never use the term “root causes,” is because the causality is very sketchy. And in fact, you know, when people try to make the linkage between poverty and terrorism, it just doesn’t hold up empirically. But what is interesting is we did find in some of these other areas – and there is seven or eight – I think it’s eight areas, that ended up in the strategy, where there is an empirical basis bases for these being conditions conducive to terrorism, whether it’s systematic abuse of human rights, whether or not it’s socioeconomic marginalization, and political marginalization of youth, these have an empirical basis, but I don’t think we have exhausted the need to go scientific in these areas.

What is happening essentially de facto is now on a issue-by-issue basis, we’re convening people, including those who can provide that scientific basis. Terrorism will always be maybe the ultimate in political issues, but we do need a scientific basis to get at this subset in particular, the conditions conducive to terrorism because right now it’s a very unscientific debate. It’s country X says, you know, this is what creates terrorism. Country Y says, that is what creates terrorists, and you can just have your own narrative, and you don’t get anywhere in terms of cooperation.

If we can start to narrow that, as we have now with the document, but go further on an issue-by-issue basis – how to people actually become terrorists? Well, we have lots of – (chuckles) – studies out there. Now we need to start aggregating this and then drawing some conclusions that people can sign up to to be able to fight terrorism.

On Lawrence's I think astute question about the relationship to moving change in broad packages or in issue-specific areas, the answer is we need both at different times. Two thousand and five, we actually got a lot through a package. Of the three issues I mentioned only one of which figured prominently in 2005, and that was terrorism. The strategy was negotiated later, but the agreement to negotiate a global strategy was in that 2005 document, and it benefited from the package approach in that sense. But the negotiation took place in the year following.

The other two issues, climate was in there as a political piece of the package, but it was not intrinsic to the negotiation in 2005. It kind of slipped through with a lot of other things. I think it does require at different points in time a linking-issues approach, and in others, separating them almost. You know, categorically separating them.

Right now in the U.N. system, we are very much in today's world in a separating mode. I think the linkages across issues right now don't look very helpful. So in terms of moving U.N. reform, in terms of moving various substantive packages, we are finding things moving better when they are kind of on their separate tracks, but at least moving in parallel so you can see the other tracks, the relevant tracks, so that what is important to one set of countries, they can look across the aisle and say, ah, I see my issues moving. I'm not going to link it to that, but as long as my issues are moving, I'm willing to play over here on this other track.

So if I could characterize it now, we are in a separate but parallel progress mode, and I don't see any other – anything else working in the immediate future.

MR. FLANAGAN: Okay, we have time for a few more questions. If we could pool them again, maybe this lady here in the first row and then second row here.

Q: Hi, I'm Erin Crowe (sp); I work for the State Department in international organization affairs. And I work on sanctions and counterterrorism. And I was wondering if you could comment on the inability of the U.N. to define terrorism and how that might stymie work on any other issue.

Q: Fairborz Ghadar, I'm a senior scholar here at CSIS. My question is not terrorist-related. Smart power has two dimensions, or maybe three dimensions. But one of them is public sector. And we've been talking about the public sector relevant to smart power. The private sector also plays a significant role by what they do, which enhances our power and also detracts from it. Given the U.N. institutional characteristic, is there a role for the U.S. private sector to enhance our smart power? Thank you.

MR. ORR: I think I'm going to work backwards again. On the private sector role, I couldn't agree more that the private sector is – if we're talking about the use of smart power, the private sector is going to be a piece of the equation in almost every issue that you deal with. There is almost no such thing anymore as a purely governmental issue. And traditionally, I would have said this is a handicap of the U.N. We are, after all, very much a member state-driven organization, and we suffer from some of the biases of kind of a state-centric organization. But what's interesting is our doors are much more open today to the private sector than they've ever been. The former secretary general started that in a quite robust way and the current secretary general is expanding it even more so.

As our doors open to the private sector in a range of areas, it provides the best of both worlds – the dynamism of the private sector and the interests of the private sector with a framework that is agreed upon by governments. It ain't always pretty. But when you can get all those actors in the room and get them focused on something, things are different. And I would say that one example of this is on climate change.

The secretary general, in making climate change a priority, has been reaching out to private sector as actively as he's been reaching out to governments – and vice-versa, the private sector has been reaching out to him. Any solutions we're going to see on climate change are going to actively involve major private sector interests from around the globe. And we're not going to have a successful negotiation if the private sector doesn't vote with its feet and say yeah, this is an agreement that I can sign up to and that I would move my money on. And that's not just American business; that is Indian business, Chinese business, Brazilian business, European business. We really need to take the whole broad range of business interests in mind.

The U.N. is not structured to deal with business in a classic way. We've had a very successful – I think – start on the corporate social responsibility side through the global compact. We've had a lot of individual partnerships with the private sector through peacekeeping, and a lot of our specialized agencies – direct partnerships with the private sector. But we have not integrated private sector into our regular decision making in the way that we will need to in the future. I think that is part of our agenda, seeing how important it is.

On the question about the difficulties of defining terrorism, in 2005, member states put two issues on the table. We would like a definition of terrorism to be able to complete the comprehensive convention, and we would like a global counterterrorism strategy. People put probably originally better odds on getting the definition and the comprehensive convention than they did on the strategy, because they saw the strategy as kind of interest-based, whereas the convention was legal, and maybe with some crafting you could find a legal definition that people could live with and move on.

In fact, in practice, it worked exactly the opposite. The legal definitions and the politics behind them stood firm. While governments around the world need to fight terrorism, they all see a problem in their countries and they want to deal with it. So the

strategy became a practical way to do that. And they agreed to put aside the definitional issue in order to get agreement on the strategy.

And in actual fact, there's not a problem there. There's not a contradiction. We can pursue common actions on terrorism without defining legally terrorism down to the last dotted I and crossed T because we already have 16 legal instruments defining terrorist actions. You don't necessarily gain that much more by finishing out the definition to be able to get full coverage on everything. Those 16 international legal agreed instruments provide a very strong basis for concerted action. And then, you can find other mandates that are maybe not of a convention nature, but that provide a solid basis for joint political action.

That said, I don't want to give up on the comprehensive convention, because I think it is doable. Member states came close a few years ago. The problem is that it revolves around two issues that are at the core of problems in the Middle East in particular, the issue of so-called state terrorism and the issue of freedom fighters versus terrorists. If there is reasonable movement in the Middle East, that could unlock it a bit.

It is also possible that we don't have to turn to the Middle East for the solution on this. Member states are cooperating on counterterrorism through the U.N. in a way they never have through the strategy. They're starting to learn they have a lot to gain by working together through the strategy. It is possible that when they review this strategy a year from now, and the breadth and depth of the cooperation among member states on counterterrorism, it seems that they might say, hey, why don't we go the rest of the way. I'm not going to bet my mortgage on it, but it is entirely possible that we could see the convention actually get unlocked by the positive progress on the strategy, instead of the reverse, which is what many people thought originally was the way to go.

MR. FLANAGAN: Very interesting. Well, I'm sorry, but we've reached the end of our time today. Bob, I want to thank you for both taking time to come down here and share your insights with us on some unexpected developments, I think, for some of us, in what's going on in the U.N. system today, and also for your candor in answering a very broad range of questions. And we wish you the best of luck in your work.

Before closing though, let me just remind you that out at the front of the room, there is an agenda schedule for upcoming seminar events. The next event in the smart power series will be – in these lectures and discussions – will be with former Ambassador Chet Crocker who served many years, as you know, as assistant secretary of State for African affairs. And he will be expounding on his vision of smart statecraft and how the United States can use it effectively. So we look forward to seeing some of you at future events in this series. And again, thank you all this morning for a very rich discussion. Thank you, Bob.

(Applause.)

(END)