October, 2009

Scholar Dilip Hiro has come forward with an interesting article on why Obama's approach to Iran is unlikely to bring about the changes that the U.S.

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran Rejects Deal to Ship Out Uranium, Officials Report
NYT by David E. Sanger, Steven Erlanger, and Robert F. Worth

US trying to gauge Iran nuclear response: Clinton
AFP

The Return of Israel's Existential Dread
WSJ by Yossi Klein Halevi

Russia to boost Obama with nuclear treaty: report
AFP

Panel 6 looked beyond the arsenals of the US and the UK to evaluate the views on nuclear debates from other countries. From a broad level, there was a discussion about how countries around the world perceive U.S. nuclear policies and what the possible implications are for U.S. policy moving forward.

After the first day addressed a variety of broadly international nuclear issues, Panel Five turned inwards to focus on the conference’s host country and discuss “Key Issues Affecting UK Nuclear Posture.” The focal points of the discussion were how the UK could approach a scaled down submarine-based Trident force and ballistic missile defense, specifically the effect of the U.S

FISSILE MATERIAL
The Next Steps on Nonproliferation
Foreign Policy by Hillary Rodham Clinton

US Must Plan for Nuke Wars
DOD Buzz by Greg Grant

Iran to propose two amendments to IAEA deal: report
AFP

Why Iran Will Push Back on the West's Nuclear Offer
Time by Tony Karon

After a delay due to flying, PONI has summaries for the last three panels from the Fall conference in the next day. Panel 4 tackled the tough task of zero and sought to identify many of the key obstacles in moving to a world without nuclear weapons, including the possible problems posed by technological advances over the past sixty years.

There was a lot of discussion about nonproliferation and disarmament last week.  In addition to Clinton's speech and the Arms Control Association's Iran panel (discussed here), both the Hudson Institute and the Elliot School's new Institute for Security and Conflict Studies hosted panels.

On Wednesday morning (10/21), two different Hudson panels discussed "U.S. Nuclear Weapons, Fron 32,000 to Zero" and "Enlisting Other States and international legal regimes to strengthen nuclear security--Nonproliferation and Arms Control" respectively.  Panelists included Jack David, Paula DeSutter, Douglas Feith, Christopher Ford, William Hartung, Abram Shulsky, Walt Slocombe, and Ashley Tellis.

On Thursday evening (10/22), the Elliot School panel discussed "Nuclear Futures: The Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament."  Panelists included Ambassador Abdallah Baali, Ambassador Bonnie D. Jenkins, Joe Cirincione, and Charles Glaser.

Within and between the events, there were a diversity of viewpoints, but one important question emerged:  What is the connection between disarmament and non-proliferation?  Is it possible, in the short-term, for the U.S. to demonstrating that it is fulfilling its obligation under Articles VI?  Will U.S. nonproliferation credibility lead to tangible benefits in the nuclear nonproliferation regime?

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran set to respond to atomic deal this week
Reuters by Reza Derakhshi

Iran backs uranium plan outline, but seeks changes
AP by Nasser Karimi and Brian Murphy

US making plans for Iran nuke strategy
AP by Robert Burns

Ex-US diplomat: Russia balks at zero nuke talks
AP by Douglas Birch

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran to accept nuclear fuel deal: TV
AFP by Jay Deshmukh and Farhad Pouladi

Iran officials appear split on nuclear plan
WP by Thomas Erdbrink

Why it's sane for Kim Jong-il to be mad
Reuters by Andrew Marshall

Concern mounting in U.S. over Japan's foreign policy
Kyodo News

Panel 3’s topic of “preventing nuclear proliferation” spurred an interesting discussion among participants about some of the relevant tools that can be used to stop nuclear proliferation.

Panel 2 looked at “Responding to the Spread of Dangerous Materials and Technologies.” Speakers and guests delved into thinking about what type of verification efforts would be needed for a FMCT and whether it would be possible to draw on existing measures to help craft these guidelines.

FISSILE MATERIAL
Korean Envoy Meets with U.S. Official
Chosun Ilbo

Both Iran and West Fear a Trap on Deal
NYT by David E. Sanger

UN inspectors visit once-secret Iranian site
AP by Ali Akbar Dareini

Turkish PM exposes nuclear rift in Nato
Guardian by Robert Tait

FISSILE MATERIAL
Calls for nuclear weapons in South Korea
UPI by Lee Jong-heon

What might derail the Iran nuclear deal?
CSM by Robert Marquand

Senior Iranian MP casts doubt on atom fuel deal
Reuters by Parisa Hafezi

Israel Signals Concern on Iran Talks
NYT by Isabel Kershner

Today, administration officials and Iran watchers wait to hear whether Iran's leadership will agree to ship a substantial portion of its nuclear fuel to Russia, where it would be converted to fuel rods and returned for use in a medical research reactor.  A successful deal could have a number of advantages.  It would delay Iran's ability to create a nuclear weapon by decreasing its stock of enriched uranium.  The deal might also serve as a confidence building that could pave the way for future agreements limiting Iran's nuclear program. While there was agreement in principle, the Iranian delegation had to get approval from Tehran, which, they admit, is not certain.  Iran has until tomorrow to approve the agreement, and analysts disagree about the likelihood that Tehran will accept.

The proposal is an important test of Iranian intentions.  If they say no, White House officials have said that would show they aren't interested in real negotiations.  If they say yes, officials would be cautiously optimistic that an agreement that resolves the dispute over Iran's nuclear program might be possible.  Either way, it's important to remember that these negotiations are only a stepping stone.  Whatever Iran's reaction to this proposal, there will be months, if not years, of negotiations to come.

Future negotiations and the appropriate long-term policy for dealing with Iran was the topic of an Arms Control Association (ACA) panel this morning.  The event, hosted at Carnegie, featured Paul Pillar of Georgetown, Greg Thielmann of the ACA, and James Dobbins of RAND and was moderated by Peter Crail of ACA. In an hour and a half, the panel discussed intelligence, Iran's capability and intentions, and the appropriate role of negotiations.  There were a few important takeaways.

After a bit of an extended absence, PDI live debates are back with a bang. Debate 5 will feature John Steinbruner of UMD fame and Walt Slocombe from Caplin and Drysdale debating the timely subject of de-alerting. Details as a follows:

Date: Thursday, November 5
Time: 6:00 – 8:00 pm (a bit later than previous events)
Topic: Physical de-alerting
Location: CSIS B1 Conference Center (1800 K St NW)

To RSVP, contact Chris Jones via e-mail here or phone at (202) 775-3234.
 

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran Envoy Backs Uranium Deal, but Will Tehran?
AP by George Jahn

What's With Iran?
NYT by Mark Medish

Clinton cites nuke worry; panel fears bio attack
AP by Robert Burns

Gates Pledges Nuclear Umbrella to Counter North Korea
NYT by Reuters

FISSILE MATERIAL
Lowering the alert levels in U.S. and Russia
WP by Walter Pincus

U.S. Seeks to Keep Watching Russia’s Weapons
NYT by Thom Shanker and Peter Baker

Why a Month Matters
Foreign Policy by Nima Gerami and James M. Acton

Nuclear talks delayed as Iran objects to France
AFP by Simon Morgan

NOH picked up on Friday’s post questioning Joe Cirincione’s use of the statements of the mayors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki as providing strong evidence to answer the title question “Will Japan Go Nuclear?” to quip

Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on Sunday called on the United States to make a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. Okada is not from Hiroshima or Nagasaki, so is it okay to listen to what he says, PONI?

Another uninteresting PONI potshot that doesn’t answer the original post aside, one should look at what Okada was actually quoted as saying when speaking in Kyoto: 
 

We cannot deny the fact that we are moving in the direction of no first use of nuclear weapons. We would like to discuss the issue with Washington [emphasis mine]

According to a recent post by Hans Kristensen on the FAS Strategic Security Blog, the Obama administration is seeking to delay action at the U.N. on de-alerting nuclear forces:

The Obama administration has asked four countries to postpone a resolution at the United Nations calling for reducing the alert-level of nuclear weapons.
The intervention apparently is intended to avoid the Obama administration having to vote against the resolution before the important Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 2010 — on an issue Barack Obama promised to support when he ran for president.
The resolution, which was last adopted by the U.N. General Assembly with overwhelming support on December 2, 2008, calls for “further practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status.”

To some, the request might appear surprising.  Obama has been a staunch advocate of nuclear disarmament and a reduced role for nuclear weapons.  And, as Kristensen notes, de-alerting of U.S. nuclear forces was one of Obama’s campaign promises.  So, why would he delay action on something that he previously supported?  There are two possible explanations.  Either the White House changed its mind, or it decided to focus on other issues.

Not to beat the dead horse that is quickly becoming the Iran sanctions rhetoric, but, a follow-up to the post I made on this subject a few weeks ago seems appropriate given the developments of last week. Clearly, the proper place to begin here is with the recent quote by Russia's foreign minister Sergey Lavrov that "threats, sanctions and threats of pressure in the current situation, we are convinced, would be counterproductive." This not only comes after Russian president Dmitri Medvedev previously stated that sanctions are sometimes inevitable, but also flies in the face of the Obama administration's attempts to present Iran with an international front united against its nuclear program. More important than the implications of this for Obama's credibility though

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran says will enrich uranium if no deal in Vienna
Reuters by Parisa Hafezi

Russia Worries About the Price of Oil, Not a Nuclear Iran
WSJ by Garry Kasparov

Japan to pressure U.S. over no pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons
Mainichi Daily News

Conferees Approve Study of Nuclear Bomb
WP by Walter Pincus

Joe Cirincione had a piece in the Huffington Post recently titled “Will Japan Go Nuclear?” As I’ve argued previously, the idea that if we go to 1,499 deployed strategic warheads or consider getting rid of

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iranian go-slow dims deal chances at Vienna atom talks
Reuters by Mark Heinrich

U.S. Considers a New Assessment of Iran Threat
WSJ by Siobhan Gorman and Jay Solomon

Obama loosens missile technology controls to China
Washington Times by Bill Gertz

Beijing Is Violating North Korean Sanctions
WSJ by Gordon G. Chang

CSIS is happy to announce what we'll deem the "beta" version of our "Comprehensive Framework" project.  The full project page is located here (also check the handy brochure made he

FISSILE MATERIAL
US says level of unity on NKorea near 'unprecedented'
AFP

House allows states to sell funds linked to Iran
AP by Jim Abrams

Some See Iran as Ready for Nuclear Deal
NYT by Michael Slackman

China's Hard Choices on Iran
World Politics Review by Jon B. Alterman

FISSILE MATERIAL
Russia's new military doctrine allows pre-emptive nuclear strikes
RIA Novosti

A different regime change in Iran
Financial Times by Richard Haass

India tests nuclear-capable missiles
UPI

U.S. Official Praises China's Role in North Korea Negotiations
WSJ by Jason Dean

President Obama recently roped in the Nobel Peace Prize, in part because the committee "attached special importance to Obama's vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons." Whether Obama should have received the Nobel Peace Prize and the implications of receiving the award is beyond the PONI purview but it raises an interesting question of how Obama's "extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and co-operation between peoples" plays out in nuclear nonproliferation land. James Kitfield at GSN had a good read about some of the obstacles the Obama administration will face on its nuclear agenda. His analysis of the domestic political scene was pretty spot on but I differ a bit with some of the international section of the piece. On Iran he argues,

The administration's first gambit was last month's decision to scrap a proposed missile defense system in Eastern Europe, a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. Resetting that relationship was important not only in paving the way for a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in December but also in persuading veto-wielding Moscow to accept tougher U.N. sanctions on Iran for its clandestine nuclear weapons program. If Iran is able to shake off weak sanctions and thumb its nose at the Security Council by acquiring and eventually testing a nuclear weapon, it could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and scuttle any chances for Senate ratification of the test-ban treaty, dooming the administration's nonproliferation agenda.

FISSILE MATERIAL
U.S., Russia must lead on arms control
Politico by Brent Scowcroft, Joseph Nye, Nicholas Burns, and Strobe Talbott

Iran will enrich uranium further if talks fail
AP by Ali Akbar Dareini

Amid Missile Tests, North Korea Agrees to Talks
NYT by Choe Sang-hun

Russian FM: 'considerable' progress on arms treaty
AP

Despite the proclamations that the nuclear talks with Iran in Geneva last week represented a "positive step" - the talk of enacting new sanctions on Iran continues. Yesterday, Stuart Levey, the Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence stated that a comprehensive and sweeping set of sanctions was being prepared if Iran fails to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. This rhetoric is far from new though. Sanctions were passed against Iran in 2006, 2007, and 2008 - to no avail - and this year both the Obama administration and Congress have been loudly threatening Iran with a new line of sanctions if it does not cooperate. And, with Obama's September deadline to Iran apparently punted in light of an "agreement in principle" at Geneva - despite the revelation of the Qom nuclear facility - expect the sanctions talk to continue.

Is a sanctions regime the right course of action to take though? The case against sanctions generally revolves around three main points:

EAST ASIA

1. French envoy calls for substantial nuclear talks
Associated Press
October 7, 2009
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iURO8fOyWVOA0ytFlaAGuC9F7R9wD9B680L80
 

I stumbled across this rather interesting opinion by novelist (no idea what kind) Bok Koh-ill in the Joongang Daily:

If North Korea strikes us with nuclear arms, would the umbrella over our heads really work as planned? It is a question none can answer as the umbrella has never been tested.  But whether the American president would actually order the firing of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads against North Korea remains unknown. The U.S. chief executive may hesitate to chance nuclear apocalypse over a relatively small North Korean nuclear provocation if it doesn’t pose immediate danger to Americans. Washington may close the affair with sanctions or similar action if the North gives an explanation and apologizes for its attack. There is no guarantee that North Koreans won’t exploit this weakness in the American nuclear umbrella. They have gotten away with atrocious terrorist attacks before. Even if they don’t actually launch a strike, they could use the threat to achieve other ends. Whatever the case, we cannot tolerate North Korea as a nuclear power . . . If North Korea becomes a nuclear weapons state, we too have to develop a doomsday machine, or nuclear weapons.  We must speak up. The weakness in the American umbrella is too risky and perilous and the North Koreans are too belligerent.  We must pronounce that if North Korea is recognized as a nuclear power, we cannot do anything but develop weapons ourselves. That is the only deterrence against North Korea becoming a nuclear arms state. [Emphasis Mine]

EAST ASIA

1. S.Korea raises concern over China-N. Korea economic deals

Yonhap News by Lee Chi-dong

EAST ASIA
1. N. Korea calls for increased exchange, cooperation with South
Korea Herald
October 3, 2009
http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2009/10/03/200910030005.asp 

FISSILE MATERIAL
Q+A: What's behind Geneva agreement on Iran's enriched uranium?
Reuters by Louis Charbonneau

Inspectors Prepare to Visit Qom Facility
WSJ by David Crawford and Joe Lauria

Obama agrees to keep Israel's nukes secret
Washington Times by Eli Lake

GOP memo spells out demands on START talks with Russia
The Cable (Foreign Policy) by Josh Rogin 

Carnegie held an event Tuesday called "Rethinking U.S. Nuclear Posture" (video is now available here).  Chris already covered Jeffrey Lewis's discussion of extended deterrence.  The other half of the discussion featured Michael Gerson laying out the case for No First Use (NFU).

According to Gerson, U.S. nuclear policy, which maintains the option of nuclear first use as part of a policy of calculated ambiguity, is not credible and dangerous.  Gerson argued that there are three main reasons other countries don't believe the U.S. would initiate a nuclear conflict:  1) The perception of the U.S. (especially under the Obama administration) as risk averse causes countries to question whether the U.S. would be willing to break the nuclear taboo 2) If the U.S. used nuclear weapons first it would do irreparable harm to its nonproliferation leadership 3) After the Gulf War, U.S. military planners revealed they had no intention of using nuclear weapons to counter chemical attacks.

As the U.S. begins negotiations with Iran over their nuclear program there needs to be an honest assessment of how important a nuclear weapon is to Iran. Iran’s nuclear efforts, whether civilian or military, have to be viewed in context.

Why Iran wants nuclear energy for civilian use

There is a real argument that Iran’s primary goal is to pursue effective nuclear energy. Although Iran has the third largest oil reserves and the second largest gas reserves they lack a domestic refining ability which forces Iran to rely on imported gasoline. A domestic nuclear energy capability would diversify their economy away from oil, establish energy independence, reduce Iran’s susceptibility to fluctuations in oil prices, and enhance a growth rate that while impressive, significantly trails their neighbors on the south side of the Persian Gulf. Further, nuclear energy would establish a national industry that would bolster Iran’s 12.5% (probably grossly understated) unemployment rate, a weak point for Ahmadinejad in the Presidential elections.