March, 2009

PONI is proud to announce the second event in the "PONI Debates the Issues" live debate series.  The event will take place on April 13 from 5:30-7:30 pm at CSIS in the B1 Conference Center.  The topic for the debate will be:

The Obama administration should make the Global Zero vision of a world free of nuclear weapons a central focus of their foreign policy 

Affirming the resolution will be George Perkovich, Vice President of Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  Negating the resolution will be JD Crouch, Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and Former Special Assistant to the President. To RSVP for the event, you can do so here.  We encourage you to RSVP quickly because space will fill up quickly.

The PONI team has a busy upcoming week with the Annapolis conference and some other CSIS events so blogging may be a bit light but we will try to post as often as possible.

The economic crisis has helped bring the inefficiency of defense acquisition to the forefront of the DoD agenda.  With an Administration that seems ambivalent at best about missile defense, it is an obvious candidate for a program that needs to be thoroughly evaluated. The press from the past couple of days on the issue seems to generally agree: Aegis is in, Air Borne Laser is on the outs, and GMD won't be prom queen any time soon.  An interesting trio of vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright, Michigan Senator Carl Levin, and soon-to-be State Department undersecretary Ellen Tauscher all had some sharp words for some of the missile defense systems that are perpetually behind schedule and overbudget. According to the the American Forces Press Service, General Cartwright said,

Khamenei's recent rebuff to Obama's video reach out again raises the inevitable back-and-forth of how to try get negotiations off the ground.  Obama's video message mentioned that Iran's place on the international stage

cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization.

This week, Hillary Clinton tapped Ellen Tauscher for undersecretary of Arms Control and International Security.  According the Washington Times, former CSIS Senior Adviser Bob Einhorn was offered the position but chose to decline and instead take a senior adviser role. Joe Cirincione had an amusing commentary on the Cable:

Both are top shelf ... Bob Einhorn is the Thomas Jefferson of arms control-erudite, scholarly, and experienced. Ellen Tauscher is more Andrew Jackson--strategic, powerful, with a populist touch. Both are deeply knowledgeable, Bob with treaties and diplomacy, Ellen with nuclear programs and politics. ... Trying to stop Tauscher from getting a treaty ratified would like trying to stop Sherman from marching to Atlanta. Ideally, Secretary Clinton can get the best of both worlds, having Ellen Tauscher as Undersecretary and Bob Einhorn as a special advisor.

On Tuesday NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino testified before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development on Tuesday.  The transcript can be found on Atomic City Underground here.  The overriding theme was the need for the Nuclear Complex to become "smaller, safer, more secure and less expensive." While "smaller" may trigger some debate , "safer" and "more secure" are obviously laudable goals that no one would argue against.  One aspect of the safety and security debate, however, may be losing some steam.  According to GSN, a number of key senators wrote OMB to scrap their review of moving the complex from DoE to DoD.  The letter admitted the NNSA-DoE relationship "is in many ways dysfunctional" but nonetheless feel the effort should be abandoned. The dysfunctional relationship should serve as justification for the study to proceed so as to thoroughly analyze the NNSA and reform options both within the NNSA and moving the Complex elsewhere, such as the autonomous agency supported for by the new Stimson report (blog post here).

PDI wishes everyone a happy submariner day. As per ITAR-Tass, Russia spent theirs announcing the lay down of a new fourth-generation submarine.

Adam Lowther published an op-ed in the Boston Globe today that sets out to debunk some of the common arguments made in favor of the abolition of nuclear weapons.  True to the nature of debate, a format highly supported by this blog, the article outlines a series of arguments and then provides a response to each. PDI has taken it a step further and placed the pro-abolition and response together and then provided some commentary on the issue:

Argument 1

Pro-abolition: American political leaders have failed to alter nuclear policy for the post-Cold War security environment. Response: First, Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush were responsible stewards of the nuclear arsenal, bringing the number down from a high of 24,000 to the current 5,400, which will continue to decline to between 2,200 and 1,700 to meet the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty requirements. Nuclear-capable bombers were also de-alerted more than a decade ago. Cutting the size of the nuclear arsenal 80 percent is a substantial shift in policy.

PDI Thoughts: While cutting the current arsenal 80 percent is certainly a substantial shift, the question hinges on a complete analysis of the current strategic environment. Within that environment, the task is to find the appropriate balance between having a credible deterrent while minimizing risks such as terrorist theft that clearly increase with the number of weapons in the world.  The question of past cuts, however, sort of skirts the issue.  The arsenals maintained by the United States and Soviet Union were so vast that substantial reductions were a warmup.  Now it's time for the Big Dance, in the spirit of March Madness.  Given that reductions discussions are now within a ballpark that could substantially alter geostrategic security calculations, hammering out specifics and getting agreements from Russia and others will be much more difficult.

The PONI Blog Team has included some additional links in the "Reference Desk" section of blog.  Stay tuned for ongoing updates to the Reference Desk and the site as a whole.  If you have any comments or suggestions for the Reference Desk feel free to contact us here.

The Korea Times picked up on a recent CRS report written by (former CSISer) Mary Beth Nitkin and Emma Chalett-Avery.  The report puts the conventional anti-nuclear sentiments that exist in many parts of Japan in the context of recent developments throughout East Asia such as the 2006 North Korean test.  While a rising China and an unstable Korea certainly worry Japan, it is important to note that the report finds

Japanese officials and experts remain remarkably uniform in their consensus that Japan is unlikely to move toward nuclear status in the short-to-medium term.

As the debate on the timeline for Iran's breakout capability rages on, the New York Times had a piece over the weekend discussing the differing views of Director of DNI Admiral Blair and Israel chief of military intelligence Amos Yadlin.  Could the Israelis be hyping up the threat to try to convince the United States to increase pressure? Sure.  How confident are we in estimates for the total time needed for Iran to have enough LEU for a bomb, enrich it to HEU, and the produce the accompanying technology for a bomb?  Tough to say.  Without delving into the litany of breakout estimates it is nonetheless important to consider some of the implications of the lack of consensus: 1. The view from Jerusalem- The magnitude with which Israel views the threat of a nuclear Iran likely means that "the nuclear-threat clock ticks a lot faster in Jerusalem."  With Israel pressing for fast negotiation timelines, it is important for the U.S. and Israel to be on the same page to the greatest degree possible.  While the sensitive nature of this type of intelligence will no doubt complicate matters, the U.S. and Israel should try to be in the same ballpark when it comes to watershed milestones and timelines as the Iranian nuclear program progresses to reduce the possibility of an Israeli attack that could have drastic consequences. 2. How intelligence estimates could impact initial negotiations-  Accurate intelligence estimates are important to help determine where the U.S. puts the rough mark on the wall in the initial negotiations with the Iranian regime.  The U.S. has to delicately balance appearing to take the Iranians seriously while not ceding too much so as to embolden the regime.  Breakout estimates may implicate factors such as how long negotiations can take, whether a temporary freeze should be evaluated, and perhaps even whether the U.S. would allow some level of enrichment capability post-negotiations.  As it turns out, the negotiations themselves may prove just as tough, if not more so, than the journey to get there.

An article from the Economist yesterday had some thoughtful observations about the possible bilateral nuclear cuts between the U.S. and Russia.  With Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's sights set on a START following as evidenced by his statement, "This treaty, the present treaty, has become obsolete,"  there is still more homework to be done to adequately address some of the obstacles facing further nuclear reductions.   The Economist explains,

So might an early and radical chop in weapons numbers be announced by the two presidents next month? Mr Obama has already set "getting to zero" as the guiding principle of his nuclear policy, to loud applause from would-be disarmers. Some have speculated that he could go for an eye-catching first cut to 1,000 warheads each, with more to come. But that could be dangerously over-ambitious.

Theodore Postol published an op-ed in the New York Times that proposes a new take on missile defense:

The defense would have fast-accelerating interceptors that could home in on and destroy the large, slow and fragile ICBMs. The interceptors would weigh about a ton and could achieve a top speed of five kilometers per second in tens of seconds. They would be carried by stealthy unmanned airborne vehicles that look like B-2 bombers, but are smaller and carry much smaller, though still substantial, payloads. Such vehicles already exist.

The proposal, undoubtedly constrained by the length of an opinion piece, would have to be able to sufficiently prove the author's assertion that the system, "would be technologically feasible, and could be developed, built and deployed near the areas of concern in a relatively short time."  Missile defense is no easy game and Obama has shown his disapproval for "unproven" systems.  There also will be pushback on the idea that current missile defense plans are "provocative, unworkable" yet the new system would "pose no threat to Russia or China."  A cooperative missile defense arrangement with Russia, whether based in Eastern Europe or unmaned aerial vehicles, seems to be the one of the common solutions to allaying Russian fears.  If this came to fruition, it could be valuable by will be a difficult agreeement to reach.  China, however, would likely not remain quiet as U.S. interceptors flew within proximity of projected North Korean launch sites.  The system may not completely eliminite Chinese strike abilities but nonetheless could significantly alter deterrence calculations in Asia.  At the very least, the Chinese would raise havoc and would need some concessions to allow this idea to fly.

No country fears Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons more than Israel. Many in the Jewish State view Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat and take seriously President Ahmadinijad’s threats to “wipe Israel off the map.” Prime Minister – designate Benjamin Netanyahu made opposing Iran’s nuclear ambitions a central theme of his successful election campaign and heightened tensions with the Islamic Republic. As recently as this Sunday, OC Military Intelligence Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin remarked that “Iran had crossed the nuclear threshold’ and its attainment of nuclear military capability is now a matter of ‘incorporating the goal of producing an atomic bomb into its strategy." With an Iranian nuclear weapon seemingly imminent from an Israeli perspective, a recent piece by Louis Rene Beres in Haaretz calls for a reconsideration of Israel’s official stance of nuclear ambiguity. Beres states:

Press continues to pick up on the GAO report last week that talked about the management and cost difficulties that the Life Extension Program has encountered (the PONI blog had a post on the issue last week here) .  The Sunday Herald picked up on the issue with the title "How the US forgot how to make Trident missiles."  The sensationalist title is referring to the difficulties the NNSA faced in restarting Fogbank production for the W76.  The article likens the situation to

James Bond destroying his instructions as soon as he has read them

As North Korea prepares for some sort of launch, the United States is determining possible responses.   In addition to discussions of Japanese and/or U.S. missile interception, the U.S. has brought up pursuing action under United Nations Resolution 1718, an action mentioned again yesterday in statements from North Korea envoy Stephen Bosworth.  There are a couple of important considerations to evaluate with regards to Resolution 1718: 1. What constitutes a violation of 1718?  North Korea continues to hold they are just preparing for launch of a satellite as opposed to a ballistic missile.  The State Department said Friday the distinction between what is launched is irrelevant:

As everyone sacrificed an hour of sleep for some daylight this weekend, David Ignatius' op-ed in the Washington Post raised an interesting "two clocks" dilemma facing the Obama administration on Iran.  On the one clock, they want to be sure that negotiations are well planned, genuine, careful, and do not have arbitrary time limits attached.  On the other clock, the Iranians continue to produce LEU each day and so there is an incentive to get the talks moving or shift the goalposts for the conditions or outcomes of the negotiations.  Israel's military intelligence chief went so far as to say Iran is intentionally using the prospect of negotiations to by more time and that

Iran has crossed the technological threshold. Reaching a military-grade nuclear capability is a question of synchronising its strategy with the production of a nuclear bomb

The U.S. must work to develop a comprehensive strategy that it can begin to put in place so that it can get the ball rolling while also reassuring Israel so they do not consider unilateral military action.  One possible interim measure to help soothe Israel fears a bit could be to convince the Russians to scrap their potential S-300 sales to Iran as part of a larger missile defense negotiation. **Update: Richard Weitz published a piece today about the role of the S-300 in Russian Arms Sales to Iran**

 Above is the tile of one of the sections from the new Stimson Center report (PDF) that takes on many of the current issues facing the nuclear complex.  The report paints a grim picture of the "silent crisis" of atrophy within U.S. Science and Technology, both generally and within the nuclear realm.  For example, the report notes that

The amount invested annually by the US government into research in the physical sciences, mathematics, and engineering combined is equal to the annual increase in US healthcare costs incurred every six weeks. (Pg. 13)

While the primary focus of the report is the recommendation for an autonomous agency to oversee the nuclear complex, it is worth noting the report's mention of the importance of nuclear competence:

There was an interesting post on the LA Times blog today about a new scientific technique developed at Ben-Guiron University to "de-claw" plutonium that is created in large reactors.  This process, if found reliable, would render the plutonium unable to be used for weapons purposes by adding americium to "denature" the plutonium. Obviously nonproliferation benefits could be garnered from the ability to ensure plutonium could not be weaponized.  This technology could also be used as another offer proposed to countries on the path towards developing nonpeaceful weapons.   The offer to "de-claw" plutonium can be a nonproliferation "win-win": either the country accepts and therefore would be unable to weaponize their plutonium or their rejection helps build the case for strong international action to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons.  Russia's offer to host an international fuel bank at Angarsk is another good example of an offer of this nature.  If you give them an offer they shouldn't refuse, it increases the scrutiny to determine what exactly is happening.

The GAO recently released the unclassified version (PDF) of their January report analyzing the Life Extension Program (LEP).  In general, the report found that:

NNSA and DOD have not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks for either the B61 or W76 life extension program.

One of the primary problems that NNSA ran into was the recreation of Fogbank for the W76 warhead. Originally created in the 1980's, the production infrastructure for Fogbank was closed in the 1990's spare a small pilot facility.  While NNSA hoped that they could begin reproducing Fogbank with relatively ease, that was not the case:

 There has been a flurry of press in the past couple of days in response to story reported by the New York Times that Obama sent Medvedev a secret letter a few weeks ago essentially arguing that the U.S. would be willing to scrap its missile defense plans in Eastern Europe should Russia cooperate on Iran.  Both sides downplayed the rhetoric and were quick to argue that the proposal is not a linked quid pro quo.  While an explicit quid pro quo does carry its own risks, it is still useful to consider what an informal exchange of this nature would look like even if it's simply part of a broader warming of relations.  The primary question is what specific steps will be taken by the Russians. Brent Scowcroft has highlighted Russia's importance to solving the Iran problem but the question remains how and to what degree will Russia use its unique leverage over Iran?   This is particularly true given the problems some see ahead for the Russian defense industry in the wake of the economic downturn.  Will they cutoff helping with Bushehr?  Is cutting off sales of other types of military equipment to Iran on the table?  If Russia is unwilling to exert the degree of pressure needed or it proves insufficient, the option of a joint missile defense in Russian territory also has its skeptics, even if the United States were to agree.  The U.S. should work to figure out what exactly Russia is willing to bring to the table in this quid pro faux.

North Korea’s possible upcoming rocket launch will play an important role in the debate over missile defense. Japan, North Korea’s long-time nemesis, has declared it is dispatching naval destroyers equipped with anti-missile systems and is prepared to shoot down the test rocket if it approaches Japanese territory. Should Japan actually follow through on its threat, it could impact the future of missile defense initiatives well beyond Northeast Asia. Missiles represent an attractive weapon of choice for a number of rogue countries and groups. Aside from North Korea, Iran has made considerable progress in developing its own ballistic missile program and may soon be capable of striking America’s European allies. Hamas and Hezbollah, utilizing their own arsenals of Kaytusha and Kassam rockets, have successfully terrorized large sections of the Israeli populace.