June, 2009

PONI Debates the Issues is adding a new feature to the blog entitled “Fissile Material” that will provide a collection of some of the most interesting recent nuclear news stories and opinion pieces.  Without further ado, today’s fissile material:

Goldberg named to lead North Korea task force

EU wants to talk to Iran

Global Zero Commission presents 3 step plan

Kyl and Perle discuss deterrence

Lessons learned from inspectors

Finally got to read through the entirety of Keith Payne’s 2009 deterrence article.  In the same way the Strategic Posture Commission (of which Payne was a commissioner) balked at providing a specific number of nuclear weapons needed to the Congress, Payne makes a strong case about the problems of starting with a number centric approach and reverse engineering a strategic posture from there.  The article reiterates the importance of deterrence, damage limitation, assurance, and dissuasion, including a nifty venn diagram to represent the overlapping nature of various aspects of U.S. deterrence requirements.  There’s also interesting argument made in one of the early sections of the article:

The Cable reported today that Senator Kyl lifted the hold that he had placed on Ellen Tauscher’s confirmation for her new gig at State.  Hopefully, that will allow her (and CSIS alum Kurt Campbell) to get voted on before the July 4 recess.  This is yet another example, however, of the problem with the confirmation process.  As the Cable notes in their Monday post about the initial hold:

 Republican Senators — as well as some Democrats — have indicated that placing holds on nominees is one of the only ways they have found to get the administration, overwhelmed with multiple challenges, to respond to various gripes and concerns.

In an op-ed entitled “A New North Korea Strategy” published in yesterday’s USA Today, authors Stephen J. Solarz and Michael O’Hanlon argue that the latest round of U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea are capable of successfully resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis - dependent of course upon Chinese support. While it remains unclear how exactly this idea is a new strategy, the authors write that

The only real hope of getting North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons is to apply such significant economic pressure that the regime is forced to make a choice between economic collapse and the verifiable dismantling of its nuclear weapons and facilities.

A significant debate is occurring in the UK over whether or not to renew the Trident missile system set to expire 2024. With no replacement for the Vanguard-class submarine and Trident missile designated as yet and a defense review upcoming, MPs as senior as Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats, are looking to stop the renewal program before it begins. As the UK’s four Trident-armed Vanguard-class subs constitute its deployed nuclear arsenal, the debate over the Trident is in many ways a debate over what, if any, nuclear weapons the UK should possess.

As discussed in a previous post and underscored by North Korea’s recent behavior, CTBT entry into force is problematic. According to the treaty, the CTBT will enter into force 180 days after the 44 states listed under Annex 2 ratify it. Of these states, nine still have not ratified: the United States, China, Indonesia, Egypt, Israel, India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Is there a workaround for a situation in which just a few holdouts (or perhaps just one) remain?

A GSN article from earlier this month quoted Daryl Kimball and Jeffrey Lewis on the issue of issue of provisional entry into force. This basically means that even if the treaty didn’t come into force, the parties could, in Lewis’ words, “agree to act like it did.”

The first real test for the sanctions imposed on the DPRK by the U.N. Security Council has arrived. Resolution 1874 calls upon United Nations member countries to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of transporting prohibited materials or weapons. Since Wednesday, a U.S. Navy destroyer has been tracking the North Korean vessel Kang Nam - a cargo ship suspected of carrying missile components allegedly headed for Myanmar (details in the NYT story here).

Problematically, the U.N. resolution only allows for voluntary inspections or an inspection by local officials at a nearby port if the ship refuses to be searched on the high seas - which a North Korean ship most likely would. And, if Myanmar is indeed the ship’s destination, given that the ruling military junta receives arms shipments from the DPRK, a search in port is highly unlikely.

Chinese support of UNSC Resolution 1874 was initially celebrated as a significant step forward in the attempts to denuclearize North Korea. However, it appears increasingly likely that strict Chinese enforcement of sanctions on the DPRK is a pipe dream. The sanctions, designed to force Kim Jong Il to abandon nuclear weapons, are the harshest yet passed by the Security Council. As before though, China’s cooperation is the linchpin.

Unfortunately, China, since Friday, has made statements suggesting it will do as little to enforce UNSC Resolution 1874 as it has previous ones. A Chinese diplomat said:

North Korea’s behavior is unsettling for so many reasons and on so many levels. Such is life in a world where ego-maniacal despots still exist, however bizarrely. Speaking to the IAEA’s Board of Governors, Mohamed El Baradei lamented on the consequences of North Korea’s recent nuclear test.

I deeply regret this, particularly at a time when the prospects for progress on nuclear disarmament are far better than they have been at any time in the recent past.

Reflecting on the broader consequences of North Korea’s test and the latest round of sanctions embodied in UNSCR 1874, United Nations assistant secretary-general for policy planning, Robert C. Orr, insists that the P5 needs to “get North Korea right.”

With British politics in a state of array, there’s been some interesting press coverage in the past couple days regarding future plans for the Trident. On Monday, the Financial Times published an article about the pressure Brown is facing on the Trident renewal issue.  In particular, the article cites a recent report foreign affairs committee that states:

the Government should specify whether there are circumstances under which the UK would be prepared to suspend the Trident renewal programme.

Continuing down the path of aggressive outward rhetoric:

 North Korea warned Wednesday of a “thousand-fold” military retaliation against the U.S. and its allies if provoked, the latest threat in a drumbeat of rhetoric in defense of its rogue nuclear program.

Obviously North Korean statements need to be taken with a grain of salt but it is at least a little intriguing to think through how some of the escalation scenarios would hypothetically go down in this very Team Americaesque statement.  I’m just sayin: 1000-fold military retaliation is a lot.

There’s no doubt North Korea’s recent bellicose actions have Seoul and Tokyo in particular on edge given their proximity to North Korea.  As such, South Korea wants to take their relationship with Washington to the next level.  As Blaine Harden explains,

 As state media in North Korea continue to warn of possible nuclear war, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak flew to Washington for talks with President Barack Obama at which Lee is expected to seek a written promise of continued U.S. nuclear protection.  The United States has maintained a nuclear umbrella over South Korea since the Korean War and it periodically reaffirms that protection, although not at the level of a White House statement.

In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal last Thursday, John Bolton argues that Israel must strike Iran’s nuclear program now to avoid a more dire situation in the future. He rightly states “central to any Israeli decision is Iran’s possible response” and outlines six potential Iranian responses used as arguments against an immediate attack:

There is a new prospective player in the quest to solve the North Korea problem: Mongolia, according to the Washington Times.  Mongolian Foreign Minister Sukhbaatar Batbold indicated they could host a meeting between North Korea and the United States.  Apparently Secretary of State Clinton was “quite interested” but

State Department officials declined to comment on a mediating role for Mongolia with North Korea, but said Mrs. Clinton expressed appreciation for Mongolia’s troop contributions to Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the most recent issue of Arms Control Today, Daryl Kimball writes that:

Since there is no viable or prudent pre-emptive strike option and punitive sanctions alone cannot stop North Korea’s nuclear and missile buildup, the latest crisis requires a renewed diplomatic push, led by Washington, combined with the implementation of more effective economic, military, and political sanctions.

In that same vein, Leon Sigal today wrote on the North Korea crisis that the United States needs to engage in “sustained diplomatic give-and-take” - the result of which, he claims, would be “steps [taken by North Korea] towards full denuclearization.”

Haven’t these same tactics been used previously though in attempts to deal with North Korea? In fact, Kimball notes in an earlier piece of his article that:

Michael O’Hanlon’s  op-ed in the Examiner today defending Gates’ missile defense plans as “prudent and sound.”  In response to conservative criticism (similar blog post on the issue here) he says:

But this critique is overblown. The Obama administration’s proposed cuts to missile defense are measured and prudent. There is room for debate on specifics, of course. But there is no cause for alarm that we are lowering our guard . . . But on balance, a $10 billion-a-year program is pretty darn serious, and there are already multiple layers of redundancy. Given the other challenges facing the nation on and off the battlefield, Gates’ proposals are prudent and sound.

Based on the substantial technological obstacles to some of the programs in question and the host of issues facing the Department the proposed missile defense plans do not seem that far-fetched.

Armchair Generalist (a solid defense blog) argued against strategic ambiguity in saying:

I hate this game the politicians play - “we will retaliate and it will be massive,” but we’re not going to tell you if it’s coming by cruise missile with a nuclear or conventional warhead. For some reason that I don’t fathom, this “strategic ambiguity” is supposed to be the preferred diplomatic response. I suppose “civilized” nations aren’t supposed to openly discuss the potential of nuclear warfare, except behind closed doors. It might offend the senses.

The Strategic Posture Commission outlines the general defense of strategic ambiguity when it states:

Hillary Clinton appeared this weekend on ABC’s This Week and continued the series of warnings about regional arms races stemming from the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea.

We want to avoid a Middle East arms race which leads to nuclear weapons being in the possession of other countries in the Middle East.

John Boehner’s op-ed in the Chicago Tribune continues the trend of Republicans criticizing the Obama/Gates decision to reduce the missile defense budget by $1.2 billion.  Missile defense is always a contentious issue but his characterization is not quite right.  Written in the context of North Korea being Obama’s “3 a.m moment” he says:

I urge the president to reverse his opposition to a national missile-defense system . . .I have been disappointed by his decision to gut missile defense funding in his Defense Department budget proposal.  Instead of supporting a “national” missile defense system that would protect our citizens from a potential attack, the administration proposes a “theater” system that would protect just the troops in a given part of the world, leaving our shores vulnerable. That’s the national-security equivalent of bringing a knife to a gunfight and it puts us in greater danger should North Korea continue building its nuclear program.

Gates’ decided not to increase the 30 ground-based interceptors but as he told the SASC on 14 May that is capable to deal with the North Korea threat: