January, 2010

FISSILE MATERIAL
The President's Nuclear Vision
WSJ by Joe Biden

Cold Warriors say no nukes
The Hill by Ben Goddard

Dialogue on stalled Iran atom deal goes on: IAEA
Reuters by Dominic Evans

Senate OKs sanctions on Iran
CNN

By John K. Warden

Although the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will not be officially released until Monday, February 1, Inside Defense got their hands on a leaked draft that’s dated 3 December 2009.  Like the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the QDR is a legislatively-mandated review carried out by the Department of Defense (DoD).  The QDR aims to indentify long-term threats and outline how the DoD will adjust forces to react.

While this is just a draft, its contents likely provide a pretty good idea of what will be in the QDR, and may also provide some useful hints about what will be in the NPR, now scheduled to be released in March.  Spencer Ackerman already noted that the draft includes an explicit referent to Obama’s yet to be released National Security Strategy.

While the document does not include an explicit reference to the contents of the NPR, it does establish the connection between the documents:

The QDR was conducted in tandem with a number of other reviews relating to U. S. national security ends, ways, and means. The Nuclear Policy Review, Space Policy Review, and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, all led by DoD, were conducted in parallel with the QDR. Each effort informed and was informed by the others as they went forward.

Nuclear policy is also discussed at various points in the document.  First, the draft identifies the potential spread of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist organization as a “key geopolitical trend”:

By John K. Warden

President Obama's first State of the Union address included only a few sentences about nuclear weapons and nonproliferation:

Now, even as we prosecute two wars, we're also confronting perhaps the greatest danger to the American people -- the threat of nuclear weapons. I've embraced the vision of John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan through a strategy that reverses the spread of these weapons and seeks a world without them. To reduce our stockpiles and launchers, while ensuring our deterrent, the United States and Russia are completing negotiations on the farthest-reaching arms control treaty in nearly two decades. (Applause.) And at April's Nuclear Security Summit, we will bring 44 nations together here in Washington, D.C. behind a clear goal: securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years, so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists. (Applause.)
Now, these diplomatic efforts have also strengthened our hand in dealing with those nations that insist on violating international agreements in pursuit of nuclear weapons. That's why North Korea now faces increased isolation, and stronger sanctions -- sanctions that are being vigorously enforced. That's why the international community is more united, and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more isolated. And as Iran's leaders continue to ignore their obligations, there should be no doubt: They, too, will face growing consequences. That is a promise. (Applause.)

However, what if Obama gave a State of the Union address dedicated exclusively to U.S. nuclear policy?  If that was the case, it might read like the speech below, which I wrote borrowing ideas and language from three speeches by President Obama:  his February 2009 address to Congress; Prague speech; and last night's speech, and one by Secretary Clinton:

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran faces consequences over nuclear program: Obama
Reuters by David Alexander

Clinton sees consensus forming on Iran steps
Reuters by Andrew Quinn

N. Korea steps up call for peace treaty amid seething border tension 
Yonhap

Global Strike Command Set to Take Control of Dual-Capable Bombers
GSN by Elaine M. Grossman

FISSILE MATERIAL
U.S. business urges Obama resist Iran sanctions bill
Reuters

U.N. arms forum seen stuck on bomb-making material
Reuters by Stephanie Nebehay

India-U.S. deal a major hurdle
The Hindu

Pyongyang's 'Peace' Ploy
WSJ by Chung Min Lee

By John K. Warden

A letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reveals that the Japanese government does not oppose the retirement of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N).

Based on the findings of the Strategic Posture Review Commission, many have argued that maintaining TLAM/N is essential to the credibility of U.S. assurance to Japan.  The commission’s final report, which was released in May 2009, states:

One particularly important ally has argued to the Commission privately that the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities...In Asia, extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of...TLAM/N...In our work as a Commission it has become clear to us that some U.S. allies in Asia would be very concerned by TLAM/N retirement.

Okada’s letter, which is dated December 24, 2009, seems to directly contradict the Commission’s findings:

FISSILE MATERIAL
Report says Al-Qaeda still aims to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S.
WP by Joby Warrick

A Failure to Imagine the Worst
Foreign Policy by Graham Allison

North Korea may be readying missile test - S.Korea TV
Reuters

Intelligence from Tehran Elevates Concern in the West
Der Spiegel by Dieter Bednarz, Erich Follath and Holger Stark

By Chris Jones

During the Cold War, academia made significant contributions to nuclear policy. Scholars like Bernard Brodie helped create valuable theories to help navigate the unprecedented geopolitical terrain of a world with nuclear powers. Other academics like Henry Kissinger and Jim Schlesinger moved from the so-called ivory tower to take high level national security positions responsible for crafting U.S. nuclear policy in this tumultuous time. Professor Michael Desch explains: 

Brodie, Wohlstetter and Kaufmann played central roles in shaping how the Pentagon understood the implications of the advent of nuclear weapons upon warfare . . . While the Pentagon did not always embrace their policy recommendations, there is little doubt that these academics provided the conceptual frameworks which policymakers used to think about the nuclear revolution.

As nuclear weapons fell off the radar at the end of the Cold War, so did much of the intellectual energy behind studying important concepts like deterrence. General Chilton lamented at the deterrence symposium this summer when he said:

And why is it important that we stoke the intellectual fires on the study of deterrence? Well, here I must admit to perhaps at least a partially selfish reason. It is my view that it has been the better part of two decades, since most of us in the U.S. Department of Defense have invested the appropriate time, thought and consideration to studying the topic of deterrence. . . We have had too little fresh thinking about deterrence in the last 17 years, yet the world has marched on and marched forward at an alarming pace toward greater complexity. We see it economically, technologically, socially and militarily in ways that were unimaginable a generation ago.

Brookings hosted an event today featuring a panel of Strobe Talbott, Steve Pifer, and Clifford Gaddy that was moderated by Fiona Hill.  The event was in large part a rollout of the new publication by Pifer, Gaddy, and Joe Cirincione about the U.S. Russia relationship on WMD-related issues.  Moving beyond discussion of the current treaty being negotiated, the report makes recommendations for the U.S. and Russia in 3 areas: the next round of arms reductions, shoring up the nonproliferation regime, and tackling the peaceful use of nuclear energy issue.   The report contains a bunch of recommendations in each area that I won't get into.  Two interesting arguments made at the event that were not necessarily at the heart of the discussion:

1. Strobe Talbott spent awhile talking about the domestic political environment in the United States and how that will impact the administration's 2010 nuclear agenda.  While Scott Brown's election doesn't directly impact the fact that Republicans will have to be courted to get a START follow-on ratified, Talbott argued that Brown's election does have an impact on the administration's arms control aspirations.  Washington is currently quite polarized and the degree to which the Republicans dig in their heels and try to put the administration on the defensive on issues like Health Care may be a harbinger of what kinds of fights will be expected on issues like START follow-on. 

2.  As the U.S. and Russia seek to finalize a signed START follow-on "soonish"  they will begin thinking about tackling another treaty that will have to deal with some of the very thorny issues like TNW's, non-deployed weapons, and missile defense.  This will be a long and arduous process but Pifer argued that the U.S. and Russia should seek to make a statement in the lead up to the 2010 Review Conference stating their intent to begin the work on such a treaty.  Should this happen, it could provide the administration another piece to include in its shield against criticism about Article VI, although the longstanding effort to get CTBT ratified may cast doubt in some minds about how much stock to put in words about intentions. 

FISSILE MATERIAL

North Korea accuses Seoul of 'open declaration of war'
London Times

Ahmadinejad hints Iran resolved to make 20 pct nuclear fuel
AFP by Jay Deshmukh

New nuclear deal "95 pct" agreed-Russia's Medvedev
Reuters

U.S. Should Embrace Using Nukes for Nuclear Threat Only, Experts Say
Global Security Newswire  by Martin Matishak

Three steps to reducing nuclear terrorism
CSM by Micah Zenko and Michael Levi

(Thanks to PONI coordinator Mark Jansson for some valuable comments)

As the dust settles from the third installment of the Gang of 4 op-ed, the emphasis upon maintaining a strong deterrent as key “as we work to reduce nuclear weaponry and to realize the vision of a world without nuclear weapons” has provided a big enough cake for everyone to take their own slice. Apparently, the op-ed simultaneously rebuffs Kyl’s claims, “broke camp" with past op-eds and "headed back to the nuclear reservation,” emphasized the importance of confidence in deterrence, and had both good and questionable signs. As is oft the case with debates on nuclear issues, how you interpret the op-ed probably depends on your starting point and what sections you choose to quote.

The primary argument highlighted here that didn’t receive as much attention in other coverage of the op-ed is the emphasis upon the importance of ensuring recruiting the best and the brightest to ensure technical competency on nuclear weapons. Travis Sharp, now at CNAS, argued that reports of funding increases in FY2011 and some DoD money for the labs helps alleviate part of the concern but that worries about the mission importance are overstated. He argues:

JASON’s warning about perceived lack of mission importance, however, strikes me as a lesser concern. The nuclear laboratories and the U.S. military should communicate their concerns about morale up the chain of command, and the concerns should be taken into consideration because less-than-happy scientific and military personnel will not maximize U.S. national security. From an arms control perspective, I would add that innovative, technically rigorous, science-based initiatives contribute mightily to nonproliferation, and you are certainly not going to get Teh Scyense from Beltway hacks like yours truly. However, let’s make one thing absolutely clear. While people are an invaluable part of the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, the FEELINGS of the nuclear bureaucracy should not be the determinative factor when formulating U.S. nuclear weapons policy. In response to JASON’s concern about the perceived lack of mission importance, let me just say that I’m so sorry the Cold War had to end and nuclear weapons work became so much less interesting and such an unstable career path. We should definitely forget about President Obama’s plan to reduce unnecessary nuclear weapons so that it doesn’t scare away the best and brightest lab workers. The job security of U.S. governmental personnel should be the primary driver of U.S. foreign policy, after all. Lest we forget, the commander in chief throws the signs, and the nuclear laboratories and the U.S. military hook up the beats with clout – regardless of how they feel they are progressing on their self-actualization charts. When it comes to determining U.S. nuclear weapons policy, sustaining the morale of governmental personnel in the nuclear complex must not be permitted to trump the primary objective of protecting the American people from the threat posed by nuclear weapons. [emphasis in original]
 

Sharp raises a few important questions about what it means to have a suitable sense of mission and purpose at the laboratories that desereve further examination.  There are three major points to emphasize:

By John K. Warden

After Republican Scott Brown won the special election in Massachusetts on Tuesday, speculation began about the fate of all parts of Obama’s agenda.  Is health care dead?  Will the House just pass the Senate’s version of the bill?  What does Brown’s election mean for cap and trade legislation or comprehensive immigration reform?

In the middle of all that, there was also a prediction about how Brown’s election would impact Obama’s arms control agenda.  John Bennett, writing in Defense News, reported that Brown’s election might hurt the chances of the Senate ratifying a new START:

Massachusetts Republican state Sen. Scott Brown's stunning Jan. 19 victory in a special U.S. Senate election will complicate the Obama administration's efforts to finalize a nuclear accord with Moscow, a senior Pentagon official says.
The wide-reaching nuclear treaty would, if the two sides iron out a few remaining wrinkles, require U.S. Senate approval. And that means, as with other treaties, 67 senators would have to approve the new START pact.
Getting to 67 votes got more difficult when Brown captured the Senate seat occupied for decades by the late Democrat Edward Kennedy. The win will reduce the Democrats' majority in the chamber to 59 seats.
"Sixty-seven is many, many more than 60," Michael Nacht, assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, said at a Jan. 20 conference in Washington. "And it's even more than 59."

While it's difficult to argue with the basic argument -- replacing a Democratic Senator with a Republican Senator does require an additional Republican vote for ratification, I disagree with the conclusion -- that Scott Brown joining the Senate makes it more difficult for Obama to get START ratified.

FISSILE MATERIAL
The Doomsday Clock keeps ticking
LA Times by Lawrence M. Krauss

South wants North Korea back at nuclear talks mid-February
Reuters

Six powers to unite over Iran nuclear ambitions
AFP by Christophe Schmidt

World will 'not back down' on Iran: Clinton
AFP by Lachlan Carmichael

By John K. Warden

Last week the EastWest Institute release a report entitled "The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: New Technology, New Prospects?"  The report, edited by Jacqueline McLaren Miller, was the result of an “off-the-record meeting of experts in Washington, D.C., to evaluate the United States’ technical and scientific capacity to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of its nuclear arsenal and to detect nuclear explosions.”  The report begins by reviewing technological changes that have occurred since the last CTBT debate in 1999.  The issues covered are:  1) whether the United States could maintain an effective nuclear deterrent after ratifying the CTBT; and 2) whether it’s possible to monitor global nuclear testing.

On maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent without testing, the report concludes:

FISSILE MATERIAL
Jones, Mullen to Russia to work on nuclear deal
AP by Mark S. Smith

U.S. to deploy missiles near Russia
Washington Times by Nicholas Kralev

Stalled atom fuel offer to Iran still on table-IAEA
Reuters by Mark Heinrich

Gates wants nuclear talks with China
Washington Times by Bill Gertz

Marc Ambinder provided an update on all things Nuclear Posture Review Friday at the Atlantic. There was some good news out of the report for those worried about the nuclear priesthood slow rolling the administration's policy agenda:

But this NPR achieved a bureaucratic hallmark that none of its post-Cold War predecessors could brag about: it has become a true interagency project . . . A few debates have been settled, and the degree of consensus on several contentious issues would surprise outsiders . . . One theme in recent press reporting -- that the White House is fighting to win control of the document from the entrenched nuclear bureaucracy -- may have been true earlier in the process, but the National Security Council seems to have a handle on it now.

While the NSC is reported to firmly have the reigns of the effort, the NPR process is far from over. According to press reports, topics such as our declaratory policy, which begs the fundamental question of the purpose of nuclear weapons, remain unanswered as the deputies begin to turn their attention to the issue. As a result, Ambinder argues the stakes are high for the NPR:

An NPR that too closely hews to the status quo and/or is largely indistinguishable from its 2002 Bush-era predecessor document will be a wasted opportunity. And, remember, the administration only gets one shot at a NPR, even if the president is reelected. For better or worse, this document will shape the future course of the Obama Presidency's nuclear weapons agenda.

FISSILE MATERIAL
How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent
WSJ by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn

Debating Declaratory Policy On Nuclear Weapons
The Atlantic by Marc Ambinder

Nuclear Bomb Update Effort Slowed by Posture Review, Science Studies
GSN by Elaine M. Grossman

Iran Rejects Heart of Nuclear Proposal
AP by George Jahn

The "Gang of 4," as they are known, published another op-ed this January. Unlike the last two that focused primarily on outlining the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, this piece emphasizes the "maintain a strong deterrent" aspect of the debate a great deal more which injects a sense of pragmatism about some of the actions that will be required on the path to the vision of zero.  The big news for many will be the endorsement of the JASON's language about the viability of current practices to maintain confidence in the warheads (although the op-ed did note "Departures from our existing stewardship strategies should be taken when they are essential to maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent").  As suggested last week, the real issue that does not got enough discussion in debates about "modernization" of warheads, infrastrucutre, and delivery systems is the people.   The four horseman devoted a good deal of the piece to this important subject by explaining:

FISSILE MATERIAL
Review: Iran never halted nuke work in '03
Washington Times by Eli Lake

China urges flexibility on Iran, downplays sanctions
Reuters

'Significant' progress in US-Russia nuclear talks
AFP

Sources: DoD To Delay Space Posture Review
Defense News by Vago Muradian and John T. Bennett

As noted recently, expectations in nuke land are high for 2010. Just last year, North Korea tested another nuclear weapon while simultaneously Iran continues to move toward a nuclear weapon which has prompted serious concerns about a proliferation tipping point.  The Gang of 4 noted in 2008 that these daunting nonproliferation challenges will require “essential cooperation" "to stop our downward spiral."  With START follow-on, the NPR, the Nuclear Security Summit, and the Review Conference all happening this year there are hopes major progress can be made on the nonproliferation front.  The Review Conference in particular is important for many on the nonproliferation front in hopes the U.S will be rewarded, or at least not punished, for its efforts on that front in the last year.  

In some respects, the 2010 Review Conference will be one of the first major symbols to see whether efforts to seek cooperation produce any fruit. Held quinquennially, NPT Review Conferences bring together States Parties to the treaty to “maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of the Treaty.” The last go round in 2005 was generally considered a bust and Harald Müller went as far as to call it “the biggest failure in the history of this Treaty.” There is plenty of blame to go around for the failure but U.S. nonchalance towards the effort certainly didn't help matters.  Müller explains:

The decisive responsibility of the US positions for the failure of the Conference has already been exposed. American policy was pursuing with great determination the John Bolton line of devaluing multilateralism and international law. In the context of this policy, the NPT has ostensibly lost a lot of its meaning for US security policy

In addition to de-emphasizing the importance of the NPT and arms control, the Bush administration was also perceived, rightly or wrongly, as increasing the importance of nuclear weapons thanks to the pre-emption language it the NPR and the mangled sales pitch of RNEP and RRW. To its credit, the administration did explicitly argue for  a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the 2001 NPR and negotiate substantial arsenal reductions in the SORT treaty but was not the perception of the administration's policy.

By John K. Warden

If 2010 is to be the year where arms control makes a comeback, the momentum will begin with the ratification of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).  START has been at the top of Obama’s arms control agenda since his Prague speech last May.  As the negotiations have dragged on, people have begun to question when (if ever) negotiations will finish and what the final make-up of the agreement will be.  I’ll try to answer some of the main questions below.

Is an agreement between the United States and Russia close?  Why has there been a delay?

The short answer is:  it depends on who you ask.

Some believe that the Russians will continue to drag out the agreement and that there is no end in sight.  Ariel Cohen, a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, for example, believes that Russia feels they have the upper hand and will continue to push for more and more concessions.

Others are much more optimistic.  The AFP recently reported, citing U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns, that the two sides are “on the verge” of an agreement:

"We're on the verge of completing the agreement and ... I'm optimistic that we'll complete it soon," Burns said, according to the transcript of an interview released by the US Embassy in Moscow as he was visiting Russia.

However, it’s hard to take Burns seriously.  For months now, there have been too many ‘sources close to the negotiations’ with ‘inside information’ saying negotiations are just about to finish.  Officials have ‘cried wolf’ one too many times, causing Page van der Linden, a contributing editor for Daily Kos, to comment, “I'll believe it when I see it.”

The most realistic assessment comes from U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Ellen Tauscher, quoted in the Global Security Newswire:

FISSILE MATERIAL
North Korea threatens to halt talks with South
Reuters

U.S. to keep door open for talks with Iran - senior official
RIA Novosti

China to send lower-level envoy to talks on Iran
Reuters by Arshad Mohammed

Russian Nuclear First Use: a Case of Self-Defeating Exaggeration?
Eurasia Daily Monitor by Jacob W. Kipp

FISSILE MATERIAL
US Defense Spy Chief: Iran Undecided on Nuclear Bomb
VOA News by Gary Thomas

Rocket data dispute still unresolved in U.S.-Russia nuke talks
The Cable by Josh Rogin

Talks Hit "Sweet Spot" for Landing New START Agreement, U.S. Official Says
GSN by Elaine M. Grossman

Putin Is Medvedev’s Biggest Spoiler
Moscow Times by David J. Kramer

By John K. Warden

A couple days ago, I argued that the delay in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was likely the result of intense negotiations to find an acceptable compromise:

Of the many explanations for the delay in the NPR, the one that makes the most sense is that there are difficult political compromises that have to be made to satisfy all the people involved.  The final document will likely include some ambitious language.  While no-first-use seems like a non-starter, there could be a declaration that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use.  The document could also call for additional cuts in strategic warheads beyond the new START range.  At the same time, the NPR will reiterate the importance of nuclear weapons in assuring allies and commit to investments to maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
Without a clear consensus among the parties involved, finding an acceptable compromise is taking longer than expected.  Like the final health care bill, the final version of the NPR will contain language that no one is happy with, but everyone can live with.

If this turns out to be the case, will the NPR have any nonproliferation benefit?

According to some, statements about the role of nuclear weapons aren’t enough.  In a recent post at the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Ivan Oelrich argues that those who focus on what declaratory policy will emerge from the NPR are “missing the point.”  Oelrich argues that declaratory policy and doctrine are only important inasmuch as they result in tangible operational changes:

For the nonwonks of the world, there is a peculiar item showing up on the "what's hot" lists of 2010: arms control. As Colin Clark noted in DoD Buzz:

The sleeper issue of 2010, the one issue that almost no one who follows defense these days knows much about, is arms control. And it looks likely, says defense analysts and congressional aides, to be the single hottest defense topic on Capitol Hill this year . . . Today, the scent of battle is in the air. Arms controls experts on both sides of the aisle flash brighter smiles and deeper scowls these days than they have in years.

For those that have been working these issues for years, the message seems clear: game on. As reported by the Cable yesterday:

With Barack Obama's pledge to rid the world of nuclear weapons faltering out of the starting gate, leaders of the arms-control community convened a major meeting Tuesday to gear up for their biggest fights in years. The next few months will be critical, insiders say, with a number of key international treaties up for renewal and battle lines being drawn in Washington and abroad. About 50 senior think tank and advocacy executives packed the K Street conference room of the Ploughshares Fund to strategize and rally the troops for the upcoming policy war. "This is going to be the fight of our lives," Ploughshares President Joe Cirincione told The Cable shortly after the meeting concluded.

Looking forward, there are two major questions to answer about nuclear issues at the beginning of the not aughts:

How big is 2010?

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran blames U.S., Israel in bombing death of physicist Massoud Ali-Mohammadi
WP by Thomas Erdbrink and William Branigin

Iran denies nuclear “halt” but technical woes slow pace
Reuters by Mark Heinrich

US-China differences set to scupper agreement on Iran sanctions
Deutsche Welle by Jefferson Chase

Arms control leaders convene major strategy session
The Cable by Josh Rogin

FISSILE MATERIAL
Pentagon Scientists Target Iran’s Nuclear Molemen
Wired (Danger Room) by David Hambling

Crunching the Risk Numbers
WSJ by Nate Silver

S. Korea and U.S. Dismiss N. Korea’s Peace Talks Proposal
NYT by AP

Clinton: Iran sanctions should target elite
AP by Robert Burns

By John K. Warden

In the last couple of weeks, there has been a flurry of news about the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  The NPR was scheduled to be released in February, at the same time as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), but will now be pushed back to March.  For months, there has been speculation about the contents of the NPR and that has intensified since the delay was announced.

There have been a number of explanations for the delay.  Michael Anton at the Weekly Standard thinks the delay was caused by START:

The last time the U.S. went though this exercise (in 2001), we at least put the horse before the cart.  We calculated our force requirements then used that as the basis for a new treaty (the so-called “Moscow Treaty”).  This time, the delay in finishing the NPR may well be in order to allow the new treaty to be finished first, to that the NPR can be backfilled with rationalizations for all the concessions Obama administration officials are busy making to the Russians.

The explanation is questionable.  The basic parameters of the new START have been set for some time, certainly long enough for the NPR drafter to take them into account without delay, and the cuts in START are likely to be modest, still allowing around 1500 deployed warheads.  It’s also been reported for a while that the main thing holding-up START is verification details, which are unlikely to have much of an impact on the content of the NPR.

Another explanation is that the delay was caused by bureaucrats being behind on their work.  Poking fun at the bloggers and columnists who are reading too much into the delay, John Isaacs at Nukes of Hazard writes:

FISSILE MATERIAL
North Korea Calls for Peace Treaty Talks With U.S.
NYT by Choe Sang-Hun

Iran offers nuke fuel deal
Politico by Laura Rozen

Elite Revolutionary Guard's expanding role in Iran may limit U.S. options
WP by Thomas Erdbrink

A Nonstarter on Arms Control
NYT by Ariel Cohen

FISSILE MATERIAL
US-Russia nuke deal in weeks, maybe months: experts
AFP

U.S., British Might Share Firing Device to Update Nuclear Arms
GSN by Elaine M. Grossman

International nuclear bank in Kazakhstan
BBC by Humphrey Hawksley

Iran strike could destabilize Middle East: Pentagon
Reuters by Phil Stewart

By John K. Warden

Last month, the CSIS Defense and National Security Group, led by Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, released a new report dedicated exclusively to extended deterrence and assurance.  The report, entitled "Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance," aims to identify the characteristics of the U.S. nuclear force posture that support extended deterrence and generate a strategy for maintaining assurance going forward.  The report begins by exploring extended deterrence and assurance at the conceptual level and then more specifically analyzes the competing needs and interests of U.S. allies in Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East.

Throughout the report, differences between extended deterrence and assurance are indentified.  For example, the difference between how allies and adversaries follow U.S. capabilities:

In contrast to potential adversaries who follow U.S. nuclear posture issues closely and with considerable expertise, U.S. allies’ defense planners may rely on less credible intelligence sources…and have more limited analytic resources for assessing the deterrence effects from changes in force structure…This explains why assurance requirements, at least in the near-term, can exceed the requirements of deterring the ally’s potential aggressor…allies can be more sensitive to certain force structure attributes and less sensitive (than their potential aggressor) to others. For example, ‘symbols’ of deterrence can be important to the credibility of assurance even if they do not affect an adversary’s deterrence calculations.

Despite Ambassador Brooks' statement to the 2009 Carnegie opening panel that “No-first-use is the least interesting of all the issues we’ll talk about in the next two days, and I haven’t looked at tomorrow’s agenda,” it’s back in a big way. Survival’s October/November back and forth on the issue helped draw attention to what is being reported as one of the key sticking points in the now delayed Nuclear Posture Review. One of the developments emerging in the debate are potential options that can move away from calculated ambiguity without adopting a complete No First Use (NFU) pledge.  These calls for a middle ground between the two are stem from both political and substantive concerns.

On the political front, Mort Halperin’s Survival article advocated for a nuclear weapons statement of purpose (discussed in detail below) accompanied by a revamping of our negative security assurance agreement.  He argues this approach “avoids much, if not all, of the political fallout that would result from a no-first-use pledge” which “can and should be put off for another day” because of the Obama administration’s ambitious agenda to get 3 treaties (START, CTBT, FMCT) in the first term and the “very serious domestic political storm a president would confront” by seeking said pledge. Likewise, PONI documented the Evans/Kawaguchi co-chaired ICNND commission's decision to call for a “sole purpose” doctrine during the “minimization” phase until 2025 and then complete global NFU after due because they acknowledged that:

We would prefer that sooner rather than later, such declaratory “sole purpose” statements be hardened into unequivocal “no first use” commitments, but acknowledge that there has been an issue in the past as to whether such commitments have been seriously attended.

Meanwhile, Jeffrey Lewis recently crafted a formulation very similar to Halperin’s and argued that NFU pledges can suffer from similar credibility problems to calculated ambiguity pledges and fall prey to the unproductive “what if” game.

FISSILE MATERIAL
Obama's Nuclear Arms Pledge Hits Stumbling Block
Time by Eben Harrell

Nuclear weapons review put off
Washington Times by Bill Gertz

A False Nuclear Alarm
Foreign Policy by Joseph Cirincione

Think Again: Nuclear Weapons
Foreign Policy by John Mueller

FISSILE MATERIAL
NKorea Began Uranium Program Soon After 1994 Deal
CBS News by AP

Iran Shielding Its Nuclear Efforts in Maze of Tunnels
NYT by William J. Broad

More doubts over Iran's 'nuclear trigger'
Asia Times Online by Gareth Porter

Another Iranian Revolution? Not Likely
NYT by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

A few days into the new year decade, the Nuclear Posture Review is due out in less than a month and apparently it hasn’t been a walk down easy street. According to Paul Richter in the LA Times, Obama’s nuclear agenda has “run up against powerful resistance from officials in the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies.” This worry is far from new with the importance of this worry highlighted by Ambassador Soderberg’s statement:

"This is the first test of Obama's nuclear commitments," said former U.S. Ambassador Nancy E. Soderberg, who held senior foreign policy positions in the Clinton administration. "They can't afford to fall short at the outset."

Further evidenced by the number two quote on our top of 2009 list, expections for the NPR are running high.  At the same time, the NPR team has been dealt the tough task of trying to square the competing goals of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and ensuring a strong deterrent which will be no cake walk.  As a result, there will undoubtedly be disagreements about how to answer that question both inside and outside the administration but the degree of disagreement explained in the press recently between the White House and the Pentagon may be a bit overstated. That is not to say there are not key disagreements a la the infamous Principals Committee meeting but rather that the sides may not be as diametrically opposed as conveyed.

FISSILE MATERIAL

US says door still open on Iran nuclear issue
AFP by Christophe Schmidt

G-8 Summit Could Focus on Nonproliferation
Global Security Newswire

U.S. Navy Juggles Ships To Fill BMD Demands
Defense News by Christopher P. Cavas

Israel balks at U.S. arms deals with Arabs
UPI

Holding Firm on Iran
The Nation by Robert Dreyfuss