January, 2009

As part of the ongoing "Schieffer series" here at CSIS (and co-sponsored by TCU), journalist Bob Schieffer moderated a discussions last night (video current on the CSIS homepage here) that featured George Schultz, Sam Nunn, Sidney Drell, and David Sanger.  The discussion revolved primary around the recent momentum, spurred in large party by the "Four Statesmen" op-ed, for moving towards a world without nuclear weapons.  Some of the most interesting points raised at the event include: -The role of young people/the sense of urgency-  Schieffer gave each speaker one last final statement and Sam Nunn closed the event by saying that the great opportunity before us is a call for young people to play an important role in doing the necessary work to figure out all of the complicated deals of every step involved in moving towards zero.  Schutlz's concluding statement also talked about the urgency with which there needs to be the productions of reports, conferences, revisions to those reports, etc.  He also mentioned how the importance of having scientists involved in all aspects of this process.

PONI Debates the Issues is proud to officially announce its first live debate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) from 5:30-7:00 p.m. on February 12, 2009 in the B1 conference center.  The debate will be the first in a series of live debates we are hosting at CSIS as an extension of the blog to help foster in-depth discussion and debate on important nuclear issues.  This debate will address the following topic:

Resolved: the United States Federal government should provide the requested funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.

The debate will feature two extremely qualified experts on the issue. Taking the pro side of the argument that RRW should be funded will be Clark Murdock, director of PONI and Senior Adviser at CSIS. Taking the con side of the argument that RRW should not be funded will be Joseph Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund. This opening debate will also congruently serve as the PDTI launch party and will include appetizers, refreshments, and an open bar. To RSVP for the event, contact the PONI blog here.  Due to the expected turnout for the event, RSVPs will be granted on a first come, first serve basis so we encourage you to sign up as quickly as you can.

After the Russian announcement about removing missile from Kaliningrad (post on the issue from yesterday located here), Steve Andreasen wrote an op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle today arguing to slow down the current missile defense trajectory that we are on.  Citing a combination of cost, unknown reliability, and political backlash Andreasen instead argues,

We should not succumb to bluster from Moscow - nor should we allow it to cloud our analysis of whether there is a better way to achieve our security objectives. Instead of deploying unproven missile defenses against a prospective Iranian threat, we should work intensively with Europe and Russia to build a genuine diplomatic offensive to curb Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Specifically, we should discuss the possibility of holding off on U.S. missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic in exchange for Russia's support for robust action, including further sanctions, on Tehran if negotiations to stop its nuclear and missile programs fail.

The recent "warming," or perhaps mild defrosting, of relations between the U.S. and Russia is certainly a welcoming sign.  Arms control type of problems are usually a place where the U.S. and Russians can find common ground even when relations are rocky.  Whether this spills over to other parts of the relationship will be they key question.  Russia has hampered U.S. efforts on Iran, particularly in the Security Council, for quite some time and so getting them on board to actually help pressure Iran will not be a simple task.  The other part of the equation that is missing is the role of China.  They have also been a strong voice of dissent and a change in the Russian position on Iran may not be enough to convince the Chinese to not veto tougher sanctions resolutions.  The Obama team is high on dialogue and cooperation which is a fresh new approach but we will see how it actually plays out in trying to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and other important problems.

According to Fox News, Gary Samore has been targeted for the position of "WMD Czar" that has come about from the recommendations of both the 9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission.  Initially announced by the Cable, Samore is another Clinton administration veteran that sources claim has accepted the position.  With more direct access to the White House Administration, Samore will have more power to get things done quickly in this new role.  Currently located at CFR, Samore's previous position was Director of Non-Proliferation at IISS.  A link to his CFR bio can be found here which also contains links to various speeches and publications to help get an idea of his views on various nuclear issues, particularly with relation to the Middle East. Given that the Bush Administration refusal to even set up the office, it will be interesting to see how the office's objective of "preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism" actually plays out in terms of substantive policy.  Samore has quite a bit of work published on Iran which is the primary focus for those trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to another state.  Does that become the focus or should the office be focused on issues like increasing domestic defenses and responses measures to a possible nuclear terrorist attack?  The relationship between the WMD Czar office and State will also be important to watch.  Hillary Clinton has clealry placed WMD-related issues very high on the agenda and so what role, if any, does the WMD Czar play in negotations with Iran and North Korea is up in the air.

There are reports coming from the Russian press (although subsequently denied by Defence Ministry) that Russia has decided to postpone their plans to deploy nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, according to the Guardian.

 Analysts today said if confirmed the Russian move - which follows a phone conversation this week between Obama and Russia's president Dmitry Medvedev - could open the way for renewed dialogue on other issues that divide the two countries . . . Today's Russian move can be interpreted as a Kremlin olive branch to the new US team and a tactic to put pressure on Obama to scrap the shield.  "These plans have been suspended because the new US administration is not pushing ahead with the plans to deploy the US missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic," an official told the Russian state news agency, Interfax.

While the measures on both sides are temporary, it does raise the possibility for a thawing of relations between the two countries.  Given the looming negotiations over the extension (or modification) of START and a host of other issues important for the U.S.-Russia alliance, these type of confidence building measures could go a long way in providing benefits to the relationship.  In terms of missile defense itself, it will be interesting to see where the program come's out in the equation of Obama's formula to evaluate the effectiveness of programs and reduce costs.  It could be targeted as a way to save $12.7 billion but also represents a program that has an entire agency devoted to it and many who strongly support its role in helping deter and defend against potential attacks.

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently issued a warning about the proliferation threat from North Korea and particularly Iran. He said that Iran could provide a "nuclear domino effect" in the Middle East, according to Reuters.  Adding a degree of urgency to the potential consequences of an Iran nuclear program, ISIS's Mark Fitzpatrick today declared, "During 2009, Iran will probably reach the point at which it has produced the amount of low-enriched uranium needed to make a nuclear bomb," according to SkyNews.   In the context of NATO, one of the primary questions is whether the United States will be able to get Russia and China on board for tougher sanctions to further pinch the Iran economy during this economic downturn.  At the same time, U.S. nuclear cooperation deals , such as the one recently signed with the UAE, may be an avenue to help check against a proliferation cascade in the Middle East.

Mark Thompson published a piece in Time yesterday discussing the looming battle between Obama and Gates over the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.  While Gates has repeatedly called for the RRW and defended its merits throughout the fall, the White House website actualized an Obama pledege against new weapons by stating the United States, "will stop the development of new nuclear weapons."  Period.  Thompson summarizes the standoff by arguing,

 Obama would have a difficult time reversing course on what is now a stated policy of his Administration instead of simply a campaign promise. And any move to produce new nuclear weapons will be read by other nations as a U.S. push for nuclear supremacy, even as Washington urges the rest of the world - Tehran, are you listening? - to do without the weapons. Russia would very likely respond by upgrading its own arsenal.  But Gates argues that building a new generation of more reliable nuclear warheads would give the U.S. the confidence to shrink its overall nuclear arsenal. After all, if you have only a 50% level of confidence that a nuclear weapon is going to perform as advertised, you'll need twice as many

Given the lack of official press on either meetings between Gates and Obama on the issue or a compromise to the competing ideas the RRW issue could be an early hot button issue to set the tone for the interaction between Gates and Obama throughout the administration. Thompson ultimately concludes that loose nukes are the largest terrorist threat and so, "A new batch of nuclear weapons, unfortunately, isn't going to change that."  While many people agree that nuclear terrorism may be the most likely short term risk, there are also large parts of the military and Washington that clearly think the United States will need to maintain a credible deterrence for an indefinite period of time and RRW could be one way to help ensure that.

The Wall Street Journal published an opinion piece this week briefly discussing the two Schlesinger reports.  While the Air Force has worked to implement many of the recommendations made in the first task report, the second report makes much broader claims about the atrophy of the nuclear mission throughout the DoD and the importance of our extended deterrence to allies and friends throughout the world.   The piece's conclusion goes a step further and argues for the importance of White House leadership to achieve some of the ideas set forth in Schlesinger 2,

It's now up to the Obama Administration to move on the task force's findings. But adopting the management and personnel changes the report recommends won't be enough. "Strengthening the credibility of our nuclear deterrent should begin at the White House," the report states. If the new President makes clear his commitment to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, that attitude will echo down the chain of command.

Obama's calls for moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons and support for various arms control measures add an additional element of complexity to the situation.  Obama's objectives and the call for increased deterrence credibility may not be directly at odds with each other but it will certainly not be easy to simultaneously achieve both objectives.

RAND and the Air Force are teaming up to host a seminar on deterrence at Barksdale Air Force Base today.  According to the Shreveport Times, the seminar will largely be classified.  Discussing the agenda for the meeting Lt. Gen. Robert J. Elder Jr. said,

This event focuses on global deterrence from a historical perspective, but with a view towards improving our capabilities today and posturing for the future.

In the wake of Schlesinger 1 and Schlesinger 2 it will important to see how the Air Force and the rest of DoD respond to both the lack of attention to the nuclear issue and also the deterrence calculations put forth in Schelsinger 2.  Stay tuned for updates of any press coverage related to the unclassified parts of the event. UPDATE: The Shreveport Times published an article on Saturday briefly discussing the unclassified opening remarks by Lt. Gen. Robert J. Elder Jr.

According to Global Security Newswire, North Koreans told Selig Harrison that they had weaponized approximately 30 kilograms of plutonium.  As part of the discussions the officials relayed the message that,

North Korea is now a nuclear weapons state and will not commit itself now on when it will give it up as a result of denuclearization negotiations

At the same time, the Associated Press recently reported that South Korea's number 2 negotiator confirmed that North Korea is in fact moving towards its goal of disarmament and Reuters published an article discussing a pro-Pyongyang paper's article about the North's willingness to work with the Administration. It will be interesting to see to how these seemingly different paths will be reconciled in negotiations with the incoming Obama Administration.  North Korean hardline attempts may make concessions at the bargaining table become even more difficult.  With Kim Jong Il's health constantly in question, it will be important to see who becomes in charge of calling the shots in North Korea.

PONI member Raja Karthikeya wrote the following original piece for the PDTI blog on the implications of U.S. extension of BMD to India:

BMD, India and the Atom

Raja Karthikeya Gundu (Junior Fellow - Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University)

The bilateral discussions to extend the US missile defense shield to India have restarted the debate about India’s nuclear posture and its implications for US security architecture. In recent years, India has made considerable strides towards a triad of nuclear delivery systems. Two of the three legs of the triad are fairly functional since the acquisition of Su-30s from Russia and the successful deployment of the indigenously developed Prithvi and Agni missiles. At the same time, since India has an avowed “no first use policy”, these fighter-bombers, and missiles are part of the India’s counterstrike capabilities which need to be safeguarded, ostensibly with a ballistic missile shield.  India has made an effort to develop an indigenous system - the “Pradyumna”. But, India has simultaneously been interested in acquiring the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system from the US, especially for exo-atmospheric interception of Chinese IRBMs.

In an intriguing letter, three former British military officials raised doubts about the need for the use of Britain's trident system.  The AP reported that Field Marshal Dwin Bramal and retired Army generals David Ramsbotham and Hugh Beach downplayed the ability of nuclear weapons to deal with the prominent threats in today's security environment.  Of particularly interest to the United States were a couple of arguments made about the role of the United States in Britain's nuclear affairs:

• The British rely on U.S. developed missiles, as evidenced by the December sale of 2/3 of AWE Management, Inc. to Lockheed and Jacobs Engineering, Inc.  places a large portion of the responsibility for producing Trident
• The role of U.S. support in deterrence calculations.  The letter was quoted as saying, "It is unthinkable that, because of the catastrophic consequences for guilty and innocent alike, these weapons would ever be launched, or seriously threatened, without the backing and support of the United States."

Should Britain scrap its Trident system? What role should the United States play in supporting British nuclear policy?

PONI member Michael Tkacik wrote the following original piece for the PDTI blog:

Gary Hart, former senator from Colorado,  published a piece about the current nuclear tipping point that exists in regards to the nuclear arsenal.  He cites the four statesmen op-ed and the creation of Global Zero as two of the largest reason behind bringing about this tipping point. When evaluating the reasons behind the shift, he postulates ideas that range from military to political to a care for future generations.  While the move toward global reductions has received increased press attention, there seems to be a great deal debate about the timeframe for these activities.  Hart argues,

Now faced with frightening economic consequences of unregulated market collapse and the prospects of a very long international economic recovery, a new Obama administration in Washington could well be looking at initiatives that bring increased security at little or no cost, or indeed that produce cost savings. Nuclear zero, elimination of nuclear arsenals, must be at the top of this list. It may be argued that the president must fix the economy first before anything else gains attention. This false argument assumes intelligent people can do only one thing, even one complex thing, at a time or that some talented economic people cannot carry out their project while other talented diplomatic people carry out quite another

How quickly can the United States move in the direction towards zero? How feasible is the realization of cost savings related to reducing the nuclear arsenal? How large of a role will nuclear reductions actually play on the very full plate of the incoming Administration?

PONI member David Gill contributed the following original piece to the PDTI blog: