November, 2009

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran defies censure, plans 10 uranium sites
Reuters by Parisa Hafezi and Reza Derakhshi

Iranian lawmaker: Iran could leave nuclear treaty
AP by Ali Akbar Dareini

Russia Vows Quick Completion Of Iran Atom Plant
Radio Free Europe by Reuters

Russia, U.S. to sign arms pact, may miss deadline
Reuters by Denis Dyomkin

Roger Cohen had an op-ed recently discussing the challenges facing the Obama and quoted Henry Kissinger who observed:

FISSILE MATERIAL
Big powers draft resolution to press Iran at IAEA
Reuters

Waiting for Tehran
Foreign Policy by Carol E. B. Choksy and Jamsheed K. Choksy

Iran official warns Russia of legal action over S-300
Reuters

Mullen leads US in arms control talks with Russia
AP

FISSILE MATERIAL
Japan lobbied for robust nuclear umbrella before power shift
Kyodo by Masakatsu Ota

Iran Says Needs Guarantees to Ship Nuclear Fuel
NYT by Reuters

Indian Army chief's remarks reflect offensive nuclear doctrine: Pakistan
IANS

U.S., Russia study ways to extend START verification
WP by David Alexander
 

FISSILE MATERIAL
U.S. Experts Visit N.Korea
Chosun Ilbo

Iran Testing Air Defense System for Nuclear Plants
Bloomberg News by Paul Tighe and Ali Sheikholeslami

U.S. and India Hone Nuclear Pact for Singh's Arrival
WSJ by Amol Sharma and Jay Solomon

U.S. Treaty-Monitoring Presence at Russian Missile Plant Winding Down
GSN by Elaine M. Grossman
 

In its safeguards report on Syria released Monday, the IAEA noted a number of ongoing discrepancies between Syrian statements and evidence gathered from the suspected reactor that Israel destroyed at Al Kibar in 2007 and the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) under IAEA safeguards in Damascus. Syria refuses to discuss Al Kibar (aka Dair Alzour), and requests to view technical documentation of the destroyed building and access to its debris, the munitions that destroyed it, and any salvaged equipment remain unanswered. Traces of anthropogenic (chemically processed) natural uranium found at the site remain unaccounted for. While Syria alleges that the traces originated with the Israeli missiles used in the strike, it refuses to substantiate the claim, and the Agency has all but ruled this explanation out.

This CSIS just released the final product of its U.S.-U.K.-France Trilateral Dialogues on Nuclear Issues.  The final statement comes from a group of high-level "Track 2" participants who were assembled to discuss nuclear issues and identify areas of consensus between the three countries.  The CSIS, led by CEO and President John Hamre, Senior Adviser Clark Murdock, and Non-Resident Senior Adviser Franklin Miller and with support from Fellow Jenifer Mackby and Research Assistant Chris Jones, hosted three meetings to develop and sharpen the statement. 

The final statement, entitled "Trilateral Nuclear Dialogues: Toward a Common P3 Approach on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Energy Use, Disarmament and Material Security," focuses on the shared assumptions and objectives, common policy agenda, and specific initiatives and tactics that the three countries should focus upon over the next few years including at the May 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

In addition to outlining a number of specific initiatives the three countries should support, one of the key takeaways from the statement is the importance of priorities. The four main priorities identified are: 1) Strengthening the non-proliferation regime; 2) Pursuing disarmament; 3) Providing for the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and 4) Rapidly secure global nuclear inventories.  And, according to the statement, focusing on these priorities will be critical to success:

FISSILE MATERIAL
ElBaradei urges Iran to agree fuel deal by year end
Reuters by Dave Graham

Outlook for tough Iran sanctions is dim
AP by Robert Burns

IAEA inspectors revisit disputed Iran nuclear site
Reuters by Mark Heinrich

Panel Sees No Need for A-Bomb Upgrade
NYT by William J. Broad

Earlier this week Carnegie hosted an event earlier this week as part of the roll-out for Deepti Choubey's new report Restoring the NPT: Essential Steps for 2010.  At the event, Carnegie’s George Perkovich moderated a discussion between Choubey and Egypt’s Ambassador to the United States, Sameh Shoukry that covered the report and the prospects for success at the 2010 RevCon.

While emphasizing the importance of next year's meeting, Choubey worried that the expectations might be too high.  President Obama's talk of disarmament and a world without nuclear weapons has raised the bar.  However, realistically the U.S. will have little tangible gains in disarmament by next May.

The U.S. and Russia will likely agree to modest reductions in a new START treaty that will hopefully be ratified, but there is almost no chance that the U.S. will have ratified the CTBT by that time.  During the discussion at the event, Choubey said START wouldn't be enough.  She explained:

FISSILE MATERIAL
North Korea Arms Trade Funds Nuclear-Bomb Work, UN Panel Says
Bloomberg by Bill Varner

Minister Says Iran Won’t Ship Uranium Abroad
NYT by Michael Slackman

Iran Imperils Western Nuclear Deal
WSJ by Chip Cummins and Jay Solomon

The Conventional Arms Control Challenge
Foreign Policy in Focus by Frida Berrigan

FISSILE MATERIAL

North Korea's nuclear plans cloud Obama in Seoul
WP by Jon Herskovitz and Patricia Zengerle

Iran rejects sending uranium abroad, considers swaps
Reuters

Secrecy shrouds Iran's contingency centers
Asia Times by Gareth Porter

Why China Isn't Willing to Get Too Tough on Iran
Time by Bill Powell

There’s been an exchange over the past few days between us and NOH about an op-ed published on CTBT ratification (the original article, the initial response, th

FISSILE MATERIAL
Inspectors Fear Iran Is Hiding Nuclear Plants
NYT by David E. Sanger and William J. Broad

Iran wants nuclear fuel swap to take place on its own soil
The Hindu by Siddharth Varadarajan

IAEA deepens Syria atom probe over uranium traces
The Star by Reuters

New Russian-U.S. arms reduction treaty hampered by differences
RIA Novosti by Ilya Kramnik

Courtesy of ISIS, the IAEA today released new safeguards reports on Syria and the Iranian nuclear program.

On the Qom facility, now known as the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), Iran explained to the IAEA that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had been allocated the site in the latter half of 2007 and that “that was when the construction of the FFEP had started.” Iran reiterated that explanation in an October 28 letter:

“As a result of the augmentation of the threats of military attacks against Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to establish contingency centers for various organizations and activities . . .  

There has been quite a news deluge out of the nuclear world lately, which, while beneficial for blogs dedicated to the analysis of things-nuclear, is certainly rather problematic for the United States and the nonproliferation world. Although the stories concerning North Korea and Iran appear to be running on repeat, with little apparent progress in either direction, the nonproliferation regime as a whole seems to be inching ever closer to the brink. This, of course, is not an attempt to write the post-to-end-all-posts, but the nuclear developments (or lack thereof) during these latter months of 2009 are troublesome and merit consideration as part of the bigger picture – that is, examining the larger spectrum of nuclear issues and not just the isolated ones.

FISSILE MATERIAL
Obama presses Iran on atomic deal, Tehran defiant
Reuters by Caren Bohan and Oleg Shchedrov

Nuclear watchdog chief to issue new report on Iran program
RIA Novosti

US, Russia see deal on missile cuts by year-end
AFP by Stuart Williams

Alliance and North Korea
Korea Times by Tong Kim

The Morning Joe and NOH referenced a recent op-ed written by some of the NOH staff in The Register Citizen that advances a number of questionable arguments in favor of ratifying the CTBT. Diving right in, it argues:

Nuclear weapons tests are a toxic relic of a past characterized by arms races and fallout shelters. Except for outlaw nations like North Korea, the world today has quit the business of testing nuclear weapons.

The French test in 1995 and the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998 (not to mention recent murmurings within India they should test again) at least call into question the idea that only “outlaw nations like North Korea” have refused to quit the "toxic relic of the past" business of testing. It is unlikely the U.S. (and France…and probably India and Pakistan) test anytime soon but the core of the debate is whether the fact we are unlikely to test means we have no reason not to sign the treaty or whether the U.S. should refuse to lock itself into permanently forswearing nuclear tests. The latter argument, whether or not correct, could certainly include unpredictable scenarios where another country, including one that may not be an “outlaw nation,” tests or undertakes other destabilizing measures that could put significant pressure on the U.S. to test. Next it argues: 

FISSILE MATERIAL
Russia Seeks Removal of U.S. Observers Under New Nuclear Accord
Bloomberg by Lyubov Pronina

Tauscher promotes new missile defense plan before trip to Europe
Foreign Policy (The Cable) by Josh Rogin

Diplomats: Iran nuke plant 7 yrs old
AP by George Jahn

Pakistanis Worry About US Nuclear Intentions
NYT by AP

Well, not exactly, but the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran is apparently causing some conflict within the Iranian government. Gerald Seib, Washington bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal, recently reported that while the P5 + 1 (or the EU3 + 3, take your pick) debate the merits of another round of harsh economic sanctions, “more meaningful stress fractures are showing up within Iran itself.” Since Iranian negotiators in Geneva agreed, in principle, to the exportation of low-enriched uranium for conversion into fuel for the Tehran medical research reactor, there has been a substantial split in rhetoric among Iranian officials.

With START expiration now 25 days out, it’s high tide as the sides rush to try to finalize an agreement. According to AFP (and GSN) there still some kinks to work out on mobile Topols and delivery vehicle numbers:

The Kommersant daily, citing an expert familiar with the START talks, said Washington was seeking to keep a provision from the original treaty for monitoring Russia's arsenal of mobile ground-based missiles. "They are offering to keep and even strengthen control over our mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as the Topol," the expert was quoted as saying by Kommersant. Russia is against the proposal since the United States currently does not have its own mobile ground-based ICBMs and it is therefore of "unilateral character," he said. The maximum number of "carriers" capable of delivering nuclear warheads remains another sticking point, the newspaper reported. "In their package, the Americans stipulated a new ceiling for warhead carriers that we don't quite agree with," the expert told Kommersant, referring to proposals presented to Moscow last month by US National Security Adviser James Jones.

The GSN article also cited Aleksey Fenenko as saying Obama’s moves on missile defense don’t completely placate Russian concerns although this does not seem to be at the heart of the current disagreements. Washington, meanwhile, is less than stoked about Russia’s response to the offer Jim Jones brought over last week. RIA Novosti (via Lexis Nexis) explains:

Ellen Tauscher, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, on Tuesday expressed discontent with Russia's response to an arms control offer recently put forward by the Obama administration. It was the first American official admittance of problems at the talks . . .The snag in the agreement is that the United States wants to retain close control over Russia's Topol mobile ICBMs.

FISSILE MATERIAL
Exclusive: Iranian enrichment has not grown: diplomats
Reuters by Mark Heinrich

Ahmadinejad suggests Iran role in atom fuel bank
Reuters

US-Russia nuclear talks hit snag: report
AFP

The Senate and the START treaty
Washington Times by Robert S. Norris

Secretary Clinton helped roll out the administration's modernization Stockpile Management Program (SMP) in her remarks at USIP by stating:

So in addition to supporting a robust nuclear complex budget in 2011, we will also support a new Stockpile Management Program that would focus on sustaining capabilities. This is what the military leaders, charged with responsibility for our strategic deterrent, need in order to defend our country. General Chilton, Commander of U.S. STRATCOM, has said repeatedly that he doesn’t need new nuclear weapons capabilities – but he must be confident in the capabilities that we have.

Marc Ambinder initially read the last sentence as a swipe at Chilton but a DoD official called and clarified:

What Chilton said accurately reflects where Secretary Gates is and the rest of the military is, which is that the arsenal we do have needs to be tended to, so that we can assure our allies and our adversaries that our stockpile has the capabilities that we say it has

While officials from DoD, State, and the administration were quick to argue "the interagency process to produce a new nuclear posture review is proceeding apace without exposing grand fissures," Ambinder points out "That doesn't mean there aren't any fissures."  For the prime example, see Elaine Grossman's article in August (and our post about it) which probably foreshadows disagreementsthat will occur between top officials about what the SMP should include. 

By John K. Warden

Last week, we hosted our fifth live debate.  In one of the best debates of the series, John Steinbruner, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, and Walt Slocombe, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, debated about de-alerting the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.  The audio and video is available here.

The specific topic wording was:

Resolved: that the United States should pursue a negotiated agreement with Russia to de-alert each country's nuclear arsenal by implementing reversible physical changes to substantially increase the time required to launch

Each side, Steinbruner on the affirmative and Slocombe on the negative, gave an opening statement.  The statements were followed by a series of question periods (asking each other, moderator, then audience) and brief closing remarks.

When Obama announched a change in U.S. strategy for missile defense in Europe, many accused him of abandoning Poland and the Czech Republic, who had agreed to host third-site interceptors and an advanced radar respectively.  At the time, I thought that the administration might take other steps to assure our allies including involving them in alternative missile defense deployments.

This is the strategy the administration has pursued.  Poland has agreed to host SM3 batteries (which is what they wanted in the first place), and the Czech Republic accepted a role in the modified plan.  The New York Times reported that the Czechs were willing to participate after a visit by Vice President Biden a few weeks ago, but didn't have any details on their specific role.

FISSILE MATERIAL
US presses diplomacy with NKorea despite skirmish
AP by Matthew Lee

U.S. missile defense may backfire if too robust: general
Reuters by Phil Stewart

U.S. Official Says IAEA Has Evidence Iran Sought Atomic Warhead
Bloomberg by Janine Zacharia

Is Russia playing both sides on Iran nukes?
CSM by Howard LaFranchi

FISSILE MATERIAL
Obama will send top diplomat to North Korea for direct talks
WP by Scott Wilson

Iran's Moves Reveal Leadership Rift
WSJ by Gerald F. Seib

Just How 'Secret' is Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program?
Foreign Policy by Christian Caryl

JASON Panel Offers Secret Nuclear Warhead Upkeep Recommendations
GSN by Elaine M. Grossman

Picking up on last week’s discussion, one of the elephants in the NFU room is the domestic political feasibility of currently making such a pledge.  If the NPR were to come out in favor of such an approach that could provide some political traction for the administration but that seems unlikely.  In the exchange in Survival about NFU this month, Mort Halperin’s article was particularly interesting. While Scott Sagan takes Keith Payne and Bruno Tertrais head on about whether adopting NFU is a good idea, Halperin has “come to the conclusion that this is a good idea whose time has not yet come.”  He argues:

 There are other proposals to pursue this objective which would be as effective as a declaratory no-first-use policy and which might produce less controversy.  In his Prague speech, in addition to announcing support for the long-term objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, Obama committed himself in the short run to four other measures which have long been debated and which advance the same objectives as the no-first-use proposal. These are: reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, immediately and aggressively pursuing US ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and starting negotiations on a verifiable end to the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This ambitious agenda will require all the attention and political capital the president can reasonably devote to this issue. Under the circumstances, no first use can and should be put off for another day. Seeking three treaties on nuclear arms control in his first term will not be easy.

FISSILE MATERIAL
U.S. Weighs Pyongyang Envoy
WSJ by Evan Ramstad

Iran Is Said to Ignore Effort to Salvage a Nuclear Deal
NYT by David E. Sanger

Medvedev Says Russia May Back Sanctions on Iran if Deal Falls Apart
NYT by Ellen Barry

Defending the Arsenal
New Yorker by Seymour M. Hersh

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran tested advanced nuclear warhead design – secret report
Guardian by Julian Borger

Iran holding up nuclear deal with demand for reactor fuel, diplomat says
WP by Glenn Kessler

Bunkers or Breakthrough?
NYT by Roger Cohen

Passing the buck on North Korea 
Asia Times by Donald Kirk

Here's the final resolution and agenda for tonight's de-alerting debate between John Steinbruner and Walt Slocombe.  You can still RSVP by contacting Chris Jones at: cjones@csis.org.  We look forward to seeing you tonight.

PONI Live Debate: De-Alerting
November 5, 2009, 6:00-8:00 P.M.
B1 Conference Center, CSIS

Resolved: that the United States should pursue a negotiated agreement with Russia to de-alert each country's nuclear arsenal by implementing reversible physical changes to substantially increase the time required to launch

6:00-6:20     OPENING RECEPTION AND WELCOME

6:20-7:30     THE DE-ALERTING DEBATE
Affirmative: John D. Steinbruner, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland
Negative: Walter B. Slocombe, Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Moderator: John K. Warden, Project on Nuclear Issues, CSIS

6:20-6:35   Opening Statements
6:35-6:50   Cross-Examination and Moderator Questions
6:50-7:20   Audience Question and Answer
7:20-7:30   Closing Statements

7:30-8:00     CLOSING RECEPTION
 

FISSILE MATERIAL
Nuke negotiator heads to U.S. to discuss N.K.
Korea Herald by Kim Ji-hyun

Iran wants to be seen as regional power: ElBaradei
Reuters by Louis Charbonneau

Iran On the Edge
Foreign Policy by Hossein Askari

Mohamed ElBaradei looks to US to fix nuclear system 'in tatters'
CSM by Howard LaFranchi

Following up on Joshua Pollack’s post on ACW about the problems with negotiating through public statements, it looks like German Chancellor Angela Merkel took some time during her address to Congress yesterday, which was mostly about climate change, to add her two cents worth of provocation.

The $52 billion question looming large for the NPR and how to prepare the U.S. strategy for the 2010 RevCon: what are these things for? While the SPRC noted “the principal function of nuclear weapons has not changed in decades: deterrence” it was quickly explained that “the Commission takes a very broad view of the concept of deterrence, encompassing many elements.” Likewise, Laura Holgate noted the CFR Task Force “fails in what I believed was to have been its primary goal: to provide a clear and actionable statement of the purposes served by nuclear weapons.” In an effort to satisfy the President’s Prague object to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, many argue that the role should essentially be restricted to deterring the attack of nuclear weapons as seen in Daryl Kimball’s “Core Deterrence” concept, Joe Cirincione’s remarks in his interview with Daily Kos, and Scott Sagan’s article in Survival continuing his case for a No First Use.

Of all the items on the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policy agenda, negotiating and ratifying a new START is the top priority.  START was also the topic of a panel discussion last week, hosted by the U.S. Institute for Peace.  Panelists included Ambassador Linton Brooks, Joe Cirincione, and Tom Scheber.  The discussion focused on both the details of START negotiations and the role that a new START plays in the administration’s disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.

It’s not surprising that a new START is the administration’s number one priority.  First, the current START expires on December 5th.  Without a new agreement, Russia will be able add warheads to its strategic launchers.  Furthermore, according to a report last week, the administration wants an agreement completed before Obama accepts his Nobel Peace Price on December 10th.

More importantly, completing a new START is seen as an important part of the administration’s disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.  According to Cirincione, the administration sees START as an important catalyst for the rest of its disarmament agenda.  Negotiated cuts in the U.S. and Russia arsenals could generate momentum for further reductions in the role of nuclear weapons (including ratification of the CTBT) before the May 2010 NPT Review Conference.

So the important question is:  Will the administration get its wish?  Really, it’s a two part question.  First, will the U.S. and Russia be able to complete negotiations promptly so an agreement can be signed?

Last call for those interested in the upcoming PONI Debates the Issues event between John Steinbruner and Walt Slocombe.   Details below: 

Date and Time: Thursday, November 5, 6-8 pm

Topic: Physical De-Alerting of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal

FISSILE MATERIAL
U.S. pressed N. Korea to allow IAEA inspectors back
Breitbart by Kyodo News

Iran Raises Uranium Output as Photos Show Need for Wider Checks
Bloomberg by Jonathan Tirone

Iran's Khamenei rejects U.S. outreach
WP by Thomas Erdbrink and William Branigin

Why We Don't Need to Resume Nuclear Testing
Carnegie by Daryl G. Kimball

FISSILE MATERIAL
NKorea threatens to expand nuclear arsenal
AP by Jae-Soon Chang

Iran’s Politics Stand in the Way of a Nuclear Deal
NYT by Michael Slackman

Iran’s Military Power Subject to New U.S. Study Used for China
Bloomberg by Viola Gienger

Mixed Signals From West About Trusting Russia
NYT by John Vinocur